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THE FILING ASPECT OP TfTi RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.
Parti. Psychological 
Chapter I.
INTRODUCTION. The proposition which it is the aim of this 
thesis to prove is that the prius of the religious consciousness 
is a feeling of dissatisfaction with all existent reality both phy- 
sical and spiritual and a consequent urge towards fellowship with 
the Supreme Cause of all things for the purpose of solving the contra 
dictions, limitations and failures of life.
Having traced the origin of religion to this vague feeling; of 
dissatisfaction it will be then necessary to prove that feeling is 
the primary element in consciousness from which its other elements 
derive. This will lead to an examination of the nature of conscious 
ness from two different standpoints: firstly, from the standpoint of 
the three irreducible states of mind, and, secondly, from the stand-
*
point of the instincts. These two investigations will establish 
the fact that feeling is primary in consciousness.
Instincts develop into sentiments which are organised round 
three main sentiments, and form the system known as personality. 
These three main sentiments are three irreducible phases of one 
ultimate sentiment, namely, love, which is feeling par excellence, 
and the ultimate metaphysic of mind and being. The sentiment, as 
the/
2.
the word implies is regulated by the element of feeling in it, so 
that the conception of the sentiment corroborates the contention 
that feeling is regulative in mina and personality.
After demonstrating the regulative function of feeling in mind 
and personality, further demonstration of this fact will be furnished 
by a discussion of the relation of feeling to reason and will in the 
apprehension of aivine realities.
Thereafter the nature of communion with G-oci which is the es- 
sence and goal of religion will be considered. This communion 
Issues from the supreme sentiment of love which is the basis of 
both human and divine personality and activity.
The final chapter will be devoted to recapitulation and a 
final vindication of the above argument.
1   The Definition of Religion.
Most writers on religion are perplexed with the difficulty of 
finding a satisfactory definition of religion, so much so that one 
writer (Professor C.C.J. Webb, "Group Theories of Religion", p. 59: 
quoted from Waterhouse, "Philosophy of Religion", Epworth Press, 
London: 1923) concludes that religion "cannot be defined". Another 
writer (Hoffuing, "Philosophy of Religion", Eng. Trans: 1903, p.109; 
remarks that the definition of religion is a "matter of taste", In 
contrast/
contrast to the above, a third writer, Professor Leuba ("A Psycho- 
logical Study of Religion", New York, MacMillan: 1912, Appendix) 
enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from forty-eight 
great men, and adds two of his own to complete the fifty.
Professor Pratt in his book, "The Religious Consciousness" 
(New York, MacMillan: 1924, p. U says: "All definitions of re- 
ligion are more or less arbitrary, and should be taken as postulates 
rather than as axioms. In this sense I shall myself propose a 
tentative definition of religion, not at all as a final or complete 
statement, nor because I think it of any great importance, but be- 
cause I Intend to write a book about religion, and it, therefore, 
seems only fair that I should tell the reader in advance, not what 
the word means, but what I am going to mean by the word". Farther 
on ((jp. ,cit.',p3' ile says: "Again let me adiait, or rather insist, 
that tnis, like all other definitions of religion, is more or less 
arbitrary. Whosoever wishes to do so has certainly a perfectly 
logical right to give a narrower or much broader definition of the 
term, provided he is willing to take the consequences". It may be 
here possible to understand the writer's meaning as an effort to 
disclaim infallibility for his definition, but the flavour of arbi- 
trariness is disappointing in a serious discussion, as the reader 
ought to feel that the writer had been compelled to adopt his 
definition by the logic of facts, after due consideration of all 
the facts of the case. A discussion of religion on such an arbi- 
trary footing, as the writer proposes, might be an exercise in 
dialectics/
dialectics for the writer, but it might not be edifying to the 
reader; that would depend on the adequacy of tha definition or 
conception of religion with which the writer set out.
In spite, how3ver, of this initial lightheartedness with regard] 
to the impossibility of arriving at a complete definition Professor 
Pratt gives a definition of his own, and most writers on religion 
do the same; they propose a definition of tneir own which, though 
not proposed as final, still embodios, what, in view of all the fact! 
seems to them to be the essential notes of religion. With regard 
to these definitions, however, Professor Pratt says: (bp.cit,p.1.) 
"But the striking thing about these definitions is, that, persuasive 
as many of them are, each .... ,;..":. seems quite unpersuaded by 
any but his own. And, when doctors disagree, what are the rest 
of us going to do? Can we be justified in talking about religion 
at all?" If the situation is as above represented, then the pro- 
test is Justifiable. If, according to Professor Webb, religion 
"cannot be defined1,' then it is practically the unknowaole, ana if, 
according to Professor Hoffding, religion is atf matter of taste',1 
then it is so infinitely varied that a science of it is well nigh 
impossible.
But the situation as regards our knowledge of, and power to 
define, religion ought not to be so hopeless as above represented. 
Religion ought no longer to be regarded as the unpredicable, be- 
cause now for fully a century a great deal of specialised study of 
different aspects of religion has been done, resulting in the pro- 
duction of a great mass of material for the student of religion. 
In producing this material different schools with different methods 
in/
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in different countries have been engaged. The British School of 
Anthropology, the Dutch School of the Comparative Study of Religions 
the American School of the Religious Convert, the German School of 
Mysticism and the "A priori" Faculty, the French School of Sociology 
the Viennese School of Psycho-analysis, and the Swiss School of 
Analytical Psychology, all have made invaluable contributions toward 
the formation of a science and philosophy of religion.
But it is just this plethora of collected mat?rial that has 
led to the confusion of the writers above referred to, and it has 
made the subject of religion the happy hunting-ground for collators 
of facts pertaining to religion, most of whom view these facts from 
the narrow angle of their own particular study, and end by producing 
a one-sided definition which omits more than it contains. Thus the 
stuient of anthropology will produce a definition which leaves out 
what is characteristic of the higher religions; the Sociologist wil 
equate religion with something social; the philosopher will equate 
it with values, and so on. Thus we are driven to the conclusion 
that the collation of facts is one thing, and their interpretation 
is another, and that what is required is a discipline that can gathe 
up the results of all the sciences, and use them in the interpret- 
ation of religion. One distinguished Professor used to say that 
what was required was men who could look over the garden wall, and 
see what the man in the next field was doing. But quite as much 
as the comprehensive discipline that will gather up the fruit of 
all/
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all the gardens there is required for the interpretation of reli- 
gion personal appreciation or personal experience of religion.
It may be that religion is of such a nature that it will not 
yield its secret to any but the person who combines with the com- 
prehensive discipline a first-class experience of what religion can 
be. For example, "caeterls paribus", the person, who studies re- 
ligion with a mechanistic view of mind, is not likely to get to the 
heart of religion, as soon as the student to whom religion is a vi- 
tal experience. Professor Leuba ("The Psychology of Religious 
Mysticism", Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd: 1925, p.325) 
concludes his exhaustive work on niysticism with a chapter oft the 
"Disappearance of Belief", in which he displays a table of statistic 
showing the relative success in the sciences of believers and un- 
believers in a personal God according to an investigation carried 
out in the United States which is quoted to prove the author's con- 
tention. The report says: "I do not see any way to avoid the 
conclusion that disbelief in a personal God, and in immortality, is 
directly proportional to abilities making for success in the science 
in question", that is to say, belief in a personal God is a hind- 
rance to success according to Professor Leuba. This conclusion is 
due to the fact that Professor Leuba is, throughout this book, and 
throughout all his writing, operating with a mechanistic view of 
mind, which also is the view of the new psychology writers, and it 
is this fact that makes their conclusions so antagonistic to reli- 
gion.
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A heavy collation of facts and statistics, supposed to relate
to religion, may not prove the contention of the collator, but only 
that he has missed the point. In the same way taose who spend all 
their energies on primitive religions, and give us a definition, 
which leaves out the higher religions, have made trie assumption 
that primitive man is more religious than the modern man. With 
regard to this Professor Pratt says:(op. cit., p.12) "We must not 
forget (as the students of primitive religion seem to do; that the
modern man is as genuinely religious as the savage; and that the 
real nature of religion may be as truly seen in one's next door
neighbour as in the Toda of Central Inaia, or the Semite of 1500 B.C'- 
If religion is a distinct thing, then, it must contain some genetic 
principles which underly the religions consciousness everywhere 
making religion what it is. It seems as if we were on the wrong 
track, if we say that religion'cannot be defined, or that it is n a 
matter of taste* or that rall thoughts, all feelings, all volitions 
of all men are always religious; or that religion is"permanent 
admiration; then, religion becomes synonymous with consciousness, 
and theology becomes psychology. We shall now examine some of the 
definitions of religion that have been offered, classifying them 
into one-sided definitions and into those that are more complete, 
and, finally, we shall propose the view of religion which will be 
herein put forward for proof.
8.
2.-One-sided Definitions of Religion.
As an example of a definition biassed on the siae of prim- 
itive religions we may take that of M* Salomon Reinach: (quoted 
from Principal Galloway, "Philosophy of Religion", p.182, Edin., 
T & T. Clark: 1925; "religion is a body of scruples which act as 
an obstacle to the free exercise of our faculties". With regard 
to this definition Principal Galloway says: "We can safely say 
that to identify religion with a system of taboos is to ignore 
what is most valuable in it, and to select a subordinate feature, 
and call it the whole. You cannot do justice to religion by try- 
Ing to reduce it to magic and superstition which gather round its 
beginnings".
An example of a definition founded on a faulty psychology, as 
well as on a faulty anthropology, is that of Max Muller, who, in his 
"Science of Religion" termed religion "a mental faculty or dispo- 
sition wb3.cn enables man to apprehend the Infinite", (op. clt,.p..l8lj 
The mental faculty for apprehending the infinite, however, as w&ll 
as the savage apprehending the infinite, are proved by psychology 
and anthropology to be myths. C. P. Tiele in his "Elements of the 
Science of Religion". (Edin., Blackwood: 1897 and 1899 Vol: II, pp.
230 - 23 O gives a similar definition founded on the old faculty 
psychology which divided mind into distinct faculties each possess- 
ing a function of its own. Another well-known instance of this 
class of one-sided definition is that of J. G. Frazer, who- in the 
2nd edition of "The Golden Bough" explained the rise of religion as 
due to the failure of magic, according as the more intelligent among
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primitive man became conscious of the inefficacy of magic. The 
relation between niagic ana religion has been widely discussed, and 
it has been shown that religion and magic may both have been de- 
rived from the same elemental attitude of mind towards the abnormal, 
and the awesome, but that they ^iffer in standpoint, the idea in 
religion being trust, and dependence, and in magic control, so that, 
being polar o^nosites, the one cannot have been derived from the 
other.
Of the sociological definitions, one type is that of Professor 
Ames who is ority one of the many writers, especially in America,who 
are impressed by the part the individual plays in society, and 
the influence of society on the individual. This enthusiasm for 
society is a reaction from the individualism of the 18th century, 
and has had a salutary influence in emphasising a forgotten truth, 
but preoccupation with the social factor leads to the resolution 
of religion, and every other activity of man into the needs of 
society. In his book, "The Psychology of Religious Experience 11 , 
(Boston, Houghton, Mifflin: 1910, p.168, quoted from Professor 
Pratt, op. cit., p.8; Professor Ames identifies religion with 
morality, especially with social morality. Religion is the con- 
sciousness of the highest social valuesj "Non-religious persons 
are those who for lack of some mental endowment are not interested 
in the welfare of society, whereas the typically religious people 
are those who work for social improvement". The confusion here 
is/
to.
due to the fact that in all the great religionsboth moral and re- 
ligious elements are to be found very closely associated, and the 
closeness leads to identification of the one with the other. Also, 
among primitive peoples particularly, the social nature of religion 
is very marked; but there is this important objection to this de- 
finition that the social interpretation of religion does less than 
justice to the part played in religion by the individual, who has 
always been the means of progress in religion, and, moreover, there 
are many facts connected with social life that have no significance 
for religion. Another type of sociological definition is that of 
Professor Durkheim, who construes religion in a somewhat different 
manner. In his book "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" 
(London, MacMillan: 1915) Professor Durkheim finds the essential 
characteristic of religion to be the distinction between tne sacred 
and the profane. This reference to practice is so far right in 
that it emphasises the fact that religion is an activity which 
serves practical ends, and is not merely a theory or a matter of 
feeling, because among primitive men religion is intensely prac- 
tical, ana the definition will apply to a great deal in religion 
at that stage; but it leaves out a great deal of what is most im- 
portant in advanced religion. Moreover, there is a great deal in 
religion which cannot be expressed in terms of group consciousness, 
and has no definite relation to the distinction between the sacred 
and/
11.
profane. To Durkheim and to Sociologists in general religion is 
an activity of the social organism which it developed in the pro- 
cess of evolution on account of its protective value to society, 
but religion, as we shall see, is not merely utilitarian.
3. Completer Definitions of Religion.
Professor William James ("Varieties of Religious Experience",
°v 
London,Longmans: 1903, p.508) sugested as a minimum characteristic
A
of all religions "an uneasiness and its solution 1'. But "uneasi- 
ness'1 or unrest is not characteristic of religion alone, because 
there is mental unrest, physical unrest, political and social unrest, 
industrial unrest, and many other forms of unrest or uneasiness 
which have nothing to do with religion, so that this definition is 
far too wide, as it does not specify which of these forms of un- 
rest is peculiar to religion. Professor Menzies in his "History 
of Religion" defines religion as "The worship of spiritual beings 
from a sense of need". Principal G-alloway in his admirable book 
on the Philosophy of Religion (p.184; which is the most adequate 
text book on the above subject which has yet appeared in our lan- 
guage (op. Qit., p.184) proposes as a tentative definition of re- 
ligion: "Man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks 
to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, ana which 
he expresses in acts of worship and service". In explanation 
of/
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of his definition Principal Galloway says: "The cognitive side 
of the religious consciousness is represented by faith, and faith 
is stimulated by emotion and posits the object which will satisfy 
the needs of the inner life. One of the most urgent ana constant 
of man's needs is that which is expressed in the desire for self- 
conservation, or, as we have put it, for the stability of life in 
the face of the manifold forces which threaten and limit him". 
It will be seen at once that this is a more comprehensive defini- 
tion; it takes into account what is an invariable feature of the 
religious consciousness, its reference to the transcendent, and 
this is characteristic of religion from the lowest to the highest. 
It also takes account of the fact that the reference to the be- 
yond is due to dissatisfaction within, a dissatisfaction induced 
by a feeling of powerlessnesss in the face of the mysterious powers 
around him, and the desire to be allied to the source of these 
powers. Moreover, it emphasises the fact that such a search for 
help satisfies the emotions within, and leads to stability of life 
so that on this satisfied stabilized life follows a life of devotion 
and service.
The above are all authentic notes of religion at all stages, 
but what requires clarification is the exact needs in virtue of 
which man is religious. Man has a great many needs, physical, 
mental, and spiritual, but which of these needs are satisfied by 
religion the definition* does not tell. It simply says that they 
are/
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are "emotional needs". Now this qualification does not carry us 
very far, because the subject of the emotions is a very complex
one, and it is very difficult to select which or what group of the 
» 
emotions is operative in religion. Professor William McDougall
in his book, "An Introduction to Social Psychology", (London, 
Llethuen & Co., 1926; enumerates seven principal instincts, each 
with an accompanying emotion, and he maintains that these seven 
instincts with their emotions are the source of all motive forces 
in the individual. Other psychologists, however, have criticised 
this postion and they have enumerated many more instincts, some 
with, and some without, any accompanying emotion. Also they have 
pointed out that the same instinct may have two accompanying emo- 
tions related to one another as opposite polarities. Furthermore 
they have shown that there are human emotions which can be asso- 
ciated with any particular instinct. Thus to attribute religion 
to the satisfaction of emotional needs, when it is not clear what 
the nature or function of the emotions is, is only to explain one 
unknown by another unknown. Out of the numerous emotions that c 
come into play in the life of the individual, it will have to be 
specified which of these emotions it is that are satisfied by re- 
ligion, because there are some emotions that are obviously not re- 
ligious. For Instance, out of the seven primary emotions enumerat- 
ed by Professor McDougall the emotion of "anger" which is evoked by 
the instinct for "pugnacity", the emotion of'dlsgust " which is 
evoked/
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evoked by the instinct of "repulsion", can hardly be regaraed as 
the source of the religious spirit, and on the other hand the re- 
maining emotions in his list, the emotions of "fear", "wonder;1 
"Submission", and "tender-emotion'1 might v/ell be regarded as com- 
bining to form the religious mind.
Principal Galloway, not in his definition, but in his comment 
on his own definition quoted above, does specify one need as the 
most fundamental. We again quote: "One of the most urgent and 
constant of man's needs is that which is expressed in the desire 
for self-conservation, or, as we have put it, for stability of life 
in the face of the manifold forces which threaten and limit him'' . 
(op. cit., p.184). In writing the above the author seems to have 
had his eye on man as a living organism engaged in the struggle for 
existence, and not on man as a religious being. Religion does help 
towards self-conservation and stability of life, but every living 
organism from the lowest to the highest endeavours to do the same 
thing, so that this activity is not peculiarly religious, and one 
cannot agree that the roots of religion are to be found in a need 
which is the common foundation of the life of all plants, and ani- 
mals, as well as of man. We do agree, however, with the writer's 
insistence throughout his book that religion is due to a need, and 
that it is in a conspicuous degree concerned with emotion, but what 
is emphasised here is that the particular need involved in religion 
will have to be first specified, until which time we have not yet 
distinguished the religious need from any other of the needs of tne 
human mind, or even of the human constitution.
15-
^   -Proposed Definition of Religion .
Another method of defining religion arisea from the modern 
propensity to orientate the enquiry into the nature of religion 
from some psychological consideration like the tripartite division 
of mind into volition, cognition, and conation. This results in 
one or other of these three divisions being taken as the source of 
religion by many writers. For instance Professor Pratt in his 
first book "The Psychology of Religious Belief" (New York, Mac- 
Millan: 1907) emphasises emotion as the chief constituent in religion
*
This he retracts in his later book on "The Religious Consciousness", 
(p. 52n). He says: "I take this opportunity to acknowledge the 
Justice of certain criticisms of Chapter I of the book referred to. 
There is no doubt that in that work I identified feeling too close- 
ly with the background, and gave it too preponderating a position 
over thought". Other writers again emphasise the cognitive element 
in mind and reduce religion to "a belief", "an attitude", or"a 
value", or they emphasise the third element, and they make religion 
to mean "duty", or "loyalty", or "morality". But though religion 
engrosses all these elements of "belief", "duty", "loyalty", and 
"morality", and is in a large measure also "an attitude", and "a 
value", still there is no common agreement that any one of them in 
itself constitutes religion. They are all subsumed under religion, 
but religion itself is something over and above them all, and it is 
this elusive something,therefore, that has to be brought to the 
forefront/
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forefront of our thinking.
We have seen that different kinds of biasses in favour of 
particular lines of study have been the cause of the ambiguity 
that exists still as to the nature of religion. The evolutionary 
bias is another of these, and as we shall see it has serious de- 
fects. With regard to this Professor Ward (Psychological Princi- 
pals", Cambridge University Press: 1920, p.25; says; "Now this 
idea of gradual evolution has certainly exerted a powerful influ- 
ence upon modern psychology. It is the less surprising^therefore, 
especially when we remember the defects of the older psychology, 
to find that the attempt is now frequently made to treat psychology 
wholly according to the historical, or, as it is oftener called, the 
genetic method. In biology such a procedure is possible; for the 
protozoan, as well as man, the paragon of animals, is equally 
accessible as an organism. But the only experience immediately 
accessible to us is our own, and this - in spite of its complexity - 
is the first we know, and the one we know best. Lower forms of 
experience, notwithstanding their greater simplicity, we know later, 
and know less. Accordingly all attempts - regardless of this dif- 
ference - to treat of human experience as merely the culmination 
of a long but entirely objective development, have so far been 
marked by serious defects. The start is avowedly physiological, 
from what is metaphorically described as "organic behaviour' 1 , 
meaning thereby such adaptability of organism to environment as 
seems/
17.
seems to be determined solely and completely by the organism's 
structure, and from its apparently automatic and invariable char- 
acter to require mechanical explanation. Later on, psychological 
conceptions are gradually introduced to eke out the shortcomings of 
the mechanical interpretation". Here we see the result of the
/ 
evolutionary bias; it proceeds from biology to psychology, as Pro- 
fessor Ward observes, from the living protoplasm of the amoeba to 
the living experience of man, from mechanism to mind, and ends in a 
physiological psychology of the very worst sort. If we wish to 
proceed from the known to the unknown, he says, "then Analytical 
Psychology starting from human experience should precede any attempt 
to treat of the genesis of experience as a whole, or to correlate 
psychology with physiology:". Such a psychology with a bias towards 
levelling up the phenomena of mind with the rest of the evolutionary 
process .need not be expected to do Justice to the facts of mind 
which do not fit into its evolutionary hypothesis, and, useful as 
its findings may be within the limits of its own method, its ver- 
dict with regard to experience as a whole need not be regarded as 
final. Thus the great defect of the view of mind of evolutionary 
psychology is that in its preoccupation with theories of determin- 
ing forces it fails to realise the autonomy of the mind or self, 
whereas it is the existence of this n ind or self or ego that is 
of paramount Importance to our present study, and it is necessary 
to give some consideration to the evidence for and against its 
existence.
18.
Different from the evolutionary bias is the bias of the "man 
as man 1 ' psychology which focusses on a cross section of the stream 
of consciousness. This is in the interest of specialisation, but 
there is no interest in the question where the stream cones from, 
or whither it goes past the cross section. An instance of this 
type of psychology will be found in Professor Webb's article on 
Psychology in Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 
Looking into this stream Professor Webb finds a flow of sensations 
beyond which psychology can pronounce nothing; we can never get 
beyond sensation; it is the only thing we are certain of. The 
reply to this, however, is that, if we watch the stream, we shall 
see some of the sensations not only flow, but flow up-stream; 
the^e is reflection; and the reflection is due to something that 
is above the mere flow of sensations; it is due to mind which is 
as much a datum as the sensation.
Division of labour, however, wherever it is possible, is de- 
sirable in the interest of progress and efficiency, but the ten- 
dency is for each science to explain everything. In the stream of 
sensations the self is forgotten. Wundt from a different stand- 
point denies that there is a soul, and other psychologists would 
only admit a soul with a qualification. The fact seems to be 
that the soul or self has been lost sight of, and we need a tt %agnurn 
opus"on the subject of the "soul" which would combine the results 
of all the sciences of mind. It is, undoubtedly, a defect of the 
division/
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division of labour that they lose sight of the whole In the pro- 
cess of distinguishing the parts. "It is not enough", says Pro- 
fessor Ward, (op.cit., p.35. J to talk of feelings, or volitions: 
what we mean is that some individual - man or worm - feels, strives, 
acts, thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem it has been frequent- 
ly forgotten or gainsaid. It has been forgotten among details, or 
through the assumption 'of a medley of faculties, each of them 
treated as an individual in turn, so that among them the real 
individual was lost".
To Professor William James, on the contrary, there is no "soul", 
or "self" or thinker, but only thoughts. He says: "Each pulse 
of cognitive consciousness, each thought dies away ana is replaced
- by another. Tae other among the things it knows, knows its own 
predecessor, and finding it "warm" greets it, saying: "Thou art 
mine, and part of the same self with me". Each later Thought, 
knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the 
final receptacle - and appropriating them is the final owner - of 
all that they contain ana. own. Each Thought is thus born an 
owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realised in itself 
to its own later proprietor........ It is this trick which the*na- 
scent thought has of immeaiately taking up the expiring thought 
and ''adopting" it, which is the foundation of most of the remoter 
constituents of the self ("Principles of Psychology", 1fi-90, Vol.1, 
pp.339f: "Textbook of Psychology": 1892,p.2161.quoted from Professor
Ward, op. cit., p.39). This "provisional solution" must be the 
final/
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final wora of psychology concerning the self or subject: "thei
thoughts themselves are the thinkers" according to Professor 
James. But it is certain that the passing thought does not think; 
it represents a process belonging to an organism, and that organism 
is thinker, and there are certain structural factors by which the 
Dascins- thought if, determined, and the SUTI told of these structural   •*-*' »^> 7
factors is personality or self froMthe nsycliolog' eel point of view.
From such a deliverance we turn bo Professor Ward wiiose article 
on psychology written over forty years ago is still the foundation 
of much of the current psychological teaching in our country. He 
says:(op.cit.,p.24y M The so-called operations and states of conscious 
ness are not mere modes "in vacuo": they imply an active ana affect- 
Itle subject, and it can only conduce to clearness to make this 
fact as explicit as possible." Again he writes: (op. cit., p.36j 
"Still this unity and continuity of the contents of consciousness 
is not what we mean by the psychological subject; on the contrary 
we look to the psychological subject for an explanation of that 
unity, and we may have to look to it too for an explanation of the 
unity of the organism". Further than this we could not expect a 
psychologist to go; further than this no one could go in the matter 
than to say that the self is responsible for the mind, and not only 
for the mind, but possibly also/
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also for the organism Itself.
We are now able to proceed with some sense of security with 
the assumption that there is a self or soul, and that the ancient 
division of man into spirit, soul, and body is a completer descrip- 
tion of man than that afforded by some modern psychological sciences, 
The body is that part through which mind at the present stage of 
existence functions, and, as Professor Ward said above, we may have 
to look to mind for the cause of the articulation of the body. The 
soul is that pat-t which is the source of the sensations, volitions, 
cognitions, and conations, and is common to man and animals. The 
spirit is that in virtue of which man possesses conscience, self- 
consciousness, and ideals. Animals have the power of reasoning 
and memory of a very rudimentary type, but they do not possess self- 
consciousness like man. The difference between man and the lower 
animals whereby man possesses self-consciousness may only be of de- 
gree, that is to say, spirit may be only a higher level of soul, and 
conscience,and self-consciousness only a higher degree of the rudi- 
mentary reason possessed by animals, but, like many other phases of 
evolution, the difference of degree may be such as to constitute a 
new category which we call .spirit. The words of Principal Gallo- 
way on the subject of immortality are applicable here: (op. cit., 
p. 37U "We set out from the fact that the unity of the soul can- 
not be explained through the bodily organism: it is not created by 
the interaction of the bodily elements. This psychical unity, 
present /
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present at all stages of development from pure sentiency to ration- 
al self-consciousness, is the teleological principle which makes 
development possible. Living elements do not evolve a unity, but 
because they already form a unity, they develop- Now the human 
organism we suppose to be a graduated order of elements, and these 
elements are monads, because each possesses a decree of inner or 
psychical life; while the soul is the supreme or dominant monad 
which gives unity to the whole. By its selective and assimilative 
activity it builds up the body, in other words, unifies and develops 
in a specific teleological way the system of monads we call the boay. 
Hence the germinal soul, by the active selection and disposition of 
subordinate elements constitutes a psychical life which grows from 
sentiency to self-consciousness. So it is conceivable that the 
soul, or dominant monad, persisting after the disintegration of the 
present organism might build up a new and higher order of body 1.'
With this agrees Dr. Drever ("an Introduction to the Psycho- 
logy of Education", London, Arnold: 1^23, p.77-78.) He says: 
"Analytical Psychology has much to answer for in the way of giving 
a fnlse impression of concrete psychical processes, and the fact is 
well exemplified in the present case. The rise of iieational 
consciousness makes possible the development not of one but of 
many sentiments....The self-sentiment, therefore, is not merely a 
sentiment among sentiments.; it is a synthesis of all the senti- 
ments....It is obvious that there is in psychical life a co-ordi- 
nating/
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co-ordinating factor, which becomes clearly manifest at t£e 
levels, where it has been identified with Reason. But this co-or- 
dinating factor is found at all levels. Reason is not a new force 
entering mental life from without at the higher levels. At the 
lowest levels the life and behaviour of the organism is co-ordinated 
but the co-ordinating factor is not conscious of itself. When the 
ideational level emerges, however, the possibility of a conscious
co-ordinating factor is present". Dr Drever remarks (ibidem) that
 
"McDougall has called attention to the fact that he has not suf- 
ficiently investigated the conditions under which the hierarchy 
among the sentiments is established" This among other things is 
what would require to be done if we are to have< an adequate history 
of the human soul. ' At present, however, we are not able to pursue 
the subject of the soul any further. It is sufficient to make 
clear that, though its existence is denied, by various members of 
Psychological Schools, yet there is a great preponderance of opinion 
in favour of its existence, and we are justified in maintaining 
that man is made up of body, soul, and spirit. It must hare be 
pointed out that soul is used both in a theological and in a 
psychological sense,and that in the tripartite division of body, 
soul, and spirit, the term soul is used in the psychological sense, 
and the term spirit is used to imply what is understood by soul in 
the theological sense.
It is now possible to indicate to which sphere of man's nature 
religion/
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religion belongs; it belongs to the sphere of man's spirit. With 
this agrees the statement: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship 
Him foust worship him in spirit and in truth." Jn. TV. 24. The 
greatest teacher of all acknowledged the threefold division of 
man's nature into body, soul, and spirit, when He said: " I am 
the way, the truth, and the life". No doubt this definition of 
himself was an answer to the questions that occupied, the minds of the 
age into which He was born, nevertheless the combination was the 
originality, ana it was not an invention but a record of His life 
in which can be distinguished three parts. Firstly there was His 
life of service, and service was the subject of a large part of His 
teaching; it was the fruit and final test of life: seconuly there 
was "the truth", His teaching. "And ye shall know the truth, and 
the truth shall make you free". (Jn. VIII. 32 ) He emphasised the 
necessity of clear thinking, a clear ethic, and a clear theology. 
He taught the world how to think in all directions. But over and 
above these two aspects of H^S life there was His secret life of 
communion with the Father, which He calls"the way". What the 
world required was to know how to come to the Father, and His life 
of communion pointed them to the way, but there is more in the 
statement "I am the way" than the fact that He taught people the 
way of fellowship with the Father, just as "I am the truth and the 
life" means all that is implied in philosophy ana ethics. "I am 
the way" points to that which is essentially religion, as disting- 
uished/
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distinguished from philosophy and other interests; it is in this 
activity that we find the moment that is peculiar to religion, and 
distinguishes religion from philosophy and ethics, and that moment 
is the felt need for communion with God. Even in the lower nature 
religions,communion with the god is what is aimed at, according to 
Principal Galloway.(op. cit., p.?6; "In nature-religions, he says, 
there seems to exist a sense of sympathy "between man and the objects 
of his worship, which is not purely selfish". The same writer 
says (op. cit., p.82) "Religion can only be stated in terms of a 
relationship, and any human experience which annuls all relation
}| ueo ipso ceases to be a religious experience". But "relationship 1,1 
again,is not definite enough; there are many kinus of relationships, 
but the relationship involved in religion is that of friendship, or 
of fellowship, or of communion. There are many kinds of relation- 
ships, International, national, political, public, private, pro- 
fessional, =md many other kinds, so that to describe religion as 
^relationship" is not enough; the kind of relationship in religion 
must be distinguished from other relationships.
The nature of religion is expressed by Augustine as communion 
in his famous saying: "Pecisti nos ad te, et inquietuin est cor 
nostrum donee requiescat in te". This is the authentic cry of 
religion in all ages: "As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks 
so panteth my soul after thee, 0 God". (Ps. 42: 1) The urge that 
impels primitive religions and that creates the unrest of the 
modern/
modern man are both due to the fact that man was maue to find ais 
rest in God. Any description of religion, therefore, that aoes 
not place in the forefront this urge towards union and communion 
with God falls to distinguish it from other aspects of human act- 
ivity. Religion cannot, ofcourse, develop apart from theology, 
philosophy, and ethics; it includes volition, cognition, and co- 
nation, but it is not, as some maintain who are impressed by the 
importance of "will", mostly conative; it is not mostly "duty", nor 
is religion mostly cognitive, a belief only; nor is it feeling 
only, but it begins from feeling the core of which as we shall see 
in the next chapter is a need. It is in virtue of this neeo. that 
man cannot stop at philosophy or ethics. This neea is the measure 
of man's greatness, and it is because he is capable of religion or 
of communion with God that he is also capable of philosophy.
In the same way we see that to equate religion with "values", 
as many writers do, fails to take account of the fact that many v 
value attitudes do not bear any religious significance, and that 
it is Impossible to say which values they are that are concerned 
with religion. Religion is a need and a quest for values, but 
they are values of a certain kind, namely, the values for which 
fellowship with the divine stands.
Likewise to define religion as loyalty omits what is char- 
acteristic of religion. Professor Royce ("Sources of Religious 
Insight", Edin. T&T. Clark: 1912, p.8; says: "Now for my present 
purposes, this interest in the salvation of man shall be inaae in 
these/
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these lectures, the essential feature of religion, in so far as 
religion shall be here dealt with....The central and essential 
postulate of whatever religion we in these lectures are to con- 
sider, is the postulate that man needs to be saved". "Religious 
Insight means then, for my present purposes, insignt into the need 
of, and into the way of salvation' 1 (op.cit., p. 1?^ This salvation 
comes about by means of loyalty. Professor Royce in the interest 
of science elects to omit all reference to revelation as being sub- 
jective, because it is always a revelation to some particular person, 
therefore he finds religious insight to come from the common ex- 
periences of man, outside revelation, particularly, loyalty; the 
cattle lifting Highlander becomes very religious Inter on because 
of his former loyalty to his clan. The obvious criticism of this 
is that it is not loyalty that makes the cattle-lifter religious 
later on but something else, namely, divine grace revealed in Christ 
Also it may be asked, if it is scientific to omit revelation which 
is-one of the facts of the case, and, further, there is this im- 
portant consideration for Professor Royce to get over that wherever 
man is exercised about salvation, he is also very much concerned 
with the idea of the Divine Being, through whom salvation is expect- 
ed. Here we quote the worus of Professor W. P. Paterson in another 
but similar connection. He says: ("The Nature of Religion", London, 
Hodder & Stoughton: 1925, p.471-472) "It has been overlooked that 
a hope of salvation is inextricably bound up with the idea of a 
Divine/
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Divine Being who is adequate to the hope of fulfilling the task.
I have quoted from Bradley and Bosanquet striking tributes to the 
depth and efficacy of the Protestant conception of the way of Sal- 
vation, but they have not equally dwelt on the grandeur of the doc- 
trine of God which was its presupposition; and it may be said that 
the way of justification by faith only commended itself, as it did 
to awakened consciences and anxious hearts, because it was conjoined 
with the doctrine of the living God who is able and willing to save 
sinners, and who also embraces the soul in the individualising love 
of the Heavenly Father". The need of salvation, in fact, is the 
sense of separation from the Divine Being and salvation is attained 
when man finds himself in fellowship with God and he feels this need 
because God has made him for Himself. The view of religion, there- 
fore, which is proposed in this thesis for discussion and proof, 
and which underlies the prophetic consciousness, is that it is a life 
of communion with God, a communion which is only possible on the., ; 
understanding 5 that the essence of both human and the divine nature is 
love, and that out of this loving communion develops., on the part of 
man a knowledge of God, self, man, and nature which issues in a life 
of self-realisation through service which is prompted by love, and on 
the part of God in a revelation of Himself which is also prompt 
ed by love.   If, then, there is anything new in this thesis it is r. 
the use that ismade of this conception of love in the explanation of 
religion, for up to the present the fundamental nature and metaphysi- 
cal import of love has been left unnoticed by writers on religion. 
This neglect is due to an Aristotelian tradition that love being a 
feeling cannot be predicated of God. Our first task therefore will 
be to show what feeling is, and the regulative position it holds in 
mind. Thereafter it will be shown that love which is also feeling 




1 . The_Different Me.aningj*___p__f_Consciousness..
Having defined what we mean by the term "prophetic" which we 
took to mean prophetic in the religious sense, so that the term 
"prophetic consciousness" is synonymous with the term "religious 
consciousness',' it is necessary next to define what we mean by the 
term Consciousness.
In popular speech consciousness is very often limited to 
"awareness", but, as we shall see a little later, in psychology, 
consciousness extends beyond the limits of "awareness". In popu- 
lar speech consciousness has also a second and wider application, 
whereby it comes to mean the whole of pB/chical experience, so that 
the religious consciousness incjud.es the whole of religious experi- 
ence with its objective as well as its subjective implications. 
It is with the religious consciousness in this latter sense that 
we are concerned in the present discussion.
At the outset, therefore, we wish to dissociate from any at- 
tempt to give a more limited meaning to the terra than that given 
above, as has been done by a well known writer, Professor Thouless 
in/
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in his book, "An introduction to the Psychology of Religion". 
(Cambridge University Press. 1924, ; ,.5; He distinguishes between 
the religious consciousness and religious experience thus: "The 
religious consciousness is that part of religion which is present 
to the mind ana is open to examination by introspection. It is 
the mental side of religious activity. Religious experience is
a vaguer term usea to describe the feeling element in the religious 
consciousness - the feelings which lead to religious belief or are^
the effects of religious behaviour. Examples of wh^.t is meant by 
religious experience are: the sense of the presence of G-od describ- 
ed by the mystics, which also is not very uncommon amongst other 
people; the feeling of peace after Prayer or Sacrament; and the
 
less intense, hardly perceptible, emotional undercurrent which 
a'ccompanies ordinary religious life".
It need hardly be pointed out that this is a very restricted 
meaning of religious experience. By this meaning religious ex- 
perience has no objective reference whatsoever; it is limited to 
feeling which is purely subjective. "The sense of the presence*
of God described by the mystics", "the feeling of peace after 
Prayer or Sacrament", and the emotional undercurrent which accom- 
panies ordinary religious life" are purely sublective states of 
consciousness,and do not prove anything beyond their own existence, 
whereas religious experience as commonly understood witnesses to a 
reality beyond towards which it strives. On these restricteu. 
terms/
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terms religion would have no need of theology, philosophy, or 
ethics, but only of psychology which when it proved the presence of 
these states thereby proved the presence of religion. But,as we 
have seen already, religion is not concerned with feeling only, but 
with knowing and willing as well, and it is in this wider sense 
that religious experience, or the religious consciousness will be 
used.
2. Psychological Description of Consciousness
Although our main concern is with consciousness in its widest 
interpretation, we have first to discover what light psychology can 
throw on the nature of consciousness in its narrower psychological 
sense, because this is the focus of mind through which all that 
ever enters mind must pass, and it is necessary to find out how 
consciousness arises, and especially how consciousness of the 
realities implied in religion arises. This if we can discover will 
help to elucidate the nature of the prophetic or religious con- 
sciousness .
According to Dr Drever "An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Education" (London. Arnold. 1923 p.20) "Consciouness is another 
word that defies definition", because it is an ultimate fact. All 
that we can do is to try and describe it, and eventhat is not easy. 
In Mind,then,we can distinguish two elements "process" and "struc- 
ture"/
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structure". Consciousness is a characteristic of certain processes, 
but it is not an entity. I..; In consciousness, "we have a peculiar 
inside knowledge of certain conscious processes, which is direct 
and immediate, but not direct and immediate in the same sense as our 
knowledge of external objects". (ibidem; Thus conscious pro- 
cesses have two characteristics, firstly, an Inside view of the event 
and, secondly, a unique type of synthesis of life action: "Con- 
scious process must be described as a unique kind of synthesis or 
integration - psychical integration in which tae life process of 
an organism and physical processes resulting from environing con- 
ditions are combined or integrated into a product that is neither 
physical nor physiological, but psychical." (op.cit., p.2t; 
Feelings and impulses are types of conscious processes and these 
are ultimate ana unanalysable. These processes ar,? events that 
go on, but they are not permanent facts or entities.
Consciousness again is not awareness because there may be con- 
scious processes in which the individual is not personally aware. 
Dr. Drever says: (op. cit., p.21; "The Psychologist is constantly 
coming across facts, in normal as well as in abnormal mental life 
which point in the direction of conscious process below the level 
of personal awareness. Even from the introspective standpoint it 
is incumbent on him to attach a sufficiently wide meaning to the 
word "conscious" to include a wider field than the field of awarer 
ness in the ordinary sense of that term".
These processes and phenomena in mind other than the conscious 
are/
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are called "the subconscious" but the latter is a terra which, Jr. 
Drever thinks, ought to be discarded,because we thereby suggest 
that subconscious processes are different from conscious processes, 
whereas subconscious processes are the sane as conscious processes, 
the characteristic of a conscious process being psychical synthesis 
or integration, and not merely presence in personal consciousness. 
He says: (op.cit., p.22) "Conscious process is the primary mode in 
which the psychical is manifested. The older psychologists recog- 
nised no other modes. But modern psychology has realised that the 
conception of the psychical must be widened so as to include pro- 
cesses and phenomena other than conscious process. These pheno- 
mena are grouped together under the designation of the unconscious. 
Unfortunately the psychology of late years has been pursueu. with 
much assiduity, but with little scientific caution or logical pre- 
cision, and the result has in many cases been a psychology verging 
on the mythological".
Over and above the conscious processes in mind some of which 
we are aware,and some of which we are unaware, there are also struct- 
ural elements,the best example of which is the sentiment. "The 
sentiment is not an experience or conscious process, but a deter- 
minant of conscious process,and of the external behaviour which 
results...Vfe may be clearly conscious that we possess a certain 
sentiment, as we are conscious that we possess a pancreas or adre- 
nal glands, but the sentiment itself is never in consciousness. 
So too me nories.. .customs, habits, prejudices, and. the like". 
vop. cit., p
This, then, Is as far as psychology can describe mind. So 
far we have seen it consists of two elements,of process and struct 
ur'a.l factors.. The processes are conscious, but the structural 
elements com1.!sting of what are comrnorTy known as instincts, inte- 
rests, sentiments, ideals, prejudices, o^ln'.ons, habSts,customs 
and organised knowledge are unconscious. These two elements are**^ -^-^
related in this way that structure determines what conscious pro- 
cesses we are going to have; they are unconscious determinants 
of conscious processes, and are the real "unconscious".
Now the^e structural elements are not Inactive or inert, but 
are active at all tiroes in relation to environmental conditions, 
and in interacting with one another. This is process also, but 
it is different from the process in consciousness inasmuch as it 
does not possess the characteristic of psychical integration. 
An example of this process Is the Freudian "Censorship", and is 
called endopsychic process. This is, therefore, a third element 
in mind so that in our final analysis of mind we have firstly, 
structural mental elements, or the "unconscious", secondly, the 
processes involved in the interaction of these structural elements 
with one another, or the "endopsychic" processes, and thirdly, 
there is conscious process.
3  The Focus of Consciousness .
Having described the nature of mind and reduced it into its 
various elements, it will be evident that in order to investigate 
how/
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how consciousness of the realities implied in religion arises we 
are not primarily concerned with the unconscious or with enaopsychk 
processes, but with conscious processes which are the focus and core 
of consciousness and of experience. These conscious processes 
have a threefold nature. They are feeling, thought and activity 
or volition, cognition or perception and conation. But, when we 
have reached this far a new difficulty begins, because, when we 
wish to find out with which of the above three phases consciousness 
begins, we find a great deal of controversy as to which of these 
is first. Professor Ward says: "Psychological Principles" 
(Cambridge University Press. 1920 p-4o) "While it Is agreed - 
practically on all hands - that the ultimate facts of mind are 
cognition, feeling, and conation, there is no corresponding una- 
nimity either as to the category to which these facts belong or as 
to how they are related1; ', They are spoken_,of as'-processes, states, 
affections, actions, and so on: formerly they were for the most 
part dealt with in separation as the "energies" or "functions" of 
corresponding faculties. At other times we are told that they 
are never presentea to us separately, but always in conjunction"... 
Again feeling ana cognition are sometimes regarded as antithetical, 
"in inverse ratio"; sometimes it is said feeling may be absent al- 
together: by some, "will" is said to be dependent throughout upon 
feeling, by others it is regarded as a veritable"primum movens". 
After this Professor V,rard proceeds to ask two questions, firstly 
what we find invariably present in a concrete state of consciousness 
secondly/
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secondly, if there is any or^er of succession anong these con- 
stituents of a single psychosis. He then begins with feeling and. 
considers its right to be regaraea as primordial. He begins with 
answering the contention often put forward that feeling is primordial 
and invariably present wherever there is consciousness at all. 
Every living creature, it is said, feels though it HI ay never do 
anything more. This doctrine he maintains derives its plausibil- 
ity from the vagueness of the term feeling which he finds to be 
used in five different senses: it may mean (a; a touch, as a feel- 
ing of roughness; (b> an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger; 
(c> an emotion, as feeling of anger; (dj any purely subjective state 
as feeling of certainty; (e^ the one subjective state that is pure- 
ly affective, as feeling of pleasure or pain. He then finds there 
are three common traits connecting these various significations 
together: (1; Peeling as in organic sensation (2> Passivity as 
in all sensations (3; Immediacy as in touch. All these three 
qualities are present together only in one of the above, namely, 
in the feeling of pleasure and pain, and it is in this sense he 
proposes to employ the word feeling. This is also the sense in 
which it is used by those who maintain that all the more complex 
forms of experience are evolved from feeling.
Professor Ward disagrees with the latter position. He says: 
(op. cit., pp. 42-43J "So far as we can judge, we find feeling 
everywhere; but as we work downwards from higher to lower forms of 
life, the possible variety and definiteness of sense impressions 
both/
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both steadily diminish. Moreover, we can directly observe in cer- 
tain organic sensations - and these come nearest to the whole con- 
tent of primitive or infantile experience - scarcely any evidence 
of any assignable "quale". Finally, in our sense of experience 
generally, we find the elements of feeling at a maximum in the 
lower senses an^ the cognitive element at a maxi.aum in the hlsher. . . 
If, then, feeling predominates more anciTore MS wo approach the be- 
ginning of conscious life, may we not conclude that feeling is its 
only constituent? On the contrary, such a conclusion v/ould be . 
rash in the extreme", V,re have quoted Professor V.'ard at great length 
to rnalse his positionclear, because it is a position that we wish to 
contest for the reason that the view of the origin of religion put
forward in this discussion is one which leans to a conception of
mind and of the order of the states of consciousness which is di- 
rectly opposed to that put forward above by Professor V.ard.
It will be easier to criticise his position if we give his 
reasons for the above denial of the primacy of feeling. He says: 
(op. cit. p.43> "Broadly speaking, in any state of mind that we can 
now directly'observe, what we find is(i; that we are aware of a 
certain change that has occurred either in things without or in 
our thoughts within, (2) that we are pleased or pained with the 
change, and (3) that, being pleased or pained, we want and strive 
for, the continuance of what pleases us, and still more urgently 
for the cessation of what pains us. But we never find that feel- 
ing alters - i.e. without the intervention of the action to which 
it prompts - either our sensations or our situation, but that 
regularly/
regularly these latter with remarkable promptness an-i certainty al- 
ter it. We have not, first, a change of feeling, and then a 
change in our sensations, perceptions, and ij.eas; but, these 
changing, change of feeling follows. In short, feeling appears 
to be an effect, which, therefore, cannot exist without its cause".
The great virtue of the famous work on psychology from which 
the above quotation is taken is that it aoes more justice than 
older psychologies to the unity and continuity of mind and of ex- 
ternal reality. The faculty psychology of Scottish philosophers 
regarded mind as a congeries of faculties which the mind used as 
the body uses hands and feet. It was displaced by the newer 
Sensationism or Presentationism, or Assoeiationism Psychology in 
England. This psychology regarded mind as made up of elements or 
atoms due to sensations. These elements combined together by a 
cohesion of those that had affinity with one another,this was the 
beginning of the psychology of interest. A similar psychology was 
produced.in Germany by Herbart for whom consciousnesss was like a 
dome; iaeas entered the dome from below and attached themselves 
by the principle of interest to other ideas in the dome and the most 
powerful combination secured the place at the top or apex of the 
dome of consciousness,while those which failed to secure combi- 
nation by Interest fell out. The dome did justice to a certain ex- 
tent to the unity of mind, and to the fact of interest. Pro- 
fessor Ward's continuum objectivumfl and the unity and continuity of 
of mind emphasises truths that are still apt to be forgotten by 
psychologists/
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psychologists, but in the above quotation Professor Waro. himself 
seems to have fallen into the mistake of Presentationism which it 
is his aim to avoid' : . Let us consider what he says: "We have not", 
he says in the above quotation, "first a change of feeling, and then 
a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but, these 
(sensations, perceptions, and ideas; changing, change of feeling 
follows". This is nothing else but Presentationism. The fallacy 
here is in assuming that " sensations, perceptions, and ideas" can 
change. They can change and act and interact according to Present- 
ationism, but in reality they have no meaning or reality at all 
apart from mind, and minj. implies feeling, so that we conclude that 
the feeling determines what "sensations, perceptions and ideas" 
mind is going to have, and not "vice versa" and in this way feeling 
is prior to the sensations. On the contrary, to Ward "feeling 
appears to be an effect, "which, therefore, cannot exist without 
its cause". What Ward is thinking of here is not feeling but an 
emotion with a "feeling-tone". One more sentence from the passage 
quotej. above: "But we never find that feeling alters - i.e. with- 
out the Intervention of the action to which it prompts - either our 
sensations or our situation, but that regularly these latter with 
remarkable promptness and certainty alter it". But if the feeling 
prompts to the action how does it require the intervention of the 
action in order to produce it? The feeling cannot both be the 
cause and the effect at one and the same time. Here again Ward is 
thinking/
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thinking not of feeling but of the emotion which is always evokeu. 
by any situation that is presented to mina. Again he says: "we 
never find that feeling alters but that regularly these (sensa- 
tions or our situation; latter with remarkable promptness and 
certainty alter it". Thus if feeling never alters we have no
feeling before dinner but promptly dinner comes along we get a changd 
of feeling. Most ordinary people, however, are sure that they 
have a feeling before dinner, and that it is different from the 
feeling they have after dinner appears; the first is a feeling 
of hunger, an organic sensation, but the second is an emotion. 
To do Professor Ward justice, then, we give his own definition of 
emotion: (op. cit., p.276)"intense feeling is essential to emotion
....a state of emotion is a complete state of mind, a psychosis, and 
not a psychical element, if we may so say. Thus, in anger, over 
and above pain, we have a more or less definite object as its cause, 
and - added to the "diffused" wave of excitement, we have a certain 
characteristic reactive display consisting of frowns, compressed 
lips,erect head, clenched fists,etc. in a word the combative atti- 
tude as its effect". Feeling on the other hand is less complex 
than the pain or pleasure element in the'.emotion. Thus we see
that before any sensation or situation what we have is feeling, but 
on presentation of any definite sensation or situation we have an 
emotional reaction towarus it which includes as one of its elements 
a feeling of pleasutre or pain, but the psychical state itself is 
a complex one of emotion whose characteristic is bodily disturb- 
ance. The cause of Professor Ward's contradiction of himself is 
his effort to avoid the conclusion that feeling is primordial in 
consciousness.
We shall Illustrate this contradiction still further, but we 
cannot delay any longer an explanation of why we maintain that 
feeling is primordial among the three states of consciousness.
Our reason for this is that the view of religion here enter- 
tp.inea as a felt want or need for- commin^on v/1 th the Deity leado 
us to exim'r.e the nature of consciousness, one of the characteris- 
tics of which we saw to be a unU;ue type of Integration or life 
synthesis. This integration or synthesizes by-means of. three irre- 
ducible aspects of consciousness feeling, knowing, striving, aspects 
which have no r3semblance to one another, and are unanalysable. 
Of these three elements feeling appears to'be a want or a capacity 
or a need. In this capacity to feel"its need lies the possi- 
bility of the future development of the individual. The indivi- 
dual might possess the power of cognition and of conation, but he 
might remain inert as a Sphinx 'cognising the void, unless he felt 
a want in himself for something outside himself. It is his capa- 
city to feel his need that urges the individual to desire to 
satisfy that need and in doing so he is compelled to take notice 
of things in his environment that promise to minister to that need; 
this results in cognition, and, because he possesses the capacity 
for conation, he strives to secure these things. But the order 
of his activity is not, as Professor V/ard supposes, that first of 
all things are presented to him; these produce effects called 
feelings, ana his feelings urge him to avoid them or secure tiieia. 
It is equally true, of-course, that unless he was cognitive ana 
conative/
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conative the individual could not develop, but what is emphasised 
here is that religion originates in a feeling, a feeling of need of 
feelowship with God,and, therefore, the authentic cry of the reli- 
gious soul in all ages has beenfor fellowship with the Deity, and 
the cry is expressive of an urge or impulsion or need that refuses 
to "be satisfied except by the presence of God. "0 God, thou art 
my God; early will I aeek Thee; my soul thirsteth for Thee in a 
dry and thirsty land, where no water is".(Ps. 63: 1) In satis- 
fying this need the cognitive and conative elements in mind come 
into play, in fact, all three play and Interplay without ceasing. 
But what we wish to point out here is that one of these elements, 
feeling, is regulative of the rest, and that element of feeling is 
the one which is pre-eminently characteristic of religion, For in- 
stance, in the case of the Hebrew Prophets, it could be shown, how 
their career as prophets began out of a profound feeling of the need 
of personal religion, or knowledge-of God. This knowledge of God 
in turn aroused in them a profound sympathy with the needs of others 
of the same acquaintance with the Divine Being. The root of this 
sympathy was love without which they could never have been prophets, 
for, they were not simply ambitious politicians, or narrow patriots, 
but men in whom had been developed a profound love of their fellow- 
beings, a love engendered by their knowledge of the love of God for 
themselves, which they acquired by communion with GodL
With reference to the relationbetween these three states of 
consciousness, and the order or cycle in which they proceed, Dr Dre- 
ver says: (-op. cit. p.33) "The last word would appear to be, that 
knowing, feeling and striving are irreducible to one another, though 
every conscious process involves all t'^^e as aspects, and the 
different modes of conscious process - perceiving, fearing, desiring
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hoping, striving, and the like - are different because of differ- 
ences in the emphasis or prominence of particular aspects in each 
case. It is certain that pure knowing, feeling, striving, do not 
exist in the concrete; they are psychological abstractions". 
And again with reference to the question, important for our present 
discussion,as to which of these three is regulative he says: 
(op. cit., p.35} "The generalconclusion, then, to which we are lea, 
is that in the last analysis feeling, interest ana. meaning are 
identical, ana constitute this third or central factor in conscious 
process, the other factors being the cognitive ana conative, of 
which,more presently. The bidlogical function of this central 
factor is regulative; that is to say, it regulates the direction 
the activity of the organism will take, and therefore the behaviour 
as a whole". Thus feeling or interest is the regulative factor 
that is unceasingly guiding the processes of consciousness into "a 
unique type of integration or life synthesis", and is not the effect 
of other elements in mind; it is not a servant waiting on some- 
thing else, but the ruling principle which guides the mind that 
determines the personality,and this agrees with what we know to be 
the highest principle that has ever been promulgatea in religion; 
it is a law which calls for the exercise of a specific feeling^ the 
feeling of love: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 
heart,and with all thy soul,and with all thy mind. This is the 
first and great commandment. And the second is liKe unto it, thou 
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang 
all the law and the prophets". in,.22 : 37-40. This statement 
of/
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of the highest law takes account of the fact that emotion or feel- 
ing is primordial and regulative among the states of consciousness, 
but when it is evoked it calls out all the powers of mind to its 
service, the heart,the soul, and the mind.
This question of the place of feeling in religion is of funda- 
mental interest to our present discussion and it is in urgent neej. 
of investigation, "because there has been such a vast amount of con- 
troversy about it, ordinary people aeclaring in its favour, ana the 
learned regarding it with suspicion. And the controversy has a 
history: before the Romantic Revival,feeling or emotion was re- 
garded as a sign of a lack of culture, refinement, and breeuing, but 
the reaction came; feeling came to its own as the regulative prin- 
ciple in consciousness ana, in consequence, progress began in liter- 
ature, art, science, theology, ana philosophy, and it may be that 
we are again living in an nge where feeling and emotion have become 
suspect, and life flows on in stereotyped channels of thought and 
behaviour, and progress is arrested, at any rate in the sphere of 
religion.
In the sphere of theology the place of feeling in religion has 
always been a subject of debate. Immediately the subjective school 
of feeling of Schleiermacher comes into being the objective school 
of Ritschland Herrman comes forward to contest its position, putting 
all the emphasis on the objective revelation of God in Christ and 
refusing to have anything to do with mystical religion. Theologi- 
cal thought since that time has divided its loyalty between these 
two/
two positions the majority siding with the objective position, 
and this error on both sides is due to a lack of appreciation of 
the relative importance of the part plnyed by the subjective and 
the objective factors in religion. The words "subjective" and 
"mystical" hove at present got a most unhamy connotation. To 
call any experience subjective or mystical is to condemn it at; 
fanciful and unreal, but the subjective is a necessary aspect of 
every cxperiem-y quite as r:uch as the objective.
Nowadays the reaction against feeling can be seen on the one 
hand, among the writers on religion wtio construe religion as philo- 
sophy, morality, duty, or values, and on the other liana in the teach- 
ing of the Church where the emphasis IB on morality and social 
service and a reticence about spiritual revival except by education, 
the old theory of the Greeks that virtue is knowledge which theory 
is at the foundation of such otherwise hopeful movements as Young
Peoples' Christian Associations, Student Christian Movements, Copec,
\ 
and G-eneva, and Lausanne Conferences; it is to such movements
that the faith of people is turned nowadays rather than towaras the 
hope of spiritual revival through the Church. In triis way the 
Church may be shutting off the indivlaual, the society, ana the 
nation from the most powerful forces there are for regulating ana 
determining the direction of the will and personality, namely, the 
forces of the spirit.
But what it will be asked is Spirit? Spirit can only be one 
thing; it can only be another term for the total personality in its 
dynamic/
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dynamic, emotive, outreaching, aspiring aspect, the moment of its 
completes! unification, expressiveness and. ereativeness, the moment 
when all trie powers of personality are present together. .Vith this 
agrees the use of ordinary speech in which spirit and. feeling are 
identified; to speak or act with spirit means to speak or act with 
feeling. Moreover, we always think of spirit as existing at the 
apex of personality regulating it ana determining it, a position 
analogous to that of feeling in its regulative relation to the other 
aspects of consciousness. In fact whatever is preu.icable of feel- 
ing is also preo.icable of spirit which indicates that t6ere is a i-"j 
close relation-between them.. For instance, we have seen that 
feeling is most adequately regarded as a want, neea, capacity for 
something beyond itself, a capacity for progress, a vital force, 
an "elan vital" and this is also how spirit woula be most adequate- 
ly described. Cognition and win wait upon feeling; until the 
feeling is there they do not attend or act, but when feeling comes 
the mind or personality moves through the whole gamut of feeling 
knowing, and willing. This is also descriptive of spirit. '.Tore- 
over feeling, like .spirit,IB immediate, Intuitive, and needs na language
Spirit is personality with all three elements functioning together.
' ';? We have then to remember that feeling is not as some writers 
term it "pure feeling", ana they spen-a a large amount of space and 
time proving that pure feeling cannot do what the advocates of feel- 
ing say it can; they say that a state of pure feeling is a purely 
subjective state, and to this we wholeheartedly agree,because "pure 
feeling" can do nothing,because it Is nothing; it does not exist 
and/
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and. likewise pure feeling would be purely subjective if it could 
exist, but it cannot exist, because to feel is to feel something; 
there is no purely subjective state of mind.
This error is due to the tendency to regard mind net as a unity 
but as a combination of three states, and that is how writers tend 
to abstract one or other of these states, and discuss ifim-vacuo" 
whereas these elements of mina contain one another, and never exist 
in solution, so that feeling is a knowing and a willing as well and 
'Vice versa', because they are only names for three different modes 
of the same mind. %- This is also how spirit has come to be regard- 
ed as almost a supernatural, extra-personal entity, on the outer 
fringe of personality as if it did not wholly belong to us.
But there is another reason why spirit has become detached in 
thought from the rest of personality, ana. th^ reason Is that the 
three modes of consciousness, being each only the prominence of one 
particular mode of consciousness over the other? two r^modes ,._ :  
thus inhibit one another so that the constant requisition of any 
one of them may lead to serious under-development of the others . 
For instance constant use of the intellect tenas to inhibit the 
emotions and the will, ana on the other hand the emotions and the 
will may be woefully misdirected from want of exercise of the In- 
telligence. So that what is requires is the harmonious develop- 
ment of all sides of ones nature; but In practice what happens is   
that one of these elements in mind is always being neglected, and 
of these our spiritual nature suffers most neglect, because our 
existence/
existence as part of a civilizea social system compels attention 
to mental development, and the necessity to maintain good works, 
"but there is not the same compulsion to attend to the spiritual 
side of our nature, and yet we have seen that it is that part of 
our nature that is most determinative and regulative of the whole. 
The neglect is also partly due to ignorance as to what spiritual 
development requires; sometimes it has been asceticism that was 
required, at another time emotionalism,and at all times something 
difficult to achieve,so that there is no sphere of our nature 
where more light is required.
We shall therefore pursue a little further our examination of 
the nature of feeling as such further examination will help to con- 
solidate the position already attained, and will also help towards 
an answer to questions that will arise later on in the discussion. 
We wish therefore first of all to examine the description offered 
by psychology of feeling as a seeking pleasure and avoidance of 
pain or un pleasure,-In order to show how difficult it has been to 
understand feeling,and how far it has been misunderstood,and in 
order to point us to the true nature of feeling. In doing so we 
again take Professor Ward's exposition as being more metaphysical, 
ana,therefore,better suited to our present purpose. Such a dis- 
cription of feeling may be all the length psychology proper cares 
to go, but it falls short of the whole truth with regara to feeling, 
and does discredit to its real nature.
Professor Ward says: (op. cit. p. 2Jc) "From Plato aown- 
de psychologists and moralists have been fond of discussing the 
the relation of pleasure and pain. It has been maintained that 
pain is the first and more fundamental fact, and pleasure nothing 
but relief froo pain; and,again, on the other side, that pleasure 
is prior and positive, and pain only the negation of pleasure. 
So far as the mere change goes, it is obviously true that the 
diminution of pain is "pro tan to*1 pleasant, while the diminution of 
pleasure is "pro tanto" painful; and,if relativity had the unlimit- 
ed range sometimes assigned to It,this would be all we coula say. 
But we must sooner or later recognise the existence of a compara- 
tively fixed neutral state....On the whole it see.ns, therefore, more 
reasonable to regard pleasure ana pain as emerging out of a neutral 
state which is prior to and distinct from both - not a state of 
absolute indifference but of simple contentment.... Most men and 
all the lower animals are content to"let well alone". Now our 
criticism of this is that if this is a : st?±e of simple contentment 
then, it is tantamount to a state of pleasure, because contentment 
is not a neutral state; it is the most positive thing we can ever 
achieve. Moreover, a "state which is prior to and distinct from 
both" pleasure and pain is a "tabula rasa',' a state in fact, of no 
feeling at all, and yet we are told by Professor Ward that no natter 
how far back one goes biologically one finds feeling. .This is the 
contradiction one is landed in who tries to give an ultimate ex- 
planation of feeling as pleasure seeking ana avoiding pain, because 
these terms do not supply an aaequate description of the fundamental 
nature/
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nature of feeling. Professor v/ara is evidently in search of a 
metaphysical explanation of feeling,and he ends by giving an ex- 
planation which may apply psychologically to certain phases of 
feeling, "but is not a metaphysical explanation.
As a matter of fact, feeling is the first phase of the animal 
organism; it is not to "begin with concerned with pleasure or pain, 
but with satisfying the needs that it feels; it begins to go out 
of itself because of a sense of incompletemess, and there is no 
point at which this feeling of need or incompleteness Joes not exist
«
from the very beginning up to the end of life. To be is to feel. 
Therefore to describe the nature of feeling as a dodging of pain, 
ana. a seeding of pleasure is to offer a negative account of mina 
and feeling when it ought to be positive; for,of the two, pain and 
pleasure, he regards pain as the more characteristic of feeling 
for he says: (op. clt. p.279} "To ascertain the origin and progress 
of purposive action it seems then, that we must look to the effects 
of pain rather than those of pleasure".
Our criticism here is that there is no such initial neutral 
state of any living organism; the tiniest organism is a vortex of 
activities from the very first impelled by needs or wants or capa- 
cities within wanting satisfaction and expression , but these wants 
are not adequately described as mere pain; they ari acre correctly 
described as a vital force or an'^lan vital". Professor Ward 
seems to be thinking more of the objective stimuli, his "presentation 
continuum" rather than of the subjective mind itself, and that Is 
due/
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due to his preoccupation --with the continuum ana his misconception 
of the fundamental nature of mind. This misunderstanding is appa- 
rent in the self-contradictions to which his conception of -nind 
leads. We shall give one or two instances of this self-contra-
diction; he says^op. cit. p. 54; "V/e should not be Justified that 
feeling is ever determined solely by sensation. For we cannot 
imagine the beginning of life, but only life begun. Psychology 
cannot start with a "tabula rasa." In this passage Professor 
Ward maintains the direct opposite of the position he took up. in the 
earlier passages we quoted. There he said, that it would be rash 
in the extreme to say that feeling was first ana thereupon proceeded 
to show that "sensations", situations", presentations or ideas were 
first, and that feelings were the effects of such sensations with- 
out which they coula not come into existence. His words there 
were: (op. cit. p. 43) "If, then, feeling predominates more and more 
as we approach the beginning of conscious life, nay we not conclude 
that feeling is its only constituent? On the contrary, such a 
conclusion would be rash in the extreme". And again (ibidem; he 
said: "V/e have not first a change of feeling, and then a change 
in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but these changing, 
change of feeling follows. In short, feeling appears to -be an 
effect, which, therefore, cannot exist without its cause". But 
'he has just said above that "we should not be Justified that feeling 
is ever determined solely by sensation". These two statements 
are direct opposi-tes inasmuch as the first maintains that feeling 
cannot exist without its cause which is sensationand U^e  second^>"%-.,
maintains/ :i- V;.
maintains that it can, in spite of the modification "solely". 
This glaring self-contradiction is as we have said due to his fund- 
mental misconception of the nature of mind which leaas hi^i to 
assert one thing of mind at one time and the opposite thing at the 
next. For Instance, i~ the first quotation he conplains that he 
cannot get back to the beginning of mind which he expects to find 
a "tabula rasa" beyond the range of sensations, whereas he says: 
(op. cit. p.45) "The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, 
involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualita- 
tively distinguishable presentations which are the cause of its 
feelings". These two statements again form a contradiction; ana 
it is certain that the simplest form of psychical life does not 
begin with qualitatively distinguishable presentations , and it^is 
equally certainthat it begins not as a "tabula rasa" but with a 
capacity to feel which makes it possible for it to have presentations 
so that the feeling capacity is prior to and not the effect of 
presentations as supposed by Professor YFard. The prior thing is 
the feeling organism; "to be" is "to feel"; PS Professor Ward 
himself says: (op.cit. p. 2 ;45) "feeling as such is, so to put it, 
a matter of being rather than of direct knowledge", ana because it 
feels its need it comes into contact with external objects; it 
does not beginwith "qualitatively distinguishable presentations", 
but with a vague organic sensatlonof warjt; in going out to supply 
that want it meets external objects, ana th^n gets qualitatively 
distinguishable presentations. Thus we see that Professor Ward's 
account of the oraer of the states of consciousness is a miscon- 
struction/
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misconstruction of the facts, and being so naturally lan^c
in self-contradiction,and it obscures the real nature of mind ar^
feeling.
It is, therefore, necessary, here to repeat that this descrip- 
tion of feeling as essentially an avoiaance of py.in ana a seeking of 
pleasure is a very partial account of feeling which is a sense of 
want or needjOf incompleteness and imperfect'.on wherein the glory 
of the organism consists, ana it will avoid pleasure, and seek 
pain, if need be to attain that, end. This same misreading of 
fn.-ts of Professor V;ard is s^en again in the FreulV-?.n ''Pleasure 
Principle" with regarl to which Lr L-rever writes; Cop. cit. p.66/ 
"Freudian psycho1 ogists have mad-.- the conflict between the Pleasure 
Principle ana. the Reality Principle one of the foundation., stones 
Off their psychological theory. Superficially re^ardea, t'ie facts 
seem to be as they assert. But their analysis is inadequate and 
far from complete. Abstract "principles" explain nothing. Nor 
can we accept the view implied in the use of the designation "Plea- 
sure Principle" for the ;-<iost primitive type of motive. The child
or the savage may be insatiable in the pursuit of the satisfaction
»
of crude and primitive impulses, but to call this the seeVi'ng of 
pleasure is to misread the facts of the psychological situation 
altogether". This same criticism applies equally to Professor 
V,r ard's description of feeling, and when two great psychologists 
like Professors V.'ard and Freud fall into tlie sane error, though 1n 
different/
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different ways,-mind being to Freud practically .aechinically 
determined, though not, as we have s-en, to .Yard-*-, it sho'.vs tho 
elusive nature of feeling and consequently of .-Jiir-j. itself, an- as 
a clear coneeptionof the nature of feeling and of mind are inais- 
pens ble to our present inquiry we shall consiuer further Its nature 
in a l'-iter chanter in connectionwith the $n£tlnctive_. w endencles. 
So far as our Inquiry has crone it has shown feeling to be of the 
nature of an urge for completeness, the e'lan vi ! ,al of 31. Bergson, 
and it is with this urge that we connect the need felt by mankind 
for religionv/hic h at its highest and :noct characteristic level is 
a desire for fellowship with Deity which it conceives as complete 
personality.
With regard to this urge Professor J. A. Haj.field says: 
("Psychology and llorals". London. Uethuen. 1^2^.p.6ly "Every organ- 
ism is impeller to ;:iove towards its own completeness. Fulness of 
life Is the goal of life; the urge to completeness is the .aost 
compelling motive of life, There is no motive in life so persis- 
tent as this "hunger for fulfilment whether for the 'needs of the body 
or for the aeepest spiritual satisfactionof our souls which compels 
us to be ever moving onwards till we find it. V/e see the law of 
completeness operating in physiology, in psychology, in morality, 
and in religion. In physiology we c-^ll this completeness health, 
In morality "perfection", in religion "holiness", in psychology 
"self-realisation". .. .So persistent and strong is this lav; that no 
organism can rest until it has satisfied its hunger by achieving its 
complete self".
Our conclusion at this point, therefore, is this , that the 
essential/
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essential nature of religion!s a feeling of neea, a need of fellow- 
ship with the divine owing to a feeling of incompleteness or imper- 
fection, and. to understand the nature of religion we have first to 
understand the nature of the religious ulna, especially the nature 
of the feeling element of mind in which religion originates, because 
not only has the place of feeling in mind been misunderstood, in the 
past, but the nature of feeling has also been misunderstood; it 
has been regarded as "pure feeling" a state which aoes not exist, 
because feeling is never "pure feeling" but contains elements of 
knowledge and will as well. And it is because it has been con- 
fused with this abstract non-existent "pure feeling" that it has 
been denied its regulative place in consciousness and in life and 
religion. V,re shall, therefore, in a litfcr^ chapter consider the 
regulative function of feeling In the 11 fe-iiistory of the organise .
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Chapter III.
1. THE RELIGION OF PEELING
In the preceding chapter an attempt was made to indicate the 
place of feeling in conscious life. This was done by means of a 
brief criticism of Professor Ward's theory of the nature and function 
of feeling, his treatment being the fullest and most metaphysical 
of the psychologies of the past. But his account was shown to be 
inadequate on three grounds: firstly, because he maintains that 
the original phase of mind is a state of inertia or simple content- 
ment without pain or sensation of any kind; secondly, because he 
supposes that this state of equilibrium is maintained until the 
organism is impelled to activity by the supervention of painful 
feeling, so that feeling is avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, 
and of these two, to him, pain is the more characteristic, so that 
pain is the ultimate nature of feeling; thirdly, he makes feeling 
dependent on presentations, that is to say, feeling is secondary 
to cognition in consciousness.
In the present chapter an effort will be made to demonstrate 
the/
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the failure of writers on the subject of religion to render an 
adequate account of its nature on account of their entertaining 
this same inadequate psychology of mind and feeling according to 
which as we have seen ideas or presentations or cognition is pri- 
mary, and feeling is secondary, a mere accompaniment of cognition, 
its ultimate nature being an avoiding of pain. We shall, there- 
fore, take two instances one early and one recent of writers on 
religion whose account of the nature of religion fails on account of 
an inadequate psychology of mind. The first of these is Schleier- 
macher whose work on religion initiated a new era in the study of 
religion, and the second is a recent writer Professor W. E. Hocking, 
so that from Schleiermacher down to the present day the same tra- 
dition has been maintained with regard to mind and feeling with 
great consequent disadvantage to the study and understanding of the 
nature of religion.
To begin with, then, it is hardly necessary to suggest that 
if, as has been shown in the previous pages, feeling is the regu- 
lative principle in mind, and enters so largely into the determina- 
tion of mind, it will not be surprising, if sooner or later in the 
history of religious thought the discovery is made of the importance 
of feeling in the determination of religion which is allowed to 
be one of the most fundamental needs of the human spirit. Thld 
was the discovery made by Schleiermacher and which he gave to the 
world in his famous "Discourses on Religion" and later in more 
systematic/
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systematic form In his "Glaubenslehre" which inaugurated a new era 
in the history of theology and the philosophy of religion by initiat- 
ing the psychological approach to religionwhich appealed to the 
witness of experience and called in question the adequacy of the 
speculative theological methods of his time.
By his time theology had become a branch of philosophy or a 
system of natural theology, based on the theistic proofs which de- 
rivea religious conclusions from what were mostly natural premises, 
and thus sought to support the religious view of the world on what 
was actually a system of metaphysics. This was the age of reason; 
the Hellenic Spirit was in the ascendant; emotion or feeling was 
a matter of reproach and the rationalistic spirit pervaded all de- 
partments of human interest as well as religion, while the Romantic 
movement was slowly making headway. The philosophers of the time 
had evolved systems of theology from within the bounds of pure 
reason; Schleiermacher appealed to the feelings as the source of 
religious experience and doctrine. His position is generally speak- 
ing that in the world there are churches with creeds and doctrines; 
the source of these doctrines is the faith of the Church at any 
particular time; these doctrines and creeds have their genesis in 
feeling, and their criterion is their power to create and sustain 
Christian feeling. The doctrines of the Christian faith, therefore, 
are interpretations of the states of feeling of pious people.
Schleiermacher's great service to religion has been his emphasis on 
the autonomy of religious experience, but his proof fails as we shai: 
see. While, then, his/
59.
his general position may be summarised thus, it is necessary to fol- 
low a little more closely and in detail his exposition of the the- 
ology of feeling in order to see how far it covers the facts of 
religion. Before it will be possible to criticise or appraise his 
position, full opportunity must be given of stating the case fairly, 
making due allowance for a certain amount of exaggeration and for 
what was transient or one-sided in the thought of his time, as many 
strands of thought enter into his theology, because Schleiermacher 
was not only a man who had experience of intense piety, but was also 
a deep thinker who had absorbed into his thinking about feeling and 
experience all the various speculations of his time.
As Professor Pfleiderer says: ("The Philosophy of Religion", 
London, Williams and Norgate, 1886,Eng. Trans., Vol. I, p.304) 
"These manifold elements, - Herrnhutist piety, Lelbnitzian illumin- 
ation, Kantian criticism, Pichtean idealism, Schelling's philosophy 
of identity, Spinoza's pantheism and Plato's dialectics - all entered 
into Schleiermacher^s thought. Nor did he merely connect them ex- 
ternally in an arbitrary eclecticism; his mind was no less actively 
reproductive than receptive on every side, and these elements were 
fused into a whole which was new, and bore the stamp of originality. 
The power which fused them was not so much that of speculative 
thought developing Itself from one principle as that of a peculiar 
moral and religious way of feeling, and a peculiar aesthetic mode 
of view. We spoke above of the general tendency of Romanticism 
the/
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the movement which broke up and continued the genial movement of 
the 18th century, it consisted , we saw, in protesting in every 
sphere of life against reasoned reflection and enlightenment and in 
an assertion of the right and value of what is immediate, feeling 
and fancy, impression and presentiment . This tendency, Schleier- 
macher, the theologian among the Romanticists, applied to the sphere 
of religion".
With these elements of Idealism, pantheism and mysticism, how- 
ever, we are not primarily concerned at present so much as with the 
main question of Schleiermacher*s " account of religion, and his 
psychology of feeling to see whether his account of religion stands 
on solid grounds and to see whether his psychology of feeling actu- 
ally explains the nature of mind. For it is admitted on all hands 
that Schlelermacherfe protest against the intellectual schematised 
account of the religious life and his plea in favour of the feeling 
element was opportune and serviceable in the cause of religion, but 
it is quite a different matter whether he has thereby rendered a 
true and full account of the nature of religion, for until such a 
true and full account is rendered there will still be doubt as to 
the lawfulness of this emphasis upon feeling, no matter how much 
it carries conviction at firsthand no matter how much it agrees with 
the experience of the majority of people, this emphasis on feeling 
will not carry conviction with those who are critical among mankind, 
until it is shown on some more objective ground than the appeal to 
experience that feeling is responsible for the rise of religion in 
the soul. And this objective ground cannot be discovered until it 
is/
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is shown from the psychology of mind itself that feeling is the 
fundamental mode of consciousness. As Professor Hocking says in 
another connection: ("Meaning of God in Human Experience" Yale 
University Press. New York 1924 p.377) "The whole truth lies surely 
in this direction - that all our human impulses and loves are akin. 
And the psychology of inysticism waits less for an analysis of the 
love of God t-han for an analysis of all other human desires". Be- 
fore, therefore, we agree that religion is largely feeling we shall 
have to see whether Schleiermacher offers us an impressive and con- 
vincing psychology of feeling itself which will explain also mind in 
its totality and thereby explain the religious mind also'and religion 
itself, for only by so doing can he convince us that he is in possess 
ion of the truth. A general description of religion as being large- 
ly concerned with feeling may win from us a certain amount of consent 
but it is mere guess-work, and proof is absent, until it is supplied 
by demonstrating the nature of mind itself. We agree, therefore, 
with Professor Hocking that the proof of the nature of religion 
waits on the demonstration of the nature of mind itself. Schleier- 
macher is conscious of this fact and he not only offers a description 
of the nature of religion, but he also offers a psychology of feeling 
in which the genesis of religion is supposed to be found. We shall, 
therefore, begin with a consideration of his theory of religion, and 
thereafter proceed to his psychology of feeling.
In the Discourses he describes religion as "those pious eleva- 
tions of the mind, in particular, in which all other activities are 
repressed or almost suspended, and the whole soul fused in an imme- 
diate feeling of the infinite and eternal and of her union with it. 
For it is in such moments that the disposition you say you contemn
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originally and visibly manifests itself(Professor Pfleiderer, op. ci 
Vol. 1, p.306) Again he says: "That piety springs up necessarily 
and spontaneously from the inward parts of every better soul, that 
she has in the heart a province of her own in which sne bears un- 
obstructed sway, that she is worthy to vivify by her own inner 
power the noblest and most excellent, and to be welcomed and acknow- 
ledged by them, for her own inner nature's sake; this is what I 
maintain( op. cit., Vol,I p.307) Later on in the more scientific 
form of the G-laubenslehre he expresses himself in almost similar 
terms: "Religion in its essential nature is neither a form of know- 
ledge nor a form of activity, but a determination of feeling, or of 
self-consciousness"; and again he writes: "the common element in 
all the varied utterances of religion, that which immediately differ- 
entiates it from all other feelings and constitutes the invariable 
essence of religion is that in it we are conscious of our absolute
dependence upon God". (Glaubenslehre, $6? & 4. Quoted from "Reli- 
gious Experience its Nature and Truth". Kenneth Edward D.Ph. The 
Kerr Lectures, 1926, p.8, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark.)
The discourses are addressed to the cultured among its despiseri 
to whom Schleiermacher makes a plea for religion as a necessary part 
of a full-orbed culture. It is the confusion of religion with 
systems and doctrines that has brought religion into contempt. At 
the outset, therefore, he announces to his readers that it is his 
intention to leave doctrines and systems of religion severely alone 
and to lead them to the innermost springs of religion and the facul- 
ties/
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faculties from which it is evolved, which faculties are the highest 
part of man's nature. The doctrines of religion are merely the 
secondhand version of the real inner experience which is of the 
nature of communion with the Infinite and eternal.
In his second discourse Schleiermacher advances a step farther, 
and tries to describe what this inward immediate nature of religion 
is. He describes it at first negatively: religion is neither 
metaphysics nor morals. It is not knowledge, because the degree of 
piety is not proportionate to the degree of knowledge; nor is it 
morality, because many have lived moral lives who had no knowledge 
of ethical theory; nor yet does piety consist in action, because 
while the essence of action is the consciousness of freedom, the 
essence of religion is self-surrender to the influence of the whole. 
But contemplation is characteristic of religion, and it is out of 
this contemplation religion springs, but this contemplation is not 
like the contemplation of the sciences which seeks to find connect- 
ions between finites, whereas religious contemplation is concerned 
with viewing the infinite whole. Here, however, Schleiermacher 
puts in the caveat that, though religion is neither metaphysics nor 
morality nor action, yet it makes use of all these, and they are 
essential to its completion. In this way he expressly guards him- 
self against the interpretation of subjectivity, but this caveat 
which finds its way in at this point is not given any importance in 
the subsequent argument, and is only mentioned to be left alone, 
while/
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while he goes onto investigate the special moment at which religion 
comes into being. That moment is the moment of contact of the 
universe with our senses. It is "the first coming together of the 
universal life with a particular life, it occupies no time, and forms 
nothing that can be grasped, it is the immediate wedded union, sac-
*
red beyond all mistake and misunderstanding, of the universe with 
the incarnate reason, ......'..    *;     . Of such
a nature is the first conception of every living and original mo- 
ment in your life, to whatever sphere it may belong, and from such 
a conception religious excitement also springs" (Professor Pfeider- 
er, op. cit., Vol. I. p.308 ) Again he says: "Your feeling, in so 
far as it expresses the common existence of you and the all, In so 
far as you have the several moments of it as the operation of G-od 
in you, mediated by the operation of the world upon you, this is 
your piety: your sensations and the operations upon you connected 
with them and conditioning them, of all that lives ana moves around 
you, these and no others are the elements of religion, but these 
all belong to it; there is no emotion that is not religious, unless 
it be one that indicates a diseased condition of life", (op. cit., 
p. 309 ) It is difficult to criticise Schleiermacher's definition 
arid description of religion. It is at once too wide and too narrow 
inasmuch as it makes religion on the one hand co-terminus with feel- 
ing and on the other hand ,it narrows the sphere of religion down 
to one of the tripartite divisions of mind. Even though we find 
Schleiermachar/
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Schlelermacher including in his definition the idea of God, when he 
defines religion in the passage above quoted from the G-laubens- 
lehre, the admission is more or less accidental, and his undisguised 
intention is to make religion identical with feeling. This is due 
to his polemical zeal in excluding knowledge and actionfrom religion 
but these on occasion he finds it necessary to recognise as essential 
to religion, but the admission is only a temporary aberration from 
his main contention in favour of religion as exclusively feeling. 
It certainly simplifies matters to reduce rsligionto one element in 
consciousness, and disregard all the rest, but the rest is not so 
easily disposed of, and it returns to upset the too simplified theory 
by reminding the philosopher that all feelings are feelings of thing! 
without which the feelings could not exist. All subjective feeling! 
have an objective reference of some kind which has to be taken into 
account in any definition of feeling, but if feeling is purely sub- 
jective, then all feelings are the same, and there is no difference 
between true and false. Moreover, if religion is pure feeling, 
then the nature-religions in which the feeling elements greatly pre- 
ponderate over the intellectual are purer religion than the higher 
religions in which the use of reason has been at work in correcting 
wrong ideas, and in purifying emotions and sublimating them to 
higher and higher ends. To Schleiermacher on the other hand reason 
instead of being a help to religion distorts truth. But everyone 
knows that it is not reason that distorts the truth so much as pre-
 
Judice .and that because of the greater element in it of feeling un- 
enlightened by reason. In fact, the work of reason is to correct 
wrong ideas and prejudices, restrain and control extravagant and
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misdirected feelings, and guide them to more exalted ends, which 
results in the refinement and sublimation of feeling; so that the 
relation between feeling and reason is not one of antagonism, but 
of cooperation.
This is the natural result of a consistent theology of feeling; 
it enas in contradiction like the rational theology which it sought 
to displace; but while Schleiermacher failed in his attempt to 
show what religionin its fullness is he succeeded in emphasising 
one element in religion which is fundamental, and which was being 
despised and forgotten. As Professor Pfleiderer says: (op. clt., 
p.316) "Looking back from this standpoint at Schleiermacher's 
notion of religion, we cannot but allow it to be an original attempt 
to comprehend the nature and the manifestation of religion scienti- 
fically from the point of view of idealism. Religion appears no 
longer as a phenomenon coming to man from without whether by divine 
or human instruction, and necessary for the sake of outward ends 
(salvation in the world to come, earthly utility, support to moral- 
ity, etc.) and thus more or less accidental to man himself, but is 
demonstrated as a fundamental fact of man's higher mental life, 
necessarily founded in his own nature and relation to the universe. 
Religion being made thus inward in the human mind, the old dogma- 
tism (theological or metaphysical^ was transcended which never 
allowed the religious spirit to come to itself". But while 
Schleiermacher showed the importance of feeling to religion he did 
not succeed in showing its place in religion. That the place of 
feeling/
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in religion, however, is of great importance is shown by the sub- 
sequent history of the school of feeling which formed into two 
wings the right wing being represented by Frank of Erlangen and the 
left being represented in Germany by Otto and Schweitzer,in France 
by the Symbolofideisme School of Menigoz and Sabatier, by James 
in America, and Percy Gardner in Britain, while the School of 
RitschL and H3rrman f and nowadays of Earth," Gogarten, Bultmann, and 
Brunner* emphasise--the"objective side of religion. Both positions 
rest upon a one-sided view of human nature and a defective view 
of feeling, and, to the present moment, the debate continues, some 
emphasising the feeling element in mind to the disparagement of 
reason, and the representatives of reason overlooking unconsciously 
the tremendous importance of the feeling element, the result of bott 
positions being incalculable loss to the cause of religion in keep- 
ing two elements in the religious life apart which ought to be com- 
bined to the great enhancement of the religious life of mankind.
A good deal of our effort in these pages has been to show that 
the conception of religion entertained by writers depends upon their 
conception of mind; if the conception of mind is biassed in favour 
or reason to the disparagement of feeling and will the conception of 
religion will tend to be that of a philosophy; if the emphasis is 
placed on will there will be a tendency to regard religion as an 
ethical system, and if the emphasis is unduly placed on feeling to 
the exclusion of the other elements in mind the conception of re- 
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religion will be one of subjective idealism, mysticism, or panth- 
eism. Or on the other hand the writers in question may start with 
a preconceived notion of religion as predominantly concerned with on 
of these three elements in mind,and therefrom deduce a psychology 
of mind in line with their preconceived notion. We have Just 
seen this in the case of Schleiermacher's notion of religion which 
supposes to be in its essence a pure feeling so that all feelings 
are religious,and being religious are all equally true. The 
feeling part of every psychosis is the religious part, and the othe: 
elements are the non-religious parts,so that if we wish to isolate 
the religious moment, the feeling will have first to be divorced 
from the rest of the mental content, which operation is, however, 
more easily said than done.
It will be of interest, therefore, to consider briefly Schleier 1 
macher's psychology of mind to see what difficulties arise out of 
giving to the feeling element in mind a fictitious importance to 
the belittling of other elements,which difficulties are a suffi- 
cient refutation of the theory, for any theory is not likely to be 
true which raises more difficulties than it solves, and'when we fin- 
a writer landing in an enigma, it is safe to conclude that the 
truth is somewhere else than in the universe of discourse with 
which he is conversant at the time.
According to Schleiermacher feeling originates from the inter- 
action of our senses with the universe. This interaction results 
in/
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in two things being distinguished, a feeling and a view, but this 
distinction is not the primary thing; the primary state is one con- 
sisting of the union of sense and object, a state anterior to both 
feeling and view,before the two have become separated and disting- 
uished. It is a state, moreover, that cannot be conceptualised and 
of which nothing can be predicated.
According to Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit, . vol. 1. p. 309) 
Schleiermacher in the first edition of the Discourses maintained thai 
feeling and view were inseparable, that the one involved the other, 
so that there could not be feeling without view nor view without 
feeling. Both of them have reality only because they were origin- 
ally one and undivided at the moment of the first coming together of 
mind and the universe. In the 3rd edition, however, he emphasises 
the autonomy of feeling and its independence of view, and its es- 
sential nature and genius is discoverable in this moment of first 
union of mind and the universe before anything can be grasped or dis 
tinguished as either feeling or view, and this is the original mo- 
ment of religion which is outside of all reflection and speculation.
This original moment of Schleiermacher is reminiscent of the 
neutral state in consciousness of Professor Ward which was criticisec 
above in the second chapter. There we saw that according to Pro- 
fessor Ward the original state of mind is a neutral state of poise 
or equilibrium between pleasure and pain, a state prior to either of 
these, that is a state prior to any feeling or consciousness what- 
ever which would be tantamount to unconsciousness. Thus both these 
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great thinkers get hopelessly involved in difficulty because in the 
case of Professor Ward he makes presentations or ideas primary which 
is not true^and to get over the difficulty which his wrong concep- 
tion of mind has landed him into he is obliged to posit an original 
neutral state devoid of feeling of either pleasure or pain. But 
because he is sensible of such a state being very unreal he tries to 
give it substantiality by calling it a state of contentment which, 
however, is "toto caelo" removed in character from a state devoid of 
pleasure or pain, because a state of contentment is one of pure and 
profound feeling, a state as the psychologist would say of the 
harmonious functioning of all the instincts and sentiments. Schlei- 
ermacher lands in difficulty in a different way and for a different 
reason in trying to divorce feeling from view or idea fwhich procedure 
equally does violence to the facts of mind, and so he also, to seek 
escape from his predicament, has, like Professor Ward, to take shel- 
ter in a neutral state of consciousness anterior to either feeling 
or view of which nothing can be grasped or predicated simply because 
it cannot be thought or imagined. Professor Ward tried to give- 
reality to this hypothetical state by calling it a state of content- 
ment; Schleiermacher in his turn endeavours to give it reality by 
calling it "an indifference to opposites".
How Schleiermacher justifies this appellation will be seen from 
a relevant passage from Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit. Vol.1 p. 321) 
He says: "It may be said in Schleiermacher's defence, that this one- 
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71-
one-sided view is chargeable only to the bold paradoxes of the Dis- 
courses, and that his later theory of religion is free from it. 
But a glance at his Dialectic suffices to show how firmly he held, 
up to the end of his life, the identification we have described of 
feeling with religion. In fact, he seeks to establish it by a de- 
duction of feeling, which, however acute, is yet at more than one 
point halting. Feeling, he here argues, is the unity of our being 
in the play between knowledge and will. There must be between the 
predominant activity of the one, and the predominant passivity of the 
other, a point of transition and balance at which the antithesis of 
the different function results in indifference. This indifference 
or identity of the Ego in the interchange of the different functions 
is immediate self-consciousness or feeling. The same indifference 
of opposites which exists in us subjectively as feeling, is object- 
ively, in the Universe, God. This objective unity cannot be given 
as a unity either in our thought or in our will, each of these being 
already engaged in the opposition. God, therefore, is found immedi- 
ately and originally only in our feeling, as the unity, free from 
antithesis of our being; in fact, feeling as this subjactive indif- 
ference to opposites, is nothing but God, as He is posited in our 
consciousness, namely, as a constituent element of our self-conscious 
ness. ThuSjSchleiermacher concludes, feeling is immediately as such 
abstracting from any particular contents of it, simply as this for- 
mal unity of our being, the being of God in us, the only being of 
God/
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God in us, and therefore religion".
One can detect here a supreme heroic effort to accord to 
feeling its full legitimate value and significance, but it will be
^  
at once apparent how invalid the reasoning on which he endeavoufcs 
to support the case is. It is evident, however, that Schleiermacher 
recognises that somehow or other feeling is responsible for the unity 
of the Ego, but he has failed in his effort to explain how this is 
so. Moreover, he has recognised that somehow or other feeling is 
accountable for the bringing of God into relation with consciousness, 
and hence accountable for religion,but again he has failed to ex- 
plain how this is done. The above are two profound truths with 
which we are in agreement, for, it is our contention in the present 
pages that feeling, interest, meaning, value are the principles 
responsible for the unity of the Ego as Schleiermacher.maintains, 
and are the regulative principles in mind. Moreover, it is our 
contention that it is feeling or an urge or Impulse, an're'lan vital^J 
a sense of incompleteness that initiates, and regulates the elabo- 
rate process of feeling, knowing, and willing that brings God into 
our consciousness.
That there is a unity of the Ego, a psychical unity present 
at all stages of development from pure sentiency to rational 
self-consciousness, we have already seen, a teleological^prin- 
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principle which make development possible, and which we have elected 
to call the spirit of man. We have also seen that this principle 
begins in sentiency, and reaches rational self-consciousness, but 
that reason is not a new force superinduced upon life from without 
at the higher level as Dr Drever pointed out. This co-ordinating 
factor is present throughout all the stages of development, at the 
lowest stages as well as at the highest stages of life and behaviour, 
but at the lowest levels this integrating synthetising factor is not 
conscious of itself. At the lowest stages, therefore, and through- 
out long tracts of this development this co-ordinating factor will 
be predominantly of the nature of feeling and to the end, we main- 
tain, that feeling regulates the development^and this is the import- 
ant truth that is at the foundation of Schleiermacher's insistence 
upon feeling. What he insists on is that the religious conscious- 
ness does not depend on the clearness of its concepts or of its 
ratiocinative processes, otherwise the majority of mankind would be 
congenitally debarred from religion; the religious mind depends on 
something else , on feeling, presentiment, faith and intuition. 
The religious mind intuits God and intuition is largely feeling.
This is the fundamental mistake of Schleiermacherjin endeavour- 
ing to demonstrate the importance of feeling in mind and in the 
religious consciousness he tried to show that it was all important, 
and thus banished fromthe religious consciousness all other elements 
of thought and will. This abstracted feeling he identifies with 
the Ego and more paradoxical still with the being of God Himself as 
He/
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He is in and for our consciousness as well as the unity of the world 
both of which are presented with the feeling from the first; to 
have feeling at all is to have this consciousness of the unity of 
self, of the world and of G-od without the help of reason or will, 
that is to say, all feeling is religious. This is the result of 
imagining that feeling can be pure feeling functioning independent 
of the rest of mind. Peeling, however, can never be abstracted
i
from the rest of mind in this way; it is only one of the three mode^ 
of mind which are all inextricably mingled together, and so far from 
being religious from the beginning it may be either good or bad. 
Moreover the ideas of God and the universe which are supposed to be 
presented in feeling automatically from the first are ideas that comej 
after a long history of thought and activity. Thus we see that to 
maintain that feeling is all important and independent of reason and 
will and the original unadulterated source of our knowledge of God 
as Schleiermacher maintained is a vastly different proposition from 
what we here maintain, namely, that feeling is the regulative prin- 
ciple in mind and has a much larger share than is commonly allowed 
in the determination of the nature of mind and of religion.
2. The Relation between Feeling and Idea.
We haveconsidered the attempt of Schleiermacher to explain 
religion as feeling, and though his emphasis on this side of religioi 
due to his religious experience was of vital importance to religion 
and theology it failed to settle the question of the true nature of 
religion/
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religion because of his failure to make clear the exact place of 
feeling in religion owing to his fundamental mistake of drawing a 
sharp line of demarcation between feeling and other mental elements 
and attributing to feeling alone what is due to the activity of mind 
as a whole, and so the debate on the nature of religion has continue* 
down to the present day.
We shall,therefore, now consider the relation between feeling 
and thought or idea, because it is not enough merely to emphasise 
the importance of feeling in religion; no one can convince others oi 
this fact until he has first of all gone to the root of the problem 
and offered them a clear psychology of feeling as well as of the 
other elements of mind. Anything short of this will leave us in 
the realm of conjecture. For this reason many writers have seen 
the necessity to shew the relation between feeling,knowing and will.- 
ing. One of these expositions therefore we shall briefly consider, 
namely, that by Professor W. E. Hocking in his book "The Meaning of 
God in Human Experience" (Yale University Press, New York, 1924) 
This is one of the great and brilliantly written books that have 
come from across the Atlantic. We shall,therefore, consider what 
solution he offers of this problem which seems to us to be the cru- 
cial one in settling the nature of the religious consciousness, for 
it will settle whether we are to regard religion as pure mysticism 
or a philosophy, or a system of ethics. If, therefore, Professor 
Hocking's exposition is found to be free from such contradictions 
as we found in the case of Professor Ward and Schleiermacher, there 
will/
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will be the presumption that he is in possession of the truth, but 
if he leads us into a "cul-de-sac", and goes into innumerable foot- 
notes and appendices over the matter, the suspicion cannot be helped 
that we have been led the wrong way, and that the truth is somewhere
else, and that, had his conception of mind been different, he might
<
with his brilliant pen have offered us a much more interesting,be- 
cause truer account of religion. Such a procedure, if it does not 
discover for us what either feeling or religion is, may, at least 
have the important result of showing us what they are not, and thus 
enable us more readily to suggest what feeling.: is, and wherein re- 
ligion consists, so that in this and all other apparent deviations 
we have taken we are all the time heading for a solution.
Professor Hocking begins by stating the case in favour of the 
primacy of feeling; he says: (op. cit., p.33) "We have now to deal 
with this view that religion is a matter of feeling. We may agree 
to use the word feeling in a very wide sense - as a name for what- 
ever is consciousness, deeper than explicit thought, is able to give 
a bent to conduct. Feeling is not as we sometimes think it, a 
wholly vague and uncertain principle; it is capable of bearing much 
responsibility inthe direction of practical living. In the form 
of moral disposition, it may be the highest, as well as the most in- 
dividual determinant of conduct and bearing. The question whether 
religion belongs to this realm of practical and responsible feeling 
rather than to the realm of thought is an issue of greater practical 
interest/
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interest than may appear in this formal statement". In the above 
quotation, though the writer has thrown out very weighty thoughts 
suggestive of the importance of feeling, he feels that its importanc 
transcends his expression of it. He, therefore, expresses himself 
a little later in another passage apologetic of feeling, as follows: 
(op. cit., p.39) "Further if the essence of religion is feeling, it 
is to be judged by feeling and not by argument, - it is to be Judged 
as beauty and right are judged: we are not only at liberty to brin^ 
our instincts to bear, we are compelled to bring them to bear, - a 
responsibility from which we too easily escape when religion is gain 
ed by accepting a creed. Who will say that this requirement is not 
more adapted than the old one to keep alive the spirit of genuine 
religion? That forced conclusion which has driven religion from 
intellect toward feeling may thus prove a literal god-send to religi 
But there are other grounds for this change; it is, in fact, the 
outcome of converging tendencies so various that they can only be 
called the labour of an age".
Of these converging tendencies which have served to emphasise 
the importance of feeling Professor Hocking to begin with mentions 
two main divisions, the comparative study of religions and the his- 
tory of religions. The spread of civilization through conquests, 
crusades, or missions has made comparison of different religions 
inevitable,which has resulted in the deliberate and scientific com- 
parison of the different religions. Such comparison has brought 
into prominence the identity of essence in all religions. This 
essence/
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essence is something else than the religious ideas, such as myths, 
prophecies, angelologies, and eschatologies, which seem to vary in- 
definitely whereas the essential part of all religions seems to be 
independent of all these, something grounded in the instinctive part 
of human nature,in feeling. The feelings of religion all mankind 
share, whereas the ideas are a continual cause of discord; they 
are what keep religions apart and at variance with one another.
Of the effect of the study of the history of religions on the 
other hand, Professor Hocking speaks in a classical passage which 
we reproduce for its pointedness here as well as for future refer- 
ence. He saysi v Op. cit., P.41) "A similar impression is made by 
the life histories of religious movements, as we are now able to 
understand them. Religion renews its life in great outbursts of 
impulse which emanate not from new thoughts, but from rarely impress 
ive personalities, capable of inspiring exalted and passionate de- 
votion in their friends and followers. Their utterances are poetic 
oracular, couched in figure and parable, not in thesis. While 
their power and meaning seems to be propagating itself by the medium 
ship of words and thoughts, it is in reality propagating itself 
immediately, by infection, by contact, by the laying on of hands, by 
leaping across of an overmastering fire. In the presence of such 
men, leaders and carriers, others are lifted, not to high knowledge 
but indeed to a high degree of moral potency which is capable of 
executing great deeds, sometimes on the most visionary basis. With 
the crisis of the critical business of thinking and philosophising 
the/
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the decline of religious vitality keeps even step. As passion cool* 
theology spreads; and as theology spreads, passion cools still more 
Remoteness from religious leadership can infallibly be read in the 
conditions of religious life in a given place or age. The stream 
which at its source is impetuous, fierce, channel-plowing, here at 
its mouth lies lazy, divided, straggling off to the dead-level of 
religious homogeneity, through the arms of shallow, reasoning sects, 
where by the very multitude of distinctions between the believers 
there is hardly any more distinction between river and bank, saint 
and sinner^!.
In arriving at this comparative and historical judgment on re- 
ligion Professor Hocking points out that many sciences have co-oper- 
ated which have themselves no direct religious interest but whose 
results have turned out to be serviceable in the solution of the 
religious problem. Of these scientific currents of thought Pro- 
fessor Hocking mentions four - the psychological, the biological, 
the pragmatic, the critical.
With regard to the first of these, the psychological, this 
particular line of study hasproduced the almost unanimous conviction
V
among philosophers that nothing is real which does not belong to 
conscious experience with the result that nowadays public events, 
development of crafts, the making of States and the shaping of ideals 
are all examined from their inner ends, their significance to mind. 
Most/
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Most of the reality of the world is itsreality for mind; the world 
is what it feels to mind. Behaviour is the all important subject 
which is the reaction of mind to the world and the world is therefore 
best regarded as a stimulus. This points to the importance of 
feeling which is felt to be real, fundamental, immediate, and person- 
al.
The biological current of thought points in the same direction. 
This line of study seems to find the real in what is aboriginal and 
germinal; it emphasises the significance of the origin of life in 
the interaction of organism and environment and the development of 
organisms through higher and higher stages from sentiency to ration- 
al self-consciousness and the questionto be asked is what it is that 
determines this development. Reason cannot be the primary deter- 
minant because reason is only characteristic of the higher stages 
of^development, whereas feeling is found at all stages from the 
highest to the lowest reaches of behaviour. This then would seem 
to be the real because it is the permanent constituent in life. 
Peeling is prior to ideas which are only signs and signals of the 
deeper reality.
The next modern scientific tendency which Professor Hocking 
considers is the pragmatic one, which insists that nothing is real v 
which does not work. According to this view it is not fact con- 
sciousness but value consciousness that works and value depends on 
feeling. Moreover essences are known to be energies and not ideas, 
and/
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and mind is a continual source of energy which is feeling. Ideas 
on the other hand, are to the pragmatist a cause of failure of spon- 
taneous reaction; they delay and hinder action.
According to the above three currents of thought ideas have to 
be tested by a higher authority which involves to a large extent 
feeling. With this agrees the critical current of thought. Accord 
ing to this tendency of thought if ideas are to be examined they 
cannot be examined without bringing feeling to bear on them; the 
idea has to be felt first before we can criticise it and the idea 
as felt is very much richer than the exposition or rationale of it. 
The feltness is the test.
Professor Hocking allows that the above group of tendencies are 
arweighty consensus in favour of the view that religion is grounded 
in feeling, and he goes on to remind us of the fact that religion is 
commonly regarded as an affair of the heart more than that of the 
head, that religion must be accessible to the unlearned as well as 
to the learned, to babes, in fact, which can hardly be so, if reli-
 
gion depends on the results of thinking. Moreover, religion is not 
strongest in the clearest thinkers nor can thinking produce religior 
These truths that have been from earliest times regarded as axiom- 
atic are nowadays receiving the imprimatur of philosophical scienti- 
fic thinking which brings additional assurance that feeling is the 
essence of religion.
Therefore, as a result of the above cumulative evidence the 
following picture of religion emerges according to Professor Hocking! 
(op. cit., pp.49 - 51)
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(op. cit., pp.49 - 51) "Religion is to be understood as a product 
and manifesto of human desire; and that of no secondary and ac- 
quired desire, such as curiosity, but of deep-going desire, deep as 
the will to live itself......If we should venture to name this deep- 
set desire which we call religious it might be represented as an 
ultimate demand for self-conscious preservation: it is a man's 
leap, as individual and as species, for eternal life in some form, 
in presence of an awakened fear of fate......Religion is a reaction
to our finite situation.......as instinctive as a start or shudder..
an appalling recognition of what and where I am in the Universe.....
a great emotional response to the felt perils and glories of the 
weird situation...... If we resist the impulse to refer the whole
experience to a special faculty, different alike from thought, feel- 
ing and from will, in short to a "supernatural sense", we must cer- 
tainly choose the realm of feeling as fittest to contain so unique 
and intimate a transaction. The history of religious agony and 
despair, of hope, attaihment, exultation, the whole gamut of the in- 
tense inner drama, shows beyond doubt the locus and eternal spring 
of the vitality of religion. Such feeling is peculiarly able to 
retain the position which religion must hold in our living - the 
position which reason is always exposed to losing. There is some- 
thing unspoiled and original about human feeling: it lies beyond 
the reach of dispute, refutation, and change. Religious feeling 
is the adequate counterpart of those metaphysical first principles 
upon which so much used to be hung, in everything that made those 
principles attractive. It has the same primordial and original 
character, the same cosmic scope and dignity; and it had in additio
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what these principles had not, " the energetic property which fits 
it not alone to guide, but also to instigate ana to sustain what it 
has produced".
After having put the case for feeling in this very impressive 
way Professor Hocking then goes on to put forward the case for idea. 
He points out that religp.cn has never yet taken itself as a matter of 
feeling. The religious consciousness of prophets and originators 
of religion has been essentially objective, concerning itself with 
metaphysical objects, with God and the life beyond,and the more im- 
portant the prophet the more important his metaphysic for which 
reason he has always been regarded as a revealer of truth. Mighty 
religion and mighty strokes of speculation, Professor Hocking points 
out, have always gone together; a great religion will produce a 
great system of ideas. But religion seems to be in this predica- 
ment; it has to express itself in theoretical terms,and at the same
time is not able to claim scientific validity for its truths, because
o. 
its objects are beyond experience. This dilemma shows itself in
the case of the Scholastics of Medievalism who maintained the theore- 
tical validity of religious doctrines^and of the Mystics on the 
other hand who asserted the hopelessness of the idea to render any 
adequate account of religious experience. The Mystics, therefore, 
found a solution in paradoxes, such as that God is real and at the 
same time He is nothing, infinite emptiness. The cause of the 
dilemma is the necessity of the idea which, iinadequate as it may 
appear to be, cannot be dispensed with, nor can the dilemma be re- 
moved/
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removed by investigating such distinctions in knowledge as those 
suggested "by faith and reason, thought and intuition, intellect and 
insight.
Professor Hocking, therefore, suggests a method of procedure 
towards a solution; it is that of investigating the relation that 
exists between feeling and idea. He says (op. cit., p.63) "The 
best hope lies in a different direction, namely, in attacking the 
division already set up between feeling and idea. The advocates of 
the religion of feeling are not mistaken in referring our various 
religious ideas to a higher authority, which they call feeling: 
the mistake is, as I think, in not observing that the higher autho- 
rity is'itself,;;still idea. Idea can only be judged and corrected 
by idea; but these most authoritative ideas are so much more intl^. 
mately related to experience and to feeling than other ideas as to 
Justify nearly all that the religion of feeling asserts. It seems 
probable that in religion idea and feeling are Inseparable; and 
that whatever valid ideas religion may have are to be found in that
 
region of human nature where the cleavage between idea and feeling, 
never more than a tendence to diverge, no longer exists.
Our writer has here with great facility arrived at a solution 
which immediately removes this oM difficulty of this cleavage or 
division between idea and feeling. His "attack" at one fell swoop 
causes the division to vanish completely, and we are conducted in 
peace to "that region of human nature where the cleavage between idea 
and feeling never more than a tendency to diverge, no longer exists.
if/
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If then "the cleavage no longer exists" the problem has been solved 
and this supposed crucial question that separated Scholastics and 
Mystics has been effectively answered. If "the cleavage no longer 
exists" we may say that idea has coalesced with feeling or that 
feeling has coalesced with idea,and they are no longer two but one 
thing without any division or distinctionbetween them, and it is a 
matter of indifference what designation we apply to the resultant 
entity "idea" as we shall see immediately later on that according to 
him the rationale of feeling is to "fund itself in idea".
This is rather a simple and convenient explanation of the re- 
lation between feeling and idea, if it wer-J not so unbelievable that 
two elements, that play such very different parts as Professor Hock- 
ings own exposition shows, should in the end be found to be only one 
and the same thing. Further he says that the cleavage between idea 
and feeling is never more than a tendency to diverge, but on his own 
showing, which we reproduced at considerable length for this purpose, 
feeling and idea are so divergent as to cause a division between 
them from the dawn of philosophy, through the whole course of reli- 
gious history down to the present time. And the division between 
them is happily not going to be done away with in this facile way, 
because psychologists assure us that the three states of consciousnei 
are absolutely irreducible to one another, so that, whatever the 
ultimate explanation of feeling is, it is not going to be amalga- 
mated and lost in something else. The motive underlying this re- 
duction into idea and the desire to give feeling a decent burial and 
to/
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to give the credit to some supposed higher part of our nature like 
idea or will is the unconscious feeling on the part of the present 
writer and of many writers that feeling is primitive, aboriginal, 
"infra dignumj and this unconscious prejudice acts disastrously on 
the writer's exposition of religion, for, instead of developing a 
conception of religion in line with his lucid description of the 
place of feeling in religion, he spends his energy on a brilliant 
effort to show how feeling is lost in idea,and how idea struggles 
to get rid of feelingand other such mental acrobatics, and>when he 
has reached this point^we feel that the writer has entered a laby- 
rinth. We are treated to wearisome footnotes and appendices which 
make "confusion worse confounded". Thus a wrong psychology of mind 
puts the writer permanently off the track; very charming pages the 
same writer provides, but what might he not have produced with a 
truer conception of mind?
Lest there be a suspicion thatthis criticism is made on insuf- 
ficient evidence we give a few more quotations. He says: (op. cit. 
p.65) "It follows that that which can satisfy feeling is something 
which will destroy it as^feeling ......In the movement of life
feeling is always present, for the destruction of feeling is as a 
rule the inception of another: one feeling debouches into another.. 
Thus emotion maintains a perpetual circle while life lasts. But 
it remains true that to satisfy any given feeling is to bring that 
feeling to an end. And if the attainment which religion offers 
is indeed a satisfaction of all desire, and not of some fragment of 
our nature, it must intend a living escape from this perpetual circl 
we/
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we should expect to find in religion the destruction of all feeling 
as such". Again he writes: (op. cit., p.66) "If we are right, 
feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea: it 
refers always to something beyond the present self and has no exist- 
ence save in directing the self toward that object in whose presence 
its own career must end". And again he writes; (op. cit., p.67) 
"All positive feeling, I dare now say, reaches its terminus in know- 
ledge..... In the satisfaction of feeling, the guiding idea coalesces 
immediately with the object then known as present; to the including 
mind there is perfect continuity between prophecy and fulfilment - 
the feeling is unaware of death".
The language here,"feeling unaware of death", "feeling reaches 
its terminus in knowledge", "its own career must end", "in religion 
the destruction of all feeling as such", "a living escape from this 
perpetual circle", is reminiscent of,and applicable to,consciousness 
as conceived by Buddhist philosophy in its idea of Nirvana and ab- 
sorption, but it is certainly not applicable to religious feeling as 
v/e find it, say, in a religion like Christianity. If, as we in 
these pages maintain, the genesis of religion is ir. a feeling of 
incompleteness and a desire for union and communion with the Infin- 
ite, when that Infinite is recognised, let us say, in the objective 
fact of Christ, the feeling that sought fellowship with the Infinite 
is not annihilated in the acceptance of Christ; rather is the feel- 
ing more expanded, enriched, informed and enhanced. The "quale" 
of the feeling has altered; before it was dissatisfaction; now it 
is satisfaction, but in becoming satisfied it has not ceased to be, 
nor passed over into the idea or fact of Christ, an unimaginable
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process. And so is the case with all other feelings and their 
ideas; at first there is feeling after idea and then feeling of the 
idea or feeling modified by idea, but feeling meeting fact or idea 
does not mean the death of feeling followed by the growth of another] 
brand new feeling. What Professor Hocking seems to have in mirid 
here is not feeling, but desire, because desire does come to an end 
on the attainment of its object, and then a new desire succeeds in 
its place with a new object in view, but this description does not 
apply to feeling which is a mode of consciousness, and is as con- 
tinuous as consciousness itself. Another statement that is con- 
tradictory in one of the above quotations is where he says that 
"feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea"; 
in that case what is the great necessity of feeling to immolate it- 
self to idea as being its end* It has been on the contrary always 
understood that feeling is not as objective as idea, but that feel- 
ing is distinctly subjective, and that it bears the relation to idea 
of subject to object, or that the rationale of -the one is subject- 
iveness and of the otteer objectiveness.
We conelude t then,that the writer has failed to comprehend the 
nature of feeling, and consequently of religion. Another reason 
why he fails to comprehend the nature of religion is because he sets 
out with too low an estimate of religion which he regards as an in- 
stinct of self-preservation according to one of the passages above 
quoted. But this instinct of self-preservation as we mentioned 
already/
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already is characteristic also of the lower animals who have no re- 
ligion; therefore, we have to look for the genesis of religion in 
something higher and more characteristic of human nature, namely, in 
his sense of incompleteness and desire for union and communion with 
the Infinite. There are two cardinal mistakes of writers on re-   
ligion: one is to take religion at its lower stages as character- 
istic whereby they miss what is most characteristic at the higher 
stages, and, secondly, they place the seat of religion too exclu- 
sively in the intellectual part of human nature to the too great 
exclusion of feeling in which largely the dynamic of personality re- 
sides.
That there is this tendency among thinkers we shall adduce as 
proof one more instance namely that of a writer who makes not idea, 
but will the primordial element in mind. Principal Galloway writes 
(op. cit., p. 431) "The type of unity manifested in psychical pro- 
cess, in the forms of life, and in the most rudimentary individuals 
is conative unity. In every organism the active principle brings 
about an order and connexion of parts and processes, so that each 
and all co-operate to realise a final purpose or end* Within the 
world this active principle or will brings into being and sustains 
those interacting systems which we call organisms. That conation 
operative in the simplest individuals, successively builds up higher 
and more complex types of unity within the experienced world, is a 
highly significant fact. If win be taken to cover all forms of 
conation/
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conation, then will, thus broadly conceived, is the unifying prin- 
ciple of experience. And if will is the basis of life, it is like- 
wise the active principle which co-ordinates and unites the inter- 
acting elements of the organism. But if Will can build the element^ 
cf reality into those more and more complex systems which mark the 
evolution of life, it is plausible to suppose that a Supreme Will 
conferred their initial unity on the interacting monads or centres of 
experience themselves. On this theory the Supreme Win f which is 
the fundamental principle of unity or Synthesis behind experience, i£ 
reproduced in type in those living systems that appear within experi-
ence" .
Prom this quotation one can see that Principal Galloway regards 
the essential nature of God as Will and it is the fiat of this Will 
that brings into being and sustains all created beings. This prin- 
ciple of will is also the basis of the life of the individual and 
it controls his whole evolution* But we have already adduced evi- 
dence that the will is not primordial in man, but-feeling which is a 
feeling of incompleteness, an urge towards fuller life, an elan vitaj 
and, in reaching out to this fuller life, thought and will come into 
play. Without this urge from within thought and will would be in- 
ert not knowing what to think or do.
Will is, therefore, not the determining principle in the nature 
of the individual nor is it the determining principle in the nature 
of God as the above writer supposes. The determining principle in 
the nature of God is not will but love which is of the nature of 
feeling,/
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feeling, and it is this love that is the cause of the creation of 
the Universe and the cause of the creation of creatures in its own 
image. Mere will it is certain would never trouble to create a 
universe,much less innumerable troublesome beings in its own image, 
and of a Good Will on the other hand, which the writer considers God 
to be, all that coula be said is that it might or might not create 
other beings like itself, but the love which is overflowing goodness 
and lovingkindness makes the creation of the u'niverse and of mankind 
inevitable, so that a description of God which does not insist on 
love as the primary attribute of God is as far short of the truth as 
a description of mind which does not do justice to its primary na- 
ture of feeling, because mind is derived from and made in the image 
of the mind of God. God, therefore, cannot be adequately represent- 
ed as anything less than love which may be defined as goodness in 
continuous action; He certainly cannot be adequately represented as 
Supreme Will which is the description of God offered by Mohammedan- 
ism and Calvinism, and that is why both these religions though po- 
ssessing strong points are rightly regarded as defective. To 
Mohammedanism God is supreme, predestinating will or fate and the 
religious duty is Islam or .Surrender to that will, and,as is well 
knownjamong the ninety-nine names that Allah possesses he is not 
once called love. To Calvinism God is no doubt ostensibly love, 
but He is love that can predestinate beings made in His own image to 
everlasting punishment, and nothing can prevent this if God in His 
essential nature is Supreme Will. No doubt to Principal Galloway 
also/
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also God is love, but it is quite evident that he has not oriented 
his thinking on religion from the conception of God as love, because 
the word love does not appear in the index of his Philosophy of Re- 
ligion, nor does it receive any treatment in his book.
In the next chapter therefore, we shall deal with the subject 
of the instinctive tendencies whereby it will be shown that the in- 
stinct of love is the foundation of and integrating force in life and 
character^and in religion, because it is that fundamental impulse 
that accounts for our self-preservation, love towards our fellowmen, 




In t-he last chapter we have been considering the views of 
religion of two writers whose account of it fails because of their 
inadequate account of mind, and we further saw that their account of 
mind fails at the point where they try to explain the nature of feel 
ing. Schleiermacher, indeed, does make feeling the primary element 
in mind, but fails to make clear its function and nature. Profes- 
sor Hocking, on the other hand, like Professor Ward makes cognition 
or idea, prior to the rest of mind. Both these latter writers, 
while apparently aware of the importance of feeling, seem reluctant 
to accord to it the primary place in mind, as if such an admission 
was "infra dignum". But the above two writers are not alone in 
this, and examples could easily be multiplied of this reluctance on 
the part of writers on psychology and religion to acknowledge the 
rock from which consciousness is hewn, and the pit from which it has 
been digged, and as a result their theories come to unsurmountable 
passes.
Three random instances of this tendency will suffice. Pro- 
fessor H6*ffding ("Outlines of Psychology", London, MacMillan, Eng. 
Trans., p.308) says: "As in Greek mythology Eros was made one of th< 
oldest and at the same time one of the youngest of the gods, so in 
ps ychology the will may, according to the point of view, be represen 
ed as the most primitive, or as the most derivative of mental pro- 
ducts/
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products". A second writer, Principal Galloway, ("Philosophy of 
Religion", Edinburgh, T.& T. Clark, 1925, p. 284) writes: At the 
lowest level is the mere feeling of awareness, which is, however, 
only possible through the presence of conation". Again (op. cit., 
p. 354) the same writer says: "Psychological analysis suggests, I 
venture to think, the line of advance is from activity, through 
interest, to ideas of value and to the notion of end". And once 
again (op. cit., p.423) he says: "Without doubt the basal element 
in psychical process, the element which underlies the development of 
feeling and thought, is will, or put more generally, conation" . 
A third writer, Professor E. S. Waterhouse ("The Philosophy of Re- 
ligious Experience", London, Epworth Press, 1923, p. 67) writes: 
"Peeling appears always as the accompaniment of activity, by which 
it is conditioned, and on which it depends, varying with the vital 
character and intensity of the activity". To the above three write 
who are typical of a great many, conation is prior to, and is the 
cause of, feeling, but we have seen that to Dr Drever, for instance 
feeling ,is primary and the regulative principle in mind. To Pro- 
fessor H6"ffding conation is primary, but, as he says, it may be 
secondary "according to the point of view".
In a state of knowledge, .therefore, where the psychology of 
mind depends on "the point of view", of the writer, it is necessary 
to find some more objective ground than abstract theory on which to 
base our conception of the nature of mind and being* It must not 
be Imagined that it is immaterial to an enquiry into the nature of 
the prophetic consciousness what view we hold of the order or se- 
quence/
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sequence of the states of consciousness, and consequently of mind 
and being. As a matter of fact our psychology of mind is going to 
determine very materially our conclusions with regard to the nature 
of the religious consciousness. Of this dependence of theology 
upon psychology we have an egregious example in the case of Profes- 
sor Ho'ffding, quoted above, for whom the natureof will or conation 
changes "according to the point of view"; it is this same writer 
whom we quoted in our first chapter as saying in his "Philosophy 
of Religion" that the definition of religion is "a matter of taste". 
And this must be the plight of any writer who does not first come 
to a definite understanding with himself that mind must have a deter- 
minate nature which is independent of "the point of view 1.' Anbther 
example of this dependence of theology upon psychology is that of 
Principal Galloway to whom, as we have seen above, conation or will 
is primary, and in accordance therewith he regards God as Supreme 
Will, and man as Monad Will created by God in his own image. We 
also venture to think that we could have been spared the great ma- 
jority of the fifty definitions referred to by Professor Leuba, if 
only writers on the subject of religion began by determining the 
nature of mind itself. We would also have been spared the melan- 
choly admission by Professor Webb that religion cannot be defined, 
if the said writer had been in possession of a truer conception of 
mind, but, as we have seen above, according to Professor Webb all we 
know is a stream of sensations, 'but we have no right to postulate a 
mind or self or soul over and above this stream. No wonder then 
that/
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that with this stream our writer is at sea, and that in his opinion 
religion cannot be defined. We admit that it cannot "be defined witt 
any degree of adequacy, until first of all the essential nature of 
mind itself has been determined, and, when that has been done, it 
may be possible then to discover the essential nature of the relig- 
ious consciousness which is one of the phases of mind. There 
seems, therefore, to be ample   Justification for not leaving this part 
of our subject, until we have established as far as possible beyond 
doubt, the argument initiated in the last chapter that the view of 
mind which does justice to the facts of mind, and to the religious 
consciousness, is that whereby feeling is regarded as the "primum 
movens", the regulative principle in consciousness, for on this 
conception of mind is founded the view of the prophetic consciousness 
put forward inthese pages as the consciousness of a want or need of 
fellowship with a personal God, a relationship impelled by love 
wherein feeling or emotion plays a very important part, and the 
stages of progress in that communion such as repentance, conversion, 
faith, self-sacrifice, love and mystic union can only be fully com- 
prehended by realising clearly what feeling involves and its relation 
to knowing and willing. But here, again, we must issue a reminder 
that feeling, though primary, is only one of the three modes of 
consciousness, and that it is inextricably associated with intellect- 
ual and conative tendencies, and is only one of the three states of 
mind.
It will, therefore, be necessary to consider the nature of mind 
from/
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from another point of view, namely, that afforded by the instinct 
psychology, and we shall thereby at one and the same time be con- 
sidering the nature of the instinctive tendencies in a way that will 
carry us a stage forward towards'our solution of the nature of the 
religious consciousness, and we shall also thereby further confirm 
the view of mind that has been upheld in the previous chapters, and 
which is essential to the view of religion submitted herein. In 
this chapter, therefore, we shall see how a faulty view of mind, 
which puts the mental cycle out of gear by placing cognition first, 
acts disastrously on the theory of a brilliant exponent of the ins- 
tinct psychology, namely, Professor McDougall. The fact is that 
while we have works that deal exhaustively with cognition we have 
not yet any first rate "magnum opus" on feeling. If we open any 
of the orthodox textbooks on psychology, and compare the small 
amount of space allotted to the treatment of feeling with the multi- 
tude of pages devoted to cognition and its allied topics, we shall 
be convinced that an adequat e psychology of feeling or interest or 
meaning is long overdue. The only large work that has yet appeared 
on the subject is by the Austrian scholar, urth,which however has 
not yet been translated into English. And we are convinced that 
this lack of an adequate psychology of feeling has been a great loss 
to the study of religion, as well as to its teaching and practice in 
a variety of ways, and has been the cause of the vagueness as to the 
nature of religion that exists up to the present among the most 
eminent/
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eminent scholars, as we have seen, some regarding it as metaphysics 
or ethics, or aesthetics, or an evolutionary process, whereas reli- 
gion, while engrossing all these in its development, remains pre-em- 
inently a spiritual relationship with the Divine, a relationship 
determined by love, and its true nature can never "be fully compre- 
hended until we have first of all comprehended the nature of the 
spirit or soul or self which is behind all the processes and activi- 
ties. There is nothing that displays more of the characteristics 
that we associate with spirit than feeling which we shall see is 
very deepseated and prior to and determinative of the rest of mind. 
And the lack of a "magnum opus" on feeling has not only been a loss 
to the study of religion on its theoretical and practical side, but 
it has been no less a loss to the cause of education where feeling, 
interest, and meaning are so important. We shall therefore in this 
chapter, firstly, offer a Justification of the theory of the instinct 
ive tendencies which are still debated, and thereafter we shall con- 
sider the origin, nature and function, of these tendencies by cri- 
ticising the theory of them propounded by Professor McDougall which 
seems to be founded on a faulty conception of mind, and by so doing 
we shall get nearer to the true nature of mind, or soul, or self, or 
spirit.
To begin with, therefore, we shall consider the nature of in- 
stinct in general, because most of the divergence of opinion with 
regard to mind ana religion is due to the tendency of writers to 
concentrate on one phase of experience and interpret the rest of 
mind in accordance with it. It will be necessary, therefore, to 
seek/
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seek a point of view which will include within its ambit all the 
phases of mental life. This point of view is claimed to have been 
reached by the exponents of the instinct psychology. We shall, 
therefore, consider 5n this chapter the account of mind offered by 
this school through one of its representatives, Professor McDougall. 
In the supplementary chapter of his "Social Psychology" (London, 
Methuen, J926, 26th Ed., p.303) on "Theories of Action", Professor 
McDougall claims that his theory of instincts does more justice to 
all the facts of the realm of life than any rival theory because it 
"is applicable to every form of animal and human effort, from the 
animalcules pursuit of food or prey to the highest forms of moral 
volition". He says that there are two words, conduct and behaviour, 
conduct being applied to the behaviour of self-consciousness and 
rational beings, while behaviour is the wider genus of which conduct 
is the species. There are four distinguishing marks of behaviour 
according to McDougall: 1. The creature does not simply move mecha- 
nically impelled by external force; it strives towards an end. 
2. It not only strives towards an end; it also varies the means of 
attaining that end, if necessary. 3. The striving is not due to 
reflex action of independent parts; the whole organism is involved 
in the activity. 4- The striving is not simply a repetition of 
the previous process; there is increased efficiency of action. The 
whole world of material things,then, is divided into two classes, 
1. A class of things explainable on mechanical principles, 2. A class 
of things whose^ changes display the above four marks of behaviour, 
and are, therefore, to be described as teleological or purposive.
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Now it is over this word purposive that opinions diverge on 
account of the fact that many writers make the meaning of purpose toq~ 
narrow. They take as the type of purposive action our own volition- 
al efforts, and they refuse to admit to the same category any actions 
that do not evince clear knowledge of the end*
McDougall mentions the instance of Descartes who solved this 
difficulty by relegating to the mechanical category all the actions 
of lower animals, but this solution has two serious defects, accord- 
ing to McDougall. 1. It ignores the fact that behaviour on the 
lower, and onthe higher levels exhibits the same four marks of be- 
haviour mentioned above. 2. It also ignores the evidences of 
evolutional continuity^between the lower and higher forms of life. 
This second difficulty has resulted according to McDougall in forcing] 
the purposive type of process into the mechanical category, and from 
this originates the mechanical theory of mind. According to this 
view mind is mechanically determined, and we are deceived when we 
imagine we are free agents; our purposive striving towards an end 
is illusory. This theory would make moral philosophy, ideals, 
norms and standards of conduct meaningless.
The way out of this impasse,therefore, is to give to purposive 
activity a wider range so as to include both the activity of the 
lower animals, as well as of the higher. And the facts demand such 
an extension of the range of purposive activity, because to restrict
 
purposive activity to those which are guided by clearly conceived 
ends is a quite unwarranted restriction for this reasonthat the end 
is/
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is conceived with very different degrees of clearness throughout 
the different stages and levels of mental life,but life is none the 
less purposive all through. There is thereforeno justification 
for confining purposive activity to instances of clearly conceived 
end or goal; for example,in the case of man,ends are conceived with 
all degrees of clearness from the most clear down to the most vague 
ideas, and from this we infer that the actions of lower animals are 
also purposive.
Thus, as McDougall shows, purposive behaviour does not depend 
on clearness of knowledge of the end; there is purpose as long as 
the animal feels a want, and strives to satisfy it; it may feel its 
want only in the vaguest way, just as we ourselves sometimes cannot 
clearly tell what we want. So it is not knowing that determines 
the purposive activity, but something else, what McDougall calls a 
conative tendency or disposition. This conative disposition may be 
of a specific or of a more general kind, and is brought into play by 
the perception of some object. Each organism is endowed with a 
certain number of such conative dispositions, and in the course of 
life they undergo certain modifications. These are the instinctive 
tendencies or instincts; they are the fundamental conceptions of 
the science of psychology, just as mechanical process is that of 
physical science, and McDougall claims that the conceptionof the 
instinctive tendencies covers the facts of mind and behaviour better 
than any other theory of mind.
But the instinct psychology has not yet commanded universal 
acceptance/
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acceptance. For instance in his famous "Psychological Principles" 
Professor Ward does not deal with instincts at all. This might be 
expected because the work was done many years ago, but in his recent 
work, "Psychology applied to Education" (Cambridge University Press, 
1926) he still does not mention the instincts so that to this great 
psychologist this conceptionis not fundamental to the understanding 
of mind. McDougall, therefore, reviews the leading theories of mind 
that have been offered in order to show their inadequacy to explain 
mind and behaviour, and to establish his thesis that the conception 
of the instinctive basis of mind is the only theory that in any de- 
gree adequately explains the nature of mind and behaviour.
The first theory that he mentions is the mechanical theory of 
mind according to which all behaviour is due to reflex action, and 
consequently mechanically determined, and so all organisms, including! 
man, are mere machines. This is the theory beloved of the Behaviour; 
ists, and McDougall says it is the theory that is most widely accept- 
ed at the present time. It certainly does, at first, simplify our 
task to reduce all activity in the universe to mechanism, but it 
leaves out more than it includes; it leaves out, for example, all 
the four characteristics of behaviour mentioned above because they 
do not admit of mechanical explanation.
One instance of this Behaviourist School is Professor Leuba 
whom we happened to mention above who writing on the subject of 
religion produced no less than fifty definitions ofreligion. There 
is/
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is, ofcourse, a peculiar delight to a Behaviourist in an indefinite 
number of definitions of religion, because there is no reality to 
the Behaviourist beyond reflex actions, and religion is, therefore, 
a case of "quot homines". This same writer in his recent book 
"The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" (London, Kegan Paul, 1925) 
after an exhaustive collation of facts relating to Mysticism, comes 
to the conclusion that religion will gradually coincide with physical 
science. This is a typical Behaviourist reduction of the higher 
activities of mind to mechanism. He has in the above book a final 
chapter on the "Disappearance of Belief" in which he says: (op. cit, 
p.^22) "a psychiatrist in possession of the higher and finer psycho- 
logical knowledge takes theplace both of the physician and of the 
Director of souls". Belief in a God of providence who has indi- 
vidual knowledge of persons and answers prayer is a myth that will 
disappear with the advance of scientific knowledge 1.1 Thus the 
mechanical theory is most disastrous when applied to religion. It 
may work in a few cases on the lower mechanical level where the 
machine has got unhitched and the mechanical trick of the psychia- 
trist works to restart it, but it is of no avail on higher normal 
levels of mental life,and is therefore useless for our present
purpose of explaining mind and behaviour.
The second most important theory of mind is that known as 
psychological hedonism. This is the theory of Bentham and Mill 
the founders of utilitarianism. According to this theory the object 
of all action is to obtain pleasure and avoid pain and according to 
utilitarian/
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utilitarian principle a lesser present pleasure will be sacrificed 
for the sake of a larger future pleasure. A great deal of our 
actions seem to conform to this theory which fact gives this theory 
its plausibility, but there is a great deal of activity which does 
not come within its range; for example, the activity of the lower 
animals does not fit into this theory,because it is quite evident 
that the activity of lower animals is not a pursuit of ends that 
will produce the maximum amount of future pleasure. This theory, 
therefore, while it applies to some parts of human activity, leaves 
out some other parts of it as well as the behaviour of lower animals 
This theory also fails to supply the explanation that will cover all 
the facts of behaviour and conduct.
A third theory of mind is that called the pleasure-pain theory. 
The pleasure here referred to is not like the Utilitarian pleasure 
a future pleasure or pleasant end envisaged by the subject, but a 
present pleasant or painful feeling which is a spur to present acticr 
and initiates all our actions. One example of this school we have 
seen in .Professor Ward whose theory we already examined in Chapter 
II. The main defect of this theory, as we saw, is that it regards 
certain things as intrinsically pleasurable, or painful, whereas 
these qualities are dependent on the T>eed of the organism also, and 
vary from pleasant to unpleasant according to the need or feeling of 
the organism at the time. Some of this School regard pleasure as 
the source of action and others like Professor Ward regard painful 
feeling as the source of motivepower, but it is certain that not 
all/
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all the actions of man and much less the actions of animals are all 
impelled by painful feeling. This theory, therefore, explains not 
all but only some of the facts of mind and behaviour. Professor 
Ward thinks that a great deal of present day psychology will not 
survive long, and to the last he was not converted to the instinct 
psychology, but it is quite evident that the idea of the instinct 
has got a dynamic which explains much about the forces and motive 
powers that determine life ana character, whereas Professor Ward's 
account of feeling as originating from inertia lacks dynamic, and if 
he is to dispense with the idea of the instinct, then he has got to 
import a very different meaning into feeling that will cojnvert it 
into the source of motivation and the dynamic of character, but 
according to the present theory the credit for this goes to present- 
ations. This theory therefore fails to give us an adequate account 
of feeling or the motivepowers that determine life and leaves out 
more than it explains.
The next theory of mind that we shall consider is the intellect- 
ualist theory of mind. This is the school of Herbart, of Bosanquet, 
and of Bradley. One representative of this school we already con- 
sidered in Chapter III, namely, Professor Hocking. According to 
this school mind consists of a mass of ideas, an apperception mass; 
the dynamic is in the idea in the form of interest. Professor 
Hocking, as we have seen, acknowledges clearly enough the Importance 
of feeling, but he cuts the knot and arrives at a solution of the 
problem of the relation of feeling, knowing and willing by suddenly 
drawing/
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drawing attention to the fact that this feeling which seems to ac- 
count for so much in life is after all only his beloved "idea". 
To explain two absolutely different things by saying they are one 
and the same thing is far too easy a solution to be convincing.
Another form of theory of this school is the "ideo-motor" theory! 
The solution here is analogous to the one above; it claims for idea 
or cognition what is usually considered asbelonging to conation. 
This theory fails when applied to a great deal of human activity, 
and to the activity of lower animals where the activity is out of all 
proportion to the "idea", so that apparently idea and movement are 
not so closely associated as this theory would lead us to suppose. 
This school also has very little account to give of feeling, because 
its qualities have been transferred to "idea".
Other theories of mind are those which regard mind variously as 
primarily reason, rational will, sense of duty, or some such faculty 
These are all survivals or recrudescences of the old faculty psycho- 
logy. As Professor McDougall says: (op. cit., p.325) "Most of those 
who attribute moral conduct to any such special faculty recognise 
that human nature comprises also certain lower principles of action, 
which they call animal propensities, instincts, or passions; and 
these are regarded as regrettable survivals of our animal ancestry, 
unworthy of the attention of a moral philosopher". But these pro- 
pensities or instincts have to be taken into account before we can 
get a complete account of mind. All these theories, according to 
Professor McDougall, are open to two objections: 1. that they are 
incompatible/
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incompatible with the principle of evolution, and 2. that they are 
forms of the faculty theory. It is quite certainthat the springs 
of action are not in Intellectual processes, but somewhere else. 
Professor McDougall would say that the explanation of mind is in the 
instinctive tendencies. We do agree that the theory of the instinct 
does supply a great deal which did not come within the purview of 
older psychology, but we do not think that Professor McDougall can 
dispense with the psychology of the tripartite division of mind, all 
the same. Professor Ward thinks that the older psychology of the 
three divisions is going to yield more light yet than much of the 
newer psychology, and this is possible as we have seen that no theory 
of mind yet propounded has yet given a consistent account of mind, 
the reason being that something is all the time being overlooked, and 
that something, we think, is the nature of feeling, and when that 
has been adequately explored the tripartite psychology will come to 
its own,but it cannot dispense with the instinct theory,and the best 
results would be from a combination of the school of Professor Ward 
and the School of Professor McDougall and the combination would then 
reveal the origin of the instinctive tendencies to be largely due 
to feeling which at present McDougall attributes to cognition. Now 
we are in the following chapters going to make use of the quality of 
love which is a feeling, and hence our concern to make the nature of 
feeling clear.
Before then, we accept McDougall's account of the instinctive 
tendencies/
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tendencies in our exposition of the religious consciousness it will 
be necessary to call attention to his account of the nature and 
origin of instinct with which we are in disagreement, and which 
conflicts with our view of mind, and the religious consciousness 
which we maintainbriginates in a feelitog of want or a need for 
fellowship^ but not in cognition. This conclusion of McDougall's 
is due to his preoccupation with the instinct theory, and to too 
little appreciationof what can be derived from the older psychology 
of the three divisions. The account he gives of the istincts is 
useful and is more comprehensive than the older psychology, but the 
instinct psychology which places cognition first is not capable of 
giving us a complete account of mind, and the natureand relation 
of the three elements in mind has still got to be worked out. Our 
criticism of Professor McDougall is that if the theory of the in- 
stinctive tendencies which he propounds , and which is widely 
accepted as the one which throws much light on many features of life 
at all stages is correct, then it must be shown in his exposition of 
nature of the instincts where it is that feeling which is the regu- 
lative principle in mind comes in. But we shall look in vain in 
his various efforts to explain the nature of the instinctive ten- 
dencies for any admissionof any such primary or regulative part 
played by feeling. Instead of this we shall see that our author 
attributes the primary place in mind sometimes to cognition, but far 
more often to conation, while he makes very little mention of feel- 
ing, thougn he deals very much with emotion which however is not the 
primary feeling of the triple division, but a later phase of feeling 
evoked/
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evoked by the object. It may seem at first sight that it is going 
to make small difference which of these states is regarded as first, 
but we maintainthat it will make all the difference in the world to 
psychology or religion or any other branch of mental science whether 
we regard mind and instincts as primarily, feeling,or Cognition,or 
conation. McDougall seems to havelittle use for the tripartite 
division and takes over uncriticallythe tradition that conation is 
primary,and this brings his theory of the instincts into difficulty 
at more than one point. That the instincts are conative tendencies 
is the refrain of his psychology. He says: (op. cit., p.310) 
"When any creature strives towards an end or goal, it is because it 
possesses as an ultimate feature of its,constitution what we can on3 
call a latent disposition or tendency to strive towards that end, a 
conative dispositionwhich is actualised or brought into operation by 
the perception (or other mode of cognition) of some object". Again 
he says: (op. cit., P.311) "To attempt to give any further account o 
these conative dispositions would be to enter upon a province of 
metaphysical speculation, and is a task not demanded of psycholog^. 
I will only say in this connectionthat we may describe all living 
things as expressions or embodiments of what we may vaguely name, 
with Schopenhauer, Will or with Bergson, the vital impulse (1'elan 
vital) or, more simply life. And each specifically directed Co- 
native tendency we may regard as a differentiation of the funda- 
mental will to live, conditioned by a conative disposition. At the 
standpoint of empirical science, we must accept these conative dis- 
positions as ultimate facts, not capable of being analysed ot of 
being/
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being explained by being shown to be instances of any wider more 
fundamental notion".
In the above quotations McDougall regaras the instinctive ten- 
dencies as conativetendencies which are not capable of being analys- 
ed into anything more fundamental; they are ultimate features of 
the constitution of mind. But most psychologists will agree that 
though instincts are innate they are further analysable into feeling, 
willing and knowing, and that this analysis is useful and worthy of 
investigation. McDougall has evidently Jumped to the conclusion 
that a considerationof the tripartite division is-not going to be of 
much service, and he therefore adopts the tradition that conation is 
the characteristic fact about mind and instinctive tendency, and 
consequently obscurity creeps into his theory at this point, because 
he has not taken trouble first to clearly distinguish the ultimate 
elements in mind, their order and relation to one another.
This obscurity is very noticeable in the above quotations; for 
instance, he maintains that instinctive tendenc^ is ultimate, unana- 
lysable, and conative, but at the same time he makes it dependent ofl 
perception or cognition for he says," it possesses as an ultimate . 
fact of its constitution what we can only call a latent disposition 
or tendency to strive towards that end, a conative disposition 
which is actualised or brought into operation by the perception 
( or other mode of cognition) of some object". If instinctive 
tendency is brought into operation by cognition in this way we ought 
to seek for its ultimate nature in cognition and not in conation, 
but/
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but any suggestion more distant from Professor McDougall's mind 
than this could not be imagined,because his whole theme is that in- 
stinct is strongest where cognition is weakest,and that cognition 
inhibits instinct,in which case it is impossible to see how cognition 
can be at the same time the originating cause of instinct. In 
another passage he maintains that conation is independent of cogni- 
tion. He says: (op. cit., p.323) "This is the intellectualist 
theory of actionwhich attributes action immediately to "ideas", 
ignoring the obvious fact that the development and organisationof 
character, or of the conative side of the mind, is largely distinct 
from and independent of the development of the mind". The same 
thing is implied in another passage where he maintains that reason
is helpless to initiate desire, and we must remember that desire to
> 
McDougall is of the essence of conation. He says: (op. cit., p.j526j
"To create desire is a task beyond its competence; it can only 
direct pre-existing tendencies towards their appropriate objects. 
It is, therefore, a grave error on the part of some authors to say 
that reason may create a desire for a moral quality; or to say 
(as Sidgwick said) that in rational beings as such the cognition or 
judgment that this is right or ought to be done gives an impulse or 
motive to action". Thus our author maintains at one time that cog- 
nition is the cause of conation and at another time that cognition is 
helpless to initiate action or conation. Which of these two state- 
ments are we going to believe? They cannot both be true. This is 
the condition that preoccupation with his thecr y of instincts brings 
a brilliant writer to. He has formed the conclusion that the in- 
stincts, because they are important,and do explain much of mental 
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life are all Important and are the only way of approach to the study 
of mind and that no other way of approach is deserving of consider- 
ation, and he has not troubled himself to enquire whether the tra- 
dition of cognition first of conation first, which are the two that 
have been usually placed first by psychologists of the past, is safe 
to apply to his theory of the instincts. Professor McDougall was ir 
a peculiarly advantageous positionfor seeing in the clearest possible 
manner that instinct which is an inherited innate tendency, a pro- 
duct of evolution cannot by any stretch of the imagination be re- 
garded as primarily cognition except by reverting to the old faculty 
psychology which he is all the time seeking to replace. Not having 
realised from the first that instinctive tendency originates in 
feeling, as it is one of the purposes of the present thesis to es- 
tablish, Professor McDougall wavers in his opinion at one time to the 
side of cognition and at another time to the side of conation as the 
primary dynamical element in mind, these being the two elements in 
mind which different traditional schools of psychology regard as 
primary. Professor McDougalljWe again say^was in a particularly 
advantageous position for seeing that instinctive tendency is a 
feeling tendency primarily,because in the beginning, and on his own 
showing f throughout, the organism is largely guided by this feeling 
which precedes thinking,because it is innately given fbeing phy- 
siologically represented by a physical structure the thalamus which 
had a long history when intelligence was at a minimum before the de- 
velopment of the cerebral cortex which developed out of the thalamus: 
on/
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on tne advent of the fuller stage of intelligence or reason. Pro- 
fessor Ward at one point describes feeling as simply "being" and 
that is what the primary stage is like,an existence with a feeling 
continuum capable of development, because it contains in germ cog- 
nition and conation which develop after a long tirae^wnile the pri- 
ary feeling is comparatively strong from the very beginning of "be- 
ing" .
Another proof that .Professor McDougall has confused the 
states of consciousness is the fact that whenever he is describing 
conative tendency he seems to us to be describing feeling itself. 
In one of the above quotations he describes conative tendency by 
comparing it with Schopenhauer's will or with Bejrgsoris vital impul- 
sion (1'elan'vital ) , but these two conceptions are different because 
"for Schopenhauer,for example, the blind appetitions displayed by 
lowly organisms were acts of will, equally with our greatest moral 
efforts". (McDougall, op. cit., p.311) whereas McDougall himself 
describes the e*lan vital of Bergson by the Greek word Ofur/ which 
he translates as "an urge" to action &op. cit., p.409). Now there 
is a vast difference between an urge to action and the action itself, 
namely, the difference between feeling and conation; a feeling which 
is an urge naturally ends in conation or action, so that under the 
name of conative tendency our author is all the time describing feel- 
ing, but even then he is not consistent, because a feeling or urge or
is a vastly different thing from the will of Schopenhauer 
which/
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which McDougall himself admits is equal to our own "greatest moral 
efforts'! In that case MeDougall's conative tendency if it is an 
urge which applies also to lower organisms cannot be described as 
Schopenhauer's will. That Professor McDougall has not definitely 
distinguished between the three elements in mind is still further 
evidenced by the way in which he compares conative tendency with 
mental phases of feeling. For instance he identifies conative 
tendency with craving and desire which are both phases of feeling 
connected with an object. He says: (op. cit., p.316) "Therefore 
in the lower realms of life all action must be attributed by the 
pleasure pain theory to present pain. But the painof hunger seems 
to be in our own case the pain of unsatisfied craving; that is the 
pain is conditioned by the craving, and presupposes it - if there 
were no craving there would be no pain. But the craving is essen- 
tially a conation, a tendency to action, however vaguely directed", 
Again he says: (op. cit., p. 317) "Both the pleasure and the pain 
of hunger seem, then, to be conditioned by the craving, the conative 
tendency, the specifically directed impulse or appetition, And 
this seems to be true not only of the desire for food, but of many 
other desires. When, for example, we desire the applause of our 
fellows, when we are consumed with what is called disinterested
p
curiosity, when we desire to avenge ourselves.
Now the pleasure and pain of hunger and the desire for food 
are not particularly conative; we do not understand how they can 
be considered conative; the desire for food is an organic sensatior 
a feeling of want. Nor is the desire for applause in any sense a 
conation/
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conation; it is a feeling for exaltation; nor are disinterested 
curiosity, nor the desire for revenge in any sense of the term co- 
ations. If we are to call feelings such as these conations then 
there is no use in the distinction made between feeling, knowing 
and willing, and it might as well be dispensed with, but, if the 
tripartite division means anything, we must be accurate in the use 
of it otherwise nothing-but confusion will result. We have always' 
understood that feelings,cravings and desires are potential, dyna- 
mic, as yet incomplete phases of mind,but that a conation is of the 
nature of an accomplished fact, a "fait accompli" a debouchment, 
actualised action. Therefore there is a vast difference between 
a craving or a desire and a conation, and between the urge to action 
and the action itself.
But Professor McDougall may reply that he never said that crav- 
ing and desires were conations, but that they wepe conative tendencies 
Now one would like to ask Professor McDougall how he distinguishes 
between a conation and a conativetendency or in other words between 
willing and a tendency to willing. The distinctionbetween them is 
too subtle. On the same analogy we would be entitled to speak of 
feeling tendency and a knowing tendency as well as of a conative or 
willing tendency. But what againone would ask is the reality that 
one can attach to a feeling tendency or a knowing tendency, and what 
then to a conative tendency? Where do these tendencies differ from 
feeling, willing, and conation proper? Do the conative tendencies 
always become a conation? If so we might as well discard the term 
conative/
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conative tendency, and use the same old term conation. Or does the 
conative tendency remainsometimes at the stage of tendency without 
ever becoming a proper conation? If it does then it has no right to 
be called conative; it is some phase of mind anterior to conation, 
that is to say, either feeling or knowing. It is quite evident tha 
Professor McDougall has never accurately defined his terms a virtue 
inwhich psychologists are Supposed:to excel as compared with theo- 
logians. Professor McDougall compares his conative tendency to the
"libido" of Freud and Jung, but the "libido," of Freud and Jung is
/
essentially of the nature of an unrealised and often unrealisable 
wish and has passed into literature now as the "Freudian Wish% a 
wish which seeks satisfaction by conation but it is not itself co- 
nation, and because it cannot realise itself finds conation in dreas 
and complexes.
One feels sure that Professor McDougall having failed to realis 
the place and importance of feeling is compelled to import it under 
another term, namely, conative tendency, and all the time he is 
speaking of this term as desire, craving, tendency,we are certain 
that what he has unconsciously in mind is feeling,and his account of 
the instinctive tendencies would be much more intelligible if he use 
the old term feeling itself, and then even the unsophisticated would 
understand what he means,because what the ordinary personsays is 
" I have an instinctive feeling" or"l know instinctively11 or*! do it 
instinctively" Instinctive tendency is not simply conative because 
instinctive tendency contains feeling, knowing, and willing, and it 
is not clear whyit should be called conativetendency rather than
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feeling tendency, or knowing tendency. For example, the instinct- 
ive tendencies of hunger, thirst, rest, exercise, nausea, etc., 
might be more correctly regarded as feeling tendencies; those of 
admiration, awe, fear, curiosity, self display, self abasement, 
etc. might be more correctly called cognitive tendencies, while 
thope of flight, pugnacity, hunting,acquisition, might be regarded 
as preeminently conative tendencies. Thus the term conative ten- 
dency does not add any definite meaning to the word already in use, 
namely,instinctive tendency or instinct,and it would be far better 
discarded and the word feeling used in its place, because feeling 
has no lack of scope and range and it cowers all that Professor 
McDougall wishes to include in his conative tendency without multi- 
plying new and unfamiliar terms and that is why Professor Ward thin] 
that a great deal of the new psychology will come to admit some of 
the wisdom of the older sooner or later.
Professor McDougall has a whole chapter on "Volition" which is
 
vitiated throughout by this fundamental mistake of confusing conati 
with feeling or phases thereof such as desires and aversions, He 
says: (op. cit., p.204)"We have recognised that all impulses, all 
desires and aversions, all motives - in short, all conations - fall 
into two classes: I. those that arise from the excitement of some 
innate disposition or instinct; 2. those that arise on the excite 
ment of dispositions acquired during the life of the individual by 
differentiation from the innate dispositions, under the guidance of 
pleasure and pain. We may, then, restate our problem in more gen- 
eral/
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general terms, as follows: Is volition only a specially complex 
case of conation,implying more conjunction of conations of these two 
origins rendered possible by the systematic organisation of the in.-
*
nate and acquired dispositions? Or does it involve some motive 
power, some source of energy, some power of striving, of an altogeth 
different order'? Clearly we must attempt to account for it in terms 
of the former alternative, and we may only adopt the latter if the 
attempt gives no promise of success. It may fairly be claimed, I 
think, that we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition 
may be accounted for as a special case of conation differing from 
other conations not in kind but only in complexity. We may see 
this most clearly if we form a scale of conations ranging from the 
simplest type to the most complex and obscure type, namely, moral 
choice achieved by an effort, which in the struggle of higher and 
lower motives, brings victory to the higher but weaker motive. If 
types of conation can be arranged in such a scale, each type differ- 
ing from its neighbours only very slightly, that will afford a 
strong presumption of continuity of the scale; for if volition 
involves some peculiar factor not operative in other conations, we 
ought to be able to draw a sharp line between volitional and non- 
volitional conations!1 . Here McDougall is plainly confusing conatior 
with feeling or forms of feeling. For example, he here says that 
a conation arises from the excitement of an instinct and he mentions 
that aversions are forms of conation. Now aversions or repulsions 
on McDougall's own showing previously are emotions which are asso- 
ciated with the instinct of disgust and not conations at all but 
forms/
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forms of feeling,and it certainly does not conduce to edification to 
be told that aversions at one time are emotional responses evoked by 
the excitation of the instinct of disgust and at another that aver- 
sions are conations,unless we are to believe that conations are 
emotional responses which would be a "reductio ad absurdum". Like- 
wise impulses, desires, and motives, all which McDougall equates 
with conation can be shown to be forms of feeling, though desire and 
motive imply an end in view^and are to that extent cognitive also, 
but they are not conative. McDougall is unconsciously aware of this 
and, therefore, concludes that there are two kinds of conations 
volitional and non-volitional as he says above. But surely volition 
al and non-volitional phases of mind are very different things 
absolutely opposite and different enough to form two different cate- 
gories, and that is exactly what they are; as a matter of fact the 
volitional are will proper and the non-volitional are only feeling, 
for, McDougall's own account of volition is as follows:(op. cit., p. 
212) "We recognised that inthe typical case of volition a man's 
self, in Some particularly intimate sense of the word "self" is 
thrown upon the side of the motive that is to prevail", but where the 
self is not so thrown there is no act of will, the state is non- 
volition, that is to say, it is one of feeling.or wish or desire. 
Again in the above quotation McDougall maintains that volition is 
only a specially complex case of conation and conations are two types 
volitional and non-volitional,so that we arrive at a very easy 
"petitio principli" that volitions are of the volitional type. 
Thus by calling feelings non-volitional conations McDougall fails to 
distinguish/
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distinguish between feelings andconations, and has to include the 
two ofthem under conation,whereas they are two irreducible states 
of mindf although in the beginning of the organism feeling and action 
are very closely related^and it is t&is close relation that causes 
their Identification and confusion with one anotherf and because 
there is in feeling a potential, dynamic, e-motive element*and it is 
this relationship that makes Mcflougall imagine he can form a scale 
of conations ranging from the simplest type to the most complex, as
he says above. In very primitive organisms, however, action is as
 
decided as in the maturest act of will, but the action is due to a 
prior feeling of want which makes the organism move towards what it 
wants and away from what it does not want. The confusion caused by 
mistaking feeling for will or action which is due to the fact that 
feeling knowing and willing partly involve one another, is also 
evident in McDougall's conception of desire which to him is also 
conative. He says: (op. cit., p.212) " The essential operation of 
volition is the same asthat of desire, namely, the holding the idea 
of the end at the focus of consciousness so that it works strongly 
towards the realisation of its end, prevailing over rival ideas and 
tendencies". This is an inversion of facts as in the case of desire 
it is the idea that retains hold on the focus of consciousness in 
spite of all we try to do to remove it as is well known in Indian 
religions where the effort is not to retain the idea at the focus of 
consciousness but how to dislodge it therefrom; desire implies no 
effort of will.
Having then displaced feeling proper by his new term conative 
tendency Professor McDougall naturally finds it difficult to under-
Q  +   o v-i /5 /
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understand where feeling proper comes in. He writes: (op. cit., 
p. 318) "When, then, the pleasure-pain theorist tells us that feel- 
ing determines conation, we must ask what determines the feeling; 
and, if he replies thatcogn^tion of some object is the immediate 
condition of feeling, we point to these numerous instances in which 
the feeling-tone of the thought of the object varies from pleasure 
to pain, its quality and strength being obviously determined, not 
directly by cognition, but by the conation it evokes". According 
to this quotation conationdeterinines the feeling tone due to the 
experience of an object. We maintain here that feeling determines 
cognition and conation. But McDougall asks us in that case what 
determines the feeling. It is here that McDougall is making the 
mistake; the feeling that McDougall is enquiring about is not the 
primary feeling of the tripartite division, but a secondary phase of 
feeling, an. effect, a feeling-tone. Feeling inthe first instance, 
is a cause of the conation; it was because there was a prior feeling 
of some kind that the conation took place at all; in the second case 
the feeling is a later stage of the original feeling, an effect of 
the cognition and conation, a feeling-tone, or emotion. If we hark 
back to the second chapter, there Professor Ward differentiated five 
different uses of the word feeling. One of these was a feeling-tone 
it comes about this way: suppose we have a feeling for fellowship, 
this is the primary feeling of the tripartite division. When the 
person comes, our feeling still remains, but the coming of the ob- 
ject of our feeling has differently toned the feeling, and the re- 
sultant feeling is a feeling-tone, an emotion. Of the latter cate- 
gory, are all the emotions which are roused by the exercise of the 
instincts, such as wonder, awe, and so on; they are effects toned by
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experiencing the object, feeling tones or emotions, whereas each 
instinct begins in a primary vague feeling for something which it 
has not got, and is thus quite a different stage of feeling from the 
secondary feeling tones or emotions.
We therefore, think that Professor McDougall's famous definition 
is defective in not distinguishing between these two stages of feel- 
ing represented by the primary feeling and the secondary feeling- 
tone or emotion. The second of these stages the definition has got, 
but there is no acknowledgement of the first, and having left it out 
McDougall makesvthe essential nature of instinct to be conative. 
His definitionruns:(op. cit., p.25) "We may then,define an instinct 
as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which deter- 
mines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of 
a certain class,to experience an emotional excitement of a particula 
quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act inregard to it in 
a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such 
action.". It ought to read: "We may, then , define an instinct as   
an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition to feel a want or 
need which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attentior 
to, objects of a certain class, to experience a change of feeling or 
an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving 
such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, 
or, at least, to experience an impulse to such an action". We have 
here in the amended definition what McDougall had not got before, 
namely, feeling, knowing and willing all present in their proper or- 
der, whereas the primary feeling is absent from the original defini- 
tion, because McDougall has no room for it in his psychology.
As a result of his omission of feeling from his psychology we 
find/
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find Professor McDougall again astray in his theory of the relation 
between instinctive tendencies and the emotions. McDougall enumer- 
ates seven primary instincts with their accompanying emotions, as 
follows: the instincts of flight, of repulsion, of curiosity, of 
self-display, of self-abasement, the parental instinct, and the in- 
stinct of pugnacity which have associated with them the emotions of 
fear, disgust, wonder, elation or positive self-feeling, submission 
or negative self-feeling, and anger. These he regards as primary 
and the source of all the motive forces in the individual, because 
they have accompanying emotions. But it has been pointed out by 
other psychologists that there are other instincts equally important 
to which McDougall has given a secondary position,because they have 
no manifest accompanying emotion,such as the instinct to Seek pleasu 
and avoid unpleasure, the instinct of play, experimentation, imi- 
tation, sympathy, of prehension, locomotion, vocalisation, of hunting 
and of gregariousness. But these are all quite as much native im- 
pulses in human nature,and in all creatures,and they are all import- 
ant and necessary as the emotional group.
As Dr Drever for instance, points out McDougall was biassed by 
the fact that he concluded that the instincts must be accompanied by 
some particular emotion, and so had to exaiude those that had not. 
But this is not valid and we must include three groups:
1. The appetitive group which comprises the following: the 
instinct to seek pleasureand avoid pain, the instincts of hunger, of 
thirst, rest, exercise, courtship, and nausea.
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2. The emotional group of Professor McDougall.
3. A non-emotional group including the general reactive ten- 
dencies with no clear emotional associationwith them, such as, the 
tendency to play, sympathy, imitation suggestibility etc. mentioned 
above.
Now the above are all equally natural native interests of the 
human being. The appetitive and non-emotional group are as truly
ii
innate and instinctive as the emotional group out of which McDougall 
supposes that all the motive forces of the individual come. There- 
fore we deduce this fact that Professor McDougall^s reading of the 
nature of instinct is wrong simply because he has mistaken the true 
nature of feeling and its true place in mind, and he confuses feeliiq 
with emotions which are effects.
We shall see this more clearly if we give his own account of in 
stinct. He says:fop. cit., p.28) "In order to understand these 
complications of instinctive behaviour we must submit the conception 
of an instinctive tendency to a more minute analysis. It was said 
above that every instinctiveprocess has the three aspects of all 
mental process - the cognitive, the affective, and the conative. 
Now the innate psycho-physical dispositionwhich is an instinct, may 
be regarded as consisting of three corresponding parts - an afferent 
a central, and a motor or efferent part - whose activities are the 
cognitive, the affective, and the conativefeatures respectively of 
the total instinctive process". it is evident from the above quo- 
tation that as we have seen many times already, McDougall regards th 
states of consciousness to begin with cognition which gives rise to 
feeling/
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feeling which in turn results in a conation. This is also the orde 
we have seen in his definition, Now if this is the true order it 
ought to hold good when :. applied to all the instincts, but what we 
find is that this order holds good only of the emotional group, whil 
it fails in the case of the appetitive, and non-emotional group. 
That is to say, according to McDougall's theory of mind the appeti- 
tive and non-emotional groups would only yield two mental elements, 
namely, cognition and conation,while the central element, the affec- 
tive or emotional which McDougall regards as the permanent element 
in instinct, is absent.
This is another proof of our contention that the order of the 
states of consciousness is not cognition, feeling, and conation, but 
feeling, cognition and conation, and this proof we found in the pre 
ceding chapters from a considerationofthe three irreducible elements 
in mind,and in this chapter from a consideration of the nature of th 
instinctive tendencies which are innate and inherited 9 though not as 
McDougall says unanalysable. When cognition or idea or the intel- 
lectual element isput first the theory proves unworkable. We 
maintain, thersfore, that the correction suggested above of his 
definition of instinct is necessary to make it apply to the nature 
of mind, and of instinct,, because with his present definition, and 
with his present order of the states of consciousness he has to re- 
legate to a secondary position two groups of instincts which have 
as much right to be regarded as innate and instinctive as the emo- 
tional group which he chooses to call primary for no reason that 
he can make apparent except that they haveaccompanying emotions.
On the other hand if he accepted the order of the states of 
consciousness/
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consciousness suggested in these psges, namely, that consciousness 
begins in a feeling ofwant in consequence of which it meets its ob- 
ject and on meeting its object it reacts towards it,and this reactio 
is conation proper, while, what McDougall calls conative tendency, 
is simply what we call feeling propar. With this version of mind, 
then, all the three groups of instincts begin with feeling; next 
they have a cognitive part which produces a change in the original 
feeling that is to say makes it into a feeling -tone or emotion whict 
results in a conation or characteristic reaction towards the object 
In the case of the non-emotional group the feeling tone or emotion 
is not absent; it is there all the time, only, from thenature of 
the instinct, the feeling-tone or emotion is not so easily percep- 
tible, as in thecase of the emotional group, being less marked, and 
not so strong. It is quite certain that the so-called non-emotion- 
al group, for example the instincts of play, sympathy, hunting 
gregariousness, etc. have emotional accompaniments, only we have not 
got names for them because they are not so strong; otherwise we 
would have to believe that there were states of mind without .affect- 
ive states in their formation. With regard to the last mentioned 
of these, the gregarious instinct, Professor McDougall himself ad- 
mits that it does possess an affective aspect though we have no 
name for it, and the same will be true of all the rest of this 
group. He writes: (op. cit., p-7U "The gregarious instinct is one 
of the human instincts of greatest social importance, for it has 
played a great part in moulding societary forms. The affective 
aspect of the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense 
or specific to have been given a name.I1;
12?.
Thus by giving feeling its proper place as primary and regu- 
lative we get a consistent account of the instincts. When McDou- 
gall refuses it its proper place his account of the instincts is 
confusing and unintelligible, because he cannot explain why some 
instincts and emotions are primary, and some secondary, why some haw 
emotions, and some havenot. This is due to the feet that he does 
not realise that all activity begins in feeling, and that feeling 
passes into an emotion of greater or less intensity on experiencing 
its object. The emotion is only a phase of the original primary 
feeling. It is this primary feeling which is the dynamic and 
determinative part of mind that McDougall is thinking of when he 
speaks of conative tendency. But it is entirely misleading as has 
been said already, to call feeling conative tendency any more than 
cognitive tendency, because each of the states of consciousness in- 
volve one another to some extent as has been often pointed out. 
Nothing therefore, we think, can restore clearness and consistency 
to McDougall's exposition of the instincts except to substitute 
feeling for conative tendency and also make feeling in the sense 
used above the basal element in mind.
One final particular in which McDougall's wrong idea of the 
fundamental nature of mind as according to him cognition, voli.ti.aD 
and conation, acts disastrously,is in the case of the relation of 
the instincts to the emotions. McDougall takes for granted that 
each of his primary instincts has an invariable accompanying emo- 
tion of a particular kind. But the matter is not so simple as 
this. For instance, if the instinct of flight is evoked, the 
emotional reaction will be fear if the avenue of escape is closed,
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but, if the avenue is not closed, the emotion is a pleasant relief, 
and so on with other instincts also. The emotions evoked are 
pleasant if the instinct is satisfied and unpleasant if thwarted or 
baulked, and thus the quality of the emotions vary between the two 
polarities of pleasant and unpleasant, or of Joy and sorrow which 
are the terms used of emotion. Now what forms the gau£e of these 
variations between the two polarities? It is the original feeling, 
and that is why it is called regulativeand determinative. If one 
has a feeling of superiority in face of any situation, he has an 
emotion of elation,and if he has a feeling of inferiority, he has 
the emotion of submission, and the intensity of the emotion ranges 
between the two polarities of elation and submission according to 
the degree of superiority or inferiority. Thus feeling determines 
the emotion, being the primary element in mind*
One ol&her very important indication of the primaoy of feeling 
in the history of the organism is that supplied by psychologists 
working in the field of biology and reproduced by Dr Rivers in his 
book "Instinct and the Unconscious".(Cambridge University Press, 
1924) He distinguishes the difference between the feeling stage of 
the organism which is first and the intelligence cognitive stage 
which developes later by showing the difference between protopathic 
and epicritic sensibility. He describes protopathic sensibility 
thus: (op. cit., p.22) "Observations on the sensory changes which 
accompany the regenerationof a divided and a reunited nerve have led 
Head/
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Head and his colleagues to distinguish two different kinds of mechan- 
ism on the afferent side of the nervous system.....In one of these 
the protopathic stage, the sensations are vague and crude in char- 
acter, with absence of any discrimination or localisation, and with 
a prolonged feeling-tone usually on the unpleasant side, tending to 
lead explosively, as if reflexively, to such movements as would with- 
draw the stimulated part fromcontact with any object to which the 
sensory changes are due..... The sensations are such as would enable
 
one to know that something is there and that it ispleasant or un- 
pleasant. ... .but there is no power of distinguishing differences in 
intensity, nor of telling with any exactness the exact spot where 
the processes underlying the changes are in'action-" . The above 
description of protopathic sensibility answers to what we know of 
primitive feeling or sensationwhereas epicritic sensibility bears 
the characteristics of intelligence or cognition. He describes it 
thus: (op. cit., p.23> "The second stage of the process of regener- 
ation is characterised by the return of those features of normal 
cutaneous sensibility such as exact discrimination and localisation, 
by means of which it become.s possible to perceive the nature of an 
object in contact with the skin, and adjust behaviour according to 
this perception. The modes of reaction which make this exactness of
discrimination and power of external projection possible are grouped
  
together under the heading of epicritic sensibility". Now these
two different kinds of sensibilities are represented by two kinds of 
structures/
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structures in the organism, and these two structures belong to wide- 
ly separated stages of the development of the nervous system which 
indicates that the stage of feeling had a long history of development 
before the stage of intelligence supervened. In support of this 
contention Dr Rivers adduces the following facts: (op. cit., p.2?) 
"If we now pass to the central end of the nervous path by which the 
impulses subserving cutaneous sensibility reach the brain, Head 
working in conjunctionwith Holmesf has discovered a relation between 
the cerebral cortex and the optic thalamus very similar to that 
existing between protopathic and epicritic sensibility. In this 
case the Special modes of activity they have studied are associated 
with structures which belong to widely separated stages of the 
development of the nervous system. The optic thalamus represents 
the dominant part of the brain of lower vertebrates while the cere- 
bral cortex or neopallium developed far later". Further he writes: 
(op. cit.,p.49) "The optic thalamus is now hidden away in the inter- 
ior of the brain overlaid and buried by the vast development of the 
cerebral cortex. Just as I have supposed that emotiveand instinct- 
ive reactions are buried within the unconscious hidden from conscious 
ness by the vast development of those reactions which are associated
i
with intelligence, so do we find the organ of the emotions and in- 
stinctive reactions has been buried under the overwhelming mass of 
the nervous structure we know to be pre-eminently associated with 
consciousness". According to the above exposition it would seem 
that the stage of feeling and of the formationof the instinctive 
tendencies/
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tendencies long preceded the stage of intelligence, so that the 
primary element in instinct must bejfeeling and if the formationof 
the instinctive tendencies long preceded the stage of intelligence,
then the primary element in instinct must be feeling and not 
cognition as McDougall and others suppose.
An excuse must be tendered here for the space this proposition 
has taken to establish,but in the absence of authoritative psycho- 
logy it had to be done,and the proposition that feeling and not cog- 
nition or conation is primary is vital to our view of the prophetic 
consciousness and of religion which is a feeling for fellowship with 
the Divine into which the feeling or emotion of love is the primary 
element^and in the next chapter we shall endeavour to show from a 
consideration of the Instincts how the instinct of tender emotion or 
love is primary and regulative and determinative of the other 
instincts and its analysis will show us the comprehensive nature of 
love which is the highest attribute of Deity, as well as the highest 
characteristic of worship and fellowship which is the core of reli- 
gion > and the determinating factor in the prophetic consciousness.
Meanwhile we have so far shown,firstly, from a consideration of 
the three irreducible states of consciousness, secondly, from a 
consideration of the nature of the instinctive tendencies, and third3j 
from a brief considerationof biological psychology that feeling is 
the primary and regulative and determinative element in mind,and has 
got to be reckoned with in any complete account of religion and the 
religious/
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religious consciousness. But there is one point more which needs 
to be re-emphasised before we close this chapter and that is that 
this regulative feeling remains the same except for the change of 
tone in it caused by later cognitions and conations in virtue of 
which we get the changes in the feeling-state called feeling-tone 
and emotion which are only different shades of the original feeling 
with which the organism starts, and which regulates and determines 
all its later processes. In support of this we shall quote a pas- 
sage from a great psychologist, Professor Otto ("Idea of the Holy", 
p.44) He says: "But it is important here to recognise the true 
account of the phenomenon, what passes over - undergoes transition - 
is not the feeling itself. It is not that the actual feeling grad- 
ually changes in quantity or "evolves", i.e. transmutes itself into 
quite a different one, but rather that "I" pass over or make the 
transition from one feeling to another as my circumstances change, 
by the gradual decrease of the one, and the increase of the other.
»
A transition of the actual feeling into another would be a real 
"transmutation" and would be a psychological counterpart to the 
alchemists production of gold by the transmutation of metals". 
This is the metaphysical form of our psychological statement with 
regard to feeling and it emphasises the same fact that it is the sam 
feeling-self that is behind all processes of mind affective, cogni- 
tive- and volitional,regulating and determining them,and this Inter- 







1. The Biblical Conception of the Sentiments.
When the greatest teacher of all was adkea which commandment of 
the law was first, He replied: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God 
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and 
with all thy strength", and "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself 
(Mk. 15:30) This reply implies that life is concerned not with one 
but with three ultimate realities, namely, self, neighbour, and God. 
In the first place man owes a duty to himself of self-preservation 
and self-realisation. Secondly he owes the same duty to his neigh- 
bour of helping him also to self-preservation and self-realisation, 
because he cannot attain self-realisation for himself except in as 
far as he helps his neighbour to attain the same. And neither he 
nor his neighbour can attain to self-realisation, except in as far as 
they love the Highest, namely, God.
Further, the above reply denotes that the three ultimate inter- 
ests or values of the individual, or, as we shall call them in this 
chaptei? Sentiments, include the whole psychical life of man and are 
organised in a hierarchy round one supreme emotional disposition or 
sentiment, namely, love, under which are organised all other emotional 
dispositions that go to make up the complex structure of personality.
Thus we shall begin our discussion of the place of the sentiment 
in the religious consciousness by noting that the sentiment/
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sentiment of love has three supreme objects, namely, 1. the 
Supreme Being, 2. one's neighbour, 3» oneself. With this 
classification agrees a recent writer, Professor A. N. Whitehead. 
(Lowell Lectures 1926, Cambridge University Press, 192?) He says: 
"Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in 
one moment of self-consciousness.......These concepts are: 1. That
of the value of an individual for itself. 2. That of the value 
of the diverse individuals of the world for each other. 3. That 
of the value of the objective world". The third it will be noticed 
is different from the corresponding one in our classification above, 
as the writer does not admit a personal God, a question which will 
engage our attention later.
The present chapter, therefore, will be devoted, firstly, to an 
explanation of the nature and function of the emotional dispositions 
called sentiments; secondly, the nature of the supreme instinct and, 
sentiment of love, out of which religion is generated, will be ex- 
amined; thirdly, the three fundamental forms of this ultimate senti- 
ment of love which have as their objective God, neighbour and self 
will undergo investigation in the order in which they arise, namely 
self, neighbour and God. This will help to establish our thesis 
that love to God and desire for and fellowship with God is the gene- 
sis of religion and of the prophetic consciousness, and the life of 
fellowship constitutes the religious life which is a life determined 
by love which is the integrating, evolving, creating force in man's 
life.
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2. The Nature and Formation of Sentiment.
We shall begin by studying briefly the nature of the sentiments, 
the process of their formation,and their development. We already 
saw in our chapter on consciousness that there are three sets of 
mental facts: firstly, there are the structural elements in mind 
represented by such facts as instincts, sentiments, dispoaitions, 
complexes, habits, prejudices, customs, and so on; they form the 
unconscious and are represented physiologically by the thalamus and 
the cerebral cortex: secondly,there are the processes involved in 
tide interaction with one another of these structural elements in the 
unconscious called endopsychic process, the distinctive character- 
istic of which is that it lacks the characteristic of psychical 
integration and inside view which conscious process possesses; it 
is typified by the Freudian Censor; in fact the honour of discover- 
ing this element in mind belongs to Freud and Jung and their follow- 
ers: thirdly, there is the psychical synthesis or integration 
which we call conscious process or experience, the distinctive 
characteristic of which is that it ; contains an inside view of the 
process or experience.
Now the sentiment,as we have seen above,belongs to the first 
of these three classes of mental facts; it belongs to the structur-
i
al part of mind called the unconscious, and, as such, it can never 
be present in consciousness, but at the same time it can influence 
by action and interaction the other structural elements in mind, and 
also/
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also conscious process, and consequently behaviour, whenever it is 
evoked. Such is the case with all the other structural elements in 
mind. Again the sentiment like the other structural elements is 
an emotional response which is called forth by a specific object, and 
when the sentiment is in operationthis emotion colours the mental 
process, and ends in a specific form of action. This is what is 
meant by saying that the sentiment or other structural elements are 
determinants of conscious process,and,as mental development is most- 
ly on this principle,it can be easily realised on what a larger 
scale the nature of mind and of the native interests and endowments 
of the individual can be studied compared with the older method of 
preoccupation with mental processes alone, as the newer method leads 
us to, and compels us to study, behaviour as well
Being a more or less permanent structure of mind the sentiment 
remains throughout comparatively unchanged whereas the emotions 
evoked throughout its existence by the specific object will be vari- 
ously tinged from time to time according to the situation of the ob- 
ject with a varying emotional or feeling tone. There are as we have 
seen many other structural elements in mind analogous to the senti- 
ment and their definitionwill help to clarify the nature of senti- 
ment. The most important of these to distinguish are instincts 
dispositions and complexes. The instincts we have discussed already 
they are the chief raw material for the formation of mind and char- 
acter, and are different from the sentiments in that they are in- 
herited, whereas the sentiments are acquired during the life history 
of/
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of the individual and in their development modify the instinctive 
tendency on which they have been grafted.   The instincts are pre- 
sent in all in varying degrees; they each serve a biological end
and come into play at different stages in the life of the individual
\ 
and they can be sublimated and made to serve higher ends through the
development of sentiments and ideals.
There is another close relation between all the structural ele- 
ments which have been named,namely this,that they have all come into 
existence as emotional responses to some specific object or situatio 
This fact is of great interest to our later discussion of the "a 
priori" view of religious knowledge, and it is necessary here to em- 
phasise the fact that these structural elements have all come into 
existence in different ways through the interaction of mind and ob- 
ject. The most primitive of these emotional responses are the in- 
stinctive tendencies which are physical and psychical structures 
which have come into existence during the course of evolution throu^ 
the interaction of the organism with specific objects and situations 
in the outer world. The nature of any particular instinct, there- 
fore, depends on the nature of the objective reality through which 
it has come into existence,and at the same tine the objective realitj 
would have no effect upon mind if there were no innate tendency go- 
ing out to meet it. This fact that the existence of instincts pre- 
supposes specific objects that call it into being is important to 
expounders of the "a priori" theory, and for that reason the fact 
must be stressed here.
The sentiments are formed on the same principle as the instinct
that is to say, tfcey are structural elements of mind which have come
into/
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into existence through emotional responses to specific objects or 
situations in the course of experience, but they are different in 
that the instincts are inherited while the sentiments are acquired. 
The sentiments are also closely related to the instincts in that 
they are on the one hand, a continuation of the instincts by which 
the sentiments are made possible,and on the other hand the sentiment) 
are capable~of modifying and sublimating the instincts. A sentimen 
therefore, is formed by an instinctive emotion becoming attached to 
objects events or persons in the environment.
Dispositions again are distinguished from sentiments in this . 
respect that sentiments are consciously accepted whereas disposition 
are those emotional attitudes to things which are unconsciously ac- 
cepted, while complexes are those which are rejected as unacceptable 
and tend to be repressed according to the degree to which they are 
unacceptable. Habits again are responses which have lost their dy- 
namic emotional quality. A sentiment, therefore, is an emotional 
response towards an idea, thing, or~person which is acceptable to th 
individual. For instance, religion is a sentiment which centres 
round the idea or person of God and varies with the aspect in whiiQh 
God is conceived. The sentiments form a hierarchy under one domi- 
nating sentiment which is not simply one among many, but an integrat 
ion and synthesis of all the rest with which the self is identified; 
that is to say, the self has one dominating sentiment, or interest, 
which is the primary cause of its synthesis and development, such 
as politics or religion. The aim of all education, therefore, is tc 
create sentiments for the objects that are considered right, but 
these sentiments have further to be .established and become dispo- 
sitions/
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dispositions which are the source of our habits and character, char- 
acter being the nature of the self acting through its sentiments anc 
dispositions. The sentiments on the higher level of reason become 
ideals. Well systematised harmonised sentiments are the cause of 
strenght of character and happiness, and badly systematised senti- 
ments are the cause of strain, unhappiness, and weakness of characte 
The laws of development of these emotional tendencies have been 
deduced and defined by psychologists. Dr Drever enumerates seven 
which have been formulated as a result of the work of James, McDoug- 
all, and Shand. We can do little more than mention them. They 
are: 1. the law of development by stimulation: an instinct may die 
out for wantof use. 2. the law of selection by result: those actr 
ions tend to be discontinued which lead to unsatisfactory reaults, 
and vice versa. 3. the law of inhibition: the tendency to refuse 
to respond to any other except the first type of stimulus. 4. the 
law of transiency: many instincts ripen at a certain age and then 
fade away. 5. the law of transference of impulse: an impulse may 
be transferred from the original object to a new one. 6. the law 
of fusion of feeling: primary emotions simultaneously evoked, fuse
 
into one new emotional experience analysable into its elementary 
components. 7. the law of complication of behaviour due to the 
fusing of different emotions.
As a result of the operation of these laws we get three stages 
or levels of mental life. These three levels are apparent on ithe 
feeling, knowing and willing side of mind. From the point of view 
of feeling the various stages appear as primary immediate crude fee] 
ing/
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feeling or emotion, interest or sentiment, ideal or principle. 
From the point of view of intellectual process they appear as, per- 
ception, ideation, and reason, and from the point of view of beha- 
viour they appear as instinctive or purposive or teleological 
behaviour. These stages, however, are not separate but each stage 
involves all three,the relation between them being that at the 
perceptual level it is crude feeling, at the ideational level it i£ 
sentiment, and at the rational level it is iaeals and principles 
that come into existence.
3. Love the Supreme Sentiment.
Having briefly indicated the nature and manner of formation oJ 
the sentiments we proceed now to show that there is always a hier- 
archy of sentiments and that love is the supreme sentiment. As 
Dr Drever says: (op. cit. f p.77) "The mere predominance of some one 
sentiment will not yield a hierarchy. The only possible way of 
accounting for a hierarchy is by showing how all the sentiments cai 
be caught up into a larger comprehensive system". This is what w< 
shall now endeavour to do by showing that love embraces all other 
sentiments.
Professor McDougall points out that it is impossible to make 
much headway in classifying the sentiments by considering the vari 
objects about which the sentiments are formed, because if we have 
sentiment of love towards a man or object, the emotion will change 
according to the different situations in which the object is place 
For example, there will be fear or anxiety if the object is in dan 
ger, sorrow when it is lost, joy when it is restored, gratitude
4* /-vrtr n v» f-\ n /
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towards those who do it good, and on the other hand if there be 
hatred towards the object there will be fear or anger at its approac 
joy when it is injured, and anger when it receives favours. This 
points to the fact that the only practicable way of classifying the 
sentiments is according to the nature of these emotions. McDou- 
gall points out that all the sentiments are of two kinds, love and 
hate. These words are used to denote both the emotions and the 
sentiments, that is to say, there are the familiar emotions of love 
and hate, but there are also enduring complex emotional dispositions 
of love and hate which are not merely emotions, but permanent ten- 
dencies to experience these emotions whenever the loved or hated 
object comes to mind.
The class of sentiments represented by love and hate includes 
all forms <3f likes and dislikes, affection and aversion, and are 
thus very comprehensive, but McDougall thinks that there is a third 
class, namely, respect, so that his final classification of the 
sentiments is that they are a triad of love, hate, and respect. We 
have, however, in the beginning of this chapter agreed with the view 
implied in the Biblical quotation that there is one supreme sentiiner 
which includes all the others both likes and dislikes, as well as 
respect, namely, the sentiment of love, so that there is no necessit 
but,on the ofcher hand, confusion,as a result of supposing that there 
is a triad. What McDougall's reason for this trinity is, is not 
clear. There might be some excuse for regarding them as two, name] 
love and hate, but we do not see why respect should be put into a 
wholly different category from love. McDougall's reason for doing 
so is as follows: (op. cit., p.138) "We must, I think, recognise
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a third principal variety of sentiment which is primarily the 
self-regarding sentiment, and is, perhaps, best called respect. 
Respect differs from love in that, while tender emotion occupies 
the principal place in love, it is lacking, or occupies an alto- 
gether subordinate position in the sentiment of respect. The prin- 
cipal constituents of respect are positive and negative self-feeling 
and respect is clearly marked off from love by the fact that shame 
is one of its strongest emotions".
Now there are three distinct reasons given in the above quota- 
tion for placing respect in a category by itself apart from love. 
1. The first reason given is that while tender emotion occupies the 
principal place in love, it is lacking or occupies an altogether 
subordinate position in the sentiment of respect. Here McDougall 
is plainly indefinite as to whether tender emotion can be always 
lacking or not from respect. If it is ever completely lacking then 
it certainly is of a different genus from love and cannot be includ- 
ed in it, because the essence of love is tender emotion. But the 
writer admits that it may be sometimes present in a subordinate 
degree. What one cannot understand is how it can be absent or 
lacking at one time and present at another, although in a slight de- 
gree, or how can any one distinguish between the stage at which it 
is lacking, and the stage at which it is present in a slight degree 
only. The distinction is too subtle, and the two statements are 
incompatible.. Either tender emotion is always absent from respect 
or it is present, but our writer cannot have it both ways. Now it 
is/
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is certain that the former of these alternatives is not true, name- 
ly that tender emotion is always absent from respect. On the con- 
trary it is always present though, as he says, "in a subordinate 
position", because he himself admits that the sentiments of love, 
hate, and respect, may be present in all degrees of Intensity. He 
says: (op. cit., p.139) "Besides the sentiments of these three main 
types,love, hate, and respect, which may be called complete or full- 
grown sentiments, we must recognise the existence of sentiments of 
all degrees of development from the most rudimentary upwards; these 
may be regarded as stages in the formation of fully-grown sentiments, 
although many of them never attain any great degree of complexity or
*
strength. These we have to name according to the principle emotion- 
al disposition entering into their composition". Again he shows 
that there are a great many sentiments which are included under the 
two main heads of Icrve and hate. He writes: (op. cit., p. 138) "We 
have the names love, liking, affection, attachment, denoting those 
sentiments that draw one towards their object, generally in virtue of 
tender emotion, with its protective impulse which is their principal 
constituent; and we havethe names hate, dislike, and aversion,for 
those that lead us to shrink from their objects, those whose attitude 
or tendency is one of aversion, owing to the fear or disgust that 
is the dominant element in their constitution. The two names, love
*
and hate, and the weaker but otherwise synonymous terms liking and 
dislike, affection and aversion, are very general; each stands for 
a large class of sentiments of varied though similar composition". 
Now it is apparent that respect is of "similar composition" to the 
sentiments/
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sentiments in the first list and must be included in that list. 
Besides,according to his own analysis,the most essential constituents 
of respect are the two self-regarding'tendencies of positive and 
negative self-feeling and regard implies tender emotion. One, 
moreover, said, that no one hateth his own flesh, but doth cherish it 
and commanded man to love his neighbour "as himself". Surely, there 
fore, respect for self or others implies liking, and liking, on 
"cDougall's own admission, means tender emotion in a certain aegree, 
and this brings respect under love the supreme sentiment.
The second reason McDougall adduces for placing respect outside 
the category of love is that the principal constituents of respect 
are positive and negative self-feeling, but here again his reason is 
strangely at variance with accepted opinion with regard to the rela- 
tion between love and positive and negative self-feeling. One al- 
ways thought that humility was of the essence of love. One of the 
greatest thinkers says: (1. Cor. 13, 4-5^ "love vaunteth not itself, 
is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly". Here we have 
love described as humility and respect together, and these two to- 
gether yield the most solid positive self-feeling, the very opposite 
of being puffed up. This second reason of our writer, therefore, 
is one for including respect under love rather than for placing it in 
a separate category.
His third reason for excluding respect from love is equally 
strange. We repeat again what he says: "respect is clearly marked 
off from love by the fact that shame is one of its strongest emotion
î
But is it certain that tnere is a sharp line of demarcation between 
love and shame ir. this way, or is it not rather the case that sha:7:H 
is an essential constituent in love? Again we quote the words of
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St. Paul that love "doth not behave itself unseemly". What keeps 
love, then, from unseemly, shameful conduct except the sense of 
shame without which it could not distinguish between what was seemly 
and what not? This also is the substance of Professor Drummond's 
beautiful pamphlet "The Greatest Thing in the World" that love makes 
gentlemen. Shame therefore, is a constituent of respect simply 
because it is a constituent of love. A person incapable of feeling 
shame would be also incapable of love.
Another mistake into which Professor McDougall is led by exclud- 
ing tender emotion from respect is this: he asks how we can have 
respect for others if tender emotion is excluded as he supposes from 
respect. His answer is that our respect for them comes into exist- 
ence through sympathetic reflection, that is to say, we respect those 
who respect themselves. Now it is patent that our writer is driven 
to this very far fetched, reflex,or mechanical conception of respect 
for others,simply because from the beginning he has made the fatal 
mistake of excluding tender emotion from respect, and sympathetic 
reflection, an old solvent of various psychological troubles was 
ready to hand to fill the gap. It is more likely on the other hand 
that we respect others not by mechanical reflex sympathetic reflect- 
ion, but because their lives and their self-respect are a beautiful 
thing which evokes our tender emotion like any other form of beauty,, 
truth, or goodness. McDougall's account of respect, therefore, is 
all along an under estimate which he could not avoid,because he 
elected from the beginning to exclude tender emotion from it.
Thus McDougall's three reasons for making respect a separate 
type of sentiment are on the contrary all reasons for including it 
in/
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in the category of love, so that we arenow left with love and hate, 
and we now wish to enquire whether love and hate are really two 
independent, exclusive categories, or, whether or not the one class
includes the other, leaving us with one supreme sentiment as we have
» 
undertaken to prove. This leads us to consider more closely the
nature of love and its relation to hate. Unfortunately as regards 
the primacy or position of love there is not yet agreement among 
psychologists and philosophers. With reference to this, Professor 
McDougall says' (op. cit., p.56) "AS regards the parental instinct 
and tender emotion there are wide differences of opinion. Some of 
the authors who have paid most attention to the psychology of the 
emotions, notably Mr. A. F. Shand, do not recognise tender emotion 
as primary; others, especially Mr. Alex. Sutherland and M. RIbot, 
recognise it as alone primary, and see in its impulse the root of 
all altruism. Mr. Sutherland, however, like Adam Smith and many 
other writers, has confused tender emotion with sympathy, a serious 
error of incomplete analysis which Ribot has avoided".
Professor McDougall himself in his account of tender emotion 
gives it the primary place among the instincts and sentiments. He 
points out that the parental instinct can become more powerful than 
any other and can over-ride any other even fear itself. The reason 
he gives for this is that this instinct works in the service of the 
species while the other instincts work in the service of the indivi- 
dual for whom 1- nature cares little. What he means by this may not 
be altogether clear, but what he intends probably is that the specie 
could not exist without the protecting care of parental love, nor 
could/
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could it even have come into existence without it; without it the 
human species,if it ever could come into existence,would rapidly die 
out. The emotion of love that accompanies this instinct is,there- 
fore, sure to be very strong, but McDougall points out that it has 
been very generally ignored by philosophers and psychologists, the 
explanation he gives being that this instinct and its emotion is 
rfiuch stronger in women than in men and in some men perhaps altogethe 
lacking, and philosophers as a class, McDougall thinks, aremen in 
whom defect of this endowment is relatively common.
McDougall next enquires into the origin of parental love which 
begins as tender emotion, and becomes organised into the sentiment 
of parental love. He criticises the theory of the origin of parent 
al love advanced by Bain, namely, that parental love is generated in 
the individual by the frequent repetition of the intense pleasure o 
contact with the young. This theory, McDougall points out, does no 
give any reasons or facts to show why this pleasure is so intensely 
pleasureable as to be accountable for such a powerful instinct.
An equally impossible theory of the genesis of parental love in 
our writers estimation is that it is due to the expectation by the 
parent of filial support in old age. This he points out is one of 
the constantly renewed attempts to derive all altruism from the 
seeking of onels own pleasure. But as he says, this theory fails 
to explain why a mother's sacrifices for her child are not painful 
but joyful, whereas on this theory, they ought to be a succession of 
painful efforts. He says: (op. cit., p.6o) "Parental love must 
always appear an insoluble riddle and paradox,if we do not recognise 
this primary emotion, deeply rooted in an ancient instinct of vital 
importance/
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importance to the race. Long ago the Roman moralists were perplex- 
ed by it. They noticed that in the Sullan persecutions, while man} 
sons denounced their fathers, no father was ever known to denounce 
his son; and they recognised that this fact v/as inexplicable by 
their theories of conduct. For their doctrine was like that of 
Bain's who said explicitly: "Tender feeling is as purely self- 
seeking as any other pleasure and makes no enquiry as to the feeling 
of the beloved personality. It is by nature pleasurable, but does 
not necessarily cause us to seek the good of the object further than 
is needful to gratify ourselves in the indulgence of the feeling". 
McDougall's own comment on the above quotation from Bain is very 
striking and we reproduce the passage because it also gives an 
account of love, the nature of which we are trying to learn. He 
says: (op. cit,, p.6l) " This doctrine is a gross libel on human 
nature,which is not so far inferior to animal nature in this respect 
as Bain's words Imply. If Bain and those who agree with his doc- 
trine, were in the right, everything the cynics have said of human 
nature would be justified, for from this emotion and its impulse to 
cherish and protect s-pring generosity, gratitude, love, pity, true 
benevolence and altruistic conduct of every kind; in it they have 
their main and absolutely essential root without which they could 
not be. Its impulse is primarily to afford physical protection to 
the child by throwing the arms about it; and that fundamental im- 
pulse persists in spite of the immense extension of the range of 
application of the impulse and its incorporation in many ideal senti 
ments".
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This last sentence regarding the impulse of love to protect 
throwing the arms round the object reminds us of the saying: "How 
often would I have gathered thy children as a hen gathereth her 
chickens under her wings, and ye would not", (Mt. 23, 37.) and it 
shows how accurately Professor McDougall has gauged and fathomed the 
true nature of love, so that one of the profound lessons of the in- 
stinct psychology is that it widens our conception of what is in- 
cluded in the innate endowments of the individual, for, while we 
were under the dominance of the older psychology of the states of 
consciousness,then, everything, even parental love, was evolved 
from reason through pleasure-seeking, but the instinct psychology 
has produced this very important result that it has revealed the 
instincts also to be innate endowments though they work through the 
states of consciousness, and it has further shown that of these in- 
stincts parental love is the most fundamental, because on it dependsl 
the very existence of the species as well as its preservation and 
welfare. And not only so , but, according to this theory, of this 
Impulse to cherish and protect spring generosity, gratitude, love, 
pity, true benevolence, and altruistic conduct of every kind, If i 
is true that all these virtues are derived from self-seeking or 
pleasure-seeking then we self-conscious beings are of all creatures 
the most to be pitied, because .all our virtues are merely disguised 
selfishness, but if, on the other hand as instinct psychology main- 
tains, these virtuous impulses are in us innately, that is, are 
present in us in germ as potentialities when we come into the world, 
then/
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then we have to look for their origin to some other source than our 
own reason which develops later, to a source beyond ourselves, name- 
ly, to a creative cause that was at work before our individual exist- 
ence. It does not need much demonstration to show how important a 
result this is.
We have justnow shown something of the innate origin and the 
nature of love which is one of the main purposes of this study, but 
in so doing we have deviated a little from our immediate purpose 
which was to enquire whether there is one only or whether there are 
three fundamental types of sentiment , namely, love, hate, and re- 
spect. The last of these we have disposed of already, and now we 
have to enquire whether the two remaining, love, and hate, are two 
separate, exclusive, ultimate types.
Now with regard to parental love, Professor McDougall says: 
(op. cit., p. 61) "Like all other impulses, this one, when its oper- 
ation meets with obstruction or opposition, gives place to, or is 
complicated by, the pugnacious or combative impulse directed against 
the source of the obstruction; and the impulse being essentially 
protective, its obstruction provokes anger perhaps more readily than 
any other.....This ultimate alliance between tender emotion and anger
»
is of great importance for the social life of man, and a right under- 
standing of it is fundamental for a trme theory of the moral senti- 
ments; for the anger evoked in this way is the germ of all moral 
indignation, and on moral indignation justice and the greater part 
of public law are in the main founded. Thus paradoxical as it may 
seem, beneficence and punishment alike have their firmest and most 
essential root in the parental instinct". It is evident from the 
above/
152.
above quotation that there is a very close affintiy between love 
and hate, what he calls an "ultimate alliance" and the alliance is 
so close that both of them comprise many of the same emotional dis- 
positions, the difference only being that these emotions are called 
forth by opposite objects or situations. With regard to the rela- 
tion between the different emotions in relation to the different 
objects McDougall says:(op. cit., p. 106) "As Shand points out, when 
a man has acquired the sentiment of love for a person or other object 
he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or 
anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow 
when it is lost, joy when its object prospers or is restored to him, 
gratitude towards him who does good to it, and so on; and when he 
hates a person, he experiences fear or anger or both on his approach, 
joy when the other is injured, anger when he receives favours. It 
is going too far to say, as Shand does, that with the inversion of 
the circumstances of the object all the emotions called forth by the 
loved object are repeated in relation to the hated object; for the 
characteristic and most essential emotion of the sentiment of love is 
tender emotion, and this is not evoked by any situation of the hated 
object; its disposition has no place in the sentiment of hate".
Now it is very incomprehensible, if in the different situations 
of the loved object tender emotion, fear or anxiety, anger, sorrow, 
Joy, gratitude and so on are felt, and if, in the different situa- 
tions of the hated object also some of these same emotions are felt, 
namely, fear, joy, anger according to the change in the situation of 
the hated object, how McDougall proposes to exclude from the differ- 
ent situations in which the hated object might be found, the situa- 
tion/
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situationwhich evokes tender emotion, for, on the analogy of the 
situations cited above we can easily supply situations of the hated 
object where tender emotion is certain to be evoked. Take for in- 
stance the hated object of slavery; surely there is tender emotion 
evoked towards those who hate this object with us and so on with 
every other hated object there is tender emotion towards all those 
who sympathise with us in our hatred towards them. Even thieves 
love one another.
We, therefore, agree with Shand against McDougall when Shand 
maintains that all the emotions called forth by the loved object are 
repeated in relation to the hated object in the inverse order, and 
our agreement is on account of this reason, that towards both the 
loved and the hated object it is the whole self that reacts and 
functions with any or all of its emotions in turn, and the nature of 
the emotion called forth will depend on two conditions: 1. firstly, 
it will depend on the nature of the object, and 2. secondly it will 
depend on the nature of the situation in which the object is placed, 
for instance when a nation once friendly becomes an enemy.   With 
regard to the first it is clear that tender emotion will always be 
felt twoards the loved, and hatred towards the hated object, and in 
this law there is no change, that is to say, tender emotion can 
never be felt towards the hated object, or hatred towards the loved 
object. But it is different with the question of the situations in 
which the objects are placed, because, we have seen, there can be 
situations in the case of either object where all the emotions can 
be evoked, the difference only being that they will be evoked in 
either/
either case in the inverse order, so that it is clear that McDou- 
gall is confusing the above two conditions 1 and 2 which determine 
the nature of emotional response, and while he correctly applies 
1 and 2 to love, he wrongly applies 1only to hate, whereas 2 applies 
to it also equally well. And the reason for this mistake is that 
many modern psychologists of whom McDougall is an example have a 
very imperfect grasp of the nature and function of the s-elf, but whe 
we do look at the problem fromthe point of view of the s.elf what we 
do find is that the self reacts with all its emotions in turn to one
 
set of objects or situations in a particular way,and to the oppo-
*
site set of facts or situations it reacts in the opposite way, so 
that love and hate are related to one another not in the way that 
McDougall supposes, but as opposites dependent on the nature of the 
object, and the question now is which of these two is the greater, 
and the answer is - love, because love is positive and hatred comes 
into existence in the service of love being the response of love to 
what ought not to be in the form of moral indignation, so that love 
is the supreme sentiment which embraces all the rest.
Whatever mistakes Professor McDougall's exposition of mind and 
human nature may or may not have,he hasmade no mistake about the 
supremacy of love, for, as we have seen he makes it the source of a'. 
the virtues, and to show further his appreciation of it we give two 
more passages in this connection. He writes (op. cit.,p.65) "How 
is this great fact of wholly disinterested anger or indignation to 
be accounted for, (that is, say, at seeing ill-treatment of any 
child or creature) if not in the way here suggested? The question 
is/
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is an important one; it supplies a touchstone for all theories of 
the moral emotions and sentiments. For, as was said above, this 
disinterested indignation is the ultimate root of Justice and of 
public law; without its support law and its machinery would be 
most inadequate safeguards of personal rights and liberties......
Those who deny any altruistic motives to man and seek to reduce 
apparent altruism to subtle and farsighted egoism, must simply deny 
the obvious facts, and must seek some far-fetched unreal explanations 
of such phenomena as the anti-slavery and Congo-reform movements".
One must acknowledge here the important contribution to our 
knowledge of mind of the instinct psychology in the way that it has 
placed at the centre of personality an instinct and sentiment which 
was misunderstood and neglected by the philosophers. Nothing could 
be higher than the appreciation of McDougall of this instinct. He 
says: (op. cit., p.63) "Wordsworth's poem on thepet lamb is the cele- 
bration of this emotion in its purest form; and, indeed, it would 
be easy to wax enthusiastic in thecause of an instinct that is the 
source of the only entirely admirable, satisfying, and perfect human 
relationship as well as of every purely disinterested conduct". 
Now moral indignation or anger or hatred is one of these forms of 
^purely disinterested conduct" which are here traceable to loveas 
their source so that on our author's own showing hate is included in 
love as one of its essential constituents and there is no necessity 
to make it into a separate category. This is In agreement, with one 
of-t^el-profoundest discoveries^of-Hegel namely, .his principle of the 
dialectic unity'6f opposites. According to.Hegel oppositesjwhich 
in separation negate one another are actually necessary moments in 
a/
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a living thought process which forms a unity so that the opposites^ 
though opposed to one another in separation^are not opposed to unity, 
and it is the presence of the two opposite moments that produces 
movement and development,-: the one could not exist without the othei 
or develop without the other. This principle is at work in many 
ofcher aspects of life also. We seem,therefore, justified in main- 
taining that there is one supreme sentiment of love which includes li 
itself two opposite moments of love and hate. What we find in the 
last resort, then, is not three main parallel sentiments but a 
hierarchy of sentiments with love primary and regulativeand the 
source of all the rest. It is therefore, important to emphasise the 
superlative Service of'psychology in unravelling the nature of the 
instincts and sentiments, because as we have seen important works on 
religion can be written even to-day which contain next to nothing on 
the instinct of love and its place in religion, whereas modern psyche 
logy compels us to look for the origin of all that is noblest and 
highest in man, and hence to the origin of religion also to this verj 
instinct,and when theology has oriented its thought from this centra: 
fact a more natural and simpler account of the origin and nature of 
religion will be forthcoming. And in that account love will be 
displayed as the genesis as well as the end of religion which is a 
faith that worketh by love,and so the emphasis will be on the works 
of love more than on intellectual beliefs, because the conception of 
love will revolutionise theology and through theology preaching, and 
the theology will be simpler, more intelligible, and more popular, 
and religion more within the reach of everybody.
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Professor McDougall in the above passages gives to love a very 
high place, but it woula have been more satisfactory if he had made 
love supreme, as it actually is, instead of one of three, but he was 
prevented from doing this by his faulty view of mind as originating 
in cognition and conation instead of in feeling which is at first a 
vague feeling ofphysical need which develops into a need for fellow- 
ship with God, a feeling the essence of which is interest or mean- 
ing' or value.on which all our higher ideas and susceptibilities de- 
pend, and the regulative factor in this interest,meaning,or value is 
tender emotion or love, because as will be seen further on the ulti- 
mate categories of the true , the good and the beautiful depend 
for their recognition upon the parental instinct, tender emotion, 
and the sentiment of love.
4. The Three Supreme Objects of Love.
It has been shown above that there is one supreme, sentiment 
regulative of all the rest,and now an effort will be made to show 
that this sentiment hasthree principal objects, namely, self, neigh- 
bour and God, and we shall now discuss them briefly in this order. 
The origin of our consciousness of the ftelf and not-self was a 
question which engaged the attention of olderpsychology, but the 
more recent psychology has revealed the importance of the social 
factor in the not-self and has thereby enabled us to envisage a 
large number of factors in the problem which did not enter into the 
purview of the older psychology. It will be, therefore, of advan- 
tage to consider the account which is given by this psychology which
IB/
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is oriented from the point of view of the social factor as presented, 
by one of its leading exponents Professor McDougall whose theory of 
the instincts and sentiments we have been discussing,and it will con' 
duce to clearness and consistency of treatment if we consider very 
briefly his view of the origin and formation of firstly, the self 
sentiment, secondly, of its counterpart the social sentiment , ana 
finally, of the religious sentiment.
We begin then with the question of where and how consciousness 
of self emerges in the development of the individual. We have seen 
already that many psychologists like the "man as man" psychologists 
of whom Professor Webb is an instance cannot find any evidence of a 
self, and consequently consciousness is to them a stream of sensa- 
tions. To Professor James again there is no self and the thought 
is the only thinker psychology can discover, but it is certain that 
the passing thought does not think, because as we have seen thought 
is a process belonging to an >organisni which is the thinker, and the 
thinking is carried on by a mind with certain structural elements 
which determine the thinking, and it is the sum total of these 
structural elements that form the self. The mistake of the above 
writers who cannot discover a self is due to the fact that they limit 
mind to process or complex process, and they exclude from mind 
structure which is the self. And this self is more than an aggre- 
gation of structural elements and different from other wholes in 
that it is self-conscious and capable of reflection which Professor 
Webb's stream is not; it flows in one directiononly. There is, 
therefore, a self and a self sentiment which comes into existence
%
with it.
The self-sentiment then is a continuation or development of 
the
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the selfpreserving instinct, and develops J firstly through the grad- 
ual distinction between the self and the not-self. The child at 
first has one vague undifferentiated "continuum" of experience, 
which becomes gradually separated into three groups,according to 
Dr Dreverl Firstly, there is one group which is entirely within 
the control of the child as far as experience from free movements of 
limb is concerned. Secondly, there is a group entirely beyond his 
control like experience of day and night and of his own body like 
hunger and thirst so that from none of these could he know of self 
or external reality. But there is a third group partly within and 
partly without his control and in these he finds the distinction 
between self and the world and this distinction emerges in the coursi 
of motor-adaptation. It is in experiences of this kind which is 
both in and beyond his control that the distinction between self 
and not-self is found and when this distinction has been made other 
experiences are referred to these two classes and thuc knowledge of 
self and external reality arises. As this process of knowledge 
proceeds, further distinctions are made between the self and other 
objects which he interprets in the light of his own experience. 
The attention of the child is soon drawn to the behaviour of other 
persons, his neighbours, and their behaviour also he interprets in 
the light of his own experience and progress in knowledge of himself 
proceeds "pari passu" with knowledge of his neighbours, that is to 
say, the whole process of selfknowledge is a social process. And 
it is in analysing these social factors that Professor McDougall 
and/
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and other writers on Social Psychology have rendered such important 
service in showing the importance of our neighbour, and the empaasis 
of their psychology goes to prove our contention here that next to 
the self our neighbour is the most important factor in our develop- 
ment. From the earliest stage the instincts and general tendencies, 
sympathy, imitation, and suggestibility come into play, and on ac- 
count of having to accommodate his behaviour to that of those around 
him as his experience proceeds the ideas of reward and punishment, 
right and wrong, praise and blame emerge, ana according to McDougall 
these have the greatest part in the determinationof conduct. The 
behaviour at this level in non-moral.
Then Professor McDougall traces the origin of negativeand posi- 
tive self-feeling. In contact with those stronger than himself 
negative self-feeling is evoked from which humility, gratitude, 
respect and reverence are evolved,and makes us capable of the re- 
ceptive attitude of imitation sympathy, suggestibility which renders 
the individual further capable of profiting by advice,precept,ex- 
hortation, moral approval and disapproval. In contact with weaker 
persons positive self"feeling, courage, confidence, selfrespect, 
initiative arjd so on are developed. Thus these two dispositions of 
positive and negativeself-feeling render us capable of a large range 
of moral emotions.
Another factor which operates in various degrees, according to 
McDougall, in different persons to develop their regard for praise 
and blame, their sensitiveness towards moral approval and disapproval 
is active sympathy, that tendency to seek to share our emotions and 
feelings with others which as we have found is rooted in primitive
or passive sympathy which again is the essence of the gregarious in- 
stinct '
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instinct. It is tills instinct which, makes love to one's neighbour 
possible.
Now the self-sentiment and this social sentiment which arises 
out of the gregarious instinct and itsobject the herd, that is to 
say the self and neighbour sentiments are only intelligible on tn.e 
understanding that there is innately in the organism a self-deter- 
mining principle which leads the individual to regard himself and 
also his neighbour,and that principle we maintain is love which is 
the original innate image of God in man, and it is out of this 
original endowment of love that allthe virtues develop^as we have 
seen above. Out of this germinal endowment of love emerges first 
of all the instinct of self-preservation which develops into the 
self-regarding sentiment. This self-sentiment may be anything but 
clear,because when the ideational level is attained at which senti- 
ments emerge there are many sentiments already come into existence 
which shade into one another and are thus very complexly related, 
but one fact is certain that they all form a system in the form of 
a hierarchy with one dominant sentiment. As Dr Drever says: (op. 
cit., p.77>"McDougall hascalled attention to this fact,but he has 
not sufficiently investigated the conditions under which this hier-
«
archy is established. The mere predominance of some one sentiment 
will not yield a hierarchy. The only possible way of accounting 
for a hierarchy is by showing how all the sentiments can be caught 
up into a larger comprehensive system. The development of the 
self in relation to other selves, and through interaction with 
other selves, and the rise of a self sentiment is the one indis- 
pensable/
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indispensible condition. As a separate and distinguishable entity 
the self"sentiment may be far from prominent, since the idea of self 
may be anything but clear and definite. Nevertheless, as a unifying 
principle,the influence of the self-sentiment is all-pervading, and 
such hierarchy as exists may besaid to exist in the self sentiment, 
into which all the other sentiments are necessarily swept up. The 
self sentiment, therefore? is not merely a sentiment among sentiments 
it is a synthesis of all the sentiments". The self sentiment is 
seen in such sentiments as those felt for our home, native town, 
school, college, country and so on; anything belonging to these be- 
longs to our self sentiments which contracts and expands according tc; 
our feelings towards these. It thus tends to organise all other 
sentiments and interests within itself, subordinating and controlling 
all discordant sentiments, so that it becomes the supreme dominant 
sentiment.
Now we have seen already when we considered tne nature of senti- 
ments apart from their objects that there was one supreme sentiment, 
namely, that of love, which was regulative of all the rest which 
formed a system under the hierarchy of love and here on the other 
hand we have discovered that the supreme object of love is the self 
and everything that belongs to it. But we also saw that knowledge 
of the self is accompanied by knowledge of other persons, our neigh- 
bours, and these become the object of this supreme sentiment of love 
also. McDougall says that he has not sufficiently investigated the 
conditions under which this hierarchy of love to self and then to 
other objects is established and we shall see later that he. has 
failed to do so because he has not realised that the integrating 
synthetising factor is the sentiment of love which is a sufficient 
condition/
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condition for the formation of the self, the neighbour, and the 
religious sentiment, because the essence of love is appreciation, 
and its object in the realm., of things is the true, the good,and 
the beautiful,and in the realm of personality (which includes the 
realm of things as its products) our self, neighbour,and God. 
Now the essence of appreciation is the capacity to distinguish 
differences by noting that which transcends so that it contains the 
seed of infinite progress until it seeks to grasp and possess the 
Absolute or God Himself. Love, therefore, is capable of infinite 
expansion and sublimation; "Love never faileth"; it is capable of 
infinite progress, is the integrating principle of personality, the 
source of all the virtues, of all altruistic conduct, and of reli- 
gion which is a life issuing fromfellowship with God. The love 
sentiment, therefore has three supreme objects, the self, one's 
neighbour, and God, because being of the nature of infinitely ex- 
panding appreciation or valuation it cannot stop at one's self, or 
at one's neighbour, and of its own nature it is compelled to reach 
out to God in whom it finds infinite opportunity of expansion. 
Moreover, it is well known that appreciationof the true, the good 
and the beautiful, the ultimate categories of valuation or appre- 
ciation, is not of the natureof abstract sentiment, if such could 
exist, but of the nature of love. Furthermore, of these three
^-
forms of valuation the one that may be,,regarded as-the most basic 
and regulative and inclusive of all the rest is love of the beauti- 
ful or aesthetic appreciation, as.it has not only to do with the- 
beautiful in art, but is also at the basis of all phases of conduct, 
such as deportment, tact, good-humour and love. Then, again, 
aesthetic appreciation, is/
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is the one which is most apparently of the form of love; love for 
the beautifulobject is more palpably present than love for the true 
and the good, but these three involve one another like the three 
states of mind to which they are related, the beautiful which is the 
most fundamental of the categories of valuation being most related t( 
feeling which is the most fundamental of the states of mind, while 
truth is more related to knowing, and the good to willing. In this 
connection there is one other observationrequiring to be made, namely 
that it is admitted by most writers on religion that aesthetic feel- 
ing is the feeling most closely allied to the religious feeling and 
aesthetic feeling as wet have seen is essentially a form of love so 
that the religious feeling "par excellence" is love, but it cannot 
develop except in a state of fellowship or communion with its object 
It may,however, be argued that this is too narrow a basis for reli- 
gion which tends to become our master sentiment that embraces and 
dominates all our other sentiments and interests, but to this it wii: 
be replied later on that there is nothing like communion or fellow- 
ship that is so pregnant with possibilities of developments of the 
highest kind in all directions; that is to say, communion or reli- 
gion is the only means of the highest development.
It has been pointed out above that McDougall has not sufficient 
ly investigated the conditions under which the hierarchy of the 
sentiment comes to be established. This failure on the part of our 
writer to give light on this very iaportant point which we wish to 
know, namely,what it is that accounts for the existence of all these 
sentiments, what it is that integrates and synthetises them into a 
system/
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system which forms a distinctive character or personality, points 
to the fact that there is a missing factor in his theory on account 
of which it refuses to give the light which is expected of it. And 
the factor which is left out, we think,is love. McDougall himself, 
as we saw, has the fullest possible appreciation of love and he ^lc i 
blames the philosophers for never having given it its due place in 
their philosophies, but he himself has failed to make use of his 
own and his associates! very important discovery of the creative, 
integrative, sublimating function of love, andhaving failed to 
realise that the integrating factor he wants is present in love, 
McDougali as we shall see is hard put to to find a satisfactory 
theory that will explain the progress of the individual from non- 
moral to moral conduct. We shall see this if we briefly consider 
his effort to construct a theory that will explain this progress in 
conduct without invoking the conception of love, and, if his theory , 
which omitslove,fails, the presumption will be that the failure is 
due to its omission and that to explain the. very existence of the 
sentiments, the hierarchy among them and progress in personality, we 
have to postulate the conception of love.
In his account, then, of the rise and development of the self- 
sentiment we note that McDougall is unduly preoccupied with the 
social factor,and takes too little account of the importance of indi- 
viduality, so that when he arrives at the stage of the questionwhere 
he has to explain how the individual ever manages to excape from the 
apparent determinism of the social factor to the freedom and self- 
determinism of ideals McDougall seems to get into difficulty.
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McDougall attributes the development of the self in its earliest 
stages almost entirely to the social factor in tills way that in 
the earlier stages he maintains that it is rewards and punishments 
that are the determining causes of the formation of the self, and 
later on it is praise and blame, approval and disapproval out of 
which develop negativeand positive self-feeling which are at the 
core of the self-sentiment and according to which the self becomes 
aware of its place in the social scale. According to McDougall 
there is no doubt that approval and disapproval are very powerful 
determinants of the self -regarding sentiment and he enquires why 
this is so and the answer he supplies is that they are so because 
approval and disapproval are of the nature of the early rewards and 
punishments. Another factor that makes the individual susceptible 
to praiseand blame is activesympathy, the tendency to seek to share 
our emotions and feelings with others. With regard to the above 
two determinants of conduct McDougall writes: (op. cit., p. 173) 
"The two principles we have now considered - on the one hand the 
Influence of authority or power, exercised primarily in bringing 
rewards and punishments, on the other hand the impulse of active 
sympathy towards harmony of feeling and emotionwith our fellows- 
these two principles, may sufficiently account, I think, for the 
moralisation of the self -regarding sentiment, for that regard for 
the praiseand blame of our fellow-men and for moral approval and 
disapproval in general, which is so strong in most of us and which 
plays so large a part in shaping our sentiments, or character, and 
our conduct. This regard leads on some men to the higher plane of 
conduct/
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conduct, conduct regulated by an ideal that may render them capable 
of acting in the way they believe to be right, regardless of the 
approval or disapproval of the social environment in which their 
lives are passed".
In the above passage it is apparent that McDougall's idea of 
moralisationis conformity to social opinion, although such opinion 
as inthe case of some savage tribes may be very mucn the reverse of 
moral inthe true sense and this fact McDougall admits. He says: 
(op. cit., p.180) "The regulation of conduct by regard for the appro 
val and disapproval of our fellowmen inthe way discussed in the
»
preceding chapter has certain limitations and drawbacks in spite of 
its supreme importance for the great mass of mankind". The first 
drawback he mentions isthat the motives involved are fundamentally 
egoistic. Secondly the individual will not act on them when there 
is no danger of being ''found out", and in order to remedy.v this 
defect the doctrine of the all-seeing eye has been introduced by 
some. Thirdly,there is no universally accepted ? moral tradition, 
but it varies with the society in which the individual grows up. 
Thus the sanction of public opinion contains no guarantee against 
the greatest absurdities and moral aberrations,nor does it contain 
any element of progress.
Our writer then considers how the individual advances from this 
non-moral stage to the higher stage of moral Judgment when diversity 
of opinion arise in the community regarding the moral standards 
and this compels the individual to exercisehis own Judgment. This 
leads/
leads McDougall to enquire whether auch judgments are dependent on 
the intelligence or on the emotions. He points out that there are 
two kinds of moral judgments, the original moral judgment and the 
imitative moral judgments (i.e. those derived from maxims) He agre> 
that the former proceed directly fromjemot ions, but with regard to 
the latter he says: (op. cit., p.186) M AS regards these imitative 
judgments, we may go even farther than Dr Fowler and the intellect- 
ual! sts, and may say that they may be made, not only without ante- 
cedent emotion, but also without any consequent moral emotion, that
they may be purely intellectual, though this is seldom the case.
» 
That is to say, we accept certainmaxims of conduct, either purely ,
by suggestion or in part also in virtue of original judgments spring 
ing from our emotions and sentiments; thereafter the accepted 
maxims or principles may give rise to moral judgment by way of a 
purely intellectual process, the recognition of the agreement or 
disagreement of conduct with those principles, a process which may 
be expressed in syllogistic form - all lies are wrong; that is a 
lie, therefore that is wcong".
Now here we see creeping in again the same fallacy we noted 
earlier that there can be states of mind devoid of emotional ac- 
companiments as for example McDougall maintains with regard to cer- 
tain of the instincts. But we reasoned that onthe understanding 
that feeling was primary and regulativeand a permanent element of 
mind,it was still active in.the case of the so-called non-emotional 
group of instincts because active in all states of mind; only the 
feeling/
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feeling or emotional accompaniment was not so noticeable,and the 
same can be said of moral judgments of all kinds provided they are 
real moral Judgments arid .not'-academic exercises which is the kind of 
judgment McDougall seems to have had in mind when framing the above 
paragraph. All such judgments provided they are a real part of 
experience and not the judgmentsof Logic text books involve feeling 
and einotion f and in the world of experience there is no such a purely 
intellectual judgment as McDougall imagines. He himself says in the 
above paragraph that they seldom happen,and we question whether they 
ever happen. For take his own example of a judgment, namely, "that 
is a lie", unless this is a fanciful unreal Suppositional-case,(;we^ 
never jnlake^this ; particular judgment without a good deal of emotion;
our whole moral being is in the statement, and this is still more
* 
certain,if love is the supreme sentiment out of which are derived all
other sentiments of moral indignation and justice. Thus McDougall 
having missed the primary, regulative functionof feeling has also 
missed the primary and regulative functionof love in the moral life, 
and thus falls back again and again into the intellectualist fal- 
lacies which he has set out to demolish, although he has clearly 
enough at one point grasped the leading role played by the sentiment
of love. What a different account therefore he could have given, 
if he showed the moral life to be a development of the sentiment of 
love instead of resorting to purely intellectual processes, and to 
abstract sentiments for its explanation!
These abstract sentiments are another invention of our author to 
explain the means of progress in the moral life due to the defect 
his psychology mentioned above. He says :(op. cit., p. 188) "The
abstract sentiments, on the other hand, such sentiments as the love 
of/
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of Justice, truth, courage, self-sacrifice, hatred of selfishness, 
of deception, of slothfulness - these alone enable us to pass moral 
judgments of general validity. These sentiments for abstract ob- 
jects, the various qualities of conduct and of character, are the 
specifically moral sentiments. It is , then, through the develop- 
ment of such abstract sentiments that the individuals moral develop- 
ment and the refinement of his moral judgment, both ofhis own acts 
and those of others is effected, and his racr al principles are formed;.' 
Just as above our writer thinks that we can have purely intellectual 
judgments so he imagines we can have purely intellectual or,-abstract 
sentiments whereas allreal practical judgments are of the nature of 
values which are determined by feeling or interest,and sentiment on 
the other hand is never"abstract" because according to the writer's 
own definition a sentiment is an emotional response so that an abs^ 
tract sentiment, is a contradiction interms. What he means by 
abstract sentiment is the ideal or principle with which the indivi- 
dual by means of reflectiorjconsciously identifies himself. But an 
ideal belongs to the affective side of mind as was shown already. 
Thus there are no regulative aspects of rnind that are devoid of 
emotion,and when our writer attempts to show that there are he contra,, 
diets himself and this is what would be expected,if after all feeling 
and particularly the feeling of love,is the determinative principle 
in mind and life, and it is likely that no consistent theory of mind, 
or of the moral or religious life can ever be constructed that does 
not give to feeling the first place in mind,and to love which is the 
highest type of feeling the first place in the moral and religious 
life, and we, therefore, endorse what Professor McDougall says about 
the neglect of it by the philosophers and the high estimate he gives
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of this sentiment although he hasnot availed himself of its help in 
his expositiorijbecause he hascnot made it one predominating senti- 
ment which is the unifying principle and the synthesis of all the 
sentiments which form, the personality or self.
Not a great deal has been said in this chapter with regard to 
the third of the objects of the supreme sentiment of love mentioned 
above, namely, God,as thattopic is outwith the scope of psychology 
and belongs to the realm of metaphysics. At this point, therefore, 
the discussionwill leave the sphere of psychology and enter the 
sphere of metaphysics, and as these two sciences shade off into one 
another we shall have in the next chapter first of all to consider 
a thecr y of religious knowledge propounded by Professor Rudolf Otto, 
a theory which from within the province of psychology itself and 
by psychological methods essays to construct an "a priori" proof of 
the existence of G-od, a proof which beforetime used to bethe concern 
of metaphysics alone. But what we think has been established here 
is that the love which is responsible for the organisation of the L-K. 
self and finds that it cannot live without its neighbour also can- 
not cease until it finds rest in God.
In our treatment here of the self and neighbour sentiments we 
have been more concerned with disproving the theory of Professor 
McDougall which attributes the rise and progress of these sentiments 
to rewards and punishments, praise and blame, approval and disap- 
proval, and abstract sentiments. This, however, has the important 
result that it shows that this or any theory that leaves love out of 
the question is bound to end in inconsistencies and thereby the 
necessity of requisitioning love in any theory that is goingto ac- 
count satisfactorily for the motive power required for the riseand 
development/
development of the self and. neighbour sentiments hasbeen proved.
And when this solution has been found its application is not 
difficult, but here we have not the space to trace the stages of 
this impulse of love onward from its first form of love to parents, 
the family,and friends. The self-sentiment arises from love to all 
that belongs to the self and "pari passu' 1 arises love for one's 
neighbour. Progress and development in the individual life takes 
place by this impulse of love attaching by way of sentiments to 
objects of the true,the good,and the beautiful, in fact,the sentimen 
of love in the course of the individual life will have any number 
of objects the feeling-tone with regard to which will vary with the 
nature of the object in each case. This process will be quite 
unconscious and spontaneous at first unless hindered by inherited 
weakness or wrong traditions of society. It will be found that it 
is aesthetic appreciation, that will develop first in the child; 
the child will be attracted to the beautiful before it develops a 
conscience, but very soon after a rudimentary conscience appears, 
and somewhat later a sense of consistency or truth, "but it 'Is 
with the realms of goodness and truth that religion is most inune-- 
diately concerned. Praise and blame from society, no doubt, help 
the development, but by emphasising exclusively this factor the 
individuality of the person is lost sight of, and it is this indi- 
viduality, this inner endowment of the individual, that this theory 
of love as the regulative force in personality brings to the fore- 
front, and it is through this innate impulse of love which is the 
originating integrating cause of personality of the instincts and of 
the sentiments that the individual very early begins unconsciously 
to select his own objects and develop his own sentiments and person- 
ality.
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It is not, therefore, praise and blame from society that deter- 
mines his development so much as his own innate inner nature. The 
truth about the influence of society in determining the sentiments 
of the individual is largely that where mankind think correctly they 
think very much alike, so that where the individual is accepting an 
opinion of society he is not accepting something foreign but what 
is home-coming, because it corresponds with feelings within. The 
dictates of society would have no response in the individual's minds 
did they not arise from an endowment common'to the whole species. 
This is why the maxims of human society make no impression on irra- 
tional animals.
It is this native impulse or innate .endowment that Professor 
McDougall while recognising it clearly enough fails to apply, and his 
exposition gives the impression of social opinion being a cast-iron 
system which moulds the individual into a type from which he can 
only escape by means of abstract sentiments, a kind of sentiment 
which,if it could exist would be absolutely inert and static, wholly 
incapable of the progress which Professor McDougall attributes to 
it. On the other hand, it is "the motive power of a new affection" 
the affection of love that supplies the motive power and determines 
the progress of character and personality according as this affectio: 
becomes attached by way of sentiment to new and sublimer objects, as 
for example, in the Christian religion it gets detached from mun- 
dane things and becomes attached to the idea of God in Christ. 
Progress in the moral life depends upon this affection being sub- 
limated by becoming attached to higher and higher ideals more than 
on/
on rewards and punishments, praise and blame, or abstract senti- 
ments, as we are being told.
Then, again, Professor McDougall has made very little use of 
the gregarious instinct in explaining the development of the moral 
life, because he has not sufficiently made use of the conception of 
love. For Professor McDougall this instinct has very little emo- 
tion about it: he says: (op. cit., p.?0 "The affective aspect of 
the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense or speci- 
fic to have been given a name". "Not sufficiently intense" implies 
that the affective aspect is still there,andthe fact seems to be
that in situations where there is very little acquaintance or friend
/
ship the affective aspect may be very slight, but where there is 
fuller acquaintance the affective aspect may be very intense. In 
fact, it is this instinct that provides occasion for the highest 
development of the sentiment of love. We are not gregarious simply 
because we are fated to be constantly meeting or living or trading 
with our fellowmen, but because there is in nan an e-rnotive, out- 
giving nature of love, which searches out its fellows in order to 
communicate itself to them, the essence of love being to communicate 
or give. But it is a receiving as well as a giving, 
and what it wants to receive in return is not rewards for itself, 
but love in the other person,because the object of love is to create 
love, and it is not satisfied until it sees love created in the 
other. That is why man is a gregarious animal, because he is born 
with a nature to give and receive,and was created for brotherhood, 
and it is the person who gives most who receives most, and has most 
to give.
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Altruism and self-sacrifice, therefore, are not the enigmatic- 
al things thatthey have been often represented.,because they are the 
foundation of our being,an outgiving impulse. On any other theory, 
however, they are inexplicable. It is certain that the praise and 
blame of society will overcome the individual's own opinion only 
when the praise or blame of society embodies a completer ideal of 
love than the individual's own. When his own ideal seems to him 
completer it will determine his conduct and not the praise and blame 
of society.
The gregarious instinct, again, is not simply the exhilaration
of the crowd; that is only its most rudimentary form and consequent-
i
ly there is no name for its accompanying emotion. Its highest form 
is fellowship with and service for others by which v/e endeavour to 
communicate good to them. And, finally, this,same impulse of love 
which is responsible for the parental instinct and the gregarious 
instinct and all the other instincts and sentiments is also that 
which causes the need for complete fellowship,and it is because it 
cannot find this complete fellowship in nature or man that the indivi 







The Religious Consciousness and Peeling.
In the previous chapters we were occupied with the study of the 
instincts and sentiments, and we may here recapitulate the chief 
points therein established in order to reveal more clearly their 
bearing upon the subject of the present chapter. We saw that there 
is in all living organisms a nature, the primary characteristic of 
.which is a feeling of incompleteness, and an urge towards complete- 
ness. In primitive organisms this appears as the self-preserving 
instinct, and in the higher^animals, particularly in man, on account 
of self-consciousness there appears as a development of the instinct 
of self-preservation the self-regarding sentiment, and the altruistic 
or social or as we have called it here the neighbour sentiment, both 
of which, we saw,were due to the innate impulse of love which makes 
these sentiments, not merely possible, but inevitable, for, if we 
postulate love as the ultimate element in this nature, then, it is 
inevitable that it will seek out objects, because the nature of love 
is to possess an object, and it will react to these objects in ways 
that are dependent, on the one hand, on its own nature and needs, and 
on/
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on the other hand on thenature of the objects themselves. Thus, we 
saw that the' instincts were structural elements in mind which came 
into existence in the course of evolution as a result of this inter- 
action of the organism and specific objects. Similarly the senti- 
ments are structural elements in mind which caine into existence 
during the individuals lifetime as a result of the interaction of 
the individual mind and certain objects, ideas, and situations in the 
individual's environment.
These instincts and sentiments have emotional accompaniments »M 
which are, on the one hand, indicative of the nature or needs within 
of the individual, and, on the other hand, of the nature of the 
object which calls forth the emotion; that is to say, the object 
would not make any impression unless there was a receptive mind with 
which it could interact, and, on the other hand mind would be an 
undif ferentiated "continuum11 or chaos, if there were no external world 
of reality with objects of definite qualities and characteristics 
capable of recording these qualities in mind, so that the study of 
mind from the point of view of the instincts and sentiments and 
their accompanying emotions reveals to us, on the one hand, the 
nature of the individual as disclosed in his impulses or instincts, 
because he expresses himself in the satisfaction of his instincts by 
their becoming attached to objects round which they form sentiments 
and find their satis fact ion i»nd)men harmony and poise has been es- 
tablished/
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established in the system of sentiments that forms the self,and 
happiness has been attained, we discover what is the ultimate nature 
or end or ideal of that self by discovering what it requires for its 
stabilisation, satisfaction, and complete development.
But we not only discover the nature of mind,we also discover 
the nature of the extarnal world of reality with which mind interact* 
the reality in which mind finds its satisfactionand completeness, anc 
which causes it to be developed from the original undifferentiated 
"continuum" into a variety of instincts and sentiments arranged into 
a system or self. The nature of these objects is revealed and ex- 
pressed inthe impressions they make and the feelings or emotions the\l 
evoke, which feelings become witnesses to the ultimate meaning or 
value of the objects. Feeling, therefore, is of importance because 
it is our ultimate metaphysical point of contact with external real- 
ity, As we saw at an earlier stage many lines of study have con- 
tributed to draw the attention to the importance of feeling as a 
witness to ultimate realities. In this chapter, therefore, we pro- 
pose to examine the witness of the feelings to the third of the main 
objects of the sentiment of love, which occupied us in the last chap- 
ter, namely, the reality of the Supreme Being, and in this connectior 
we intend to consider the "a priori" theory of Professor Rudolf Otto.
This is a theory which fromwithin the province of psychology 
itself and by psychological methods proposes to find a proof of the 
existence of God by an examination of certain religious feelings or 
emotions, that are supposed to witness directly to the* presence of 
the Divine,- Being. At this stage, therefore, our discussion leaves 
the/
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the sphere ofpsychology proper and enters the realm of metaphysics 
at the point where these two sciences shade off into one another, 
because,though the method of this theory is psychological,its impli- 
cations are metaphysical.
The importance of this proof of the existence of God, if it 
can be established cannot be overestimated, because it at once brings 
the discussion and proof within the range of practical verifiable ex- 
perience, for nothing can bemore direct or convincing than the wit- 
ness of our feelings on which the proof is founded, and this theory 
has created an unusual interest,because it offers to supply what all 
other methods of approach to the study of religious reality have 
hitherto failed to supply, namely, objective, verifiable proof of tte 
existence of G-od. For it is commonly believed that the reasoning 
faculty has failed to supply such a proof, because its record in this 
respect has been one of supplying newer and newer premises as progres 
in knowledge proceeds, so that proofs once held valid are being re- 
peatedly discarded as obsolete, and inadequate to the newer facts 
that are constantly coming to light. Then again the animistic the- 
ory of the genesis of religion instead of supplying a direct proof 
interposes a long history of natural mental develpiaent between us 
and the idea of God, while modern psychology finds nothing in religic 
and worship but subjective processes which witness to nothing but 
theiroown^existence;; An.-account of religion, then, which puts the 
proof for the existence of God within a region which is within every- 
one's reach, where they can test its validity for themselves, would 
confer/
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confer an inestimable benefit upon those who find belief in God 
difficult. Such a theory, therefore, deserves consideration, and 
its investigation will lead us on to the considerationof the ration- 
al proofs for the existence of God in the next chapter, and, when 
both methods of approach to the question, the empirical and the 
rational, have been thus examined, it may be then possible to decide; 
which of these forms of evidence underlies the prophetic conscious- 
ness.
Now we have been all along trying to show that feeling is the 
element in mind which has been least investigated on account of 
being the most metaphysical. We further saw the important contri- 
bution of the instinct psychology in affording us a deeper insight 
into certain feeling elements in mind which made possible the ex- 
planation and systematisation of many mental elements which on the 
older view of mind were unexp]a inable. But it was found that thoud 
the instinct psychology as propounded by Professor McDougall helps
much inthe systematisation of mental phenomena, yet the ultimate 
and essential nature of feeling and its relation to other states of 
mind eludes his investigation. In the case of Professor Otto, on 
the other hand, we seem to have a psychologist who has a thorough 
grasp of the metaphysics of feeling and of its relation to the other 
mental states in such a way that it is impossible ever to confuse 
the one with the other, or resolve the one into the other, or, again 
to make feeling dependent on cognition or conation. On the con- 
trary, Otto irrefutably demonstrates that the feeling phase of mind 
is primary, and that the cognitive, conceptive, rational phase of 
mind is dependent thereon, and it is because he has obtained a truer 
view of mind that he has found so much fresh insight into the na- 
ture/
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nature of religion, although his theory contains a mistaken element, 
also, which demonstrates what was said earlier in these pages that 
the demonstrationof the nature of religion waits upon the demonstra- 
tion of the nature of mind itself.
The present theory, therefore, is of special interest to us her* 
because it supports the view herein maintained that to understand 
the nature of religion and of the religious or prophetic conscious- 
ness it is necesaary first to understand thenatureof feeling, and 
what will be found in thepresent writer is an analysis of great 
penetration of the feelings that enter into religion before their 
meanings have been conceptualised or rationalised. What the writer 
shows is that the feelings involved in religion cannot be expressed 
in words, and can only be described by means of analogies and sym- 
bols, or, as he calls them, ''ideograms". It will readily be ad- 
mitted that all ultimate experiences like feelings and sensations 
are inexpressible, but Otto-J-s proposition is different from this, an, 
what he endeavours to show is that words expressive of feelings in 
the ordinary sense, such as, fear, wonder, awe, when applied to re- 
ligious feeling, represent totally different feelings from what they 
do in the ordinary sense, and the task which Otto sets himself is to 
discover how the feelings of fear, wonder, awe in the religious   
sense differ from their ordinary sense, and, when he has isolated 
the peculiar nature of feelings in the religious sense, showing them 
thereby to form quite a unique category of valuation which he calls 
"the category of the holy" he draws the deduction that the religious 
feelings/
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feelings witness to a IB allty which ordinary feelings of an analogous 
kind are not conversant with, namely, the realityof the Divine Being, 
and the different religious feelings are caused by different quali- 
ties in the Divine Being, so that we have here inside consciousness 
itself the opportunity of proving the existence of God in our feel- 
ings which are directly caused by the Deity, so that we have no need 
of external proofs or postulates because he says: (op. cit., p.l4o) 
"Religion does not draw its life from postulates", but from direct 
contact with the Divine Being; God, in short, is known primarily in 
these feelings. This is the point at which his critics will Join 
issue with Professor Otto, but, before any criticism or estimate can 
be offered, it will be necessary to give a brief summary of his 
argument which is rather difficult to appraise because it includes 
much that is true, and also, because it omits fromfrts purview much
 
that is necessary for the full explanation of religion.
Professor Otto, then, begins by pointing out that in the theis- 
tic conception of God the Deity is thought of by analogy with what 
is highest in ourselves, such as, Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good-will 
Supreme Power, Selfhood, etc., thought of as absolute and infinite. 
Now these terms are all concepts admitting of definition, and, 
therefore, the description they offer of God is rational. Otto, 
however, is far from disparaging reason, and he says that before he 
ventured on the present line of study he had "spent many years of 
study on the rational aapect of that Supreme Reality we call God" . 
He makes clear his position in this regard by emphasing the fact 
that, the truer a religion, the more Vigorous will be its theology. 
But these theological conceptions, he maintains do not exhaust all 
our knowledge or experience of Deity. Our theological attributes 
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of God, for instance, are only predicates of a subject which is not 
fully comprehended in the rational concept. These rational concepts 
in fact, imply a supra-rational subject of which they are the attri- 
butes; that is to say, the fact that we have the concept or predi- 
cate means that we have the subject within our grasp, otherwise 
nothing could be predicated of it. Moreover there is great need to 
investigate the content in these terms that remains over and above 
the rational meaning, the non-rational or supra-rational, because 
preaching and orthodoxy and theology emphasise these rational con- 
cepts only, and fail to take account of, or give expression to this 
non-rational element in the idea of G-od, and thus they have failed 
to keep this element alive in the hearts of the people, by giving to 
the idea of G-od a one-sided, intellectualistic or rationalistic 
interpretation.
On this point Professor Otto says: ("Idea of the Holy", Eng. 
Trans., Oxford University Press, 1925, 3rd impression pp. 3-4; "This 
bias to rationalise still prevails, not only in theology but in the 
science of comparative religion in general, and from top to bottom 
of it. The modern student of mythology, and those who pursue re- 
search into the religion of primitive man, and attempt to reconstruct 
the Mbases"or "sources" of religion are all victims to it. Men do 
not ofcourse in these cases employ those lofty "rational" concepts 
which we took as our point of departure; but they tend to take: these 
concepts and their gradual "evolution" as setting the main problem 
of their enquiry, and fashion notions and ideas of lower value, which 
they regard aspaving the way for them. It is always in terms of 
concepts/
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concepts and ideas that the subject ispursued, "natural" ones, 
moreover, such as have a place in the general sphere of man's idea- 
tional life and are not specifically "religious". And then with 
a resolution and a cunning which one can hardly help admiring, men 
shut their eyes to that which is quite unique in the religious ex- 
perience, even in its most primitive manifestations. But it is 
a matter for astonishment rather than for admiration! For if there 
"be any single domain of human experience that presents us with some- 
thing unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assured- 
ly it is that of the religious life".
Prom the concluding words of the above passage it can beseen 
that Professor Otto is convinced that there is a peculiar element in 
experience which is unmistakably the religious element or "moment". 
This sometriing^however, as will be seen, reminds us in some distant 
way of the supposed religious faculty or religious instinct of earl- 
ier days. This element he attempts to isolate in the following way, 
He begins by considering the idea of "holiness" or"the holy" and 
points out that this is primarily a category of valuation peculiar 
to the sphere of religion. It isoften transferred to the sphere 
of ethics, but it is not itself derived from this sphere. It is 
not a simple element but a complex one, and though it contains an 
ethical element which is definable, and, therefore, rational, it also 
contains a specifioelement or moment which is quite distinct from 
the rational, a moment which is inexpressible, an ditpfnTOV or 
"ineffabile", in the sense that it completely eludes apprehension 
in terms of concepts, like the beautiful. Thus it is evident that 
the original meaning of the word "holy" is quite different from its 
derivative/
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derivative meaning in common parlance or in philosophical or theo- 
logical usage. He says: (op. cit., p.5) "It is true that all this 
moral significance is contained in the word "holy", but it includes 
in addition - as even we cannot but feel - a clear overplus of 
meaning, and this it is our task now to isolate. Nor is this merely 
a later or acquired meaning; rather "holy' 1 , or at least the equiva- 
lent words in Latin, Greek, Semitic and other ancient languages, wa£ 
devoted first and foremost only to this overplus: if the ethical 
element was present at all, at any rate it was not original and never 
constituted the whole meaning of the word".
Seeing, then, that the word "holy" has in common usage acquired 
an ethical sense which has driven the specific religious meaning out 
of use, so that it no longer implies this specific religious moment, 
Otto finds it necessary to invent a new term for this specific 
religious moment, and the term he has selected la the term "numinous" 
from the Latin "numenV It is implied, and is very dynamic, in the 
Hebrew UJl^i? , the Greek OiyiOS J and the Latin "sanctutf" The 
word, "holy" may be used to translate these, but this only represents 
the gradual shaping and filling in with ethical meaning, a process 
which Otto calls "schematization", so that "good"is a mistranslation 
of holy and altogether inadequate to express the "numinous" or the 
religious moment in the holy.
How, then, is this numinous feeling to be described? Here 
Otto cautions the reader who cannot remember any distinctly religious 
feelings not to read any further; but those who have had experience 
of such unique feelings can easily recall that in religious worship 
over/
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over and above such ordinary feelings as those of gratitude, trust, 
love, reliance, humble submission, and dedications there are other 
quite unique and Incomparable feelings. The first of these unique 
types of feeling whichhe mentions is what he calls by another new 
invented term, namely, "creature consciousness" or creature feeling". 
The implication here is that the creature feeling is produced by the 
"numen praesens" who is felt as it was by Abraham. Otto , therefore, 
condemns Schleiermacher'"s definition of religion as a feeling of 
dependence,because such a feeling, being felt by tne good and the 
bad, is not peculiar to religion, and besides it reaches the idea of 
God only by an inference, whereas the numinous is a direct immediate 
experience of a "numen praesens". He says :(op.cit,. p.11) "Now 
this object is just what we have already spoken of as "the numinous", 
For the creature-feeling and the sense of dependence to arise in the 
mind the "numen" must be experienced as present, a "numen praesens% 
as in the case of Abraham. There must be a felt something "numin- 
ous", something bearing the character of a "numen", to which the mind] 
turns spontaneously; or (which is the same thing in other words); 
these feelings can only arise in the mind as accompanying emotions 
when the category of the numinous is called into play. The numin- 
ous is thus felt as objective and outside the self".
In the above quotation there are two main contentions that re- 
quire criticism. The first is that the religious moment consists in 
the few primitive feelings or emotions which the author has isolated, 
and, secondly, that these emotions are caused by the direct impact of 
the/
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the Deity on consciousness. With regard to the first of these it 
is far too like the old fallacy of the religious faculty or instinct 
to be too readily accepted. While it can be admitted thatcreature- 
consciouaness is present to a certain extent in religion and the 
more so the more primitive the religion, it is not understandable hoi 
Otto finds in it and the few other primitive feelings he has isolatec 
the real moments of religion and consigns to the secular such feel- 
ings as gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble-submission, and 
dedication, which are exactly the feelings that are expressed in 
prayer and worship at its best. This reveals the absolute cleavage 
that Otto has made between religion and the rest of the moral life. 
There is no doubt that it needs to be emphasised that morality alone 
is not religion but the difference between them is not one of abso- 
lute antithesis and exclusion, because the two advance "pari passu", 
morality giving content to religion and religiongiving a goal to 
morality. Progress in religion depends on progress in morality f 
because progress in morality depends on our apprehension of values ir 
the universe,and these values become our religious values Whenhfche 
ae&rch for values leads us to the idea of the Supreme Being who is 
the source! of 1 all values. Thus moral values become religious values 
so that the values are the same in both cases only they are looked at 
from different points of view. It is not possible to draw a hard 
and fast line of demarcation between the two as Otto has done, making 
moral values one thing and religious values the "wholly other", out- 
side the bounds of reason. It is not possible to point to 
one duty and say that it is religious and to another and say that 
it is secular in this way.
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Then again if these highest feelings of all are to be excluded 
from true religionwe are left with those primitive feelings which ar 
characteristic of the religion of primitivenian, feelings which anthr 
pologists tell us exist everywhere among primitive peoples. As we 
shall see Otto derives most of his facts for his theory from primi- 
tive religions rather than from the religion of the New Testament, 
and it is the universality of the phenomena to which he appeals that 
gives the theory its apparent plausibility. But, as the religious 
life of man develops, these primitive feelings fall into the back- 
ground, and in religion at its highest it is these very feelings that 
Otto rejects as secular that characterisethe religious life. There 
are passages in Otto which imply that these raaturer feelings grow 
naturally out of the specifically religious ones, but other passages 
on the other hand emphasise their essential difference throughout. 
And as a matter of fact there is no hint or suggestion of how the 
two sets are related, that is to say how the specifically religious 
experience is related to the rest of the morai life of the indiVidua 
On Otto's theory the two are independent of one another.
On the other hand our present line of study leads us to suggest 
that by employing the conceptions of instinct and sentiment supplied 
by ordinary psychology the primitive emotions can be intelligibly 
related to the more developed emotions or sentiments because the 
primitive instincts which are structural emotional tendencies in min 
get in the course of the life time of the individual attached to 
objects in the outside world round which gather sentiments which 
develop into ideals. At first the response will be the crude emo- 
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emotion of the kind which Otto isolates, but as knowledge of the 
object grows the emotion gets rationalised, refined, and developed, 
and especially will this be the case with the idea of God which con- 
tinues to grow throughout the individual life, so that in the pro-
»
cess the.primitive instincts are sublimated and transmuted to an 
incalculable extent. And the sentiments that will gather round the 
idea of the Divine Being will not be simple and few, but complex and 
many, because the Deity is the richest conception that the mind can 
grasp. Moreover our knowledge of the Deity like our knowledge of 
everything else proceads "pari passu" with our knowledge of our self, 
our neighbour, and our environment, and in any account of our know- 
ledge of the Deity this process of mediate, middle-class knowledge 
has to be taken into account^ but such procedure would be fatal to 
Otto's theory which seeks to confine religion to a few select emo- 
tions which he maintains remain constant through life. No doubt 
the primitive instincts do, to a certain extent, retain their origin 
al character, but equally important is the' fact that they become the 
basis of many sentiments which are partly determined by the charac- 
ter of the objects to which they are attached, so that a theory of 
religion, which fails to take account of all this moral development 
of sentiments, is not likely to give a true or full account of re- 
ligion which tends to become a master sentiment, which synthesises 
all the rest. But in his effort to find a direct proof of the 
existence of the Deity Otto confines religion to a few forms of 
feelings, which are strong because they are of the innate and prim- 
itive type, and thus suit his theory better than the more developed 
kind. The great importance of Otto's work, then, IB his emphasis on
the autonomy of religious experience, but his method of proof is 
faulty, as we are trying_to prove.
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The second point to which we called attention is Otto's con- 
tention that these feelings which he has isolated are caused by the 
direct impact of the Deity which he calls "nuinen praesens". That 
this is his contention is abundantly evident from the above quo- 
tations. Furthermore, he says: (;op. cit., p. 12) "We said above 
that the nature of the numinous can only be suggested by means of 
the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of 
feeling. Its nature is such that it grips or stirs the human 
mind with this and that determinate state". There is no room for
*
doubt here as to the author's meaning; the Deity "grips" and "stirs1 
the human mind and causes determinate feelings. Let us, therefore, 
see whether the feelings so aroused are such as would maKe it be- 
lievable that they are caused by the "grip" of the Deity. For this 
purpose we shall follow a little further his exposition. After, _ 
then, discussing the feeling of creaturehood which is produced in 
the creature by the "numen praesens", Otto considers the next form 
in which the Deity is felt; He is felt as the "Mysterium Treinendum" 
with regard to which Otto has the following paragraph: (op. cit., p, 
12-13) "Let us consider the deepest and most fundamental element 
in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion. Faith unto 
Salvation, Trust, Love, - all these are there. But over and above 
these is an element, which may also on occasion, quite apart from 
them, profoundly affect us and occupy the mind with a well-nigh 
bewildering strength. Let us follow it up with every effort of 
sympathy and imaginative intuition wherever it is to be found, in 
the/
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the lives of those around us, in sudden strong ebullitions of person- 
al piety and the frames of mind such ebullitions evince, in the fixed 
and ordered solemnities of rites and liturgies, and again in the 
atmosphere that clings to old religious monuments and buildings, to 
temples and to churches. If we do so we shall find we are dealing 
with something for which there is only one appropriate expression, 
"mysterium tremendum". The feeling of it may at times come sweeping 
like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil mood of deep- 
est worship. It may pass over into a more set and lasting attitude 
of soul, continuing as it were thrillingly vibrant and resonant, un^ 
til, at last, it dies away, and the soul resumes its profane, non- 
religious mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sudden 
eruption up from the depths of the soul, with spasms and convulsions 
or lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to 
transport and ecstasy. It has its wild and demoniac forms, and can 
sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering. It has its crude 
barbaric antecedents and early manifestations, and again it may be 
developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious. It may 
become the hushed, trembling, and speechless humility of the crea- 
ture in the presence of - whom or what? In the presence of that 
which is a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures".
Now let us notice that in the above feelings, we have, according 
to the writer, "the deepest and most fundamental element in all 
strong and sincerely felt religious emotion". The feeling of this 
most fundamental element is described as "sudden eruption up from the 
depth of the soul", "spasms and convulsions", "strangest excitements',1 
"intoxicated frenzy", "transport", "ecstasy", "wild demonic forms' 1 , 
"almost/
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"almost grisly horror and shuddering", "crude barbaric antecedents 
and early manifestations", and these are said to be due to the 
"presence of that which is a mystery inexpressible and above all 
creatures" or as he said earlier to the "grip" of the Deity. But 
it makes one very sceptical to be told that the action of Divine 
Love and Holiness upon the human consciousness results in the above 
manifestations. To attribute these manifestations to the presence 
of the Divine Being is to make Him the author of confusion, andnot 
of harmony and of a sound mind. The effect of the presence of the 
Divine it can be safely presumed would be to stabilise and pacify 
the feelings, and so far from proving a"numen praesens" the above 
feelings are more likely to prove his absence, for it is notorious 
that such manifestations are capable of being produced by people who 
have no pretence whatsoever to religion, as well as by sects and 
persons in the Christian Church who are well known to make use of 
physical means in bringing about the phenomena. Such phenomena as 
is well known to students of the comparative study of religions are 
found everywhere and are no decided proof of the presence of the 
Divine, so that Otto here is appealing to phenomena waich every 
religion normally outgrows in the course of its evolution. On the 
other hand he says above, "Again it may be developed into something 
beautiful and pure and glorious. It may become the hushed trembling 
and speechless humility of the creature in the presence of - whom 
or what"? Now the question one would like to ask is whether the 
writer maintains that the "who?or what"? which causes the corybantic 
manifestations mentioned above is the same objective reality, if sue! 
it be, as causes the "pure and glorious" manifestations. Why in 
the/
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the one case in the effect of the Deity like that of the heathen 
mysteries, and in the other case like that of Christian faith.?
This Otto does not explain and cannot explain because these two 
sets of manifestations are due to two different causes altogether, 
the one set being derived from heathen rites and the other derived 
from the New Testament, and they are strung together on one string 
to support his theory. Yet Otto throughout his exposition maintain^ 
that it is the Deity who produces all the above diverse feelings, 
and that we can trace the nature or "quale" of the Deity from the 
manifestations. This will be clear from a passage in which he goes 
on to analyse the "Mysteriun"  He says: (op. cit., p.13) "Con- 
ceptually "mysterium" denotes that which is hidden and esoteric, 
that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and 
unfamiliar. The term does not define the object more positively in 
its qualitative character. But though what is enunciated in the 
word is negative, what is meant is something absolutely and intensely 
positive. This pure positive we can experience in feelings, feel- 
ings which our discussion can help to make clear to us, in so far as 
it arouses them actually in our heart. To get light upon the posi- 
tive"quale" of the object of these feelings, we must analyse more 
closely our phrase"mysterium tremendum" and we shall begin first 
with the adjective".
Here again it is clear that the writer maintains that the feel- 
ings witness to the "quale'' of the object, and he therefore enters 
upon an analysis ofthe Mmysteri u :ii tremendum' 1 in order to show us the 
nature of the Deity who causes these feelings. The first feeling 
which he examines is that suggested by the adjective "tremendur:/'. 
Tremor/
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Tremor itself is merely the ordinary emotion of fear, but here it is 
used to throw light on the kind of feeling present in religion which 
is quite distinct from the ordinary emotion of fear, but yet is to 
some extent like it, so that the ordinary term , fear, may be used ai 
an analogy to give us a hint or suggestion of what is implied in re- 
ligious fear. With regard to this fear he says: (op. cit., p. 15^ 
"Its antecedent stage is "daemonic dread" (cf. the horror ofPan; 
with its queer perversion, a sort of abortive off-shoot, the "dread 
of ghosts". It first begins to stir in the feeling of "something 
uncanny", eerie, or weird. It is this feeling which, emerging in 
the mind of primaeval man, forms the starting point for the entire 
religious development in history. "Daemons" and"gods"alike spring 
from this root, and all the products ofmythological apperception, 
or fantasy are nothing but different modes in which it has been 
objectified".
From the above paragraph it is evident that in the antecedent 
stages of religion it is "daemonic dread", "dread of ghosts" "gods" 
"mythology" and"fantasy" that are the objective causes of this feel- 
ing, whereas, in trie case of the feelings caused by the l! mysteriu .i',1 
it was the presence of "a mystery inexpressible and above all crea- 
tures" that was regarded as the cause of the barbaric and refined 
forms of the feeling alike, that is to say, in the former place Otto 
says that ( the feelings are caused by the "numen praesens", but here 
trie feelings are attributed to fancy.
The incongruity of these two positions point to a radical de- 
fect in Otto's theory. His preoccupation with the thought of estab 
lishins a direct proof of the existence of God by making the Deity 
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as "numen praesens" the direct cause of these feelings from start to, 
finish makes it impossible for him to leave any room for the evolu- 
tion of religious ideas or of religious life and feeling or for di- 
vine revelation as we have in the prophets or Christ. Otto dis- 
cusses all these, namely primitive religion, the prophets, and Chris 
but because religious feelings are, according to his theory, the 
same always and everywhere and always caused by the "numen praesens") 
therefore the prophets and Christ as well as the non-Christian re- 
ligions only provide additional examples of the numinous, so that 
the total impression on reading his book is much less religious than 
that produced by reading a regular book on the history or philosophy 
of religion. The writer speaks of the antecedent stages of religior 
but the feelings which he describes as characteristic of that stage 
are not very different from those of the stage when the^numen11 is pre- 
sent,nor does he give any hint of thepoint at which the w numer? comes 
or what difference he makes in the feelings when he does coine. If 
it is not the "numen praesens" who is present from the dawn of the 
consciousness of primitive man, but only the objects of his own 
imagination,then,at what point in man's history does the "numen 
praesens" begin to operate? There is no mediate process or hint of 
any kind to fill in this blank in his explanation, and, if man in 
his primitive stage carried on with the objects of his imagination 
causing much the same.emotions as those caused by the "numen prae- 
sens ", then it is not apparent what advantage the "numen praesens" 
conferred by his coming. The account of religion that Otto's theory 
offers is, therefore, much less intelligible than that of the ordi- 
nary books;because it takes no account of the historic development 
of religion and of morality which is the handmaid of religion, and 
so/
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so, as we have said, already, his account would have been .nuch more 
clear if he had made use of his analysis of his specific religious 
feelings which hehas so ingeniously analysed along with the concep- 
tion of the instincts and sentiments, and then the religious feeling^ 
would be no longer simple and constant, but growing in complexity 
depth and refinement with the progress of revelation in the prophets 
and Christ, in history and nature. Then the few special religious 
feelings which Otto isolates would find their place as the few primi- 
tive instincts with which man comes into the world, and they remain 
latent to the end, because they are structural and innate,although 
in the meantime the great system of sentiments , dispositions, habits 
etc. which go to form character and personality and the moral life 
have branched out of them. It is true also that without these 
primitive instincts man would not be religious, andwhat Otto's theory" 
proves is not the direct presence of God in man's instinctive feel- 
ings, but that man feels his need of God, andhas a capacity for fell- 
owship with God, so that Otto's theory has value in emphasing the 
fact that man even in the process of his evolution must havebeen 
divining in very rudimentary ways the nature of the Creator from the 
creation around him, otherwise he would never have these instincts 
feelings,but that is a very different question from maintaining that 
these elementary instincts are the only truly religious feelings, 
and that they are caused directly by the presence of God, for many 
have the above feelings very strongly who have very little fellow- 
ship with God, because the presence of God is only vouchsafed to 
those who have progressed in the moral life, to the pure in heart, 
and to those wno seek, and the emotions become refined with growing 
intimacy/
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intimacy with the Divine,and become very different from those which 
Otto regards as specifically religious. The history of this process 
of refinement Otto omits from his view of the religious life. Anot- 
her defect in Otto's theory is that in spite of all his elaborate ef- 
fort to demonstrate its uniqueness he fails to convince us that in 
religious feeling there is anything more inexpressible or non-ration-' 
al than in any other feeling. A difference there ought to be, but 
that difference Otto has failed to make explicit. This is apparent 
from a perusal of his chapter on "Analogies and associated feelings" 
where he compares the numinous with other feelings in order by help 
of these analogies and associated feelings to explicate the numinous., 
The net result of this performance is the opposite of the author's 
intention, so much so, that instead of convincing us of the uniqu6- 
ness of the numinous, he only succeeds in showing us that the numin- 
ous is on a par with all other feelings as regards non-rationality, 
inexpressibility, wholly-otherness, and the other essential character!, 
istics of § the numinous, so that we are forced to the conclusion that 
what the author is up against throughout his whole book in not the 
uniqueness of religious feeling only, but the uniqueness of all 
feeling and its essential difference from reason, and it is this 
uniqueness of feeling as such, which he calls the non-rational. 
Ordinary psychology would simply call this element the "irreducible" 
element in feeling which cannot be expressed in terms of anything 
else and so with conation also. And the service of the author to 
religion and psychology is of importance in drawl 1^3 attention by 
his brilliant analysis of it, not to the non-rationality of religious 
feeling/
199-
feeling so much as to the amount of rational interpretation it can 
bear, although, of-course, there is an overplus or irreducible in 
feeling just as there is an overplus or irreducible or unique ele- 
ment in reason and conation,and we welcome his invaluable contri- 
bution to the psychology of feeling which as has teen said here more 
than once already is in need of investigation.
In order to support the criticism of Professor Otto's work now 
offered we shall follow a little his comparison of the numinous with 
other feeling states of mind. He says: (op. cit., pp.42-43) "The 
analogies between the consciousness of the sublime and the numinous 
may be easily grasped. To begin with "the sublime" like ths "numin- 
ous is in Kantian language an idea or concept "that cannot be unfold- 
ed" or explicated.....it has in it something mysterious, and in this 
it is like that of the numinous. A second point of resemblance is 
that the sublime exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the 
numinous; it is at once daunting, and yet singularly attracting,in 
its impress upon the nind. It humbles and at the same time exalts 
us, circumscribes and extends us beyond ourselves, on the one hand 
releasing in us a feeling analogous to fear, and, on the other, 
rejoicing us. So the idea of the sublime is closely similar to 
that of the numinous, and is well adapted to excite it, and be ex- 
cited by it, while each tends to pass over into the other". Here, 
then, we have in the author's own words the same characteristics of 
the sublime as he has given us of the numinous, namely, inexplica- 
bility, dauntingness, fascination. These features exist in many 
natural phenomena and we do not need to postulate a "numen praesens" 
for/
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for their excitation in mind. Moreover they each tend to pass into 
one another a detail which is gratuitous if as we have seen the es- 
sential features are the same without any noticeabledifference. 
There is therefore on the basis of Otto's analysis of the feelings 
no comprehensible distinction between religious and sublime feeling, 
although there..ought to be distinction. The only distinction that 
could be made would be on the basis of sentiments and their objects, 
because though the feelings which are organised on the form of in- 
stincts are constant the feelings hwe a different feeling-tone or 
emotion according to the nature of the objects round which they form 
sentiments so that the feeling of the sublime or of awe and mystery 
will be differently tinged according to whether it is evoked by the 
sublimity of the Divine or the sublimity of natural phenomena, so 
that for intelligibility we require not only the analysis of Otto, 
but also the conceptions of instinct and sentiment of ordinary psy- 
chology, because Otto's psychology fails to distinguish between the 
different feelings.
Professor Otto supplies another analogy to the "Mysterium", 
namely, the category of moral obligation which shows that the'*jjyste- 
ri.uVf is not such an ineffable entity after all, if there is such a 
copious supply of analogies to it, as we shall see. By means of 
such a supply of analogies we ought to grasp most of its features, 
although the author does not encourage us to believe we can; we can 
according to him only hint at it. He says: (op. cit., pp. 45-46) 
"Now it is just the same with the feeling of the numinous as with 
that of moral obligation. It, too, is not to be derived from any 
other feeling, and is in this sense inevolvable. It is a content 
of/
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of feeling that is qualitatively "s.ui generis", yet at the same 
time one that has numerous analogies with others, and,therefore,it 
and they may reciprocably excite one another and cause one another 
to appear in mind.....such a power of stimulation characterises the 
feeling of the sublime, in accordance with the law we found, and 
through the analogies it bears to the numinous feeling..... It is 
probable that the feeling of the sublime is itself first aroused and 
disengaged by the precedent religious feeling - not from itself but 
from the rational spirit of man and its "a priori" capacity". 
Here we have again the same characteristics of the numinous possess- 
ed by the moral category as well, with the additional significant ad- 
mission that the feeling of the sublitae is disengaged by the prece- 
dent religious feeling and that religious feeling itself is disen- 
gaged by the rational. Now this latter detail is incomprehensible, 
if the religious feeling is non-rational, beyond the reach of reason 
as the author hasall along been trying to prove, but here he admits 
that it must have some rational elements otherwise the rational could( 
not appeal to it or disengage it. It seems, therefore, that there 
is here nothing more than the three ultimate categories of valuation 
of ordinary philosophy, namely, the .true, the good, and the beautiful 
and the distinctive notes of the "Mysteriu-n Tremendum" of Otto apply 
to these three equally. They are each inexplicable, "sui generis" 
daunting, and fascinating in different degrees, the sublime or 
beautiful being the most profoundly so of the three. And so the 
Supreme Being who is the source of all three is bound to be ineffable, 
mysterious, daunting, fascinating. But all this has been long ago 
admitted, that we cannot know the Deity to perfection nor describe 
him except in symbols derived from our own experience. A certain 
amount/
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amount of mystery will always remain in religion, nor, in the nature 
of the case could religion live without it. Then again, these thre: 
involve one another, and are aroused, or disengaged in a perfectly 
natural way by one another, and by the reason, so that there is no 
need to posit a "numen praesens'1 for the disengaging of "the holy" 
any more thato for the sublime. It is this postulating of a "numen 
praesens" for the excitation of "the holy" alone that makes Otto's 
theory a case of special pleading and constitutes the main fallacy 
in his argument. Another source of obscurity that may be mentioned 
here is that in places where he implies objective reality, the auth 
or imperceptibly glides into the use of the "numinous" which is main- 
ly subjective, so that it is often difficult to see what he is trying 
to prove.
There are two other feelings which Otto regards as being ana- 
logous to the numinous, namely, erotic and musical feeling. YJlth. 
regard to the analogy between the erotic and musical feeling he 
writes: (op. cit., p. 4?) "But though the two I am comparing are 
thus manifestly opposite extremes, they have a closely corresponding 
relation to that which lies between them viz.,the reason... Whatever 
falls within the sphere of the erotic is therefore always a composit' 
product made up of two factors: the one something that occurs also 
in the general sphere of human behaviour as such, as friendship and 
liking, the feeling of companionship, the mood of poetic inspiration 
or joyful exaltation and the like; and the other an infusion of a 
quite special kind, which is not to be classed with these, and of 
which no one can have any inkling, let alone understand it, who has 
not learned from the actual inward experience of "eros'' or love. 
Another/
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Another point in which the "erotic" is analogous to the "holy" is in 
having in the main no means of linguistic expression but terms arawn 
from other fields of jental life, which only cease to be "innocuous" 
(i.e. only become genuinely erotic terms; when it is realised that 
the lover, like the orator, bard, or singer, expresses himself not so 
much by the actual words he uses as by the accent, tone, and imita- 
tive gesture which reinforce them'1 .
V/ithout waiting to enquire why the writer regaras erotic and 
musical feeling as opposite extremes with reason midway between them, 
we here notice again that all that the writer proves from his analo- 
gies is that all feeling is limited for its expressionto rational 
concepts, language, imagery, ana gesture, and that numinous feeling .:« 
in that respect not different from all other feelings. The same 
criticism applies to what he says with regard to musical feeling. 
He writes: (op. cit., p. 50^ "Ivlusical feeling is rather (like numi- 
nous feeling; something "wholly other", which, while it affords 
analogies here and there will run parallel to the ordinary emotions 
of life, cannot be made to coincide with them by a detailed point to 
point correspondence". The author's comparison, therefore, of the 
numinous with analogous and associated feelings only more fully 
evinces the fact that in regard to dauntingness, niysteriousness, fas- 
cination, inef fability, and inexplicability the nui.iinou& is on a par 
with all other innate instinctive feeling,and that ftherefore,to argue 
from these characteristics in the case of the religious to a"numen 
praesens"with corresponding characteristics is a conclusion that is 
absolutely unwarranted by the facts. On the other hand what Otto's 
theory/
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theory has demonstrated is, firstly, the importance of feelir.^ in 
interpreting ultimate realities ir religion art and morals and other 
departments. Secondly, he has emphasised the fact that we have no'. 
perfect acquaintance with these departments if we have only rational
descriptions of them; they have to be felt and. experienced before
i 
they can be known. Thirdly, he has drawn attention to the limitati-
of ordinary language and imagery, and the necessity of analysing more 
carefully our feelings if we would attain to profounder knowledge of 
the realities that produce them. More important than this he has 
shown from the nature of man's feelings man's capacity for the Divine 
and also he has shown tokens of the Divine Nature in those feelings, 
though he has not succeeded in giving us a direct proof of the pre- 
sence of the Deity.
We have left to the end the element of Fascination in the "nu- 
men" which is of special interest to us here, because it corresponds 
to the sentiment of lovewhlch we have taken to be the highest force 
in life and the explanation of the existence of the self, society, 
and of religion. It will be seen, therefore, whether Otto's explan- 
ation of this feeling t the highest of allf supplies further light or 
only further difficulty. He describes the element of fascination 
thus: (op. cit., p.3O "The two qualities the daunting and the fas- 
cinating now combine in a strange harmony of contrasts, and the re- 
sultant dual character of the numinous consciousness, to which the 
entire religious development bears witness, at any rate from the 
level of the"daemonic dread" onwards, is at once the strangest and 
most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion. The 
daemonic-divine object may appear to themind an object of horror ana 
dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures
wl t.h /
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with a potent charm, and the creature who trembles before it, utter- 
ly cowed and cast down has always at the sane time tae impulse to 
turn to it, nay even to make it soaehow his own. The mystery is foi 
him, not merely something to be wonderea at, but something that en- 
trances him; and besides that in it which bewilders and confounds, 
he feels a something that captivates and transports hir.i with a stra- 
nge ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxic- 
ation; it is the Dionys3a.cc element in the numen" . Here again we 
have the "a priori" idea that the feelings are directly due to the 
influence of the "numen", but the best that we are offered from this 
element of fascination is the religious frenzy of Dionysiac religion 
and we are asked to believe that this is an element in the Deity. 
But surely we are not here dealing with the Deity at all but with 
the religion of the savage. Fascination out of which the writer 
promised love would be explained, turns out to be only tine curios- 
ity of primitive man. We, therefore, much prefer to the point- 
blank pursuit of the religious "a priori" the more pedestrian route 
of tracing the growth of the religious consciousness from its early 
gropings and manifestations in daemonic dread and self -induced ex- 
citements through the sublimation of instincts and sentiments that 
form the moral life till the individual becomes the temple of the 
Holy Ghost and God is present to him even when the feelings are ab- 
sent .
Further, Otto tells us that the ideas and concepts of this ele- 
ment of fascination such as Love, Mercy, Pity, Comfort, are all only 
natural elements of the common psychical life, but that in numinous 
love, grace, bliss, there is "something more". But when already we
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realise that ordinary love is unfathomable it is a gratuitous "ex- 
tension of the limit" to "be told there is "something more" because 
if we have to go beyond love, we have to go outside experience. 
The same result as this could be much inoreintelligibly reached in- 
directly by the conception of the instinct of love which is the core 
of the person and regulates all the other instincts and out of it de- 
velops tne sentiment of love which has for its object the self, 
others, and the Supreme Being and these three main sentiments com- 
prise an infinite number of subsidiary ones ranged round them in the 
form of a system on the principal of interest or value. Love as a 
sentiment has an infinite number of objects and the sentiment which 
gathers round each one of them will be differently tinged or have 
a different feeling-tone from every other and this is the "something 
more" which Otto is driving at, but it is not "something more" than 
love. So that the sentiment which attaches to the Divine Being will 
be of a much more exalted kind and have "something more" in it than 
any other like every other sentiment. In the same way the "wholly 
other" than human fear, awe, and reverence in the "Divine Wrath" 
would be far more simply explained as the difference in the senti- 
ment regarding the Divine Being. Into this account would come in 
fear, awe, mystery, inthe earlier stages, and faith, reason, self- 
dedication and love at the highest, all forming a gradual evolution. 
This implies that these elements of majesty, overpoweringness, energy 
and urgency in the "nurnen" are felt by man not directly as if they 
are due to the impression of the^numen1/ but inferentially because 
these qualities belong to personality, which is the product of the 
evolution of self and social consciousness. Man could have no clue 
to/
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to majesty or energy unless he had the consciousness of it developed 
in himself, and just as knowledge of the personality of others is a 
deduction from their behaviour, so the consciousness of the majesty, 
energy, and urgency of the Divine is an impression gained from His 
created works as well as from consciousness of these in ourselves, 
but not derived In this "a priori" fashion from the numen. In the 
same way he construes the feeling of sin and the necessity for atone-! 
merit as the result of the direct action of the " numen'1 . He says: 
(op. cit., p.53) "It does not spring from the consciousness of some 
committed transgression, but rather is an immediate datum given with 
the feeling of the M numen". In this way he overlooks the presence in 
man of an innate moral nature and the part played by society in 
forming conscience and in making a man feel his shortcomings and sins* 
all which normally happens without the presence of the" numen1!
Thus Otto in his anxiety to get a direct proof neglects all 
this mediate knowledge, But we cannot dispense with the knowledge 
that comes from inference, reason, and faith which reasons from what 
is to what ough£ to be. Faith is a certainty obtained through 
valuation and is of no less importance than the direct knowledge 
which Otto is thinking of. Even direct contact with the Deity 
would not give perfect knowledge of Him any more than direct contact 
with the physical world can give us perfect knowledge of physical 
reality. This, however, does not mean that real direct fellowship 
with God is not possible as well as knowledge of him by the mediate 
way of growth of knowledge and of experience. He does so reveal 
himself but conditionally to the pure in heart, and to those who seek 
Him, and what is denied is that He reveals Himself in a mechanical 
way of a "deus ex machina" and ie the direct cause of all religious 
feelings/
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feelings inthe way that Professor Otto maintains, independently of 
moral preparedness for that revelation.
But, if, on the other hand, we wish to estimate at its full 
value the witness of the feelings as distinct from reason to the 
existence of God, and we do maintain that they do so witness in their 
own indirect way, then in order to have all the facts before us the 
investigation must commence from the very beginning of feeling in- 
cluding the evolutionary stage of the formation of the instincts 
with a minute analysis of the various instincts in the manner of Otto 
LIcDougall and others* then onthe advent of self consciousness of the 
individual the growth of sentiments t disposition and character would 
have to be traced with their systematisation under one master or self 
sentiment which forms the nucleus of the self or personality, then 
the line of proof would not be so very different from that of Otto's, 
but it would avoid hiatuses and the mistake of aiming at direct 
proof. The proof though indirect would still be of immense value, 
and the brunt of it would be borne by the very fact of the existence 
of the instinct, and feelings which Otto describes. The proof would 
be to the effect that the instincts and sentiments are structural 
feeling elements in mind which have come into existence as a result 
of the interaction of mind and specific objects, situations, ideas or 
values in the external world. If there were no external world with 
values of that specific kind then mankind would never have possessed 
those instincts. The feelings of the sublime, of awe, reverence, 
fascination etc. are there as structural elements innate in man as a 
result of his evolution just because there are these values in ex- 
ternal reality. In the same manner on the advent of sentiments they 
cannot develop "in vacuo", but only when there are specific forms of 
objective/
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objective reality to call them into existence. Y/hen, then it is 
discovered that there are religious sentiments or feelings the in- 
vestigation of trie nature of the idea or object round which they 
gather is legitimate. And, if, as Otto says, it is found that 
there are feelings absolutely different from the secular, and with 
"something more" in them than inthe secular, and these are connected 
with the idea of the Divine, then it is legitimate to draw the con- 
clusion that there is a divine reality, by which they are evoked. 
And not only does Otto maintain that the reality is there, but he al- 
so maintains from his analysis of the feelings that the reality is 
personal, and we agree that the instincts are of such a nature as to 
suggest personality in the universe as the cause of them. The po- 
sition that we are here advocating is the same as that of a recent 
Kerr lecturer who has approached the subject from the psychological 
standpoint,and altaough somewhat over-sympathetic with Otto's posi- 
tion he contributes a very illuminating chapter to the discussion. 
Dr Edwards says:("Religious Experience, its Nature and Truth", Eain., 
T. & T. Clark. 1926> "I an not sure that a r^ood deal of Otto's ana- 
lysis of religious experience could not be better expressed interns 
of this exceedingly useful and illuminative conception of the senti- 
ment. The various emotions which he so well describes and which he 
seeks to educe as aspects or elements of an experience which is yet 
in some paradoxical fashion regarded as simple, primary, unde.iyative 
and irreducible, would then appear as representing some of the more 
intimately characteristic of these emotion which are linked in the 
religious sentiment with the divine object;.. Such a presentation of
the matter would notM't steams'to me-, be destructive of the essentials 
of/
210.
of his analysis, ar.i it would obviate a certain awkwardness in me- 
thod of expos'; tionv/hich sometimes gives it ar. entire.lv undeserved 
semblance of unreality and strain. The essential point of his 
theory v/oula remain in that the "numinous" reality Is the div: ne 
object itself, around the idea of which the religious sentiment 
gathers and to which the religious emotions are attached. Its 
''numinous" quality is reflected in the idea which embodies it, ana 
which still arouses and attaches to itself the characteristic emo- 
tions of the numinous experience".
This is the max.:mum deduction that can bemade, but it is a very 
important one, not simply that through his evolutionary and self- 
conscious stages man has put the valuationof Divinity and personality! 
upon his universe, but that unless there were Divinity ana person- 
ality inthe universe he would never have the nature which he has, 
attuned as it is to fellowship with the highest that he finds, and 
as Otto would suggest something infinitely more. The unfathomable 
depth of feeling points to an unfathomable Being. The essential 
characteristic of man that distinguishes him from the lower cr^atiori 
is that he has thoughts of Goa and desires fellowship with God, ana 
he has acquirea that desire during his evolutionary and -selfconscious 
life, as a result of contact and communion with, external reality, ana 
not simply by imitationof and suggestionfromt-he herd, because suggest 
ion is fruitless, unless the capacity to receive it is there, but 
man is born with the capacity to divine the presence of God inthe 
universe, and to seek ana hold fellowship with Him. The evidence of 
the existence of the instincts and sentiments such as Ctto describes, 
points to the fact that man's desire for fellowship with God is not 
merely due to subjective process, but to objective reality as v;ell. 
But/
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But Otto's work would have been far more convincing had he contented 
himself with this indirect proof and shown us the two processes de- 
veloping "pari passu" from the beginning, namely, the subjective 
feelings and the growth in religious ideas by y/hich they are caused 
and then we would be better able to judge of his facts by not having 
them "en masse". But this would not suit his method of direct proof 
Otto has a chapter on "The Numinous in the Old Testament" in which h«= 
deals with the numinous stage of daemonic dread; then Isaiah is 
taken as the stage when "The Holy One of Israel" became the expressic 
"par excellence"of the Deity, and Ezekiel and Job are taken as ex- 
amples of the mysterious. If the test of a theory is its capacity 
to explain then Otto's theory ought to throw more light onthe Old 
Testament prophets than it does. It seems as if the clearer the 
knowledge of God becomes in the minds of the prophets the less of 
the numinous there is left to describe. That there was a non- 
rational non-ethical element in the religionof Israel there is no 
doubt,but the instances that he quotes are few,because what we have 
in the Old Testament is theahistory of the progress of an ethical 
and spiritual ideal in the process of which tbe non-rational falls 
into the background. On his theory when spiritual communion in- 
creased there ought to be more of thenuminoua f but the rever;e is the 
case,and this is still further borne out by his chapter on"-Ttoe Numi- 
nous in the New Testament'.' In that chapter where communion with 
God is more to be expected the instances of the numinous are fewer 
and very far-fetched. We may take one example,"The Kingdom", he 
says, (op. cit., p.85J "isjust greatness and marvel absolute, the 
"wholly other" heavenly thing, set in contrast to the world of here 
and/
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and new, "trie mysterious" itself in its dual character as awe-com- 
pelling yet all attracting, glimmering in an atmosphere of genuine 
"religious awe". The arbitrariness of this description is seen when 
contrasted with St. .Paul's with which all woulJ. agree that the King- 
dom of God is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost".
(Rom. 14:1?.)
The remaining part of Otto's book is taken up with his theory 
of divination on which a few words fall to be said. By divination 
Otto does not simply mean the believer's mode of knowing God but 
something else, since he questions whether even Schleiermacher pos- 
sessed it. He says: (op. cit., p. 154) "It is questionable whether 
Schleiermacher himself, in spite of his (re-)discovery of ''divination 
was a really "divinatory" nature, although in his first "Discourse" 
he maintains that he is". Moreover this faculty is not the possess- 
ion of man in general but only of a few special people. He says: 
(ibidem) "Not man in general (as rationalism holds), but only special 
divinitory natures possess the faculty of divination in actuality 1 ' . 
From this description we conclude that,not being the ordinary faith 
of the believer but a special possession of the few,it must be some 
psychic gift and if so it is not the way by which knowledge of God 
is obtained,because God is not known only by those few who can, to 
use Professor Hocking's phrase, look up the "back flues of conscious- 
ness". Our conclusion then is that what Otto is engaged with all 
the time is simply the irreducible element in all feeling and feeling 
varies in people to a great extent, some being comparatively passion- 
less; and his divinatory natures are those who make the greatest 
emotional response; either that or they are purely theoretical.
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We set out in this chapter to show the part pi aye., by feeling ir1 
the religious consciousness, and, as the chief topic unac-r this heading 
usually is the status o: intuitive know lease, we have exajiinea a the- 
ory which maintains that all genuine religious knowledge is intuitive 
and this we saw leads to exaggerated claims for intuitional know- 
ledge which cannot be substantiated. "t is necessary, therefore, tc 
define the status of intuitional knowledge which is of prime import - 
ance to religion. That there is such a thing as intuitive knowledge 
is being admitted more and mo;-e,especially since the work of Eergson:, 
who has shown that reality is grasped by intuition,but that,while 
reason can analyse this real'ty, it can never put It together ag 1 r*, 
so that an account can be given of it that can fit Into a ph'loso- 
[hlcal system so as to convey it to other minis. This 's what Ctto 
has endeavoured to do. T n insisting that there is intuit ! ve re]i 
g'ous knowledge he is r'gh", cut * n endea.vour.ing to separate that 
intuit<ve knowledge from religious knowledge that 's inferential he 
has fa", led as might be expected,'cecause to have anything at all to 
saj he confined himself to those 'ntuitlons that are characteristic 
of primitive minds where the inferential element is at Its least, 
while h.' s theory is plainly inadequate to the tasx: of following up 
the intuitive element in the more developed mind.
..r.at Is intuitive in religion, therefore-, cannot be conveyed to 
other minds in a way that can supply a aroof to others, although the 
religious mind itself is certal.ii of *• ts own intu'tlve experience. 
But the fact that its reality cannot be demonstrate^ to others aces 
nob diminish its truth. For instance, there are other- things in our 
experience the reality of which we cannot aoubt though we cannot de-
»
scr'le them to others, for example, sensation. The different ele- 
ments/
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elements in mind, in fact, feeling, knowing and willirc in the last, 
resort defy analysis or description. Intuition then must be of thL 
order of fact. It must be a leap of the mind in its totality at 
concrete facts, an immediate apprehension like airect physical ser.- 
sation without any inferential process. Just ac sensation forris 
the basis of the ordinary consciousness, religious intuitions must be 
the foundation of the religious consciousness. On this primary im- 
mediate intuitional religious knowledge, ordinary religious infer- 
ential knowledge is built just as ordinary knowledge of the physical 
world is built on the basis of our sensations. It is possible then 
to conclude that intuitional knowledge is only a more fundamental 
form of inferential knowledge. This seems probable from the fact 
that while it is certain that all have intuition in some degree only 
certain persons possess it in a marked degree and these are the pro- 
phets among mankind. The conviction, authority, and knowledge with 
which prophets speak indicate that they have received more vivid and 
comprehensive intuitions of reality than ordinary people have. But 
these intuitions are very difficult or impossible to give expression 
to. What we get in the case of the prophets is not the intuitions 
themselves but the inferences or teaching drawn from them. The in- 
tuitions themselves are incommunicable, and this is what causes Ot- 
to's difficulty in describing them. The task is impossible; the 
irreducible in mind cannot be described. Even if we get all the 
insight that can be derived from all Otto's different qualities in 
the wnumen jl it would fail short of what real intuitive apprehension of 
the Divine would be because such an experience cannot be conveyed in 
language.
These immediate religious experiences, therefore, cannot admit 
of/
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of any logical proof. They are proof to those who experience then 
but not to those who have no such experiences themselves,and. so they 
cannot be related, to ordinary knowledge or fit into any philosophi-
»
cal theory. But,although there is no logical proof,there is still 
the pragmatic test. The Old Testament prophets were not accepted 
on the authority of their own asseverations but on the authority of 
the truth of their message. If they spoke notaccording to the law 
and the prophets there was no truth in them. Exponents of uysticisz 
nowadays offer as a proof of the reality of mystic visions the fact 
of the creativeness of mysticism. It yields fruit worthy of its 
origin, and there is no denying that this is a proof, for "by their 
fruits ye shall know them". Visions on the other hand, that are 
self-induced or merely subjective lead to mental deterioration. 
Applying this test to Otto's own example those v/hich lead to frenzies 
grisly horror, and so on,betray their own origin by their results. 
The mistake of Otto as well as of the mystics generally is to 
extend the range of intuitive knowledge too far and credit it with
e
what belongs to the inferential sphere, while ordinary people tend 
to deny the reality or extent of intuition which they regard as only 
a form of inference. But the two as we have seen are two essential 
and different stages of mental process like sensation and reason. 
On this point Professor Waterhouse has an illuminating passage. He 
says: (op. cit., p. 103) "Unless we have some experience of reality 
which is not inferred, in what way can we have ground for inference? 
The chain of inference cannot hang upon inference. Spinoza's 
"scientia intuitiva" was the third and highest kind of knowledge. 
It woUld, perhaps, be better to regard an immediate r.rasp of reality 
as/
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as the basis of knowledge. If that is 'to be so, it is not possible 
to deny that the religious consciousness may have an immediate sense 
which forms the basis of its knowledge, which can be apprehended as 
reality without inference". One striking illustration of the truth 
of this theory is the case of the discoveries of great scientists. 
They witness to the fact that their greatest discoveries have been 
in the form of an intuition,that in the process they were passive, 
and that the truth found them,rather than they the truth, as if real- 
ity had advanced to meet them and impinged upon their minds in the 
form of a sensation. We may not readily take the mystic's account 
of his own intuitions on account of his bias,but there can be very 
little motive for bias inthe case of the scientist. Such discover- 
ies might be supposed to be the result of former thinking processes 
carried on subconsciously and coming to a point t but the scientists 
themselves disavow any such former thinking,so that intuition must 
be regarded as a basal phase of mind which is common to all minds in 
different degrees.
To conclude this chapter on feeling, then, a word or two must 
be said about the function of feeling generally in the religious and 
prophetic life. Feeling proper as we saw is different from feeling 
tone or emotion which accompanies sensations or experience of objects 
ideas, and situations. It is the initial phase of mind,and is of 
the nature of an urge or compulsion due to needs or capacities. 
These needs demand values for their satisfaction,and so we get feel- 
ing-value which is a stage of feeling which comes between the initial 
stage and the feeling-tone or emotion. The feeling-value is like 
intuition in that both are feeling plus knowing,but they are differ- 
ent in that intuition is immediate while feeling-value feels grad-
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gradually Montessori-wise all round its object in order to know it, 
and the feeling-tone or emotion is the recult of the satisfaction. 
Feeling proper then, is the urge for satisfaction, feelinc-value is 
the search for it,and feeling-tone or emotion is the result of the 
satisfaction.
 
Feeling proper, therefore, is the dynamic aspect of nina,but it 
owes its importance to its being closely associated with the other 
aspects of mind particularly the will,because development takes place 
only through action. The will is dependent on feeling ana. hence 
vitality in religion depends on feeling. Thus the importance of 
fueling is not in itself,but in its power of inciting the will to 
action and thinking. Feeling has dynamic also only as it is connect 
ed with ideas or concepts,and it is evanescent unless it is harness- 
ed to ideas. This is what is called a sentiment,as we saw. The 
nature of the feeling,therefore, will depend on the nature of the 
Idea or object r-ovrnd voich it centres, the idea having power to re- 
fine the feeling,but the greatest change is produced in the feeling 
self by the act of will which expands the capacity of the feeling- 
self for higher experience.
Y71 th this proviso against undue emphasis on the feeling element 
in view of the modern over-emphasis on the non-rational, it is our 
concern here nevertheless to point out the importance of feeling in 
religion and in the religious consciousness. Space does not permit 
here, but it could be shown how in religion at its best, in the reli- 
gion of Israel and throughout the whole course of the Christian 
religion, it was always a rising tide of feeling centring round a 
great intuition in the form of a conviction or idea in the mind of a 
prophet/
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prophet that always marked new departure3 and revival in religion ^ 
changing the- attitude and wills of the people. When the original 
idea or form of religion ceases any longer to give satisfaction,be- 
cause the religious consciousness has outgrown its usefulnes slaving 
advanced to higher ideas.the feelin" is transferred to the higher07 -- ' *~*
ideas,and,if the older form of religion lives on without being ais- 
carded T it lives on as ritualism which is a form of religion out of 
which, the religious interest or feeling has departed. When such a 
stage arrives it is the new feeling for, or interest Injthe higher 
truth or form of religion that protests against the inadequacy of 
the old, and prompts the v/ill to the acceptance of the new. The 
task of the prophets of Israel was to protest against old forms of 
religion out of which the value had gone. Then Lgain when falsity 
is tolerated in religion it is feeling in the form of an intuition 
that detects the flaw. Reason laterbn will elaborate and clarify 
the situation to rnind, but the process of criticism begins in an 
original intuition. Or,when apathy creeps in,its detection is due 
to an intuitive feeling. Sometimes the intellect may dissipate 
the feelings by explaining them away,but the importance of the ideas 
is obvious f because they are the objects round which the religious 
sentiments gather strength and momentum, and it is from the point of 
view of the ideas that religious development can be best described, 
but those scholars interpret the prophets to us best who along with 
the ideas fathom the feelings with which the ideas are charged, the 
indignation, pathos, disappointment or love that forgea the words.
All great preaching like that of the prophets of Israel, preach- 
ing such as leads to great results in changing the will, is preaching
where there is great conviction or great feeling whicb arises out of 
profound/
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profound intuitions. It is not the idea alone that counts,the car- 
dinal mistake of much preaching,but idea with feeling,which alone 
is able to change the will. The ancient prophets of Israel knew 
this intuitively and their writings are accordingly not logical dis- 
quisitions, but torrents of burning lava,and that is why being dead 
they yet speak, and still change peoples' wills. Their age needed 
it and every age needs it before wills can be changed. It is this 
need of conviction, intuition,or feeling that made Professor Denney 
say in his "Death of Christ" that the ideal state of affairs would b< 
when every theologian was an evangelist and every evangelist a the- 
ologian. There is a prejudice against cheap evangelism which is a 
form of preaching where the feelings are not real, and cost nothing 
because they do not arise from profound intuitions as in the case of 
the prophets whose intuitions were obtained as a result of close and 
prolonged communion with God. What sent them to God was some deep 
problem of their own. As Wesley said,their own nest was stirred 
first,and that sent them to their watch tower to await God's deliver- 
ance, and while waiting they received that knowledge of God that made 
them prophets. But we can never fully understand the prophets 
apart from the conception of love. They were not merely politician! 
or patriots, but men who had acquired a love for, and sympathy with 
humanity, because they had experienced the deliverance and love of 
God in their own need, and it was this love in their hearts that 
supplied the motive power and inspiration to stand and deliver their 
message in the name of Jehovah. Without a due understanding of the 
love that their own experience of the love of God generated in their 
hearts, we have no key to the minds of the prophets.
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Chapter VII.
Reason and the Religious Consciousness.
The result of our discussion in the last chapter has been to 
emphasise the importance of feeling in religion, not by way of show- 
ing that it is something non-rational in the sense that we cannot 
give intelligible account of it, as Otto maintains, but in the sense 
that it has a metaphysical scope which is indicative of the infinite 
and eternal background, and this is so because feeling as we saw is 
in one phase an intuition, our ultimate contact with reality, and in 
another phase it acts as feeling-value,both of which facts are of 
great importance in dealing with .the problem of religious knowledge.
And precisely because this is so, feeling can bear a great deal 
of rational interpretation and description, and ordinary human natur 
can grasp its infinite, metaphysical import, and thus feel in touch 
with ultimate realities, and this is what forms the ground of assur- 
ance of the ordinary mind that It does know reality, because values 
of reality come to him through his feeling experience.
Feeling, therefore, is not the subjective unreality which 
writers have often taken it to be, and, having taken it to be essen- 
tially subjective, they have spent a great deal of argument in prov- 
ing that it cannot contribute anything to our knowledge of external 
reality.
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Llere feeling, however, as we pointed out earlier, simply does 
not exist, and, if it did exist, it would be purely subjective, as 
they say, and would witness to nothing external. But feeling is 
always a feeling of something, a feeling-value, and real feeling al- 
ways presupposes an object, and witnesses to the nature of that ob- 
ject .
The theory of Otto, though it attempts to prove that beyond, the 
intelligible rationalised area of feeling there is a non-rational 
region which defies analysis, has only had the contrary result of 
showing us by his analysis of and. analogies to that region that it 
can be rationalised, at lea^t as far as any other region of ; mind
like reason or will, for these also defy ultimate explanation and 
description.
Moreover, his theory has yielded another important result in the 
attention it has drawn to the fact that feeling is not "mere" feeling 
but that it is objective as well as subjective, and witnesses to ex- 
ternal reality, though like Otto it is possible to be mistaken about 
the exact nature of that reality, and that is why the witness of the 
feelings has to be supplemented by that of reason.-on.
Still, the line of investigation which consists in showing that 
the instinctive feelings, when they are occupied with divine reality, 
are differently tinged from what they are when occupied with secular 
realities, is of importance, because it is in accordance with the 
view of the formation of instincts and sentiments which has developed 
earlier in these pages, namely, that such specialised instincts and 
sentiments could never have developed without an objective reality to 
call them into existence, and they have assumed their specific char- 
acter/
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character as a result of the interaction of mind with certain object 
situations, ideas, or values in the external world, and thus they an 
of immense value as witnesses to thenature of that external reality.
But the feelings are not the last word about that reality, im- 
portant as its contribution is, and it is being emphasised here, be- 
cause the function of feeling has been often neglected or misinter- 
preted. There is, then, besides the witness of feeling, the wit :o 
nefi'S of reason as well, and also of the will, the will also being a 
test of reality, Feeling we described as a sense of incompleteness 
and an urga towards completeness, but there is the same compulsion 
and urge on the part of reason and will to function,just because 
they belong to the same personality. Reason as well as feeling de- 
mands a satisfaction, and is compelled to come to conclusions with
regara to reality. This controversy of feeling versus reason, head
j 
versus heart, is due to the same old fallacy of imagining that there
a,re states of mind that are pure feeling or pure reason,but as was 
said already, they each involve one another to a certain extent,so 
that the feeling which Otto appeals to as non-rational is after all 
a feeling that involves a knowing element as well, as his own analy- 
sis suggests. Non-rational feeling simply does not exist. It may 
be called non-ethical, which it is, but not non-rational. 'Thus 
feeling though the primary and regulative principle in mind, is not 
the only element or the highest element in mind, ana, to exalt it 
over the other states of consciousness, is as fatal a mistake as to 
undervalue it, or neglect it altogether. -Having, therefore, real- 
ised to some extent its function and importance in the last chapter, 
we/
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we propose in this chapter to examine the witness of reason to the 
existence and nature of the Supreme Being.
The Theistic Proofs are the historical way in which the attempt 
was made to prove the existence of God by means of reason. They....
are not proofs in the strict sense, because proof implies logical 
connection, which cannot be secured in the case of these Proofs, as 
the conclusions are made to contain more than the premises. Never- 
theless, because these are the traditional ways in which the human 
mind sought to prove the existence of God, the premises on which it 
worked must have been the only ones available, and, respect for the 
history of human thought, compels us to believe that these Proofs are 
concerned with the permanent problems of reason. As a matter of 
fact the Proofs are the ways in which the human mind in every age 
naturally argues from the facts of reality to the existence of God. 
But the fault of the Proofs is not so much with the idea of drawing 
conclusions from such premises, because they are the onlypremises we 
have, if we are to reason at all, as with the idea that we can pro- 
nounce finally on the sum total of reality by means of logical abs- 
tract reason alone. This tradition which has come down from Plato 
has dominated religious thought, and, as long as it remained, it 
rendered the Theistic Proofs unsatisfactory, because, being cast in 
logical form, they were liable to be refuted by logic, and finally 
their logical inconsistencies were exposea by Kant,, and the Theistic 
Proofs were supposed to have become "hors de combat". But as 
Pfleiderer says: ^op. cit., vol.Ill p.254; "Kant, notwithstanding 
they will always occupy human thought..........The critical philo-
sonhv/
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philosophy of Kant, it is already a historical fact, did not speak 
the last word on these questions, and it is quite illegitimate to 
appeal always to him as if philosophy had coine to an end with him". 
In the compass of a brief chapter, then, in which we have to deal 
with the vast subject of the part played by reason in the prophetic 
consciousness, it is convenient to follow the line of reasoning sug- 
gested by the Theistic Arguments, as, it is here maintained, that 
these are the premises from which the human mind in all ages, and 
consequently the prophetic mind also, rose from the contemplation of 
the things that are seen and temporal to the things that are unseen 
and eternal. But the transition of the prophetic mind, and of the 
ordinary mind also, fromthe things that are seen to th.oseth.at are 
unseen, isby the reasoning of faith, and it has always sufficed, 
whereas the reasoning of the Theistic Proofs was by logic, and could 
never satisfy, because logic alone^ls not adequate to adjudicate onth 
whole of concrete reality. Owing to the philosophical tradition 
these proofs were always presented in logical form, and consequently 
Kant's refutation was considered final, and the mistake was on both 
sides, but Kant's criticism has not invalidated the premises, nor the 
right to argue from the things of existence to their cause, so that 
we shall here proceed to discuss the problem, as it exists for, and 
is solved by, the prophetic consciousness,in order to show the train 
of thought by which mind attained to its knowledge of God. For 
this purpose the assumption underlying the Proofs ana Kant's refuta- 
tion of them,that the only means of arriving at ultimate truth is by 
logical reasoning,will be examined.
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L'Lention has been made above of the antithesis between faith 
and reason, ana, while it is not necessary to go into a lengt.iy ais- 
cussion over their difference, it is desirable to state briefly .io.< 
they differ. Faith, then, is often regarded as trie opposite of 
reason or an inferior kin-i of knowled-re. This, however, has never 
been conceded by religion, nor does this antithesis constitute the 
real difference between faith and reason. For instance, Professor 
H. 3. Mackintosh points out that the older theologians usea to ai- 
viae faith into "notitia", "assensus", and"f iducia" . Pie says ("Some 
Aspects of Christian Belief, Holder .x Stoughton, 1923, p. 153) "Into
 
faith, then, enters not only faith as surrender of the heart, but 
also the faith of cognition, that divining insight of >nov:Ie~Lge v;hici: 
seizes as it were prophetically, upon supersensible objects and re-   
lations. "Notitia 11 may exist without "fiaucia" for a man may defy 
God, but "fiducia" without "notitia" is blind". Thus knowledge is 
an essential constituent of faith, as well as feeling and will, ana 
the knowledge into the future which it attains is a knowlearre which 
is regulated by its experience of the past. Without that experience 
of the past faith with regard to events in the future coula not func- 
tion; for example, an imprisoned mind, if such were possible, at the 
moment of liberation could have no faith regarding the future, just 
because it knew nothing of the past. The facts of past experience 
are the premises from which, faith reasons from sensible experienced 
facts to what must be supersensible universal fact. Thus faith is 
a postulate because it is also an inference.
Faith has also been contrastea with, science, but the tv;o are on 
a par, in this respect at least, that science, as well as faita, 
works by postulates. From a number of certain known experienced 
facts
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facts, science postulates that certain things will happen in trie, fu- 
ture, and, when the postulate has been established, it becomes a lav; 
of science. Moreover the man of science iscompelled to make assum- 
ptions that go beyond experienced facts, ana thus exercise faith. 
For instance, he has to have faith that the lav.s or uniformities 
that he has established will hold good in the future, as they have 
done in the past, and that this connection between things will hold 
good everywhere and always. Also he has to have faith in the abili- 
ty of our faculties to give us a knowledge of reality as it is. 
Science in these and other respects has to act on faith, and faith, 
on the other hand, cannot work without knowledge, and seeks to pos- 
sess itself of all possible knowledge, but the attitude of faith to- 
waras knowledge is different from that of science. Science in inter 
ested in knowledge for its own sake, whereas faith is interested in 
knowledge with a view to finding in it that value or meaning in 
reality which it wants in order to satisfy its inner needs ana feel- 
ings; that is to say, the interest of faith in knowledge is personal 
and that of science impersonal. Faith endeavours to keep abreast of 
the findings of science, because they help it to find confirmation of 
values which it wants. Science again seeks, by bringing as many 
phenomena as possible under laws, to demonstrate the rationality of 
the universe, but this ideal is never realised, because the laws of 
science can never give us all the concrete reality of things, so that 
science can never take the place of faith, although it helps to con- 
firm it. Moreover, science limits itself to certain aspects of 
reality, and ignores others, whereas faith considers every aspect of 
reality that it can find in order to discover the particular meaning 
in/
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in things that religious faith postulates. Thus faith is not com- 
pelled to stop at the same point as science, or logic, because it 
envisages aspects of reality to which logic does not apply.
Thus the difference between faith and knowledge is not that trie 
one possesses less and the other possesses more of reason, but that 
their objects or ends differ, the end of science being rationality 
in the universe, and of faith, religious value. In these pursuits 
they both equally use reason, because it is the same mind that works 
in both cases, and the human minj. in all its thinking is regulated b; 
the well-known laws of thought, the law of identity, the law of con- 
tradiction, the law of excluded middle^, and the law of sufficient 
reason. These laws regulate the thinking of faith as well as the 
thinking of science, and that is why faith cannot believe in a Cnia- 
aera any more than science can, but faith, because it operates with 
value-judgments, can believe inthe possibility of things which sci- 
ence is not competent to pass judgment on, for this reasonthat the 
value-judgment is able to comprehend potentialities in things which 
do not come into the view of science. It is sufficiently clear, 
then, that abstract reasoning is not the only method of apprehending 
reality, and this criticism will be now applied to our consideration 
of the theistic arguments, and, in showing the defect in the arti- 
ficial traditional form,we shall be able to indicate the way in whicl 
the ordinary and the prophetic mind have always reasoned from the 
premises which they contain to the existence'of God.
The Theistic Proofs, known as the Cosmological, Teleological, 
Moral, Historical and Ontological Proofs, are divisible into 
three groups/
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groups. The first group consists of those which attempt to aeauce
the existence of God from the nature of physical reality, namely, 
the Cosmological and the Teleological proofs. The second group 
consists of the Moral and Historical Proofs which reason to the 
existence of God from the facts of man's moral nature. The third 
consists of the Ontological Proof which reasons from the sum-total o: 
reality to its cause. Together they include all the premises we 
have for reasoning about the existence of Goa. They are not proofs 
but arguments, because logical proofs in the nature of the case are 
impossible. But their consideration will lead us to discover the 
real reasoning which must have made so many centuries of thinkers 
interested in the Proofs and made them think that they gave them 
logical certainty of the existence of God. Though they did not reajj 
ise it, theii? real reasoning was different from logical reasoning, 
because it was reasoning of a different order; a higher synthesis 
of reasoning, the reasoning of the whole personality in its threefold] 
capacity of feeling, knowing and willing, the reasoning of faith 
which was the reasoning also of the prophets. This reasoning, how- 
ever, cannot be put into a single syllogism, neither can the existenc 
of God be proved with logical certainty, though it can be proved with 
a unique degree of moral certainty.
We begin, then, with the Cosmological Argument. It has two 
forms. The first concludes from the contingency of all things and 
occurrences to a necessary Being who is their cause. That is to 
say, the things in the world may be or may not be, because there is 
no principle in things themselves to bring them into existence, and, 
therefore, there must be a necessary being outside the universe as 
their cause. The second form of the Proof argues from the princi- 
ple of causality, the existence of God as First or Uncauseo. Cause. 
There/
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There is an unbroken series of cause and effect going as far bac^ as
i 
one can go in thought, but an endless series is impossible, so t her el
must be a point where the series begins in a First Cause.
Against this, Kant made two objections. In the first place hj| 
said that the law of causality is only valid inside the world of phe 
nomena, and it is a misapplication of the law of causality to use it! 
to arrive at an extra-mundane God. Secondly, he maintained that it 
was an unwarranted assumption that the world was contingent; events 
might be contingent, but not the world as a whole, so that it is not| 
necessary to postulate a cause for the wofild outside itself; it 
may be caused by an extra- mundane principle, and aowe do not need 
to appeal to an extra-mundane cause. Kant's objections to the 
Proof as it stands are acknowledged to be correct, just because the 
Proof set out from logical premises to prove the existence of God, 
and Kant offered a logical refutation, and there the Proof has re- 
mained, ana. the commonbelief with regard to it and all the Proofs is 
that they have received the "coup de grace" from the hands of Kant, 
and no one thinks of discussing them nowadays, but the Proofs are 
actually only the main aspects under which the problems of religion 
are discussed from generationto generation, and they have their 
modern forms, but the real form of tha arguments is not that in whicr 
they were presented to Kant, or refuted by him. They are ttherefore, 
convenient for our present purpose because their treatment raises the 
main topics of the religious problem as it presents itself to reason,
1. The CosmoloRlcal Proof.
The problem of the Cosmological Proof which is an ever present 
problem, and the problem which must have engaged the prophetic mind 
like/
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like every other mind, is what is the cause of trie universe. That 
the ordinary mind does employ the real train of thought which is im- 
plied in the Gosmological Proof is eviaent from tae testimony of the 
prophetic writings. Their train of though.t, therefore, must have 
been different from Kant's because his reasoning arrived at a "non 
liquitur". It is their unsophisticated lines of reasoning, therefore 
that we wish to unravel. Kant's contention was correct taat there 
is no proof that the world is contingent. On the contrary it forms 
an articulated system whose sufficient cause ;nigh£ be in itself. 
As a matter of fact causality which unites the worla into a system 
witnesses from its very idea against any external cause, for, each 
change in trie world is the consequence of some preceding change or 
cause, and is , again, the causeof trie next change, ana this nexus 
between events is inviolable, if causality is to prevail* that is to 
say, no cause can exist without its effect; but the world waicii is 
supposed by the proof to be not self-existent, but contingent, must 
have come into existence in time, and thus there must have been a 
time when it did not exist, and so its cause which produced it would 
have existed without its effect which would constitute a breach of 
the la ;.'/ of causality.
Whatever the train of reasoning is by which the prophetic mina 
rises from the conception of the world to that of God, it is certain- 
ly not that of the above reasoning of Kant's. The fact is that 
Kant's preoccupation with, the formal element in knowledge leaas him 
 is it does all extreme idealistic philosophy to an attentuated idea 
of causality which does not go beyond logical connection. But tnis 
is not all taat causality means; it implies logical connection but 
not that only. Tais brings us to the question of what causality
fl r» 1.11 a 1 1 \T /
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actually is. Logical connection implies a relation between tilings, 
and, so far, it agrees with the iaea of cause. It also implies suf- 
ficient reason which is also an idea in causality, as well as suc- 
cession which is also implied in causality, but the relation that 
exists in cause and effect is a concrete time relation which is not 
included in the logical connection, or sufficient reason, or the 
succession implied in a logical syllogism, but the latter, because of 
a similarity which exists inverbal statement only, is confused with 
real causality.
Another form of causality which is confused with real causality 
is mechanical causality. This is the conception with which science 
operates. It also implies relation, sufficient reason, and success- 
ion, all characteristics of real causality, but it, again, is one 
specific abstract form of relation between things, namely, quantita- 
tive relation. But this conception, again, just like logical re- 
lation, because of its intelligibility and workableness, is taken to 
be the whole sum and substance of cause. It is the nature of 
science to abstract one workable aspect of reality and neglect all 
the rest, but the tendency is , that in the case of cause this one 
aspect is regarded as the only one, and hence philosophies oriented 
from science tend to explain all the facts of the universe by means 
of the conception of mechanical cause. For instance, the Behaviour- 
ist School which we have noticed already, explain consciousness as 
the result of physical stimuli, which are all quantitatively deter- 
mined.
But it is not agreed that mechanical cause is a sufficient ex- 
planation of the origin of consciousness, or of behaviour. V/e al- 
ready saw that behaviour has four characteristics: firstly, it moves 
towards/
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towards an end, and is not simply impelled in a straight line by 
mechanical force. Secondly, there is variation employed in the 
means of reaching the- end; thirdly, actionis not simply the reflex 
action of parts, but the organism moves as a whole; fourthly, there 
is increased efficiency of action. None of these characteristics 
are explainable by means of mechanical action, and therefore, all 
these are outside its scope. Qualitative, biological, psychical 
relations are all outside the explanation offered by mechanical 
cause, so that real causality in any particular instance is a very 
complex, and a very vague conception, and may contain any or all of 
the above characteristics. Thus causality is not a simple concept. 
On this point one recent writer says: (l.iind, Oct., 1927) "There is 
an irradicable vagueness about the idea of cause; if you try to make 
a causal proposition, you realise that psychological propositions are E 
involved, and you hastily change the subject and consider instead the 
non-psychical universal of fact?
There is, therefore, sufficient reason to deny the legitimacy 
of logical or mechanical causality alone to pronounce on the subject 
of the cause of the world, and yet this is what has been done by ex- 
treme idealistic and scientific philosophies all along. Another as- 
sumption of the scientific philosophies is that cause, by which they 
understand mechanical cause, excludes purpose or teleology, and this 
may be granted if the only form of cause is quantitative relation. 
It is, therefore, necessary here to enquire whether causality and 
teleological are really opposed. And to begin with,it has been 
shown that causality is not quantitative relation merely, but that 
it has also qualitative, vitalistic, and psychical forms, in virtue
of which things simply ao not stand side by side in the universe, un- 
til/
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until mechanical force acts on them, but, on the other hand, in order 
that one thing may act upon another, there are in virtue of these 
varied relations a great variety of potentialities in the one thing, 
and a corresponding variety of potentialities and adaptations in the 
other thing. There is, moreover, a determines regularity with wnich 
effects follow causes, and these interactions of things within the 
world,form, not a chaos of independent objects or substances existing 
side by side, but a regular systematised whole pervaded at all points 
by definite laws of different orders, forming a hierarchy of causal- 
ities, and not merely one kind of causality, the mechanical form of 
causality being very different from the biological, and the biologi- 
cal from the psychical, and these different grades of causalities are 
evidently adapted to one another. They are not exclusive, but sub- 
serve one another, the organic by imperceptible degrees subserving 
and passing into the organic, and the organic in turn passing into 
the psychical and spiritual.
Thus our contemplation of the idea of causal connection leads 
naturally to the idea of teleology, and that is why many thinkers 
have regarded the Cosmological and Teleological arguments as closely 
related together. Even Kant himself said that causality ana tele- 
ology were equally valid and equally indispensable, and he endeavour- 
ed to unite the two. Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit., p»260-262) 
quotes Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Zeller, and Teichmuller as 
agreeing with the view that causality and teleology are illustrations 
of the same principle. The latter he quotes as saying: "The inter- 
action of all the elements presupposes laws which go beyond the ex- 
istence of each separate'element, and embrace all particular things 
in a unity. Whosoever, therefore, assumes any laws of nature what-
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whatever must also assume a system of laws, and must consequently 
refer the different laws to one ultimate unity, or to one ultimate 
end. Every student of natural science, therefore, if he seeks for 
laws of nature at all, is inevitably from that time forward a tele- 
ologist, i.e. he assumes a unity or an ultimate end, from which all 
laws can be explained, as from the simplest principle".
This, then, is the proper use of tne Cosmological and Tele- 
ological Arguments whereby causality is regarded not as a principle 
of determinism and consequently a proof against teleology, but as an 
instance of teleology. And, as the above writer says, the causal- 
ity or teleology does not belong to any of the objects inthe universe 
taken separately, so that each object is responsible for its own 
teleology. On the contrary, it is imparted to it from outside it- 
self in the form of a law which embraces all these particular object^ 
in a unity, and the simplest explanation of this teleology, design, 
or purpose is that it is imparted to the world by the Supreme Law- 
giver or Designer whom we call God.
The Teleological Argument is regarded as the simplest of all the 
arguments and the one which appeals most to unsophisticated minds. , 
and it certainly is one of the ways in which the prophetic mind like 
all other minds rose to the idea of Goo. asthe Author of design in 
the universe, and the idea of a God of providence who rules and con- 
ducts all things towards the fulfilment of His own ends and purposes 
is at the foundation of all prophetic teaching, and in this scheme 
the individual fulfils the end of his own being as well as the pur- 
poses of God which includes the self-realisation of many individuals 
In the universe there is a divine plan which is being progressively 
worked/
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worked out and is going to culminate in the final consummation of 
the Great Day of Jehovah. That day will be a day of judgment for 
individuals and peoples, and they will be judged according to whether 
they have conformed to the divine plan or not. There will be re- 
storation as well as retribution in order as far as possible to ful- 
fil this plan. There is no part outside this teleological scheme, 
heaven as well as sheol, earth and sea and sky, and all that move 
through the paths of the same, are included in it.
But, though the uniformity and design in nature is one of the 
ways by which mina apprehends God, it is only a secondary way. The 
first reason why man recognises causality and design in nature is 
because he has the consciousness of cause in his own mind. Irra- 
tional animals, because they are not self-consciousness, cannot 
interpret design in nature, though all the time confronted by it, 
but primitive man has already got the idea of causality, and attri- 
butes the events in nature to the will of his goa. It is by the 
same reasoning that civilized man also who has all the knowledge that 
science can give him concludes that it must be a will like his own 
that is the cause of all the events in nature, and, without the con- 
sciousness of this fact in himself, he could not arrive at the con- 
ception of a Supreme Will any more than the irrational animals. 
And the same reasoning that gives to man from contemplation of events 
in nature the idea of Supreme Will or Cause, also gives him the con- 
ception of personality which includes feeling, knowing and willing. 
As we wish to canvass this view that it is right to regard the Su- 
preme :.!ind as embracing even feeling also, we shall quote a relevant 
passage/
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passage from Dr Hastings Rashdall. ("Philosophy ana Religion", 
London, Duckworth, 1914,p.45) He writes: "If, therefore, on the 
grounds suggested by the Hes-elian or other post-Kantian laealiste, 
we have been lea to think that the Ultimate Reality is I.Tin^ or Spirit 
we shoula naturally conclude by analogy tnat it must ue V/ill as well 
as Thought, and - I may add, though it hardly belongs to the present 
argument to insist upon that - Feeling. On the other hand if, with 
men like Schopenhauer and Eaouard Von Hartinann, we are conauctea by 
the appearances of aesign in nature to the iaea that nature is stri- 
ving after something, that the ultimate reality is will, we must 
supplement that line of argument by inferring from the analogy of 
our own consciousness that V/ill without Reason is an unintelligible 
ana meaningless abstraction, and that (as indeea even Hartinann saw) 
Schopenhauer's V/ill without Reason was as impossible an abstraction 
as the apparently will-less universal Thinker of the Hegelian: while 
against Schopenhauer, and his more reasonable successor Hartinann, I 
should insist that an unconscious Will is as unintelligible a con- 
tradiction as an unconscious Reason. Schopenhauer ana Hegel seem to 
hive seen eacn of them, exactly half of the truth: G-od is not .'/ill 
without Reason or Reason without Will".
The above writer goes nearer than most to acknowleage tae three- 
fold elements of personality in God on the analogy of human person- 
ality. : r.ost writers stop short at Reason ana -'-'ill. The reason for 
this may be that Reason and Will are those conceptions that are most- 
ly used to explain the facts of Nature ana the moral consciousness, 
but no writer makes adequate use in such a discussion as this of the 
element of Feeling in the Divine Nature. Dr Rashaall, for instance, 
mentions it more than once, but makes no deductions from it. In 
the/
237-
the above quotation he introduces Feeling more or less apologetic- 
ally, and. forgets it before the end of the quotation. It may be 
implied in most writers, but it isnot sufficiently explicit, 
nor do they make clear what difference it would maketo their philo- 
sophy of religion to postulate feeling in its highest form of love, 
as well as reason and will as an element in the divine nature.
We submit, however, that the admission of feeling or love as an 
element in the Divine Mind could with adequate treatment throw much 
light on many of the problems connected with creation ana existence 
and Divine Providence. As has been suggested in the above quotatior 
the admission of reasonenables Hegel to grasp one part of the truth 
about God, and the recognition of Will enables Schopenhauer to grasp 
another part, but there is a whole aspect which cannot be adequately 
grasped until feeling in the form of love also is admitted as a 
constituent element in the Divine Mind. For, even tnough Hegel re- 
gards the Supreme Being as Reason, it is a very different reason he 
has in mind from that reasonwhich is the reasoning of love; it is 
mere logical reason. "Thought of Thought" is another ofhis descrip- 
tions of God, whereas it ought to be "Love, Thought, and Will". 
G-od as abstract reason and Will is the God of Speculative Rationlism, 
but it is not the God of the religious or prophetic consciousness. 
It was Hegel who said in his reactionfrorn Schleiermacher's theology 
that if religion was"mere"feeling then a dog had more religion than 
most people, but feeling is not "mere" feeling, but feeling which 
operates with reason and will. And this tradition of Hegel with re- 
gard to the exclusion of love from the Divine Nature has come down 
from Aristotle who excluded all feeling or emotion from the divine 
nature/
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nature,and love, therefore, has to be included in vail or reason 
where it escapes notice, and to the present writers go on calling 
G-od, Supreme Will, an, instance of which fact we saw in an earlier 
chapter in Principal Galloway who calls God Supreme Will, and indivi- 
duals, monad wills. Love, in this case,is no doubt implied, but it 
is evidently regarded as of secondary importance to V.'lll, which is 
apparently considered the determining factor in personality. In an 
earlier chapter, however, we showeo. that the determining, regulative, 
integrating, factor in personality is feeling,and in this chapter on 
the sentiments we identified this feeling with love.
This attenuated conception of Absolutist Philosophy has this bar 
ren result of preventing writers on the philosophy of religion from 
risking any affirmations about God that are too concretely human, for 
fear of causing too great a gulf between the God of religion and the 
Absolute of philosophy. Especially is it difficult for writers on 
the philosophy of religion to deal with the conception of God as feel 
ing or love, and work out its implications for philosophy and reli- 
gion, and these implications if made explicit might, help to throw 
light on problems that are difficult to understand, if we fail to 
consider it.
i?or instance, we have seen that God as Reason or Will is not the 
God of the religious or prophetic consciousness, because the pro- 
phetic consciousness has no conception of a God who has not the three 
aspects of mind of a complete personality. The Goo. of the prophets 
was a God who was love, reason, and will. Ana it was because the 
prophetscame to know God not only as Reason and Will but as Love also 
that/
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that the problems of nature ana existence y/ere solved for them. And 
it was not that they did not probe into these problems. We have on- 
ly to call Job, Ecclesiastes, psalmists and prophets to witness how 
none of the deepest problems escaped them, but they worked them all 
out by means of the conception of the God of love, who, just because 
he was love, hated evil and injustice, because hate is a constituent 
of love. And lie was a jealous God, because love incluo.es jealousy 
also. Moreover, he was a judge, because love is nev^r indifferent, 
but takes sides. Y/ithout this conception of love, there would be 
no solvent for the prophets for the many problems that exercised, 
their minds.
In an earlier chapter we saw that the essence of personality 
was the systematisation of all the sentiments of the individual unaer 
t.ie hierarchy of one supreme dominant sentiment, and we saw that that 
supreme sentiment is love. It is the only sentiment that can har- 
monise all the rest, and is capable of forming a complete personality 
which is only possible, when there is complate harmony among all the 
sentiments. This love at first takes the form of the self-preser- 
ving instinct; it then expands into lave for others, and finally to 
love for the Supreme Being, which it conceives of as Perfect Love. 
It is the core of the parental instinct, of family and social life 
and all altruistic service. -.Vitliout it lUev Species coula not con- 
tinue. It is the very highest dynamic an^potential thing we know, 
and there can be very little doubt that it is right to postulate tnis 
element as the very essence of the divine nature, rather than reason 
or will. Ana because it is regulative of the aivine as well as of 
of iiuman reason and will the 'principle; of love ought to explain 
more than that of reason or will.
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In dealing with, the Cosmological Argument we saw that our will 
in ourselves enabled us to understand causality and our experience 
of reason enabled us to understand purpose in nature, ana, because 
the cause of this causality and teleology was not in individual 
things themselves, we reasoned by means of our own conceptions of 
cause and purpose to a G-oa who) was endowed with like faculties to 
ourselves as the cause of this teleology. But neither reason nor 
will can ever giveus a clue as to why G-oa created the world at all. 
If God is pre-eminently Reason or Will then it is impossible to com- 
prehend where the motivecame from that caused Him to create systems 
upon systems of worlds with only one spot in that universe, as far 
as we know it, inhabited. It is not characteristic of calculating 
reason to take apparently aeons upon aeons to build up systems with 
only one small spot of it yet inhabited. As far as reason can ^augs 
it appears needless waste, and the Yastness of the universe is as 
much a cause of Agnosticism as any of the problems of existence. 
And then, also the question of freedom is unintelligible from the 
point of view of God as Reason, the bestowal on a limitless number 
of the gift of freewill which many of them use to their own harm. 
But if we posit love, no labour is too great, aeons do not count, and 
any risk is worth the creation of beings whom He can love, and who 
can love Him in return. It was Huxley who said that the solar sys- 
tem after having taken the upward road for millions of years was des- 
tined to reach the summit some day and then decline and be exting- 
uished in darkness, and the poet reminds us of "whispers from the 
dying sun", but even in that case love would be guaranteed to "keep 
the home fires burning", in some higher form. Reason again has no 
surprises; we know what it is likely to do, but in the contingency
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suggested above, love would offer a surprise with something batter. 
The physical universe may be nothing compared to one returneo. pro- 
digal. Then, also, if reason were everything we might have tele- 
ology, but there might be no flowers or birds, or beauty, or sense 
of humour which manifestly are tokens of love. Reason alone, or 
will does not explain the existence of these things,and it leaves 
more unexplained than it explains,and is, therefore, not a full ac- 
count of the divine nature.
Then again,there is no adequate solution of tne problem of evil 
except onthe hypothesis that the pre-eminent characteristic in the 
divine nature is love. Why Reason and Will or Power should permit 
such possibilities is unintelligible, but Love took the risk in order 
that there might be free-will and personality even at the risk of sin 
and suffering, and consequently whatever light is possible on the 
problem of sin and siiffering is fromthe fact of their having been 
permitted in love for an end of infinite value which was otherwise 
not attainable. This knowledge has transformed pain and suffering 
to an incalculable extent. There are two sets of persons to whom 
pain and suffering is insoluble, on the one hand, tne onlooker, ana, 
on the other hand, the sufferer, both with endaeinonistic views, and 
all mankind have naturally that standpoint in certain moods and at 
certain timss, when the$ contemplate the suffering apart from the 
fact of the love that permitted it, but when either party looks 
thoughtfully into the motive of that love, and that the suffering is 
the,inevitable result of giving countless beings the opportunity of 
being free-willed, then the pain is transformed as cy the power of 
alchemy; it is' oftener the endaemonistic onlooker rather than the 
believing sufferer to whom suffering is an unmitigated evil, because 
the/
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the latter confess to compensations in the way of insight into the 
meaning of life and the divine love that the world has not got, and 
as one writer said: "Those who have learned in the University of 
Suffering have not much more to learn in this life". That implies 
compensation and a happiness which the world knows not of. In view- 
ing the problem however, the best while free from suffering, are in- 
curably endaemonistic in their outlook, and it is said,that after all 
has been said about suffering being remedial, .piacular,, perfecting 
in its action, there is a great deal that is insoluble. But the ex- 
tent of this region also might be reduced if the solution of love 
was applied. It is very probable that love would never have permit-
»
ted the possibility of evi-1 unless it was adequate to the task of 
turning sorrow into joy. There is a great deal of suffering that 
need not be if the remedy was only sought and applied, but the com- 
plaint against humanity is: "Ye will not come unto me that ye may
/ 
have life". The great bulk of the world's suffering is simply due
to neglect of the remedy which works wherever it is applied. The 
conception of love, then, as the essence of the divine nature gives 
all the light we can have on this problem.
The prophetic consciousness solved the problem of pain in the 
light of the divine love. There was no evil in a city that Jehovah 
had not done, and for that reason it had a divine purpose. Job the 
classical instance of unmerited suffering had his pain and suffering 
stanched simply by G-od revealing Himself to him. As soon as Job re- 
linquished his human standards, and began to see spiritual values, 
and began to pray for his friends,from that hour God turned the cap- 
tivity/
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captivity of Job by revealing Himself. The psalmists are full of 
those who found peace because the hand of a loving God haa done it. 
The eleventh chapter of Hebrews supplies a catalogue of those who 
similarly endured "as seeing Him who is invisible". The mystics 
also of all ages were those who through the duress of pain and suffer 
ing sought God and found relief from their pain in taa vision of God. 
Thus, if pain is inevitable, there is also a remedy, and it is of 
wider efficacy and potentiality than our pessimism and small faith 
often admits, and that remedy is the love of God. Love also solved 
the problem of immortality. Once united to the family of God by 
filial love it was impossible ever to be separated from God by any 
contingency, even by death which was only a door which ushered into 
the fellowship of God's family above.
Moreover, unless God is a personality who is feeling, thought 
and willing, it is difficult or impossible to establish the present 
thesis that the essence of religion is an urge towards communion witi: 
God, for unless we posit love as the primary element in the divine 
nature, there is no guarantee that the love will be reciprocated. 
Religion will then be contemplation, but not communion. There is 
no incentive towards communion with mere Will or Thought. Commun- 
ion is only possible on the understanding that God made man in His 
own image, that is, on the analogy of what was'highest in Himself. 
And the'highest in man is feeling, knowing and willing.
Likewise providence or teleology would have no meaning, or it 
would be difficult for us human beings to give it meaning, unless it 
is the providence and teleology of love. A providence that was mere 
will would not satisfy the religious consciousness; it might, in
fact, be dangerous. The prejudice against including love in God 
and the habit of/
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describing Him as Will, as we saw has come down from Aristotle 
who excluded all feeling or emotion from the divine nature, and,there 
fore, love has to be stowed away in will or reason where it escapes 
notice, and so to the present, writers go on calling God, Supreme 
Will. On the other hand we have shown that personality cannot exist 
without love which is the justification of the existence of reason 
and will which are ancillary to love.
Usually a compromise is made either by describing God as Good- 
will, or by warning us that we can have no conception of what mind 
can be in the divine nature. It is this latter assumption that we 
wish to examine now. If, they say, we areto use feeling or love of 
God, we must remember that we can have no distinct conception of what 
feeling or love is like in the case of the Divine Being or of reason 
or will eitaer. Thus Rashdall says: (op. cit., p.46; "What feeling 
is for a Being who has no material organs, we can form no distinct 
conception". For this reason Rashdall thinks that the term "Super- 
personal is right to apply to God; he says: (op. cit., p. 55) "If 
anyone prefers to speak of God as "super-personal", there is no great 
objectionto so doing, provided that phrase is not made (as it often 
is/ an excuse for really thinking of God after the analogy of some 
kind of existence lower than that of persons - as a force, an uncon- 
scious substance, or merely a name for the totality of things". On 
the same point Principal Galloway ways: (op. cit., p.5o4j "Never- 
theless, to say that God is supra'rpersonal, is not in itself anti- 
religious. It certainly is not so if what is meant is, that God is 
personal in a deeper, richer, and more perfect way than man is. For 
GOd is a supra'.mundane and transcendent Being: he is beyond the lim- 
itations/
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limitations under which, a human personality develops ana from which 
it can never completely escape." In spite of the provisos to the 
use of the term put forward by the above writers, the use of the 
terra super-personal or supra-personal is misleading, because it sug- 
gests that, as Rashdall says, "we can form no distinct conception" of 
what feeling is for the Divine Being. That suggests that a degree 
of Agnosticism is necessary with regard to the divine nature which 
the religious mina will not tolerate, because it insists that we 
have knowledge that God is love, reason, and will. It is not that 
these are beyond any distinct conception, a fact which would make 
them intrinsically aifferent^so that we would haveno clue to what 
they were in the divine, but what is different in the divine is the 
degree to which these three elements exist in perfection, and har- 
monious co-ordination. Of that degree we have no distinct concep- 
tion, but the religious andprophetic mina will insist that love in 
the divine ana in thehuman are essentially the same. If another 
term is desired for the Deity- it ought to be super-personality, but 
not supra-personal which is suggestive of the G-od of the speculative 
philosophies.
It is necessary, then, to protest against the tendency to de- 
precate all anthropomorphism as, for example in the case of the pro- 
phets. Extreme anthropomorphism there is, but it is impossible to 
exclude it entirely, because we can only speak of Goa in terms of 
the highest we know in the human, and it is more likely that the pro- 
phets are nearer the truth in so doing than if they attempted to 
speak of God in "supra-personal"terms to which they had no clue in 
their own experience. Such an effort would immediately inhibit the
religious spirit, because there can be fellowship only where the 
parties/
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parties are sure that they know one another through ana. through, and, 
there are no reserves. If there is a suspicion that God is a differ 
ent grade of being, then no fellowship is possible, but be He never 
so high and perfectrand the religious consciousness demands that the 
object of its worship be perfect .  then there can be communion and 
attraction,provided the perfection is in essence the same as we ex- 
perience in ourselves,in our limited degree.
The_more clearly, then,we grasp the meaning of personality ana 
its various elements in ourselves, the more shall we be able to com- 
prehend tha nature of Goo. and an element of anthropomorphism in our 
knowledge and in prophetic knowledge is inevitable, because man is 
akin to God, and comes to know God as consciousness of self deve- 
lops. But anthropomorphism is not confined to our knowledge of God, 
In this respect our knowledge of God is on a par with the knowledge 
of our fellowmen. Them also we know by analogy and inference from 
ourselves,and that knowledge by inference and analogy is never im- 
mediate or complete, and approximates towards completeness by grow- 
ing acquaintance. Acquaintance can only grow between human beings 
where there is mutual trust, admiration and love. But no one in 
going to describe his friend can speak of hiu other than in terms 
derived from consciousness of his own personality. Thus,while it 
is necessary to insist that the perfection of God is beyona our con- 
ception,it is at the sametime necessary for the religious mind to 
believe that there are no dark reserves depths of unknown elements in 
the divine nature to which we have no clue whatsoever, and that it is 
perfectly legitimate to speak of the divine nature after the analogy 
of/
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of the human, provided the analogies are themost ethical and. spirit- 
ual that we can find. Thus, Personality, Father, Friend, Love, 
Fellowship are the highest conceptions we have, and are the only ones 
we can legitimately use, but not terms of which we do/ not know the 
meaning, like "supra-personal" Knowledge of God,then, comes by ac- 
quaintance, and fellowship with God deepens as experience grows, in 
which we come to infer his natureby analogy from his works in the 
physical worlo. and "in the world of spiritual realities, ana thus 
the root of religion is communion or fellowship which is possible on 
one condition only, namely, that He is a God whose essence is love, 
because love is the only real foundation of friendship among human 
beings also.
2. The Moral and Historical Arguments.
(a} Morality and Religion.*
We have now come to discuss the next of the Theistic Arguments 
namely, the Moral and Historical Arguments. We have in the dis- 
cussion of the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments anticipated 
some of the topics of this problem, but from a different angle. In- 
the former case we saw that causality and teleology implied mind as 
cause, and that mind always implied all the elements of personality 
of feeling, knowing and willing. Moreover we saw that personality 
cannot develop without an integrating force, and that force we saw 
was love which alone iscapable of explaining the existence of person- 
ality. . Here we appiioachthe same problem of religion from a differ- 
ent angle. The traditional form of the argument was that the moral 
life or conscience exists, therefore, there must be a God who l:n-plant- 
ed/
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implanted that moral nature in man. Such a deduction, however, is 
of no value as it seeks to prove too much and is, therefore, ircr.p-
»
able of producing conviction. The real forni of the argument, the 
form in which the religious mind naturally employs It, is that the 
moral life exists, therefore it is necessary to enquire why it exist:' 
at all and hov; it acquires its sanction and authority. What guar- 
antee is there that the moral life is founded on ultimate reality 
and not on convention
All that the Moral Argument implies is that seeing that man has
\
a moral consciousness which conceives of a moral Good or dlnd, and he 
strives towards that End, therefore,that impulse must be due to the 
ultimate nature of things. What, then, is the character of this 
universe, or its ultimate reality, that man is by nature compelled to 
seek the Good. That there is this compulsion is one of the things 
that man is certain of. He is certain that there is a distinction 
between right and wrong, and that he ought to do the one and not 
the other.
The old legalistic view was that this moral law was communi- 
cated by God to man, but this view is founded on an antiquated psy- 
chology which ignores the fact that man in his moral progress is not 
determined by an external moral law which he. finds established in the 
world, but by a law of his own inner nature, an urge, or "elan de la 
vie" out of which develops his instincts,interests ana moral nature. 
This fact was recognised by the early Greek philosophers who recog- 
nised that the Good or End for man was to be determined by the na- 
ture and needs of man. Without such a nature and needs within, no 
externally imposed lav/ would have any effect on him. This is the 
defect of the old legalistic view as well as of the categorical 
imperative/
24-9-
imperative of Kant. Kant's categorical imperative contains truth ir 
as much as it insists on the fact that the moral law is a matter of 
inward conviction rather than a matter of logical proof. It exists 
above us and demands obedience, but the categorical imperative is 
also founded on an inadequate psychology,and so he has failed to re- 
late it to the needs of the self on the one hand except in this ex- 
ternal way, and, on the other hand, he has failed to connect it ex- 
cept again in an external way, with the need of religion. It is, 
therefore, necessary to insist taat the categorical imperative or 
sense of duty, is a thing which is determined by man's own nature 
and interests, and is not something externally imposed upon him 
against his will.
Man first of all begins to live by unconscious instinct. 
Gradually he becomes self-consciousness and begins to think that he 
ought to do or not do certain things. At first he does these things 
unconsciously during which time his conduct is non-moral, but when 
he becomes self-conscious, ana begins to conduct himself according 
to certain preconceived ends and ideals his conduct becomes moral. 
At first he acts without thinking or instinctively in obedience to 
an inner law of his own nature, but, on the advent of self-conscious 
reason, he begins to question why he and others feel this compulsion 
from within to act in certainwaye, and not in others. He is cer- 
tain that it is not due to the conventions of society, because his 
ideal sometimes rises above that of society. It, therefore, must 
be in his own nature, because his ideal is his highest interest and 
highest Good. The imperative is not a thing necessarily requiring 
an effort of will, but the natural goal of life or self-realisation 
which is determined by the individual's interests and tendencies. 
Kant's/
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Kant's categorical imperative does not make it clear way it should oe 
obeyed: trie reason is that it is the individual's natural Good to 
which his interests impel him, otherwise the imperative could never 
command obedience. The duty may require an effort of will at times, 
but tae will is exerted at all,because the act is seen to contribute 
to the individual's highest Good.
This consciousness of a higher and higher moral ideal which 
goes on expanding with experience leads to the question as to what i£i 
the nature of the universe, which makes possible the moral life of 
the individual. What is the ultimate ardsufficient cause of tae 
presence of the moral nature of man in thephyscial universe. ;,ian isl 
helped towards the solution of this question in the case of contem- 
plation of the physical universe, as we saw, by the consciousness of 
himself as a cause or purposive will. It is in the same way from 
the consciousness of his own sense of duty or conscience that he is 
able to aivjne the ultimate cause of the universe, whose nature it is 
to proauce moral beings, as also being a moral being like himself, 
for in no other way could a moral being who is not his own cause 
appear in the universe. This is the gist of the moral and historic- 
al arguments, and this is how the prophetic mind arrived at the idea 
of God as moral, and holy, and righteous.Unless man had a moral 
consciousness in himself he could never apprehend it in God. Tae 
Hebrew prophet externalised the law of conscience: instead of being 
the still small voice it became the "ex cathedra" command of the 
Deity, but this is alsb due to the fact that certain regulative ideas 
come to form sentiments which thus take on an external character de- 
rnir.ding the obedience of the in^iviaual,though coming from within. 
It is at this point that the controversy between morality and 
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religion begins, and we must consider the relation between them for 
a little in order to make clear that religion includes morality and 
gives it its sanction. We have already disposed of the view of Pro- 
fessor Otto that religion is independent of morality altogether. 
Religion is not on his view mediated through morality, but is direct- 
ly given. This thesis we saw Otto failed to prove, because as we 
saw religionwithout morality would have no content or permanence. 
The other view of the relation of morality and religion is that which 
was common in part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which 
held not that religion was independent of morality but that morality 
was independent of religion. Faith in God was not required; all 
that was required was faith in duty or morality. This view was 
popularised by Kant to whom nothing was good but the good will, and 
religion in his view was only an appendage to morality. For Matthew 
Arnold religion was morality touched by emotion, that is a slightly 
heightened form of morality. The independence of morality was still 
further emphasised by the American Pragmatic and Behaviourist Schools 
of thought, morality in the case of the first being a matter of uti- 
lity, and, in the second case, being mechanically determined.
From the history of the case, therefore, it is clear that the 
connection between the two is so close, that it is difficult to de- 
fine where the one ends and the other begins or what are the dis- 
tinguishing marks of either. As a result there are a great many 
ordinary people, and a great many writers on religion who declare 
that faith in duty is faith in God, and that faithfulness to duty 
brings a man to God; the more a man sticks to his duty the nearer he 
comes to God, therefore, a man need not trouble himself about faith 
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in God, because he will naturally meet God in his daily tasks. This 
theory misses the real nature of religion just as much as Otto's the- 
ory misses the nature of morality. The doctrine is very common, ana 
is destructive of both religion ana morality. It is the essence of 
Pharisaism. At the root of this doctrine there is the fallacy that 
our duty is a compact well definea little set of duties which are 
quite within our abilities to perfectly perform.
The conceit of the moralist attitude in the eighteenth ana nine- 
teenth centuries consisted in its claiming its ability to perform 
perfectly all the commandments of God and all the duties of this life 
Such an attitude at once betrays a limited and circumscribed idea 
both of duty and religion, and consequently of God. Religion can- 
not exist without morality, but morality may exist without religion, 
but such morality is very different from the morality wHiich is 
"touched" by the emotion generated by religion. The morality of 
the moralist is the morality of his own definition,but not the mor- 
ality of religion which demands that a man shall lev e the Lord his 
God with all his heart, and with all his soul, ana with all his will, 
and his neighbour as himself.
When a poet or a preacher or a teacher tells us that the way to 
God is the way of duty we invariably fina that his reason for aoing 
so is that he is working with a limited idea of duty. The West- 
mister Confession correctly estimates the religious view of man's 
morality in maintaining that no man is able perfectly in this life to 
fulfil all the commandments of God, but doth daily break them in 
thought, word and deed. Morality is of itself natural; religion 
is supernatural. What drives a man to God and religion is the sense 
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of his utter inability to perform allthe commandments of God, as 
witness St. Paul, St. Augustine, Luther, and all the saints that have 
ever been. The morality of the moralist - and all mankind are mor- 
alists until they become religious - is selfish, self-complacent,self 
satisfied, self-righteous and occupied with self-justification, 
whereas the morality of religion is self-sacrificing, self-giving, 
self-effacing, confessing its shortcomings, because its essence is 
love. Matthew Arnold truly enough realised that the difference be- 
tween morality and religion was that religion had the addition of 
emotion, but he did not see sufficiently clearly that the emotion 
was love, nor did he realise the dynamic of that emotion. As a 
matter of fact what he implied was what all others imply who try to 
reduce religionto morality, that there is very little difference be- 
tween them, namely, a "mere" emotion. But love is not "mere" emo- 
tion; it is the very natureof God Himself and "whosoever loveth is 
born of God and knoweth God". Such emotion makes morality religious.
There is much human natural love among men and even animals, but 
altruistic love that loves even enemies is derived from God. Such 
love is not natural; it is supernatural, it is derived from con- 
sciousness of human imperfection and of the divine perfectionwhich is 
love; it is therefore the essence of the morality which is the foun- 
dation of religion and that is why religion is essentially super- 
natural, because the knowledge of this love comes from God who takes 
the initiative, and it is the consciousness of this initiative on the 
part of God that lends incentive to morality, life, and service, ana 
to the love of God being reciprocated. "^erein is love, not that we 
loved God but that He loved us". 1 John, 4, 10. "If God so loved 
us , we also ought to love one another". 1 John, 4, 11.
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But the morality which is without religion or faith in a G-oa 
whose essence is love lac^s this incentive to, ana joy in, self- 
sacrificing service. Thus the morality which has come under the 
suzerainty of religion has a very different qualityand range from 
ordinary morality. Ordinary morality is circumscribed like that of 
the Pharisees and being circumscribed it can never reach the highest 
levels. On the other hand religion lays an infinite obligation on 
morality and the religious life begins when the individual realises 
that his own morality is as filthy rags, that is, infinitely short of 
the divine standard. At the same time he realises himself as the 
object of divine love, and, in this divine love, he recognises the 
possibility of the fulfilment of the law. Thus religion imposes on 
morality an infinite obligation, but also supplies the possibility of 
infinite fulfilment. The morality of the natural man is of a human 
limited standard, but that of religion is of divine infinite standard 
The motto of the moralist is "duty", but of religious "faith* "love 1; 
in which "dutyr< is transcended.
It has been our effort in these pages to show the nature and 
supremacy of love. We found itsolved the problem of personality, 
it also solved the question of the nature of the Deity, and of 
creation, and the existence and destiny of man, and here we find it 
supplies the solution to the problem of morality, for no morality 
is complete without religion and religion can only exist if the es^ 
sence of the Divine Being is love, that is to say, the morality is 
incomplete which is not founded on love to God, whereby the idea of 
duty is replaced by a faith that worketa by love. This is the con- 
nection between morality and religion.
But there are writers who exalt natural morality at the expense 
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of religion who say that there are many people who lead good lives 
without a belief in God. Here again faith in God is replaceo. by 
faith in duty. But, as we saw, duty, in that case, is limited to 
a code of rules, or to certain limited ideals, or imperfect Goods or 
Ends, in which case morality does not reach God, and it is because of 
their limited code that such are satisfied with their achievements 
and do not feel their need of God or religion. They no doubt are 
good and love their neighbours, but the good is often the enemy of 
the best. They are near the Kingdom without being in, and the high- 
er the standard of their morality the nearer they are,but that does
5
not say that their morality is enough for them or that they are as 
well outside. If they were inside their morality would be infinite- 
ly enhanced,and their joy infinitely increased, and for that reason 
it is a duty to help such to exercise faith in God and not acquiesce 
in the creed that faith in duty is the same as faith in God. Such 
people have come to anchor by their faith in duty because faith in 
God was presented to them, in some form which they- could not accept, 
a form by which faith in God appeared to them as less worthy than 
faith in duty,and their honestyjand sincerity led them to chose the 
worthier of the two, namely, faith in j.uty.
Another argument of those who wish to level religion down to 
morality or below morality which is the tendency of the new psy- 
chology writers is that there are certain people who waile apparent- 
ly very religious lead immoral lives and there are many genuinely 
religious whose characters are very unstable. The former of these 
cases, however, proves nothing as they are simply cases of abnormal 
psychology, and one can find parallel cases of a man imagining him- 
self a Croesus while possessing nothing, or a Napoleon while inno- 
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innocent of the art of war. But these cases ao not prove that rich- 
es or strategy are nothing. And. as to the latter case, there is 
surely more hope for taeia with religion than without, ana we do not 
know what handicaps they may nave had in life to begin with.
Values and Ultimate Reality.
As we have seen, our knowledge of God depends on our knowledge of 
reality which includes ourselves and our universe, and from these v;e 
reason to God. It is, therefore, necessary here to enquire how v/e 
obtain knowledge of reality, and whether the knowledge so obtained 
gives us true ana full and reliable knowledge of it, and of the Su- 
preme Reality wnica is God. This question has to be answered be- 
cause Agnosticism declares God cannot be known and Pessimism aeclares 
there is a discrepancy between our knowledge and reality, and both 
these affected the prophetic mind as well as the ordinary nind at 
different times throughout history. There has always been a dis- 
crepancy pointed out by philosophers between the Absolute of philo- 
sophy and the God of religion ana nowadays the reliability of our 
knowledge is called in question by such writers as Bert rand Russell 
for whom the Supreme Good is a fabrication of our own minds, a mere 
projection of our own desires hanging in the air without any support 
or reality.
To begin with, then, it is now recognisea by philosophy that 
our mode of apprehension of reality is by means of value- judgments or 
feeling-value. This is a conception introduced into philosophy by 
Lotze, and especially by the Ritschlian School. It is of special 
interest to us in this study, because it emphasises what nas been 
urgea frequently enough in these pages that for the apprehension of
vna
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reality feeling is required as much as knowledge which corresponds 
to value. And there is no reason why the conception should be 
limited to feeling ana knowing to the exclusion of willing, because 
our apprehension of reality as we shall see in the next chapter de- 
pends on the will as well. This is the discovery of the new German 
school of psychology the Gestalt School, for whom apprehension of 
reality is given in the form of a "gestalt" or configuration.
The conception of feeling-value, then, is an illustration of 
how the different elements in mind, the feeling, and theknowing, and, 
we maintain, the willing element also, enters into the apprehension 
of reality. All human activity, we saw, originated in a feeling of 
incompleteness which results in attention being drawn to those things 
that minister to the satisfaction of those needs. Other aspects of 
reality which do not for the time being minister to the neea are'ig- 
nored, and, as far as the individual is concerned, are non-existent, 
but, with the development of the need, and the emergence of fresh 
needs, fresh values are realised, and thus needs and values create 
fresh needs ana. values. The nature of his needs depends on the na- 
ture of man, and hence the values that he finds inreality depend on 
the chief end of man himself. And these values that he finds in his 
environment are the individuals facts so that facts are not the solid 
objective realities that they are commonly supposed to be. Neither
»
is truth because truth is often taken to be what we believe to be 
truth - facts and truths as commonly understood are in reality values 
which vary with the completeness of our knowledge of reality. 
Values, therefore, go on varying through life as higher and higher 
values are realised and they also vary with different communities 
and ages. The question, therefore, is how these values of conscious 
ness/
253.
consciousness are relate^ to ultimate metaphysical value. 
these values merely subjective or are they objective as well, and 
how J.Q we know that they are objective? Hiw do we know that there . 
a Supreme G-ood or G-oci corresponding to our iaea of tue Deity? This 
problem was often before the prophetic mind, ana their solution was 
derived from an appeal to experience and to history just as our sol- 
ution here will be.
For, if we dismiss the absolute subjectivism of Berkeley which 
maintained that things had no existence apart from mind, and consiae 
the idealistic view of reality as set forth , for example, in ward'; 
"naturalism and Agnosticism" that things have, not ac Berkeley saia 
no "existence" apart from mind, but no "reality" apart from mind, ai 
Y/arci says, that allows that things have some degree at least of ob- 
jectivity apart from mind, and it is trie interaction of mind and ob 
ject that creates value. How then can we know that mind receives 
correct impressions of reality seeing that the subjective element 
is so large.? The answer to this is the s-irne as the answer which we 
found for the criterion of faith and also of reason. Reason justi- 
fies itself by the criterion of the laws of thought, particularly 
the law of non-contradiction. This also is the criterion of faith 
because it Includes reason. And faith is also a value, ana the on: 
criterion of value also is the principle of non-contradiction, or 
coherency of particular values with the system of values.
But the principle of non-contradiction unfortunately is not so 
easy to apply, and mistakes have been made in its application which 
have had serious consequences both for philosophy, ana for religion 
The grana mistake of philosophy from the beginning is in the assum- 
ption as we have seen already that the only test of truth is logica
p.nnfli S
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consistency. The beat examples of this reduction of all reality to 
one logically reaaonea system are the philosophies of Spinoza ana of 
Hegel. Everything was explained, according to the logic of these 
systems, and nothing had any reality which did not come within the 
scope of their logic, nor had anything any value beyona that accoraedl 
to it by their logically constructed schemes. Religion and the 
Christian religion had only that value which fitted in with their 
principles of interpretation.
After these philosophical interpretations of reality caine the 
scientific explanation with the rise and progress of science ana trie 
assumption was that the sciences combined could give us a full ac- 
count of reality, but, as we saw, science operates with one aspect of 
reality only, namely, quantitative relations, so that a great many of 
the aspects of reality do not come within its view at all. Neither 
the philosophical nor scientific explanation took account of any 
other values than the logical and mechanical, whereas reality has 
many other aspects which are quite as important for ministering to 
man's needs. Man is not only reason but feeling and will as well, 
and these create values of their own. With regard, to this claim of 
idealistic philosophy to explain all reality on logical principles, 
Professor H. R. Mackintosh (op. cit., p. 290) writes: "Increasingly 
one feels that a purely logical construction of things, like that of 
Absolute IdealifkfB, is quite irrelevant and non-committal in regara to 
those elements of human life that make it best worth living. Other 
aspects of experience than the logical are ignored, or, as with Bo- 
sanquet, they are subsumed under a conception of logic so enlarges 
as to become unintelligibly vague. It is however, a wholly unjus- 
tifiable assumption on the part of Speculative Rationalism that there 
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exists only one right method by which reality can be apprehended". 
The other aspects of human nature, therefore, have to be ta^en into 
account, and these are feeling and willing which correspond to aes- 
thetics and morality, and in these also reality is reached by the 
same principle of non-contradiction. These are in a different cate- 
gory from reason In that they cannot be expressed in logical syllo- 
gisms like the truths of reason, but in their case the law of contra- 
diction holds with equal validity for a thing cannot be both beauti- 
ful and not beautiful, or good and bad at one and the same time. 
And there are degrees of goodness and badness, of beauty and ugliness, 
and out of the recognition of these differences in experience,ideals 
of beauty, truth, and goodness are evolved, by which the particulars 
are judged. These vary to some extent with every single individual, 
but not to an absolute extent, and in the historic process of develop 
ment these ideals obtain clearer and clearer definition, so that the 
subjective element belonging to the individual is more easily detect- 
ed and the common basis of reality on which the idea,! values are 
founded is more easily recognised. Absolute non-contradiction or 
absolute coherency of all parts of experience can never be attained, 
for that would imply absolute knowledge which is impossible for finite 
beings, but what is demanded by the human consciousness is a degree 
of coherency that is adequate to the needs of its existence in its 
threefold aspects of feeling, knowing and willing. Such a criterion 
aannot be deduced from, individual,experience but only from- the^ o 
united experience? of..-the--whole, race, and this is just the point 
where the importance of the historical argument cornea in. Individu- 
al experience has to be supplemented by the experience of the history
of the race which corrects the individual coefficient, and makes the 
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ideals and values display a much greater degree of consistency ana 
coherence than any individual values can. Ana thus a higher aegree 
of certainty is obtained of our ueing in possession of reality as 
far as our finiteness allows. Thus trie final test of tae corres- 
pondence of values with, ultimate reality is a test of adequacy,but
Ittis^not'ah absolute test.
But certainty will increase when lOvie'will.'be-admit ted along wi1 
reason, ana the effect of this will be of the greatest importance 
for religion which is still not absolutely certain about the ideal 
of life, nor of the divine nature on account of the influence of 
rationalistic philosophy which presents a God with which the reli- 
gious consciousness is not satisfied. We, therefore, think that 
when the whole nature of man is taken into account the nature of 
the Divine Being will be more apparent, as a Being whose nature is 
love, a conception which alone satisfies the religious consciousness 
The objection to anthropomorphism is from rationalistic phil*S*phy, 
and not from the religious consciousness, for, if God made man as
9
the crown of Creation, and represents H-is highest thoughts, then 
H-is thoughts also in some sense are anthropomorphic, although it is 
allowed that Kis thoughts are infinitely above our thoughts, and 
they are so as expressed even in man, for we are yet a very far 
distance, it may be an infinite distance, from comprehending even 
man, let alone God Himself.
But as we progress in our knowledge of man so we shall pro- 
gress in knowledge of the divine nature also, and there are recent 
movements whose results have not yet been fully exploited, which 
will bring us nearer to comprehending God because they come nearer
to comprehending man. With regara to these movements, Professor 
j]. S. V/aterhouse/
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Professor E. S. Wateriiouse says: ("The Philosophy of Religious 
Experience", London, Epworth Press, 1923, p.218) 'Mithin the pre- 
sent century a number of lines of thought-, diverse in many ways, 
have yet tended to modify the rationalistic methods of philosophy. 
Variously expressed in some part by Pragmatism and Humanism; in 
another way by certain forms of Personal Idealism and of Pluralism, 
and again by Vitalism, tiaere has none the less been a certain unity 
throughout all. No one has been more convincing than Bergson in 
showing the limitation of intellect to represent the actual nature 
of living experience, in saying what a "logic of solids" fails to 
grasp. Still more recently, the philsosophicalimplication of Ein- 
stein's principles has borne in the direction of emphasising the 
human factor. But perhaps the greatest pressure is coming from 
psychological and biological conceptions of experience. The work 
of such writers as LIcDougall, Rivers, Freua, and Jung has brought 
home the immense significance of instinctive reaction and unconscious' 
experience upon mental life. Modern psychology has given us a 
wholly new idea of the origin and process of experience, ana the full 
meaning of this for philosophy has yet to be realised". In this 
study we have been trying to show that one of the elements in ex- 
perience whose significance for religion has yet to be worked out is 
feeling which gives us love as the integrating principle in person- 
ality and as the essence of the divine nature. Love is a concep- 
tion which cannot survive in the high latitudes of absolutist phil- 
osophy, but as the above writer points out various movements are in- 
sisting that what is highest in experience is indicative of the 
highest reality, and so one day this highest principle will come to 
its own. In the same way another element whose significance for 
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tae religious life, particularly has still to be workea out is trie 
will which will be con^iaere^ in tae next chapter.
So far our argument ha* been to tae effect taat knowledge of ' 
God as a Creator, Designer, Personality, Author of moral law is ae- 
rived by inference from the consciousness of these characteristics 
in ourselves. The validity of the proof of Goa by inference there- 
fore will depend on the nature of tae inferential'process . Logical 
inference we saw already has validity within a certain circumscribed 
universe of discourse, but it is not competent to pronounce judg- 
ment on the whole of concrete reality. If,therefore,our inference 
is merely a logical one,our proof roots on a very inadequate found- 
ation, on premises waich do not include all tae facts. It is 
therefore, essential to point out that the inference referreu to in 
our argument is not an inference which is arav/n by tae inaivij.ua! 
when he reaches the stage of philosophical reflection, but a fact of 
life which begins to be given to him in the process of living from 
the very beginning of trio life process. The belief in God is part 
of experience,and is given us in the constitution of things; it is 
given us with the other common-sense facts of life t and undergoes 
verification with all the rast of our common-sense knowledge.
In the beginning of this study stress was laid on the fact 
that the instinctive tendencies which are the ger.a of personality 
develop through interaction with external objects ana. reality, so 
that the roots of personality which draw the inference grow out of 
the nature of development of personality through tae system of sentI 
ments which again are developed round tae objects of external reali- 
ty. Similarly tae conception of value-judgments stresses tae fact 
that in the vital process tne human mind is never subjective, but 
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in as close a touch as it can achieve with external reality. Fur- 
ther there is a process of verification going on through the appli- 
cation of the principle of non-contraaiction which is unconscious 
and experimental rising not out of mere curiosity, but out of the 
needs of life, and this process of verification is continuous as the 
history of the race, and it is not of the reason alone,but is a three 
fold process of feeling, thought, and will. It is as a result of 
such a process that the deduction of God as Creator, Designer, Per- 
sonality and all the other attributes of God is made. This is what 
the above writer means when he says that modern psychological and 
biological conceptions of experience have given a wholly new concep- 
tion of experience the implications of which for philosophy have not 
yet been fully worked out. This shows the importance of modern 
philosophy and psychology. Intransigent philosophies and psycho- 
logies there are, but there are also results that will abide. For 
instance, the attributes of God are simply the highest values that 
have emerged in the historic process, and what themodern humanistic 
philosophies teach us is that we must trust our own common-sense 
faculties, and when all these values are teleologically arranged, 
and point to a supreme value, then we are justified in attributing 
the highest we find in our "experience of things to the nature of    r, 
God. Thus love which we found is the supreme- principle in life, 
must also be the essence of the divine nature, otherwise we have no 
clue yet to the divine nature, if the highest we know does not sup- 
ply it.
That the prophetSjfor instance, arrived at their convictions 
regarding God ana reality by tais concrete way of personal experience 
is evidenced from the gradual development of the apprehension of 
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divine and hu;u:m values as seen in the Hebrew prophets. In a book 
of essays on the subject of "Immortality" (London, Putnam, 19-+, P- 
58J Professor A. G. tfelch writing on the gradual development of trie 
idea of immortality among the Hebrew prophets, says: "liow on one 
siae the higher religion coula have no quarrel with tae idea of the 
continuance of life after aeath. So i'ar as life of a ,<:ind was be- 
lieved to continue in Sheol, there v/as nothing in the thought to 
offend. The one place where at first the higher faith came into 
collision with the earlier forms of belief was in connectionwith the 
people's mourning customs; and here it made a significant difference. 
All those customs which implied no more than the belief in a con- 
tinuance of the spirit after death was quietly left alone; but every 
practice which seemed to suggest the belief in any other G-oa than 
Yahweh having power in Sheol, or which coula be construed to mean a 
cult connected with the dead, was put under the ban. These were 
proscribed as emphatically as the arts of necromancy which implied 
the possibility of consulting the dead or the powers which presided. 
over death. Yahweh alone must be acknowledged by the Israelite, 
whether in life or in death". This passage graphically illustrates 
the working out of the principle of non-contradiction among moral 
and spiritual values in the historic process in the way of gradually 
eliminating what contradicts the higher values. The application of 
the principle was not a matter of speculation but a grau.ua! process 
arising out of experience. This is confirmed by Professor Welch in 
another pass ige: ^op. cit., p. 62) "Israel in its religious minas was 
never given to speculation. Its religious thinking w..s rooted con- 
tinually in experience. Devout men,who held firmly the faith in a 
G-od who revealed His will as a guide and inspirationto conduct, were 
bringing/
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bringing its principles to bear on the life of men lived in the flesh 
The faith referred to above is a faith waich, while developed by com- 
munion with God, would never have haa a beginning apart from trie ex- 
perience of life in a world whicn haa b3en created by G-oa ana ex- 
pressed His mind. This is illustrated by another pa-sage from 
Professor Welch (op. cit., p.66; "The prophets believed in a new 
order which was to appear in this earth, because to them Goo. brought 
the world, as well as man into being, and brought it into being to 
manifest His will. The fulness of the whole earth wa- God's glory. 
It, like man, had for a time been turned, aside from its true end 
through the moral confusion which reigned in it. But, in His day, 
when God revealed Himself, it should all return to the order which 
is eternal,because it was that which was in God's mind when He cre- 
ated it". This is the postulate of the prophetic raina, and it is 
derived from the aata of experience, ana history justified the 
postulate, because it was grounded in reality, intuitions of which 
the prophets obtainaa inmore than ordinary vividness and compre- 
hensiveness, and that is what made them unique among mankind.
3- The Ontological Argument.
We come lastly to examine the implications of the Ontological 
argument. It isnot our purpose here to deal with it in its his- 
torical aspect any more than we did with trie otriers, but, as with 
them, we are only concerned with the underlying thougnt that gave 
rise to the argument. The Oosmological ana Lloral Arguments are 
only special forms of the Ontological which implies them both. 
The movement of thought is the same in all, namely, frcm what is,to 
what/'
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what oughtto be. The Cosmological Argument argues from tae princi- 
ple of purpose in the world to a supreme Designing Cause; the ...'oral 
Argument reasons from the fact of conscience to a perfectly moral . 
Being; the Ontological Argument is not limited to any phase of 
reality, out reasons from the whol^e of experienced reality to the 
permanent grouna or reality behind it. The movement of thought is 
from a sense of dissatisfaction with reality as it is experienced 
to the Source of all reality, and from this idea of the source of all 
reality, man is compelled to think the existence of G-oa, ..ana 
because man is compelled to think God, therefore G-od must exist. 
This is the thought underlying the Ontological Argument.
As these arguments imply one^another, some of the topics that 
have been already taken up will be touched on here, but the venue 
and the emphasis will be different. We have already seen that man'-0' 
nature as revealed in his instinctive tendencies which are the raw 
material of his personality issues in the course of experience in a 
personality with emotional, intellectual, and practical needs which 
find expression and satisfaction invalues in the outside world. 
These values summea up under the he^as of truth, beauty and goodness, 
exist in infinite degrees and varieties, but they are teleologically 
arranged so as to serve one another so that they form a system. 
This system exists in varying degrees and in broken outline which 
stretches beyond man's knowledge so that it is never complete. It 
only exists as a postulate, but it is a postulate which if it cannot 
be verified leaves all the values without any foundatiorihanging in 
the air, and all life illusory. All the springs of life and conduct 
are contained in this postulate or idea of God, and God must exist,
otherwise there is a discrepancy between experience and reality, be- 
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because this demand comes directly from experience, but, as Pro- 
fessor Waterhouse says, there must be a way "out and home" between 
experience and reality. The Ontological Argument implies the de- 
mand of the religious consciousness that there must be this way 
which ends in G-od and that the values in reality are expressions of 
His nature. This is undoubtedly one of the trains of thought by 
which the prophetic mind as illustrated in the Hebrew prophets 
reached out t*o God. Profound dissatisfaction with existing values 
led them on to G-od in whom the highest values existed in perfection.
This brings us to the question of what kind of God would satis- 
fy the religious consciousness, because the religious consciousness 
is not satisfied by being assured that God exists; it demands that 
the nature of God should satisfy religious needs. The history of 
religion reveals two indubitable facts, firstly that the religious 
consciousness demanas that the ultimate reality or Supreme Being be 
personal, and, secondly, it demands that communion with the Supreme 
Being be possible so that religion on the historic view of it appear^ 
as communion with God.   Thus conceptions of religion that -fail to 
satisfy these two tests are rejected by the religious consciousness, 
as for example, Polytheism, Pantheism, Deism, Absolutism, Naturalism, 
Agnosticism, Positivism,and Pessimism, and all the later conceptions 
that havebeen advanced as explanations of the Supreme Reality.
But while many writers agree to the essence of religion being 
communion with a personal God, they tend to qualify both the idea of 
personality and of communion in such a way that the resultant con- 
ception takes us beyond experience into a region where the conception 
has no meaning, because we have no clue to it in our own experience.1
Thus while they reject the Absolutist God they re-introduce him under 
other/
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other epithets. We may take as an example of this tendency, Pro- 
fessor Waterhouse who has been quoted already. In the argument on 
which he builds up his "Philosophy of Religious Experience", he main- 
tains that experience gives us reality which must be sufficiently 
close to us to be comprehended by our intelligence, and, therefore, 
we must interpret the Supreme Reality on the analogy of what is 
highest in ourselves. He says: (op. cit., p.25Q) "Since the exist- 
ence of Goa is itself postulated, the characteristics of that exis- 
tence are similarly of the nature of a postulate. But they are 
postulated to account for the fact of the divine-human relationship. 
What is fundamental is that such relationship Implies intercourse, 
communion with a Being who responds. This raises the question, so 
often treated as if it were solely one of philosophical appropri- 
ateness, of speaking of God as personal. Yet the actual and most 
urgent reasonfor doing so is the sense of communion which the re- 
ligious consciousness experiences in the divine-human relation......
The divine-human relationship conveys to those who seek it the con-
\
viction that God responds to human approach directly and immediately, 
and that fellowship with him exists. Fellowship as far as we know 
it exists only between personalities, or at least creatures of a 
nature sufficiently similar to be mutually responsive.....It seems, 
therefore, a natural corollory to the religious postulate to regard 
the reality which assists in the attainment of human good as inter- 
pretable after the analogy of ourselves. The spectre of anthropo- 
morphism which has had a long life since Xenophanes, is surely get- 
ting somewhat needless. The crasser forms have vanished. Reality 
we believe to be sufficiently close to man to be comprehended by
our intelligence, ana since that which offers no analogy is unintel- 
ligible/
270.
unintelligible to us, we are surely justified in preferring the 
analogy of mind to that of matter, and of personal to impersonal 
existence. If the character of nature can be reflected in hu^ian 
mirrors so may the character of God. A humanistic philosophy 
which acknowledges what all philosophy must illustrate, the anthro- 
pic character of knowledge, finds little to criticize in the postu- 
late of aivine personality".
By the above reasoning then, we are justified in interpreting 
God after the analogy of human personality. This is in consonance 
with the writers argument throughout, because the postulate of per- 
sonality in God arises out of the vital process of living and reality 
must be given in experience. Anthropomorphism is to the writer a 
needless objection, and there is nothing to criticise in arguing 
from personality and its characteristics in ourselves to personality 
with like characteristics in God. But what the writer seems to 
give us with one hand he seems to take away with the other hand in 
t:ie following passage: (op. cit., p.252) "As far as the religious 
consciousness is concerned, the personality of God is a well-nigh 
unanimous conviction. As such it must testify to a true appre- 
hension of the nature of reality, but not necess .rilybe regarded as 
a consistent conception. None of the normal beliefs of mankind 
are baseless, but few are accurate. The common-sense, real world 
of things is a true apprehension of the nature of reality, but that 
does not justify our assumption of the explanation which calls God 
personal". In this passage the writer declares that to attribute 
personality to God is an unjustifiable assumption; personality can- 
not be consistently applied to God, while in tae former passage he 
encouraged/
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encouraged us to believe that there was "little to criticise in the 
postulate of divine personality" and tftat God was "interpretable 
after the analogy of ourselves". These two statements are incom- 
patible with one another, and we are left in darkness as to what the 
writer really wants us to believe. The writer refers to personality 
-is not a consistent conception , but there is little use offering us 
an inconsistent one unless we are told how it is inconsistent. In 
the former passage the utmost he dares to call God is "a Being who 
responds", but this isnot enough for the religious consciousness. 
Many grades of being can respond.God must do more to satisfy the re- 
ligious consciousness. He must reciprocate love, mere response is 
not sufficient qualification for God. This conception would only 
give us the unknowable of Agnosticism or the depersonalised Absolute. 
It is true as the writer implies that some beliefs are baseless, 
some only relatively consistent, and only a few that are consistent, 
but the idea of the personality of Goo. may be one of the latter. 
Nor is the author's position cleared by an argument from Lotze. He 
says: (op. cit., p.255) "Every monad, or centre of perception, has 
being-for-self, and, therefore, the germ of personality. Is a word 
which is capable of covering so much,really helpful when applied to 
God? Must we not with Lotze, speak of perfect personality as exist- 
ing only in God,and regard the question as being whether we are en- 
titled to be called persons. Yet to do so is to rob the analogy of 
value and leave us characterising God by an idea which has little in- 
telligibleness for us. On purely philosophical grounds there seems 
to be asmuch against as for, ascribing personality to the principle 
of reality. Recollecting, however, that the sense of communion is 
found/
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found in all religious experience, and that communion implies simi- 
larity ofnature, we may speak of a personal God in the sense of a 
responsive God, but we can hardly ask for more on the basis of reli- 
gious experience". In reply to the above argument, it may be af- 
firmed most emphatically, that we are entitled to be called persons 
but "every monad or centre of perception" is not. Mere perception 
is not equal to personality because every individual is not a person- 
ality, so that if personality is made to cover "every centre of per- 
ception" which includes animals and even insects, we agree with the 
writer that it isnot "helpful when applied to God", but that is not 
true personality. Moreover, the argument is topsy-turvy, because 
the conception of personality is derived from ourselves, and yet we 
are not allowed to predicate it of ourselves, but only of God. This 
is anthropomorphism with a vengeance, and this dire extremity of a 
philosophy of religious experience whereby it is obliged to clothe 
Beity with garments saved over from ourselves.indicates a fundamental 
misreading of facts, and it makes one stop ana enquire what the mis- 
sing factor in the situation is.
The confusion very manifestly is with regard to what constitutes 
personality in the human as well as in the divine nature. In an - 
earlier chapter we traced the origin and growth of personality, and 
saw that it originates in the self-regarding instinct or instinct of 
self-preservation out of v/hich develops, the gregarious or social 
instinct, which is the source of all altruistic tendencies. The 
only sufficient explanation of these altruistic tendencies is that 
the root of this instinct is love, and it appears at first as love 
dtself, and then as love of others, and finally as love of God, in




which means that He demanded nothing more than that man should actu- 
alise what was present in him in germ. Love is the only principle 
which, is sufficiently dynamical to reconcile all elements in human 
nature, and bring them into an organised system under its own ser- 
vice in the form of personality, or which is sufficiently dynamical 
to love one's neighbour, or to love God.   And on the other hand 
there would be no inducement on the part of the individual to love 
God unless he wore -assured that God also was a personality whose 
nature was love. Religion, which is now proved "by the science and 
history and comparison of religions to be essentially communion with 
God, is only intelligible as a universal phenomenon, if we posit 
love as the essence of personality, both in the human and divine   
natures. And these conceptions of love and personality in God are 
not, in spite of what Professor Waterhouse and others say, beyond 
our conception, and different from what they are in the human, which 
would inhibit the religious spirit immediately among the most en- 
lightened people; on the contrary, they are in essence the same, fcjut 
differ infinitely in degree, and it is of the degree of perfection 
in the divine personality or love that we shall never have perfect 
knowledge, nor does the human being desire it. But he cannot do 
without personality and love in the divine nature.
Love also, we saw, is the highest conception we possess, and 
humanistic philosophies encourage us to believe that the highest we 
experience is indicative of the highest reality there is. It is 
also the conception which explains most of the deepest things of 
life and solves the deepest problems. As we saw already we took it 
to explain tae why and wherefore of creation, and without it there 
is no answer. It explains freewill, the problem of pain , the
nn /
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question of immortality, and the necessity and. inevitablen^ss of re- 
ligion. This was also the conception by waich the great poets of 
the Christian era solved the problems of existence. To Wordsworth, 
nature was friendly because he saw in it the presence of God. Ten- 
nyson saw in it the purity of G-od, and Browning saw in it the love 
of God. They each saw the love of Goo. in their degree, but Brown- 
ing of the three was the one who looked into the seamy siae of life 
which the Pantheism of Wordsworth aid not allow him to do, and he 
neeaed a profounaer solvent than communion with nature. This sol- 
vent he found in love. Browning had imbibed the distrust of know- 
ledge of the Agnostic Schools of his earlier years , a distrust 
waich never left him; knowledge could never comprehend the real. 
As Sir Henry Jones says: ("Idealism as a Practical Creed", Glasgow, 
Llaclehose, 1910, p. 133) "Subjectivity, solipsism, relativity, limi- 
tation, inconsistency, insecurity - every defect in knowledge which 
philosophy could discover or invent is asserted and reiterated by 
Browning.......There is a fated inconsistency here which no dialec- 
tical skill on thepart of the poet - and he tries many methods - 
could finally overcome". But Browning founa the only solution he 
coula find in thelove of God. The writer says: (op. cit., p.184; 
"When Browning comes back to "Love", he speaks with the "great 
mouth of the gods". Taking his work as a whole it is scarcely 
possible to deny that Love is at once the supreme motive of his art, 
and the principle on which his moral and religious doctrine rests. 
He is always strong and convincing when he is dealing with this theme 
It was evidently the light of his life; it gave him courage to face 
the evils of the world...... It plays in his philosophy the part that
"Reason"/
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"Reason" filled for Hegel, or the "Blind Jill" for Schopenhauer; 
and he IB as fearless as they are in reducing all phenomena into 
forms of the activity of his first principle. Love not only gave 
him firm footing among the wash and welter of the present world, 
where time spins fast, life fleets and all is change, but it made 
him look forward with joy "to the immortal course". For all the 
universe seemed to him love-woven, all life is but treading "the 
love way", and no wanderer can finally lose it". Love is the sub- 
lime st conception attainable by man - trie one way in wnicn he dares 
define his.God* To love, he tells us once and again, is tae supreme 
the sole object of man's life, the one lesson he is set to learn on 
earth: and that once learnt, in what way matters little, "it leaves 
completion in the soul". Thus Browning solves the meaning of life, 
the moral ideal, the problem of immortality, the nature of God, by 
means of the conception of love. He also sees the principle of love 
at work in the process of creation from primaeval chaos to order, 
from matter to physical life, and from physical life to the life of 
reason and love in. man. In the light of love he says, "The secret 
of the world was mine".
Sir Henry Jones, who believed'Christ to be'only a historical 
person, concludes his comment on Browning with a passage inwhich he 
implies that love is what makes Christianity sublime,andprobably the 
final religionof mankind. He says: (op. cit., p.lQQ-i; "jlany poets 
- may I not say all poets? - have sung of love, some of them with 
more exquisite utterance and lighter grace than Browning. But there 
is a respect in which Browning stands alone. He has given to love 
a moral significance, a place and power amongst the elemental con- 
ditions of man's nature and destiny, and he has given it a religious 
and/
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and metaphysical depth of meaning which I believe are without ex- 
ample in any other poet. By means of Love, daring to believe the 
Naz-arene teacher and to adopt as the light of all his seeing the 
conception which makes Christianity sublime and probably, the ulti- 
mate religion of mankind, he identified the human with the aivine, 
and found in love the atonement of tae world. Here lay the secret 
of hio powdr and all his hope". It is a noteworthy admission frcm 
a-moral philosopher like Sir Henry Jones who never recognised in 
Christ anything more than the Nazarene teacher,that no other religiorl 
is likely to surpass Christianity because it is founded on the con- 
ception of love which is the highest conception known to man. Com 
ing from a moral philosopher, this tribute to love is of very great 
value. This reminds us of what we quoted from Professor McDougall 
in an earlier chapter, that the parental instinct or the instinct of 
love is the only parfect and completely satisfying one among the 
instincts. From more directions than one, then, we find, as Pro- 
fessor Henry Drummond said, that love is "The Greatest Thing in the 
World", and it is so because it is the essence of the divine nature. 
We conclude, then, that the religious experience demands that God be 
conceived of as a personality whose essence islove, and that it was 
thus He was conceived of by the prophets in different degrees. 
Hosea, with no less insight than Browning, saw into the profoundness 
of itsnature. The perfect love of Christ like Hosea 1 s,perfected 
through experience of suffering, caused Him to give as the supreme 
rule of self-realisation the command, "Thou snalt love". Thus the 
philosophy that leaves love out of its reckoning u hard put to to 
find an adequate conception of human personality or of God, and ends
up by offering us the Absolute in some disguised form. Consiaer- 
ation/
Consideration of the religious problem viewed from the point of view 
of the Cosmological, Moral and Ontological Arguments yields degrees 
of light according to the comprehensiveness of the metaphysic invol- 
ved in each, in the same way as the philosophies of the poets or phi]| 
osophers yield light according to the depth of their metaphysic. The 
philosophy of Wordsworth, for instance, was a reconciliation of God 
and Nature, that of Tennyson wasa reconciliation of religion and 
science, that of Browning went deeper into the mysteries of the mor- 
al and spiritual life. Each gave light according to the comprehen- 
siveness of their metaphysic, and so Browning gives fuller light be- 
cause of his use of the profounder conception of love, but the great- 
est Insight of all was reserved for Him, who "brought life and immor- 
tality to light through the Gospel, because it is a Gospel of love. 
He not only pointed out the way, the truth, and the life, but was 
Himself in His own person the way, the truth, and the life, and He 
not only spoke to us of love, but was Himself, Love Incarnate. If, 
therefore, reality belongs to that which explains and illumines, the 
supreme reality belongs to love which must be the essence of the beinfl 
of Gofl, and no satisfactory philosophy of religion can ever be con- 
structed which leaves it out of its reckoning, or refuses with Aris- 
totle to predicate love of God, because it is a human emotion, a 
pre-supposition which implies a gulf between the divine and human 
nature which does not exist. In conclusion, then, the function of 
reason is to establish connections and relations between the various 
items of experience, out of which process we derive theology, philo- 
sophy, and science, but it is not the highest element in mind, being 
subordinate to love, for reason alone is not sufficient or safe, be- 
cause, for instance, it can contemplate with equanimity the destruct- 
ion of millions of beings made in the image of God with poison gas, 
.whereas Love would gather all under her wing.
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Chapter VIII
THE WILL AND THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.
1 . The Nature of,.jJifi W_i 11.
The nature of the will is about as obscure and as much debated 
as the nature of feeling with which it is very closely associated, 
and in its more primitive stages very often confused. Consequently 
it is useless to go on to discuss its relation to the religious con- 
sciousness until we have first determined its nature and mode of 
operation. For this purpose we shall to begin with discuss the the- 
ory of the will propounded by Professor LIcDougall as being the full- 
est and best suited to the present discussion. Regarding the pro- 
blem of the will and McDougall's treatment of it, Dr Drever says: 
(op. cit., p.l36> Psychologists have great difficulty, and have 
exercised much ingenuity, in explaining how ..we will an act, and how 
when we will an act, that act comes to be performed. McDougall has 
given us an account which seems to meet satisfactorily all the dif- 
ficulties, and to include what is essential for the explanation of 
all the phenomena". But theology is a wider discipline than psycho- 
logy, and for that reason McDougall's explanation,as we shall see in 
our criticism of it, is insufficient and requires to be supplemented.
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In an earlier chapter the growth of personality from the raw 
material of the innate tendencies by means of the formation of sen- 
timents was traced. First of all appeared the self-preserving 
instinct with the self-regarding sentiment which became modified by 
the social instinct. The nature of the self-preserving instinct 
as we saw, was love, because the core of personality is love and love 
for self or the self-preserving instinct is the first form that love 
assumes. As the individual develops the social instinct coses into 
play. This social instinct is the source of all altruistic ten- 
dencies, and these altruistic tendencies so apparently opposed to the 
self-instinct are a perfect enigma except on the understanding that 
the sentiment of love is the core of personality. Later on emerges 
the religious instinct,the essence of which is the desire for com- 
plete fellowship. This desire, again, is not explicable except on 
the understanding that the fundamental instinct in human nature is
\
that of love. Each of these three instincts, .then, the self, the 
altruistic and the i)feligious are only different manifestations of 
the original endowment of love which is the integrating force in 
organising the sentiments and is the core of the master sentiment at 
each stage. The three emerge in the above order very close on one 
another,because they come from the same root. They help one . 
another's development through interaction, and the three persist in 
varying degrees till the end.
Progress from the lower selfish levels of conduct to the higher 
altruistic levels is effected by a process of subordinating the 
lower to the higher. This is possible by means of the individuals 
capacity to conceive ideals,which capacity consists in the ability to 
recognise/
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recognise or love the beautiful, the true, and the good, but the 
individual is greatly helped forward in the task of framing his 
ideals by means of the moral tradition,the nost refined part of 
which is absorbed by the individual through the instincts of admi- 
ration, fear and awe which make up the complex emotion of reverence.
In this way the formation of the ideal and the desire for the 
ideal is explained, but, as McDougall says, the question to be asked 
now is how this desire for the ideal which is bound to be weaker 
and thinner than the less refined and stronger desires of the lower 
nature subordinates those coarser desires to itself. The answer to 
this question would explain what the will is, but theanawer is not 
so easy. McDougall says that William James was so impressed by this 
victory of the higher over the lower and stronger, that he defined 
moral action as "action in the line of the greatest resistance", 
and beyond that James fails to offer us any further explanation of 
the ultimate nature of will. The utmost he can define will is that 
it is that which exerts itself on the side of the weaker motive, 
some unexplainable force or energy.
Our author next discusses the problem from the point of view of 
moral science, the fallacies of the libertarians and determinists. 
The libertarians maintain that the moral tradition has been slowly 
evolved by the influence of the precept and example of great moral 
geniuses,but this is only to explain one mystery by another, for no 
one can account for the appearance of genius, so that, if the moral 
tradition has its source in this mysterious and incomprehensible 
source, it can, as TJcDougall says, be described, but it cannot be 
explained, and no amount of acquaintance with its development in the 




On the determinist presupposition, again, there is no room for 
will at all. All the individual's actions are determined before his 
birth. He may act in accordance with his own nature,which is all 
the freedom the determinist allows, but when thenature is predeter- 
mined the actions are equally so, and there is no room for the exer- 
cise of the will. If, then; man is not free to act according to 
his own will,there is no responsibility, and hence no foundation for 
morality, and no meaning in rewards and punishments, praise and 
blame.
A third theory that of indeterminisin has been put forward by 
Dr Schiller according to which it is maintained that there are often 
situations in which the issues on both sides are equally balanced 11 
like a billiard ball on the edge of a knife,so that a minimal force 
of will could decide the balance either way, and,if the experiment ;.  . 
were performed on the top of the Rocky Mountains the ball might reach 
either the Atlantic or the Pacific, so great is the reality and po- 
tentiality of will. But,though it is admitted that such situations 
often occur, the theory does not explain thenatureof will, or where 
this independent deciding factor comes from. These are the sblu- 
tions which McDougall considers from the moral point of view.
Next he enquires whether psychology can offer any better ex- 
planation of the will being exercised on the side of the weaker ideal 
motive against the coarser, stronger and more primitive motive. 
McDougall thinks that psychology can render the help required,and, 
before propounding his own theory,he clears the ground by disposing 
of certain faulty theories that are ruled out by his own criterion.
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He begins by enquiring what volition is, and for this purpose 
he divides all conations into volitional and non-volitional types, a 
procedure as we shall see later of doubtful utility, and so that we 
may criticise his theory later we reproduce his argument here. 
This division, he points out, is not allowed by Schopenhauer for whcr 
the blind appetitions displayed by lowly organisms were acts of will, 
equally with our greatest moral efforts. McDougall is undoubtedly 
correct in criticising Schopenlauer for this, because acts of will 
are not "appetitions"f but "acts." For Bain, he again points out, 
there was no such distinction as volitional and non-volitional, since! 
all activities are prompted by pleasure and pain, more in the way 
of reflex actions. But McDougall thinks that the propriety^f the 
distinction into volitional and non-volitional conations has been 
generally recognised of late years owing to the greater insight into 
the large part played by the simplest modes of action in our lives. 
Herbert Spencer's idea of volitional action, according to I.'cDougall, 
is action which is preceded by the idea of movement, but this 
McDougall points out is only the mark of ideomotor action which oftenl 
takes place automatically in machine-like fashion very different frod 
volition, and this view of Spencer is evidently due to concentration 
of attention on those conations that are expressed in bodily movement]
Others again according to McDougall confuse volition with desire 
by representing volition as determined by the antecedent idea of the 
end to be attained by it. But this is a mark of all desire, and, as 
he says, a man may struggle against the promptings of a desire whose 
end/
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end is clearly represented, that is to say, the will struggles again. 
st the desire so that volition is something else than desire, or de- 
sire issuing in action.
Our author then represents Professor Stout as defining- voli- 
tion as "a desire qualified and defined by the judgment that, so- far 
as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the desired 
end". McDougall criticises this by saying that this judgment is 
characteristic not of all volitions, but of the volitions which we 
call resolutions. Such a judgment does not have the force which in 
the case of hard moral choice comes to thehelp of the weaker motive 
against the coarser and stronger. The judgment, in fact, is only 
the form in which the act of will is expressed after it has taken 
place in mind.
Another view of will which McDougall contests is that of Pro- 
fessors Bain and Stout. Bain maintains that we can only will a 
movement of soms part of the body and this view is endorsea by Stout. 
But *!cDougall points out that will has power over ideas also to re- 
tain them at the focus of consciousness, when,but for the volition, 
they might be driven away by other ideas or sense impressions. The 
advocates of the above view, however, reply that the cases of vol- 
untary direction of attention to ideas or sense-impressions is due 
to motor adjustment of some kind of sense organ which aids in the 
retention of the idea or sense-impression at the focus of conscious- 
ness. This view of Stout, McDougall thinks, is refuted by the fact 
that desire always retains the idea at the focus of consciousness, 
and mind goes back to it again and again without any motor adjust- 
ment^
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adjustment, so that it is hardly right to deny to volition, which is 
desire and morethan desire, that which we concede to do sire. This 
theory UcDougall points out owes its plausibility to the fact that 
the clearest and most demonstrable form of volition is that in which 
it is followed by movement.
Lastly he considers the explanation of will offered by Pro- 
fessor James, and Wundt, namely, that will is one aspect of apper- 
ception which consists in the inhibition of all presentations except 
the one which is selected to be retained at the focus of conscious- 
ness. Thus volition has only a negative function according to thesi 
two great authorities, and, as ?.1cDougall says, neither of them ex- 
plains how the inhibition is effected, or where the force or motive 
comes from. Their theory owes its cogency to the fact that all 
attention involves innervation, but innervation is characteristic of 
the whole of the nervous system being the negative process that ac- 
companies enervation. Thus inhibition is only a secondary aspect 
of volition, and not its essential characteristic.
Having rehearsed Professor McDougall's views regarding other 
theories of wil.1, we now come to examine his own theory of it. 
For this purpose we reproduce here a paragraph in which his view is 
fairly fully expressed. He says: (op. cit., p. 204) "We have 
recognised that all impulses, all desires and aversions, all motives 
in short, all conations - fall intotwo classes: (l) those that 
arise from the excitement of some innate disposition or instinct; 
(2; those that arise on the excitement of dispostions acquired dur-. 
ing the life of the individual by differentiation from the innate 
dispositions/
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dispositions under the guidance of pleasure ana pain. We may, 
then, restate our problem in more general terms, as follows; 
Is volition only a specially complex case of conation, implying 
some conjunction of conations of these two origins rendered possible 
by the systematic organisation of the innate and acquired disposi- 
tions? Or does it involve some motive power, some source of energy, 
some power of striving of an altogether different order? Clearly we 
must attempt to account for it in terms of the former alternative, 
and we may only adopt the latter if the attempt gives no promise of 
success. It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can vaguely 
understand the way in which all volition may be accounted for as a 
special case of conation, differing from other conations, not in kind 
but only in complexity. We may see this most clearly if we form a 
scale of conations ranging from the simplest to themost complex and 
obscure type, namely, moral choice achieved by an effort which in 
the struggle of higher and lower motives, brings victory to the side 
of the higher but weaker motive."
According to the above paragraph volition is "a special case 
of conation differing from other conations, not in kind, but only in 
complexity". When we enquire what a conation itself is T we are told 
that "all impulses, all desires and aversions, all motives" are all 
conations. On examining these elements, however, that we are told 
are conations, we find that they all belong to the feeling element ir 
mind, having nothing in them of the nature of will. For instance, 
an impulse is an impulse or feeling to act, but is not an act of will
Itself. A desire or aversion is a desire or aversion towards some- 
thing,/
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something, but it is not an act of will. Likewise a motive is a 
motive to act, but not an act itself. These are all purely subject- 
ive states that precee'S. action which is what feeling is. Professor 
Ward, among the five kinds of feelings which were quoted in an earl- 
ier chapter, mentions feeling as a purely subjective state as one of 
the five forms of feeling which he defines, and he deals with desire 
under the heading of feeling, and not under conation. Professor 
McDougall then, cannot want us to believe that will is only a com- 
plex kind of feeling in the form of an impulse, desire,or aversion, 
or motive, and yet that is what his words mean, namely, that volition 
is a special case of conation, and yet conation is defined as impulse 
desire or aversion, or motive, all of which are subjective feeling 
states. But, McDougall defines a volition as an act of will. 
He says: (op. cit., p.205) "It is convenient and justifiable to re- 
serve the name "volition", or act of will, for a particular class of 
conations." But if conations are limited to impulses, desires, 
aversions, motives, then they exclude volition, because none of them 
can be defined as acts of will. There is evidently something wrong 
here in McDougall's psychology and what is wrong is that McDougall 
has failed to distinguish between the three irreducible elements in 
mind with the result that he is confusing and mixing up feeling with 
conation which lands his exposition in contradiction and obscurity 
at these points where the analysis of mind is concerned. We found 
that this same failure on his part to keep distinct the three ele- 
ments in mind lent to confusion in his account of the instincts and 
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sentiments, and here, again, the result of his failure is obvious, 
for the impulses, desires, aversions, and motives, are not conations, 
but feelings ; nor can he find anywhere among such feelings that 
which he calls volition, if volition as he describes it is an act of 
will.
It is the same want of grasp of the essential nature of mind in 
its three irreducible aspects that also leads to his mistaken dis- 
tinction between volitional and non-volitional conations. That 
L!cDougall is sensible of the radical difficulty of making such a 
distinction may be gathered from his words in the last quotation, 
where he says: "It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can 
vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be accounted 
for as a specail case of conation". Immediately after this he 
writes: (op. cit. p. 205 J "If types of conation can be arranged in 
such a scale, each type differing from its neighbour only very 
slightly, that will afford a strong presumption of continuity of the 
scale; for If volition involves some peculiar factor, not operative 
in other conations, we ought to be able in dniv,r v, f-hari' lint V.etween 
t\j volitional and non-volitional conations. That such a scalr <:-an 
be made, is, I think, indisputable; and an attempt to illustrate it 
will bemade on a later page. But, though we cannot draw any sharp 
line between volitions and conations of other types, it is conven- 
ient and justifiable to reserve the name "volition" or an act of will 
for a particular class of conations, and we must first, try to deter- 
mine what are the marks of the conations of this class". Here the 
confusion is very apparent, for, in the first instance, he says t/.iat 
"we can vaguely understand " the relation Letv/e^-i volitional aril 
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pon-volitional conations,while immediately after he says that "we 
ought to be able to draw a aharp line between volitional and non- 
volitional conations", and so he proposes to draw up a scale in order 
to Indicate the division between them, while in the next line,almost 
in the same breath,he says that "we cannot draw any sharp line be- 
tween volitions and conations of other types*1 . These last two 
statements are contradictory, arid this contradiction is due to the 
fact that McDougall is mixing up will with states of feeling. If 
volition, then, is a deliberate act of will,then it does not cover 
all the cases of will, because many acts of will are not of this 
conscious and deliberate type, but are unconscious and instinctive. 
These latter are not allowed by McDougall to be volitions or will at 
all, as will be seen from his scale of conations, but, had he made 
use of the threefold analysis of mina, he would have realised that 
the unconscious and instinctive type of will is as essentially will 
as the conscious and deliberate type which he calls volition, for 
the three aspects of mind always involve oneanother, and never exist 
in isolation, so that the most undeveloped mind, for instance, the 
mind of the child possesses a will, each three phases entering into 
each psychosis in different degrees, so that from the dawning of 
mind and intelligence there is an embryo will, and it is essentially 
the same nature as that of the adult 5 and most developed will, the 
difference Detween tuera1 being that the undeveloped will is uncon- 
scious and instinctive to the extent that it is undeveloped, while 
the developed will is self-conscious and deliberate to the extent 
that/
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that it is developed. The terms, therefore, that should be employ- 
ed of these two extremes of will are unconscious and instinctive of 
the one, and self-conscious ana deliberate of the other, but not 
volitional and non-volitionai, for the one class are as much acts of 
will as the other. The term"non-volitional" implies that in primi- 
tive life there are no acts of will, whereas activity is one of the 
most obvious characteristics of primitive life. It is impossible 
at any stage of life to have a non-volitional or will-less mind any 
more than a feeling-less mind. If volition is an act of will, as 
McDougall defines it, then all conations are volitions and they 
range between the two extremes of unconscious or instinctive and 
self-conscious or deliberate, but to think that we can draw a sharp 
line between the two as McDougall suggests above is absurd. McDou- 
gall 's non-volitional conations are evidently mistaken feelings of 
the form of inpulses, desires, aversions, and motives t buo nothing 
but confusion results from calling feelings conations, a term which 
ought to be reserved for will. Preoccupation with instinct, and 
social factors has debarred McDougall from considering the useful- 
ness of the threefold division, and what he forgets is that the es- 
sence of will is action.
There io another point xn wnicn McDougall's explanation of will 
appears to be faulty, and that is in his conception of what he calls 
"the weaker motive". In defining will he says: (op. cit. p.2o6) 
"The essential mark of volition - that which distinguishes it from 
simple desire, or simple conflict of desires - is that the personal! 
ty, as a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the person- 
ality, the man himself, or all that which is regarded by himself and 
others/
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others as the most essential part of himself, Is thrown upon the 
side of the weaker motive". What is questionable here is the as- 
sumption that the highest forms of will are those in which the mo- 
tive is weakest. If that is so then ascetisism ought to be the 
highest life. McDougall all along is comparing the higher ideal 
motive with the cearser stronger and more primitive, as if the lat- 
ter were always stronger than the former, and will "par excellence" 
is when the decision is made in favour of the ideal and weaker mo- 
tive. Strength of accompanying feeling, however, is not the cri- 
terion of competing motives, but value for the self. All feelings 
are value-feelings,but the strongest,coarsest and most primitive 
have not necessarily the highest value for the self. Those with 
the highest value may have a relatively weak accompanying feeling, 
but being recognised as of higher value to the self, they have more 
influence over the will. But very often the value is not clear, 
and in order that mind may discover which of a number of competing 
motives is of most value it has to deliberate. Deliberation, there- 
fore, is one of the factors that is operative in the highest forms of 
will. For the purpose of deliberation, in order that a certain ob- 
ject may be kept before mind, until it is finally Judged to be the 
one of highest value, effort of attention is required, and this 
holding of the object at the focus of consciousness is an essential 
part of will. The act of will, however, takes place when, after 
holding the idea at the focus of consciousness,and after deliber- 
ating on Its claims against all others which thereby become inhibited 
the mind makes the appropriate reaction towards that idea. Till 
this reaction has taken place the will has not functioned. Every 
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Idea has its own feeling value and its own characteristic reaction, 
and until that reaction takes place the value of the idea has not 
been realised nor has it produced its proper effect upon mind and 
character. MWoe is me", said Kinglake in Eothen, "if I hesitate on 
the bridge which leads from thought to action". Thought, deliber- 
ation, attention, are not enough^there must be the act of will, the 
reaction appropriate to the idea, a debouchment, otherwise the will 
has not been moved, and we have only sentiment.
It is here that the importance of will comes in,because with- 
out the activity of the will there can be no character or person- 
ality. Etymologically character means a mark and this mark is pro- 
duced by every act of will. We have seen that personality is form- 
ed by the systematisation of sentiments into a hierarchy under one 
dominant master sentiment, but the degree of integration of the 
personality will depend on the extent to which less important senti- 
ments are made to subserve the higher so that there may be harmony 
throughout the whole system. This harmony isproduced by the will, 
and the way'it is produced is as follows. When the highest ideal 
has been discovered a characteristic feeling or sentiment gathers 
round it, and whenever the will acts in accordance with this feeling 
or sentiment the more real the ideal becomes and the more the indi- 
vidual becomes like his ideal. The more real the ideal becomes 
the more it systematises all other interests and sentiments round it, 
until there is complete harmony among all the sentiments. This is 
the condition known as mental poise or strength ofcharacter or com- 
plete personality. When, however, the will does not act in accord- 
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accordance with the promptings of the feelings that have gathered 
round the ideal, the individual doesnot realise his ideal, nor does 
his ideal control or systematise his sentiments, but sometimes one, 
and sometimes the otherf gains the upper hand,and is obeyed. The 
sentiments are all there, but the highest is not being acted on, and 
the condition is that of sentimentalism, weakness of character, and 
lack of personality. Thus the acquirement of sentiments is not 
enough; there must be habitual action in accordance with the motives 
supplied by the system of sentiments. Moreover the system of senti- 
ments must be a true ideal,because the will may be exerted in the 
interest of a wrong as well as in the interests of a right ideal,and 
so there can be strong character that is bad as well as strong char- 
acter that is good.
On this point Professor McDougall has a paragraph which illu- 
mines this point. He says: (op. cit., p.224-5) "For the generation 
of character in the fullest sense, the strong, self-regarding senti- 
ment must be combined with one for some ideal of conduct, and it 
must have risen above dependence on the regards of the mass of men; 
and the motives supplied by the master sentiment in the service of 
the ideal must attain an habitual predominance. There are men so 
well described by Professor James, who have the sentiment and the 
ideal of the right kind, but in whom nevertheless, the fleeting 
unorganised desires repeatedly prove too strong for the will to 
overcome them. They lack the second essential factor in character, 
the habit of self-control, the habitual dominance of the self-re- 
garding sentiment; perhaps because the native disposition that is 
the main root of self-respect is innately lacking in strength; per- 
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perhaps because they have never learnt to recognise the awful power 
of habit, and have been content to say, "This time I will not troublf 
to resist this desire, to suppress this impulse; I know that I can 
do it if I really exert my will". Every time this happens the 
power of volition is weakened relatively to that of the unorganised 
desires; every time the self-regarding sentiment masters an impulse 
of some other source, it is rendered according to the law of habit 
more competent to do so again - the will is strengthened as we say, 
and, when the habitual dominance of this master sentiment has been 
established, perhaps after many conflicts, it becomes capable of 
determining the issue of every conflict so certainly and easily that 
conflicts can hardly arise..... In this way the self comes to rule 
supreme over conduct, the individual is raised abovemoral conflict; 
he attains character in the fullest sense and a completely generalis 
ed will, and exhibits to the world that finest flower of moral 
growth, serenity. His struggles are no longer moral conflicts, but 
are intellectual efforts to discover what is most worth doing, what 
is most right for him to do". The three characteristics of the 
highest type of will, therefore, are deliberation, concentration 
and action, but action is the essential characteristic of instinct- 
ive as will as of deliberate self-conscious will so that action is 
that without which will cannot exist.
In will, then, the self is thrown on the side of the motive 
that is to prevail. McDougall, then, asks what that force is which 
causes the self to bethrown on the side of the motive. His answer 
to this is that it is the self-regarding sentiment. This we think 
is an insufficient answer as will be shown later on, but as the 
self-regarding sentiment is undoubtedly of great importance we shall 
reproduce/
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reproduce his account of it here. The self-regarding sentiment is 
not a mere idea because no idea except the pathological fixed ideas 
and quasi - pathological ideas of hypnotic suggestion has any force 
to oust any strong desire. The idea of the self has force to ex- 
clude all other ideas, because it forms the nucleus of that system 
of emotional dispositions that form the self-sentiment, and this 
system is always called into play whenever the idea of self comes 
into the focus of consciousness. It is by means of the system of 
feelings that centres round the self that the self is enabled to will 
whatsoever it wants. Apart from this powerfully organised system 
of feelings the idea of the self, however rich, clear, and accurate 
it® content can have very little power to move the will. Thus, as 
McDougall says,there may be a man with complete self-knowledge, but 
he may have no self-respect,^or he may have lost it like the drunk- 
ard; such a man may have excellent moral ideals, and may wish their 
realisation both for himself and for others, but he cannot act be- 
cause the sentiment or feeling which is the driving power of the will 
has been lost or has atrophied; in spite of his possession of the 
highest moral ideals he may be a villain, because there is no senti- 
ment to move the will. McDougall therefore defines volition as: 
(op. cit., p.214) the supporting or reinforcing of a desire or cona- 
tion by the cooperationof an impulse excited within the system of 
the self-regarding sentiment". It may be pointed out here, by the 
way, that "supporting or reinforcing" are not a sufficient account of 
will, because every desire or idea has its appropriate reaction for 
the self and an act of will means bringing about its appropriate re- 
action for whatever idea is selected, and not simply "supporting or 
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reinforcing it", which would apply to mere attention.
The next factor that McDougall considers as being operative in 
the activity of the will is the sentiment for self-control. He 
calls it a special development cbf the self-regarding sentiment, and 
the master sentiment for volition and especially for resolution. 
He says: top. cit., p.218) "For the man in whom this sentiment has be-
 
come strong the defci^e of realising his ideal of self-control is a 
master motive that enables him to apply his adopted principles of 
action, the results of his deliberate decisions, in spite of the op- 
position of all other motives". McDougall calls the sentiment for 
self-control an abstract sentiment a term which we have criticised 
already. In this case it is impossible to see how there can ever 
be sentiment for abstract self-control or self control alone, as self 
control is only a means to an end, the end of self-realisation, and 
is never sought for its own sake except in asceticism. What he 
has described in the above quotation is simply the same thing over 
again, namely, the activity of the will under the influence of the 
self-regarding sentiment.
A third motive force that affects the will mentioned by McDou- 
gall is the instinct of self-display or self-assertion, the influence 
of the gallery. The way in which this sentiment works is also not 
convincingly dealt with by McDougall, and the reason is that he has 
omitted some of the greatest factors for influencing the will, and 
it is here that his theory needs to be supplemented. Now the great- 
est forces for moving the will, we think, are not one as McDougall 
imagines but three, namely, the self-sentiment, the altruistic 
sentiment, and the religious sentiaent. McDougall has correctly
enough seen that the self-sentiment is one of the forces that moves 
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the will, but he has not seen the importance of the social or al- 
truistic sentiment,while the religious sentiment has not come into 
his view at all. The self-sentiment, the sentiment for self-con- 
trol, and the instinct for self-display or self-assertion which 
McDougall considers are the only motive forces of the will are all 
occupied with self, but, as the Individual develops, the social or 
altruistic sentiments comes into play, and also the religious senti- 
ment, and these move the will quite as much as the idea of self. 
As a matter of fact the more perfectly moral a person is the less he 
considers self, and the more he considers others, and he considers 
God most of all. McDougall failed to see this, because he failed to 
see that the self-sentiment is only one manifestation of a supreme 
force which lies behind it, as well as behind the altruistic and 
religious sentiments, namely, the force of love which is the core of 
personality. This position at the centre of personality which is 
occupied by love, McDougall gave to the self-sentiment and its off- 
shoots, whereas they are only phases of love which is the supreme 
sentiment. Thus McDougall's metaphysic is far too inadequate.
What, then, is love andhow does it movethe will? We have al- 
ready referred to the profound principle enunciated by Hegel the 
principle of the dialectic function of opposites whereby opposite 
elements like love and hate are opposite Just because they form a 
living unity,and it is the presence of the two opposite elements 
within theunity that is the cause of activity. Neither of the two 
could function apart from the other, and it is their opposition 
which causes the origin of activity, and it is in this relation be- 
tween love and hate that we are to look for the "fons et origo" 
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of the activity that moves the will. And we must remember that - 
love and hate include all degrees and kinds of likes and dislikes. 
This suggests that love is not the mild passive sentiment that it 
is supposed to be, but it is kept alert and active by the presence 
of an opposite principle. This alertness again suggests a highly 
cognitive element in l#ve. This cognition takes three forms; 
love of the beautiful, of the true, and of the good. That love is 
highly cognitive is seen most clearly in the case of the beautiful 
for the most developed knowledge of the beautiful is still of the 
form of love, and, though it is not so apparent, our knowledge of 
the true, and of the good, is also a form of love. Love in its 
different forms is the only power that can move the will, and McDou- 
gall is right, when he says that a mere idea has no force to move 
the will, but only sentiment, which is a feeling, and love as we 
saw is feeling, and we have seen here that it is knowing, and also 
that it is that which moves the will.
Love of the beautiful, the true and the good, finds expression 
and embodiment in the self, social, and religious sentiments, and 
these three persist together till the end, because the three are 
fundamental in personality. Which of these three is the most im- 
portant for influencing will and consequently character it is 
difficult to say. McDougall seems to think it is the self-senti- 
ment whereas the rest of his book on Social Psychology suggests 
that it is the social sentiment, but the history of religion has 
nothing more convincing to show than "the expulsive power of a new 
affection" introduced by way of the religious sentiment which in- 
dicates the power of the religious sentiment to move the will. At 
the same time it is essential to realise that the three are required 
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for the full development of will and personality, and not merely 
the self-sentiment as McDougall maintains.
Love is not mere feeling, but though it is not mere feeling it 
is all the same feeling, and it deepens with knowledge. It also 
develops tarough use or exercise. Feeling and knowing react on 
one another all the time, and make possible one another's develop- 
ment. Love is feeling, knowing and willing in perfect combination 
and function. The profound nature of love is also seen in the fact 
that love is a form of interest and interest is at the foundation of 
all education and all learning. This is why we cannot learn a sub- 
ject we do not like, or know a person whom we do not love. The 
completest form of love will exist in that personality whose senti- 
ments are completely harmonised under one master sentiment, and we 
saw in our discussion on the relation between morality and religion 
that without religion the sentiments cannot be completely harmon- 
ised. They can only be harmonised where the self, social and re- 
ligious sentiments each play their proper part, so that Professor 
McDougall's answer to the question of what the forces are that move 
the will is Insufficient,as he only mentions those sentiments that 
belong to the system of the self-regarding sentiment,and neglects 
the social and religious sentiments. This is due to the fact that 
McDougall as a psychologist fails to make use ofthat metaphysical 
force which creates all the sentiments, and is the cause of the 
organisation of personality, namely, love. McDougall himself as 
we saw in an earlier chapter accuses the philosophers of neglecting 
this basal and regulative element in human nature, namely love, and 
the philosophers cannot therefore be quoted in its support. We 
have therefore to go to those who have examined the nature of love, 
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namely, the students of mysticism. Mrs Herman says: (" Meaning 
and Value of Mysticism" London, James Clarke, 1922, p. 2?6) "Mystical 
intuition is not something which is isolate! from the intellect. It 
is, in fact, the action of the intellect and the will energising God- 
ward under the supreme impulse of love. It is love which is "the 
true hierophant of the mysteries of God", and "love with Divine ful- 
ness is the unity of will and reason in the highest power of each"... 
But to love truly, be it God or man, is to love with the mind. And
 
thus we find Pascal for whom thought applied to religion was essen- 
tially a passionate activity of his whole being - an "amor intellect- 
ualis Dei" - flinging out the striking dictum that "love and reason 
are only one thing. Love is a precipitancy of thought which rushes 
in one direction without examining every detail, but none the less 
it is a kind of reason". Whether it be the Vous kptjy of Plfttinus, 
or the "God known of the heart" of Pascal, where the heart is under- 
stood as "an implicit of Reason and Love", it is, as we have already 
pointed out, the intellectual element which, by adding light to heat, 
gives a luminous glow, a convincing passion, a vital logic, to the 
utterances of the great mystics which no esoteric theosophy or mysti- 
cism of "pure feeling" can give11. Will, as we saw, is the personali- 
ty functioning as a whole,and the force that causes it to function or 
exist at all is love, and we saw that its activity is dependent on an 
opposite principle of hate, an illustration of which principle we 
see also in nature in the case of the atom of physical science 
which is not as was once supposed Indivisible, but consists of a 
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systam of negative electrons functioning round a positive nucleus. 
We thus see the same principle explaining the ultimate source of 
activity on the one hand in the realm of matter and on the other 
hand in the realm of mind. The positive nucleus in mind which is 
regulative of all the elements in mind and personality is love with 
all its forms of likes and it is the cause of the activity of its 
opposite quality of hate and all forms of dislikes, and they at the 
same time minister to its activity, so that it is here in the posi- 
tive nucleus of love that we find the power that moves the will in 
its three main forms of the self, social, and religious sentiments, 
and not in the form of the self-sentiment alone as Professor McDoug- 
all supposes, so that his explanation has to be supplemented. But 
one of the most important of his findings in the above discussion of 
the will is the fact that no mere idea can ever move the will,but 
only the idea that is strongly Infused with emotion or what he would 
call sentiment, and we emphasise the fact here because we wish to 
refer to it later on.
2. The Function of the Will in Religion.
(a) The "Will to Believe'1 .
Having examined the nature of the will and how it functions it 
now requires to be considered how it operates in religion. In so 
doing it will be necessary to examine one or two forms of the gener- 
al objection that religion being a divine gift cannot depend in any 
way on the will of man. The first of these forms that will be con- 
sidered is the doctrine of the "Will to Believe". This theory was 
popularised by William James thirty years ago by the publication of 
an esaay on "The Will to Believe". Thft. doctrine had great vogue,
/
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fcnd brought comfort and practical help to a great many people who 
were assailed by doubt instilled by the nineteenth century scientists 
like Huxley and Tyndall who taught that to adopt beliefs uncritically 
and on insufficient evidence was dishonest, sinful, and immoral. 
Professor James pointed ott that the scientists themselves adopted 
beliefs on Insufficient grounds, and made postulates, and hypotheses, 
and he argued for the fight to believe wherever in the absence of 
logical proof there was a wish or a will to believe. A superficial 
understanding of his doctrine gives the impression that it implies 
that a man can produce religious faith at will, and so can believe 
anything he likes. This misunderstanding, therefore, has to be 
dealt with before we can advocate the use of the will in religion. 
The misunderstanding was not due to James' exposition, but to his 
critics. "The fact that his critics", says F. C. S. Schiller, 
("Problems of Belief", London, Hodderfc Stoughton) "one and all, ig- 
nored his reservations and restrictions is not, of-course a proof 
that James did not make them, but merely an (involuntary) illustra^- 
tion of the power of prejudice to blind itself to what it does not 
wish to see, and so really a confirmation of James 1 contention".
James 1 theory arose out of his consciousness of the fact that 
our beliefs are seldom the result of pure reason but are dependent 
on tradition, prejudice, Imagination, and other non-rational factors, 
and these forms of belief are neither pure reason nor pure unreason, 
but are embodiments in varying degrees of truth, so that we have to 
be content with the degree of truth we have and act on it, for if 
we shrink from action, and do nothing we are in danger of missing 
what further truth we might have got if we had willed to act accord- 
ing to our lights.
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In order to understand, therefore, more fully the right to be- 
lieve or the will to believe we have to explain a little the meaning 
of belief. Belief arises out of the feeling of reality independent 
of us through the development of the distinction between the self 
and the not-self. It has thus a double aspect the one dependent on 
the subject, and the other dependent on the ob|eptlve n ' reality. 
Psychologically described also it has two aspects, namely, believing 
as a process and believing as an attitude. Belief as a process may 
be described as a complex of feeling, knowing, and willing, whereas 
belief as an attitude belongs to the structural part of mind like 
disposition and character, as we saw in an earlier chapter. Belief 
as process has many forms such as doubt, denial, supposition, con- 
viction, surmise, guess and so on. There are two great groups of
\
beliefs, (U beliefs involving matter of fact, (2) beliefs involving 
valuation. The former can be subdivided into four classes accord-
*"\
ing as they rest on (a) a sensation coefficient (b) a memory .coef- 
ficient (c) a coefficient dependent on the valuation put on the 
evidence of others (d) a reasoning coefficient. The second group 
the group involving valuation, can be subdivided into three classes, 
namely, (1> those that are dependent on an aesthetic coefficient 
(2) those dependent on an intellectual coefficient and (3) those 
dependent on a moral coefficient. These beliefs are not mutually 
exclusive, and any one may depend on more than one coefficient. It 
is thus evident that belief is dependent on the object aswell as on 
the subject, and that it depends on other coefficients besides the 
coefficient of reason which is the only one which the scientists 
like Huxley and Tyndall considered. "Rationalism insists", says 
William jJames/
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William James. ("Varieties of Religious Experience", London, Long- 
man's, 1902, £.73) "that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find 
for themselves articulate grounds. Such grounds,for rationalism 
must consist of four things: (fj definitely abstract principles: 
(2)definite facts of sensations; (3) definite hypotheses based on 
such facts; and (4) definite inferences logically drawn* Vague 
impressions of something indefinable have no place in the rational- 
istic system.". He admits that the above principles yield the excel- 
lent fruits of philosophy and physical science. "Nevertheless" he 
says, (ibidem) if we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, 
on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning and 
science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have to adj- 
mit that the part of it which rationalism can give an account of is f 
relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige un- 
doubtedly ..... .but "it will; fail to convince or convert you all the
same, if your dumb intentions are opposed to its conclusions. If 
you have intuitions at all they come from a deeper level of your 
nature........your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your needs
your divinations have prepared the premises of whifch your conscious- 
ness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you abso- 
lutely "knows" that the result must be truer than any logic-chopping 
rationalistic talk however clever, that may contradict it. This 
Inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is Just as 
manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when it argues 
against it".
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As we have seen reason is only one of the foundations of be- 
lief, and we "know" in other ways, than by reason alone. What 
James taught by his "Will to believe", then, was that we have often 
to act on something else than logical certainty, although it may be 
irreducible to logical form, because it is of a different nature, 
and Implies a different criterion from logical certainty like the 
criterion of moral, and aesthetic truth. He did not mean that we 
can believe anything provided it possesses practical value as prag- 
matists believe. The "Will to believe" as his critics understood .. 
it in the sense of believing by sheer effort of will is psychologi- 
cally an impossibility, because belief as we have seen depends on an 
independent reality outside us, and has a share in determining what 
belief will be acceptable to mind. "Ideals", says Professor Hock- 
ing, (op. cit., p.162) "do not come out of the void; postulates 
and moral principles are not whispered to us in the form of "innate 
ideas"; it is on the spur of experience that our wills adopt their 
aims and their deepest meanings. Whatever is present in ideal, is 
first present in independent reality. In the order of existence we 
are first passive and then active". It is impossible then for the 
will to adopt any belief like, for example, a religious belief, un- 
less it has received it through experience, because such a belief 
would lack that emotional quality that alone could make the will 
reacttowards it; it would be a mere idea, and, as we saw, a mere 
idea in the absence of a strong sentiment could never enable the will 
to act. And James never meant that such a thing as voluntary belief 
was possible. The choice or act of will for James had to be an 
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urgent one arising out of fundamental needs.
We may, therefore, dismiss this objection against the use of 
will in religion, because it is based on wrong psychology and on 
wrong eplstemology, and the "will to believe" in the sense of James' 
critics of believing "in vacuo" is a contingency that can never oc- 
cur in regard to religious belief, or any other belief. And we are 
in accord with James' contention that logical certainty is not the 
only kind of certainty, and that we are entitled to act upon con- 
victions that cannot be expressed in logical form. Faith, for ex- 
ample, is a postulate adopted, not as a result of logical reasoning 
altogether, but as a result of the more fundamental synthetic reason- 
ing which is carried on by the total personality in the process of 
experience, a reasoning involving all three elements of feeling, 
knowing, and willing,which again include aesthetic, intellectual and 
ethical valuations. And to exercise the will in accordance with 
auch a faith is not only perfectly legitimate, but imperative, be- 
cause as James contended, if we do not risk acting, we are losing 
truth every time we refuse to act, truth in the form of virtue and 
character, as well as in the form of knowledge. Religious truth 
will never be able to produce complete logical proofs in its own 
support. The utmost that we can ever attain to is a degree of
A
certainty that is adequate to our emotional, intellectual and aes- 
thetic needs, and if, in these circumstances we are not to will to 
believe, we are lost. As long as a belief does not contradict our 
previous experience, and the experience of history, we are entitled 
to/
306.
to regard it as true, and to act on it even without logical proof, 
because, as we saw, there are other coefficients besides the reason- 
ing coefficients determining our beliefs, and they are equally valid, 
though they are of the non-rational kind that are not reducible to 
syllogisms.
James 1 theory, then, emphasises the necessity of action accord^ 
ing to our light which is the theme of the present chapter. There 
is a close connection between belief and action which is implied in 
the ideo-motor theory of action. As we saw above, belief is a 
complex of feeling, knowing and willing, and each item of belief, 
therefore, has its appropriate feeling and action. It may not be 
possible to trace the form of activity of each mental item or idea, 
because ideas form complexes in mind, but when one item of belief 
gains possession of the focus of consciousness, the appropriate 
action ought to follow; otherwise, as James contends, there is 
loss, and the idea does not make that contribution to mind and ex- 
perience that it might if acted upon, nor does will and character 
receive that development and expansion which the effect of the action 
would bring.
Beliefs that are not acted upon remain mere sentiment, and have 
a demoralising effect in producing in the individual the conscious- 
ness of a discrepancy between belief or intention and action, a con- 
sciousness of insincerity or hypocrisy, because the individual thinks 
one way, and yet does not act in that way, but in some other less 
noble way. A test of the truth and reality of a belief is its re- 
ducibility to action. What we believe, we are generally ready to 
act upon. How little we believe certain things is revealed by our 
want/
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want of preparedness to act in accordance with their demands. The 
reason of our want of preparedness to act is that we are not suf- 
ficiently interested in them, or, in other words, we do not suf- 
ficiently love them, for it is love that moves the will. The con- 
clusion with regard to the doctrine of the will to believe, there- 
fore, is that in cases of doubt, as well as in cases of complete 
conviction, the action of the will is necessary, if we are to make 
progress in character, and this doctrine is implied in Christ's 
oft quoted verse in this connection - "If any willeth to do His will 
he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God". The saying 
is addressed to the person who is in doubt about the will of God, as 
well as to the person who already knows it, and, for the latter per- 
son, there is the greater necessity to act, because there is less 
excuse for inactivity, and it is this latter class of person that we 
are primarily considering here, namely, those who already know be- 
yond a doubt what the will of God is, and our thesis is,that due 
exercise of the will in accordance with that knowledge will, accord* 
ing to the words of Christ, yield a knowledge of God otherwise un- 
attainable.
It was because prophets and saints of all ages were ready to 
act to the utmost limit on their convictions that they acquired a 
knowledge of God which madeuthem channels of divine truth to their 
generation. And it was because He would have no discrepancy be- 
tween preaching and practice that Jesus spent His whole strength in 
doing God's will, and thus acquired a consummate knowledge of God. 
The/
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The above words imply that doing God's will is not always easy, and 
Christ Himself once prayed that He might have an easier task, but it 
was at the end of a week of the severest strain ever imposed on hu- 
man weakness. Nevertheless after further wrestling in prayer His 
spirit overcame His human inclinations, and He yielded to the will 
of G-od, and, as is always the rule, the severer the effort of the 
will the more glorious is the result. What failure of the will or 
its action may mean in loss or gain respectively in any pivotal 
case, it is impossible to estimate. Not only the life of Christ, 
but His teaching also, gives abundant proof of the value He attached 
to action; for example it is the theme of the parable of the talents 
of the two sons, of the vine, and of the Judgment day; it was the 
test and the end of life. So that if right beliefs are important, 
so also is the right use of the will, and tint is wny its consider- 
ation is of the utmost importance in a discussion on religion, so 
that we shall now proceed to discuss another form of objection 
against the use of the will in religion; namely, the objection that 
religious beliefs are produced by an effort of the will operating.by 
way of auto-suggestion.
(b) The Will and Auto-suggestion.
The use of the will in religion is concerned with religious 
practices such as prayer, worship and service, and so, before we 
can come to discuss the use of the will in such practices we shall 
have to consider a common criticism from a certain class of psycho- 
logist, that the use of the will in such cases is nothing more than 
a form of auto-suggestion. To a certain class of psychologist es- 
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especially the "man-as-man" type or the Behaviourist type, there arej 
objective facts corresponding to religious beliefs, because religious 
beliefs are purely the result of auto-suggestion. An example of 
this type of writer is Professor Leuba who in his elaborate work on 
"The Psychology of Religious Mysticism"(London, Kegan Paul, 1925) 
proves that all the authentic marks of mysticism such as the feeling 
of exaltation, expansion, the feeling of power, ecstasy and trance, 
can be produced by natural means such aa drugs, and by ordinary 
mental processes and experiences. He, therefore, concludes:(op. cit 
p.318) "For the psychologist who remains within the province of his 
science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God, but of 
man". That is to say psychology cannot produce any evidence of di-r 
vine action, which only proves that psychology is not competent to 
decide what is of divine origin, because, what is due to divine 
influence in mind, is not a separate entity in mind to be found 
among the interstices between other elements, but is to be found in 
a specific kind of valuation set upon all reality. The facts may 
appear the same as in the natural man, but in the religious mind 
they have a different valuation and this valuation cannot be caught 
in the psychologist's net. They have also a different result, for 
the ecstasy of the alcohol, hashish and opium addict, end in degener- 
ation, while the ecstasy of the mystic leads to integration and en- 
hancement of personality, which bespeaks a different origin, the one 
being of God and the other of man.
In spite of this, "to the psychologist who remains within the 
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province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God 
but of man". But, "remain within the province of his science" is 
what Professor Leuba does not do, and we find him usurping the place
s*
of the philosopher and the theologian, and pronouncing dogmatically 
on ultimate truths. He says, (op. cit., p.32?) "The traditional 
belief in divine personal causation, strikingly embodied in religious 
mysticism, works perhaps nowhere so mischievously as in its impli- 
cation that ethical knowledge and moral energy are in custody of a 
personal Divinity, and that this knowledge and energy are trans- 
mitted to man in consequence of a personal relationship with that 
God, in particular during mystic worship". But no thinker of any 
consequence ever imagined that "ethical knowledge and moral energy 
are transmitted to man"in this way. If they were thus transmitted 
they would not be ethical. Ethical knowledge and moral energy can 
only be acquired in the process of living, but that process has two 
aspects - a subjective, and an objective one; man's part and God's 
part; and God's part is mediated through nature and. history as well 
as through the individual life. But the psychologist takes no ac- 
count of the historic or other factors, and only sees states of 
mind, and, therefore, concludes there are no other factors. Belief 
in a personal God, therefore, is to the psychologist only the result 
of auto-suggestion. He writes: (op. cit., p.330) "Let it be re- 
called, further, that neither the production of the mental state 
characteristic of mystic worship, nor its essential effects, ne- 
cessitate a belief in the causal activity of a personal agent, and 
that when the causal conception is detached from the mystical method 




obvious. It will be sufficient to mention here the therapeutic 
use made of suggestion during hypnosis and near-sleep states".
In another passage he suggests that belief in God is due to 
auto-suggestion or self hypnotism. He says: (op. cit., p.296) 
"This description of the hypnotizer upon the hypnotized corresponds 
with striking exactness to that given by the mystics of their re- 
lation with God". And because God is thus auto-suggested accord- 
ing to Leuba, He has no objective reality. He says: (op. cit., p. 
323) "The belief that the conception of God embodied in Christian 
worship corresponds perfectly to objective reality and that "it works* 
adequately is so profoundly rooted in the Christian worshippers that 
a mere hint of possible evil resulting from it will seem to them 
preposterous...... It may be shown that a belief in a God who, ac- 
cording to the biblical saying does not even permit a sparrow to 
fall to the ground without His will, is open..to serious objection*
Seeing that there is no reality corresponding to the belief in 
God, Professor Leuba sees the belief dying out everywhere. He 
says: (op. cit., p.326) "The maintenance of gestures and professions 
of belief, in the presence of persistent and detailed denial in 
action, works nowhere more disastrously than in the churches. Un- 
belief in God-providence is, in churches and theological seminaries 
fatal to intellectual honesty, and it is the main cause of their 
weakness. Their influence has waned because of the decline of
 
faith in the fundamental Christian dogma", namely what he calls God-
\
providence. We have quoted Leuba at considerable length not with 
the intention of criticising his statements in detail, because his 
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position is the position of all behaviourist psychologists for 
whom mind is mechanically determined, but because his statements 
contain a totally wrong view of the function of suggestion in mental 
life r and we have, therefore, to examine the psychologists charge 
that religious beliefs are propagated by suggestion, while they have 
no foundation in reality.
Suggestion, then, in the first place is one of the innate gen- 
eral tendencies which include sympathy, suggestibility and imitation. 
These tendencies, therefore, are all normal and natural, and it is 
by their means that interaction between individual minds and ex- 
change of ideas and learning from others is possible. Thus it is by 
their means that communal life is possible, and the individual is 
able to enter into the social heritage of knowledge and culture of 
the race. Without them, in short, the individual would be a solip- 
sist. Sympathy mostly works through the emotions,and is consequent- 
ly called "sympathetic induction of the emotions". It is an in- 
stinctive tendency to respond to the expression of emotion in others, 
and in this way it makes the individual feel-one with others. Imi- 
tation, on the other hand, is an instinctive tendency to reproduce 
the actions which we see performed by others. But the most im- 
portant of the three for us here is suggestibility which is an in- 
stinctive tendency to accept with conviction any proposition in the 
absence of logically adequate grounds. This does not mean that 
suggestion is always without such grounds, but that the purest form 
of suggestion is that wherein the logical grounds are least apparent. 
Suggestion as a matter of fact is not void of reason but contains 
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all degrees of a coefficient of reason from-the most obscure, to the 
case where the reasons arefully given.
The suspicion with regard to religious beliefs being produced by 
suggestion arose from the fact on the hand that suggestion gave to 
anti-religious thinkers a handy explanation of the origin of reli- 
gious beliefs, and also the anti-religious thinker is supported in 
this suspicion by his confusion of normal with hypnotic suggestion, 
as we have seen Leuba do in one of the passages quoted above: God, 
he said, was to themystic what the hypnotizer was to the hypnotized. 
The mistake of such writers is due to the fact that they do not real- 
ise the difference between normal and hypnotic suggestion. Normal 
suggestion is a process of believing which is a complex of feeling, 
knowing and willing. In this way any suggested proposition has got 
to pass the test of the feelings, of the reason and of the will, so 
any suggestion which does not feel acceptable, or seem true, or prac- 
ticable cannot be received by the individual. Any suggestion that 
does not fit in with previous experience of the individual and of the 
race has no hope of being accepted or regarded seriously; it is im- 
mediately rejected, so that whatever religious beliefs have been ac- 
cepted by the individual have been tested in this three-fold manner.
The conditions in hypnotic suggestions onthe other hand, are the 
reverse of this. In hypnotic suggestion the higher normal reason is 
put to sleep, and the suggestion is made to the un-conscious mind, 
the characteristic of which is that it is not fully integrated, like, 
for instance, the mind of a child; so that a proposition can be 
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accepted by it which does contradict previous experience, just as a 
child is apt to accept any statement that is made. Thus normal 
suggestibility is vastly different from the hypnotic kind, and makes 
the acceptance of any kind of belief, as in hypnotic suggestion, im- 
possible. As a matter of fact it is a characteristic of mind that 
if we try to suggest to it some idea that it does n6t accept of its 
own accord, our effort to suggest it creates a counter suggestion 
which neutralises the former idea, and this would be the effect of 
trying to suggest to the mind religious ideas which the mind did not 
accept on grounds of its own, so that whatever religious ideas mind 
accepts by ordinary suggestion, are accepted because they agree with 
previous knowledge and experience.
It is true that to begin with the child is very suggestible as 
we observed already, because his knowledge is not yet systematised. 
It is because of this suggestibility that the child is able to ac- 
quire knowledge so quickly, and to adopt the social traditions, in- 
cluding religious beliefs; but as reason develops it re-examines 
these beliefs as necessity arises, or whenever they are called in 
question, and those that are contradicted by later experience, or 
do not minister to individual needs, tend to disappear. Thus the 
belief in God and other religious beliefs would have long ago dis- 
appeared if they had been found by experience not to meet the needs 
of the race.
Another important fact with regard to suggestion which is of 
interest to us here, because it is in line with the prominent part 
we have all along attributed to feeling, is the important part play- 
ed by feeling in suggestion. As we have seen the germ of person- 
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personality is the instinctive tendencies, which are predominantly 
feeling tendencies, and the personality gets organised through the 
sentiments round one.: master sentiment, and these sentiments are feel- 
ing systems organised round specific ideas or objects. It is on 
account of the appeal that any suggested Idea makes to any of these 
feeling systems or sentiments that makes it to be accepted as a sug- 
gestion. There may be no expressed or expressible rationalisation 
before its acceptance, but there is a feeling test which, besides 
being feeling, also includes a reasoning and will element. This 
is why it is said that suggestion is the acceptance of a proposition 
in the absence of adequate logical grounds. There are, however, 
other grounds than the logical as we have seen again and again. 
There are also moral and aesthetic grounds, and sentiments of differ- 
ent kinds which have been organised in personality as a result of 
experience, and these also decide in the acceptance and rejecting 
of suggestions. The operation of these sentiments in making decis- 
ions without an appeal to reason is one of these mechanisms in life 
like habit, that make a reduction of labour in conscious thinking. 
But to say that the decisions are made mostly by the feelings does 
not mean that the decision is false, because the feelings share in 
the illumination of the reason, and in many cases feeling is appar- 
ently the sole arbiter as in aesthetic and ethical matters.
Thus suggestion operates not in the religious sphere alone, but 
in all spheres of life, creating our beliefs; and in every case it 
operates moat powerfully through the presence of strong feeling. 
This is well illustrated by a recent Kerr lecturer, Dr Edwards. 
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He says: ("Religious Experience, its Nature and Truth", Edinburgh, 
T & T. Clark, 1926, pp. 161-162) "So far from religion being in any 
unique way a product of mass suggestion, there is actually at the 
present time a very strong force of mass-suggestion in favour of 
secularism, so-called rationalism, and irreligion. This operates 
naturally as a violent counter-suggestion against all religious ideas 
and beliefs..... Its doctrines are taught to the young from their
earliest years through suggestion greatly heightened by conditions 
of highly impassioned sentiment, and no arguments will in future 
years prevail to shake the convictions thus formed. Nothing but a 
complete reversal of the whole life's conviction will suffice to 
change the mind."
According to the above quotation there are two main c nditions 
of suggestibility, one is the presence of emotion and the other is 
the presence of a crowd in which the herd instinct comes into play, 
in which sympathy and imitation also operate, thus creating condition* 
highly favourable to suggestion. It is on account of these two 
facts that united worship, for example, is so important. In this 
connection Dr. Edwards says: (op. cit., p.l48-9> "The usefulness of 
a church is that it forms a repository of religious beliefs, and by 
its collective influence aids its members in the building up and the 
keeping of the faith. Its membership provides the means of nur- 
turing, maintenance and propaganda of the religious sentiment. 
There are, further, in the various practices of religious devotion, 
both social and private, many examples of the use of suggestion in 
the formation and strengthening of belief and sentiment.......All
the/
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the associations of a church lend themselves to the establishment of 
a condition of suggestibility. Suggestibility is heightened in 
each individual by his finding himself one of a congregation of 
worshippers. Here the emotional crowd suggestibility operates. 
Hence without public worship religion would languish".
Throughout his lectures Dr. Edwards has in an admirable manner 
held the balance between the rational and non-rational elements in 
mind, and the distinctive feature of his work is the way he has 
demonstrated the function of the non-rational or feeling element in 
mind. We shall, therefore, quote what he says with regard to pray- 
er also, as we shall come to it again later. He says: (op. cit., 
p. 150) "In private devotion also, suggestion plays a great part. 
Prayer in its various forms, upon its subjective side, exerts a very 
great auto-suggestive influence. In its meditative form it may 
approximate to pure auto-suggestion. In its more usual form of 
petition, thanksgiving and adoration, it has a distinct objective 
reference........This psychological account of its influence upon
the worshipper, however, must not be held to prejudice the question 
of the reality of its objective reference. It is a well known fact 
which has been called the problem of worship, that it exerts its 
strong suggestive influence upon the worshipper by reason of his be- 
lief in God".
In case it may seem that too much importance is given to the 
£act of suggestibility, it may again be repeated that suggestion is 
the foundation of all teaching. Dr. Edwards quotes Thouless as
saying that in the University classroom, even,suggestion is largely 
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used. The lecturer does not argue, he "conveys"his views of the 
matter, by illustrating, amplifying and reiterating the statement un- 
til it is impressed on the student, giving the impression that he is 
not arguing merely, but suggesting that he is only letting truth 
speak to them. "Should a lecturer", says Dr. Edwards, "fail in his 
purpose of impressing his ideas upon the minds of his hearers, he 
has also failed as a teacher. All teaching is either suggestive or 
inefficient".
But, important as suggestion is, equally important is the fact 
to be suggested. No teacher can succeed in suggesting anything 
unless his facts are truths, and truths such as are of vital import- 
ance to his hearers, meeting emotional, intellectual and practical 
needs. In the same way prayer and worship may be rendered effective 
by means of the fact of suggestion, but suggestion would contribute 
nothing apart from belief in God. The object of prayer and worship 
is to bring God into our lives by bringing truth first into our minds 
and suggestibility is only one of His own gifts like feeling, knowing 
and willing, given in order that we might know Him, and when we use 
suggestibility in prayer and worship we only use the means He gives 
us of knowing Him and having communion with Him.
Thus it is clear that not only is suggestion permissible in re- 
ligion, but that it is indispensable, if it is to be effective, but 
the suggestion that is operative in religion is not the hypnoidal 
kind, because there is a healthy law of mind whereby, immediately 
suggestion approaches the stage of being hypnoidal, mind puts up a 
counter suggestion, and renders it inoperative. But the lesson we 
do receive from suggestion is that which it teaches us with regard to 
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the part played by feeling in suggestion and consequently in the will 
throughout the whole:life. The use of the will in religion consists 
in creating conditions favourable to the religious ideas being accep- 
ted by ourselves, or others, as the case may be. In private prayer 
for instance, and in public worship, one of the most important con- 
ditions of receiving religious truths is provided for by the fact 
that in such practices the mind adopts a passive attitude, which is 
one of the chief conditions of suggestibility, as is shown by the 
Law of Reversed Effort of the therapeutic schools, whereby beliefs 
which could never be instilled by dint of direct argument are imme- 
diately received when the passive attitude is adopted.
Another favourable condition of suggestibility, as we saw, was 
feeling or emotion, because suggestibility is innate tendency with 
a large instinctive feeling basis, and an idea is suggestible to the 
extent that it finds sympathetic response among the feeling systems 
or mind which we call sentiments. The phenomenon known as religious 
conversion is due to a revolution among these sentiments^caused by 
the acceptance by the mind of a new and powerful suggestion which 
causes a complete re-valuation of the facts of life. The well- 
known saying "the expulsive power of a new affection" by which the 
fact of conversion is so well described emphasises particularly 
the "affective" side of the new idea or value of life, which is the 
cause of conversion. But on the other hand affection without the 
idea wSuld be as ineffective as the idea without the affective ele- 
ment. The human will, therefore, can render service in making 
conditions favourable for the religious appeal by making provision 
for/
320-
for religious truths being presented not as mere ideas adaressed to 
the intellect which is only a fraction of personality, but as con- 
crete facts addressed to the total personality which includes feeling 
knowing and willing. Thus- a concrete emotional fact such as we have 
in the Gospel, cannot be presented without true feeling on the part 
of the preacher, and he can only possess these feelings by himself 
having first experienced what he is endeavouring to convey. This 
is what Dr. Denney meant by his saying, which we quoted already, and 
is worth quoting again and again, that the ideal state of the church 
would be when every theologian was an evangelist and every evangelist 
a theologian.
. The fact "par excellence" for producing religious conversion is 
the fact of Christ, not an aesthetic, or intellectual, or ethical 
Christ, but a concrete living Christ which is a different fact al- 
together from the partial presentation of Him. The partial pre- 
sentation is not a concrete fact, but an abstraction, and can never 
move personality or will, because it is devoid of feeling. It is 
a case of M Aut Caesar aut nullus", either the concrete Christ with 
emotion or no Christ at all. The reason for a concrete manifestatioi 
of God, or in other words the Incarnation was that we might have a 
concrete living fact that could appeal to and satisfy our whole na- 
ture. It is a fact which in its concreteness appeals to the whole 
personality in its religious, intellectual and moral aspects. 
Christ was not merely a religious devotee, or philosopher, or moral- 
ist. He is epitomised in His Cross, and, for this reason any true 
presentation of Him must be from an angle which displays the Cross. 
The reason for this is that the Cross is the highest and most in- 
dubibable, intelligible, and convincing expression of His love, and 
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it is His love that revolutionises the sentiments and moves the will. 
The Cross, or the preaching of the Cross, "suggests" and "conveys" 
the " love. This is what determined St. Paul in trying to make God 
known to men not to take account of any of the philosophy current 
among men, "but only Christ and Him crucified. True emotion is in- 
fectious; it is transmitted, not taught; it is the non-rational of 
the psychologists, and yet it can convey truth more completely than 
the intellect as we have seen, for it has a logic of its own, because 
emotions form systems like ideas, and have a rational element as well, 
being always organised round an idea. Love is the completest emotion.
The use of the will also comes in for the individual in the case 
of religious practices like prayer, worship and service. And the 
proposition here is that whether we wish to be assured of the truth 
or are assured of it already the will can lead us into deeper and 
deeper truth. Further knowledge of divine realities will not come, 
and what has already come will evanesce, unless an effort of will be 
made through religious practice such as prayer, worship and service. 
Truth becomes unreal that is not acted upon, and the will becomes 
weaker and weaker in religious matters if it is not being brought 
into use. On the other hand, "he that seeketh, findeth". Habits 
of prayer, worship and service bring increase of conviction, know- 
ledge, fruitfulness and ijoy. The treatment of this subject has, 
however, been reserved for the next chapter.
But before we close this chapter we shall see the part played 
by the conception of love in the prophetic consciousness. The doc- 
trine of love in the Old and New Testaments would require a volume 
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each, but here we can only refer to the subject in the briefest man- 
ner.
In the Old Testament it is the love of God that is most often 
appealed to in order to change the will of back-sliding Israel. God 
is variously set forth under figures that reveal His love, such as 
Father, Husband, Shepherd: "When Israel was a child then I loved him 
and brought my son out of Egypt; Return unto me ye backsliding peo- 
ple for I am married unto you; All we like sheep had gone astray".
In the New Testament the doctrine is still more prominent, and 
becomes the theme of almost all its writers. We have already re- 
ferred to Christ's highest commandment as that of love, and how it 
included love for God, neighbour, and self, with all the heart, mind 
and will. Many of His parables taught that love is the most power- 
ful moral force in life. The Prodigal Son is one of a series of 
parables the object of which is to inspire love and move the will.
In St. Paul, though, he is known as the apostle of faith, love 
has the supreme place. "The logical root of St Paul's ethics" says 
G. B. Stevens, ("The Theology of the New Testament", Edinburgh, T.&T* 
Clark, 1906,p. 446) "is found in his doctrine of love, the most 
fundamental and comprehensive virtue".
St. John is pre-eminently the apostle of love, and his first 
Epistle is an exposition of the nature and operation of love. St. 
John has three great conceptions which he applies to God: namely, 
light, life, love. "God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. 
(1 : 5)....."This is the true God and eternal life?....(5:20) "God 
is love, and he that abideth in love abideth in God"...(4:16) The 
three are all the same nature and principle of love. And this love 
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is not mere sentiment, but implies action: "My little children let 
us'not love in word, neither with the tongue; but in deed and truth* 
....(3:18) These deeds, are required to be not mere formal exer- 
cises in piety, but deeds of practical help; "Whoso hath the world's 
goods, and beholdeth his brother in need, and shutteth up his com- 
passion from him, how doth the love of God abide in him?" These 
deeds, again, are not bare charity, but the spontaneous outcome of 
a new life compared with which the former life was only a living 
death, because it lacked love, the principal of true life: "We 
know that we have passed over from death into life, because we love 
the brethren'1 (3:14) The distinguishing mark of this new life is 
love for our fellowmen, and it is impossible to love God without 
loving our fellowmen also; "If any man sayeth I love God, and hateth 
his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom 
he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen. This command- 
ment have we from Him that he who loveth God love his brother also". 
(4: 20-21)
Now what we are interested in specially at this point is the 
cause or source of this new principal of love, the distinguishing 
characteristic- of which is spontaneous love to God and voluntary 
altruistic service to mankind. And the cause is found in the pre- 
venient grace or love of God, which is the power that moves the will 
to altruistic service: "Beloved if God so loved us, we also ought to 
love one another'.1 ... (4:19) "Hereby know we lofre, because He laid 
down His life for us: and we ou&ht to lay down our lives for our 
brethren". (3:16) "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that 
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He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins'.1 .. 
(4:10) "We love, because He first loved us"...(4:19)
Another feature of love that we are interested in, in St. John's 
exposition is that as we saw already love is righteousness, because 
it includes its opposite principal, namely, hatred of whatever is 
evlli and unrighteous; it is righteous indignation as we have seen, 
that is the source of social morality and social justice; it is in- 
dignation which owes its existence to the presence of love. Thus 
love is not mere good-natured benevolence which acquiesces in all 
things, as it is often represented: such love instead of being a 
virtue is a defect, for it means insensitiveness to evil and toler- 
ation of what is wrong. Love, we saw, hates what would do harm to 
the object of its love, and, therefore, true love hates sin and evil, 
because they destroy happiness. The sweet-natured, amiable, ever- 
lastingly pleasant man who is never angry, is a man who is not much 
account in the business of making the world better. Love devoid of 
righteousness has been the undoing of many. St. John was the dis- 
ciple who leaned on Jesus' breast, the foremost member of the inner 
circle of those who understood the love and mind of Jesus best, and 
because he was the foremost in love, so he is the most emphatic in 
regard to the condemnation of its opposite, namely, sin: "Whosoever 
doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his 
brother" (3:10) "Everyone that doeth sin doeth also lawlessness, and 
sin is lawlessness". (3:4)
But, while it is the precedent grace and love of God which ini- 
tiates the will to love God and mankind, the continuance of that 
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love as well as its increase in depth and scope depends on 4"the co- 
operation of the will of man which is the lesson which we are trying 
to impart in this chapter. The action of the will is demanded for 
the purpose of walking in the light as He is in the light..(1:7) for 
the purpose of keeping his commandments, (2:3) for the purpose of 
purifying oneself..(3:3) for the purpose of loving the brethren (4:1 
As a result of such effort the individual receives increase of the 
grace of love which results in the increase of knowledge of God; 
"Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and everyone 
that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God". "He that loveth 
not knoweth not God, for God is love". (4:7-8) Thus love conduces 
to knowledge of God and the problem of religious doubt and religious 
apologetic^can only be solved completely by the exercise of the will 
in the direction of love andactive sympathy.
And, in service of love, it has to be remembered that quantity 
also counts as Jesus taught us in the parable of the talents, and 
other passages in his teaching. "My Father", He said, "worketh 
hitherto and I work"| that is to say, the Father!s active love was 
unceasing; and St. Paul said that "love never faileth". True love 
or sympathy is not limited or spasmodic, or selective, otherwise as 
Jesus said, "it hath no reward". Love for our friends, our own se- 
lect coterie, or clique, may be only varnished selfishness; true 
love is like the love of the Father, who maketh His sun to rise on 
the Just and the unjust. Love to Christ, to St. Paul and to St. Joh 
was unqualified; they did not labour to distinguish between ordinary 
human love and religious love as is shown by the parable of the 
Good Samaritan, by St. Paul's love hymn, and by St. John's saying, 
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that, "he that loveth is of God, and knoweth God". Human love and
«
sympathy of every kind that is not merely selfish, is of God, for 
God is love, and makes His sun to shine upon the evil and the good 
without distinction. Such love brings the individual nearer to 
God, and to fuller knowledge of God.
Love, again, expands the personality of the lover and the loved; 
"thy gentleness hath made me great". In this way love is the way 
of salvation for both parties. No one can save himself without sav- 
ing others; it is only through the exercise of love that personality 
as we saw, can develop, or be salved, because love is its original 
nature and foundation, and, while one is seeking to salve, or save, 
the personalities of others, his own personality also is being salved 
or saved* Thus love is not a means to an end conceived of as our 
own or others salvation; it is an end in itself; it is at one and 
the same time both our salvation and "our reasonable service" and 
"sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour unto God", whereby others are 
also being saved.
In all these writings of the Old and New Testament, therefore, 
it is prevenient divine love that is depended upon on the divine side 
to operate and lever the human will; but on the other hand all these 
scriptures are equally Insistent on the necessity of the exercise of 
human will on man's part in all the issues of life. There is no ob- 
scurity about the part played by man's will or about the part played 
by the will of God in the act and process of salvation. The pro- 
phets, Christ, St. Paul and St. John all preach the necessity of the 
operation of the human will; "Choose ye this day whom ye will fol- 
low"; "enter in at the straight gate"; "Awake thou that sleepeth and 
arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light"; "let us love 
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one another, for love is of God".
The exercise of the will in loving service was the divine in- 
tention in endowing man with freewill. "In this is my Father glo- 
rified',1 said Christ,"that ye may bear much fruit". It is therefore 
the end and object of all life and of all learning. It is the way 
of self-realisation, the way of fulfilling the law of the inner life 
of personality, the social law, and any other law of God that there 
is. It is also, as we saw, the only satisfactory solvent of re- 
ligious doubt that there is, and the only adequate way of knowledge 
of God. Intellectual proofs of the Being of God will never be fi- 
nal, or fully convincing, but the knowledge that comes from love and 
service is complete in proportion to that love and service, and it 
is apparently so contrived, or the nature of existence is such that 
real knowledge of God is only attainable in proportion to love and 
service; the vision of God is reserved for the pure in heart. 
Most of God's plans serve more than one purpose; service ends in 
knowledge also. William James was very near the truth, therefore, 
in his doctrine of the "will to believe", but he would have been 
nearer the truth still, if he had advocated the "will to love", for 
it woull have solved the problem of belief as well. Love, therefore 
is the supreme virtue, wisdom and service, for there is no ethic or 
philosophy higher than this; "Bring forth quickly the best robe and 
put it on him".
It is the doctrine of the "will to-love", then, and not simply 
the doctrine of the "will-to -believe" that is the outcome of the 
present chapter, because the"will to-love" goes beyond the "will-to 
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believe" and carries the solution of it within Itself. And of all 
things in this world it is this love that this world of mankind 
stands most in need of, love in its different aspects of sympathy 
and help for the poor, theunfortunate, the hopeless, the sinful, and 
most of all the selfish, worldly and indifferent. This is the form 
of crusade that is required nowadays: adventures and exploits in 
love. This is the most effective apologetic for Christianity es- 
pecially among civilized races with long established religions of 
their own which claim nowadays to find all the truths of Christian- 
ity already present in their own religious books. In such circum- 
stances the Christian apologist is not simply non-plussed, because 
his religion has enabled him to act upon the doctrine of a God and 
Gospel of love by a life of love, which non-Christian religions can- 
not enable their votaries to do, and success in Christianising the 
non-ahristian world nowadays is due to life and conduct inspired by 
love rather than to argument, though argument also has its value. 
Now love like this is not always a simple matter or easy to 
accomplish. Those who do accomplish it are those who shine like 
lights in the world, and the light that makes them conspicuous is the 
love that shines through their works, and through that love the world 
sees and understands the nature of God. "Let your lights so shine 
before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father 
who is in heaven". But this love does not come to people in their 
sleep; it involves many an effort of will, and many a failure and 
struggle, before success and ease of performance comes; it is, in 
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fact, the supreme art of life which spells success or failure of 
life itself. But in this situation God's part enables the indivi- 
dual to perform his part. G-od's part is the revelation of Himself 
in Christ. This revelation energises the will of the individual in 
the direction of the life of love and service by producing on the 
one hand the consciousness of one's own selfishness and want of love 
for others, and the unsatisfactoriness, and incompleteness of such 
a life, and on the other hand by awakening the individual to the 
consciousness of the possibilities of love as the fulfilling of the 
law of God, the law of the inner man, and the law of social life. . 
This is the origin of the life of love which strives henceforth to 
bring everyone outside into possession of the same gift that has en- 
riched itself.
This love cannot be produced by an effort of will, but what can 
be produced by an effort of will on man's part is theputting of our- 
selves in communication with God by all the means of grace at our 
disposal, such as, prayer, worship ana service, and through such 
fellowship lovi like the love of God Himself will come into the life 
in a deepening, broadening, endless stream. This brings us to the 
subject of the next chapter which is communion with God, communion 
which is the source of religion and salvation; for man is saved 
when he is no longer separate from God in the far country of self- 
ishness, but is "brought nigh by the blooa of the Gross", the con- 
tinued vision of which is the dynamic and generating cause of love, 
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love which through the result of comnunion tends to become spontan- 
eous, comprehensive and sublime as the love of Goo. waich is its 
source.
What we have been endeavouring to express in this chapter may 
be succinctly conveyed by saying that the highest life or the love of 
God cannot be learned or practised without severe discipline and 
application,much less is the highest art of all, the art of loving. 
And it is to the practice of this art by means of self-discipline 
and self-sacrifice that the modern world calls all believers. In 
support of this we shall in concluding this chapter quote two pas- 
sages, one from an eminent preacher in the West, and another from an 
eminent social reformer in the East. The Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard 
says: (The Impatience of a Parson", Hodder and Stoughton, London, 
1927, p. 130) "For an individual to be involved in treating God as 
if he were a Father and his neighbour as if he were a brother is to 
exact from him every conceivable virtue that Christianity can demand. 
To love God and to love your neighbour as yourself is the beginning 
and end of the Christian religion. We have only to pause for a 
moment to think in what that would involve us,to realise how hard it 
is for men to be Christians, and how much easier it is to make 
Christianity some sort of a philosophy rather than a definite com- 
mitment to a certain kind of life." Karawa the Japanese social re- 
former writes: (quoted from S.C.M. Liverpool letter No. 1.1928) 
"What is wanting in Japan, as in Britain, America, France and else- 
where is not the knowledge of Christianity,but rather the practice 
of love. There is a famine of love throughout the world; in the 
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churches, in the schools, in the factories, on the farm, everywhere. 
St. Paul said "Love suffers long and is kind". Belief in this eter- 
nal love of Christ finds a voice in the Cross, it forgives humanity's 
sins, it redeems us, it sanctifies us, it links the skill of science 
with the needs of daily life, it unites the nations, it binu.8 the 
factory owner to the labourer, the intelligent to the ignorant, the 
favoured nations to 'the less favoured nations, and it teaches to 
each generation of the human family the profound lesson of sacrifice 
for succeeding generations. It is to this love that young Christian 
of Japan give their allegiance. They believe that it expresses the 
essential character of God and testifies to the eternal significance 
of Christianity.
"We cannot believe in the Christianity that discounts this re- 
demptive love, or that fails to practise love in human relationship. 
Without this love no forms of communism or socialism, no kinds of 
social construction whatever can succeed.........Love is the eternal
and revolutionary principle, and without it social progress in any 
true sense is unthinkable. The clue to tais meaning of this eter- 
nally revolutionary love is the Cross. Expressed in these ultimate 
and concrete terms, love becomes the universal religion which trans- 
cends language, race and national boundaries".
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Chapter IX,
THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNION WITH GOD.
The proposition that we set out to prove in these pages was that 
the basis of religion, and hence of the prophetic consciousness was 
communion with G-od. This conception of religion was based on the 
fact that the essence of the divine, and of human nature was love, 
waich fact necessarily implied reciprocal fellowship or communion 
between God and man. In this chapter then, the nature of communion 
with God will be considered.
But, when we look about for material for such a study, it is 
difficult to find any great body of examples of communion except 
that which has already been dealt with under the title of mysticism, 
and the question thus immediately arises as to what the relation of 
ordinary communion with God of the average normal person is to mys- 
ticism. Some writers regard all ordinary communion as falling un- 
der mysticism of an extreme type. Others again regard all mystics 
as a special type of person and normal communion as something differ- 
ent from mysticism of either type, something of which the ordinary 
person is not capable. The answer to this question is of vital 
importance to our view of communion. Is all communion mystic or not' 
This is our first subject of enquiry.
It will be therefore, necessary at the outset to examine the 
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nature of mysticism to see whether it is something essentially dif- 
ferent from ordinary communion, and wherein it differs from it. 
When we begin, then, to enquire what mysticism is, we are immediately 
confronted with a great variety of definitions. This is due to the 
fact that mysticism combines in itself many characteristics of oppo- 
site polarities which are one cause of the difference of interpre- 
tation. Another reason for the differences of Interpretation and 
ambiguity with regard to its meaning, is the fact that it has been 
investigated mainly by psychologists who have made use of the mater- 
ial supplied by the comparative study of religions. This latter 
science has collated a vast quantity of material about mysticism re- 
lating to every age, and climate and race. This material, psycho- 
logy has examined according to its,own method without reference to 
theological, philosophical, or historical factors, with the result 
that different psychologists draw very different conclusions, most of 
which are very disastrous to the reputation of mysticism, denying 
it any objective validity. This is the fallacy of the psychologist 
who only sees the subjective factor in mental process and pronounces 
on the truth of mysticism as if there were no other factors. By the 
method of psychology almost anything can be deduced from the facts of 
mysticism when regarded in this time-less fashion, because the facts 
are infinite in variety and can be made to prove almost any conclu- 
sions.
"Murisier", says Pratt, (op. cit., p.339-34o) "is not the only 
writer who tells us that mysticism is the heart of religion, and then 
proceeds to examine the most extreme cases of the most extreme type 
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identifying these with mysticism, and proving thereby that the heart 
of religion is rotten. Thus it has come about, quite naturally, 
that the pathological side of mysticism has been greatly over-empha- 
sised, and that mysticism, and with it religion, is beginning to get 
a bad name". The result of this is that at present a great many 
eminent theologians are biassed against mysticism, and regard it as 
alien to Christianity and dangerous to its truth. For this reason 
many books are, nowadays, printed on the subject of religion which 
contain no treatment of mysticism, or of the subject of communion 
with God, because it would involve the treatment of mysticism. We, 
therefore, understand that the meaning of Christian mysticism which 
we are mostly concerned with is communion with G-od in Christ, and 
the question vthat we are trying to answer is whether ordinary com- 
munion with God of the ordinary person is also mysticism.
Professor Pratt who is one of the more philosophical psycholo- 
gists tries to distinguish between the milder forms of mysticism 
and its extreme type. This is a step in advance on Leuba and others 
who regard all cases of nysticism as the same. This is a step in 
the right direction, and it may be as far as a psychologist can go, 
in as much as he is not competent to deal as a psychologist with the 
theological, philosophical and historical factors. Still the dis- 
tinction between the milder and the extreme forms is of value as it 
suggests that the extreme type are an exaggerated form of something 
that is moderate and normal. And the question now is, whether or 
not we are to identify this milder mysticism with ordinary communion 
with God which we are proposing to deal with hera. In o.raer to ans- 
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answer this question we shall quote Professor Pratt's ov/n description 
of the two types. He says: (op. cit., p.339; "The twc classes I
 
have in mind might be called the mild and the extreme types. The 
former is commonplace and easily overlooked; it is to be found among 
perfectly normal persons, and is never carried to extremes. The 
other is usually so striking in its intensity, and in its effects 
that it attracts notice, and is regularly regarded as a sign either 
of supernatural visitation or of a pathological condition......!
cannot too strongly emphasise the importance of making and keeping 
clear this subdivision within religious mysticism. No Just idea 
can be formed upon the subject, and no sound conclusion as to the 
nature and place and value of mysticism can be reached, unless one 
constantly keeps in mind the distinction between these two kinds of 
mystic states. A great deal of otherwise very valuable work on 
the subject has become exceedingly misleading for the incautious m?., 
reader because of a failure to make this distinction. It is a com- 
mon thing for a writer to make some general statement about mysti- 
cism as such which really applies to only one of the two types, and 
not to the other. And the failure to make the distinction in ques- 
tion is particularly unfortunate because, when either type is taken 
alone and by itself to represent mysticism the choice is not likely 
to fall on the mild and unobtrusive sort".
It would seem from the above quotation that what Professor Pratt 
is describing under the name of mysticism of the milder type is sim- 
ply the ordinary communion with God of religious faith such as we 
have in ordinary religion, and is taught in the Bible; the communion 
of Jesus, of St. Paul, and of St. John. From the above quotation it 
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would seem that all ordinary communion is of the mild mystic type, 
and that thus ordinary communion has found a footing inside mysticism 
and that grand mysticism is only an exaggeration, an abnormal form 
which it takes in persons of abnormal, but not necessarily in every 
case, pathological constitutions. And there does not seem at first 
sight to be. much objection to this, because all religious communion 
is mystic, or mysterious, or ineffable, which is all that the word 
"mystic" means. "Mystic" in brdinary usage does not mean esoteric, 
occult, or due to a special faculty. Communion with God is mystic 
if it acquires any depth or reality at all. This has got to be 
made clear because mysticism has come to have such unfortunate con- 
notation, implying something abnormal or psychic.
But we are hardly esconced within this position that ordinary 
communion is the same as the milder type of mystic communion, than 
we are confronted by other authorities on the subject of mysticism, 
who maintain that mysticism cannot be so divided, that mysticism is 
a distinct experience which is only realisable by persons of a cer- 
tain nature, and that ordinary communion is an experience which is 
below even the milder form of mystic experience. An example of 
this attitude is Mrs Herman in her valuable treatment of mysticism 
where she says: ("The Meaning and Value of Mysticism", London, James 
Clarke, 1924, p.39) "In accordance with our finding, we proceed to 
the task of separating the normal and spiritual from the abnormal 
and psychic elements in mystical literature, but on the very thresh- 
old we are brought to a standstill. Even the most rigid theorist, 
if he be honest, cannot go very far without discovering that, like 
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all real worlds, the world of mystic experience cannot be cut in two 
with a hatchet. Speaking ideally, it is quite easy to picture the 
perfect mystic entirely guileless of any aberrations into the psychic 
realm.........But such abstractions cannot in the long run satisfy us
It is another instance of the unsatisfying delusion of a fragment of 
"nature morte"- a dull, hard-edged lump cut out of the warm, living 
landscape as with a knife; it not only utterly fails to convey the 
magical quality of the whole, but, in its correct deadness fatally 
misrepresents it." The writer's argument here is that the visions 
of the great mystics cannot be separated from the rest of their lives 
and even milder mystic experiences also have their visions, which 
seems to make mystic experience one indivisible whole and different 
from the communion of the ordinary individual.
In maintaining that mystic experience is one and undivided seam- 
less garment united together by warp and woof, the writer is correct, 
but what we wish here to deny is the writer's contention that ordinary 
communion of the ordinary believer is outside the pale of mysticism. 
That this is her position will be made clear by a passage where the 
writer answers her own question whether there is a class of Christian 
"initiates" who possess a secret witheld from the generality of be- 
lievers. She writes; (ibidem) "But take the case of two healthy 
and well-developed children, the one genuinely dutiful and affection- 
ate, but somewhat unimaginative and easy-going, takes his father's 
affection for granted, and makes no conscious effort to get into sym- 
pathy with that father's mind. The other makes himself his father's 
companion and almost Instinctively anticipates his wishes. That 
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child may be said to have found a way to his father which the other 
does not dream of. And when the ground of this perfect sympathy of 
one ;.son with a father who loves both is investigated, it will be 
found that while painstaking love is one essential element in it, and 
an impelling desire to enter into his father's mind and life another, 
yet they cannot completely account for the difference. Deepest of 
all there is something that defies analysis - an instinctive sympathy 
an inborn divination, a genius for filial affection; something which 
the other uoy< could not wholly attain, took he ever so much pains. 
And in admitting this we have granted the esoteric principle, not, 
indeed, as defined by quasi-mystical secret societies, but as inher- 
ent in life itself".
Now in spite of the qua1 if ication of the word esoteric implied 
in the closing words of the above quotation the esoteric principle in 
mysticism is here plainly admitted. It is "an inborn divination, a 
genius for filial affection, something which the other boy could not 
wholly attain, took he ever so much pains.".
Now if we look closely at the two examples supplied by the writ- 
er, we see that the two boys have got affection for the father, the 
first as well as the second, and the first is also "genuinely duti- 
ful". And, if a boy is "genuinely dutiful" and "affectionate" 
towards his father, we cannot see how he"takes his father's affect- 
ion for granted, and makes no conscious effort to get into sympathy 
with his father's mind". One would conclude that his being "gen-
i
ulnely dutiful" implied a great deal of understanding 6f his father's 
mind, and a much better way, if we apply Christ's parable of the two 
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sons, of getting into sympathy with his father's mind than trie way 
of the second sentimentalist with the divination or genius for sym- 
pathy. How a "genuinely dutiful" and "affectionate" boy can take 
"his father's love for granted", which would imply a want of affect- 
ion and selfishness on the part of the boy, is incomprehensible. 
These two aspects of the boy are obviously incompatible and cannot 
exist together in fact.
Such a hybrid boy cannot be found and the writer has invented 
this forced example to prove the esoteric principle by trying to 
show that there may be people who are affectionate and dutiful enou^i 
who may not have it, while others have the mystic gift by reason of 
an innate gift of divination or genius, quite divorced from the ora- 
inary moral life, as we saw in the case of Otto's gift of divination. 
Now what we maintain is,that if a man loves God, and is "geniunely 
dutiful", he is in possession of the most inmost esoteric secret 
there is, but, of-cpurse, if he is loving anddutiful, he cannot at 
the same time be easygoing, or make no effort to get into sympathy 
with the mind of God, or take God's love for granted without being 
guilty of the sin of presumption, a most deadly sin.
As the decision on this point, as to whether only people with
psychic gifts can have the deepest and most inmost fellow-ship with
 
God, is of the greatest importance, and, lest we misrepresent the 
above writer by judging her by one illustration only, we shall quote 
a second illustration of hers which immediately follows the above 
illustration. She says: (op. cit.,p.39-*I;"Here is a trusty, un- 
imaginative, well-intentioned Qhristian man doing his duty in life 
and sending many an honest prayer heavenwards as he goes along. 
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Who would deny that such a one has found a plain and sunlit road to 
his Father's heart? But here is another, - an unlettered ana obscure 
toiler, maybe - who finds deep in his heart the instinct for com- 
munion with the Eternal, and, having found this treasure, for the 
joy of it goes and sells all that he has, that he may "own the field 
of his soul. Such a man may never have heard of the stages of the 
Mystic Way, but the less acquaintance he has with mystical jargon 
the deeper his hidden life is likely to be. He may never do any 
outstanding work in the world, but he will wear that indefinable 
hall-mark of spiritual aristocracy which never fails to be recognised 
by those who live at the King's Court.........We ask why the differ- 
ence between him and his good-hearted but obtuse brother in Christ? 
Why is not the in-seeing eye given to all God's chilaren? There is 
only the answer which is and is not an answer: "My sheep hear My 
voice"; "All men have not faith"..We have arrived at a gateless 
barrier. There is this star in the darkness, however: the myste- 
rious gift of mystic apprehension is bestowed upon elect souls not 
for their own glory, but for our sakes and for the sake of the whole 
Church of God. They are not a segregated caste of adepts; they 
are pioneers, beating plain with bleeding feet the road we all in our 
measure are called to tread".
Now, here again, the capacity for communion with God is depend- 
ent on a psychic gift which makes the possessor into a spiritual 
aristocrat, while the rest of us who do not possess this psychic gift 
are termed "obtuse" brethren in Christ, sheep who do not hear the 
shepherd's voice, men who have not the faith, and yet supposed to be 
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following in the footsteps of the psychic pioneers.
It is quite evident that the writer who at most times is clear 
and lucid in her thinking is here not sure of her own position be- 
cause the example here again is not consistent: for the first rnan f 
the obtuse brother, is admitted to be a prayerful man, doing his duty^ 
who has "found a plain and sunlit road to the Father's heart", and 
yet further on he seems to be turned into one of those who do not 
hear the shepherd's voice, and who have not the faith. With s^ch a 
chameleon of a man anything can be proved, especially the esoteric 
principle, for it nbt only divides all mankind into two classes, but 
it divides one man into two different natures. The writer is vague- 
ly conscious that it is inconsistent, because she says, "it is and it 
is not an answer", and certainly any impartial person would agree 
that it is not an answer.
In the above illustrations the writer's reasoning is vitiatea by 
the fact that she has taken a natural illustration and literally de- 
ducted from it a spiritual conclusion, while in the second illustra- 
tion she began with a spiritual case and ended by regarding it as a 
natural one. The two classes of people, mystics and ordinary people 
and the two facts of ordinary mysticism and ordinary communion, are 
not reconciled, in the mind of the writer, or the proper connection 
between them clearly thought out, and this want of clearness in 
thought appears in her illustrations. In the first illustration the 
unimaginative boy is, and is not affectionate, and, in the second 
illustration, the man is and is not a man of faith, and so this ans- 
wer, "is and is not an answer".
The writer's real answer is both No and Yes. The quest-ion to 
which the above two illustrations are the answer she puts thus: 
cit. p.38;
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"Are there really two ways to God? And is there a boay of "initiates 
who possess a secret witaheld from the generality of believers? We 
answer both No and Yes. If the term "a boay of initiates" implies 
that G-od fails to satisfy the humble soul that approaches Him in 
faith, becuase it does not possess a certain genius for the Absolute, 
the answer is unequivocably No.......There is in this sense no favour
ed class of initiates upon whom the less gifted need look in envy. 
Fulness of life is promised, not to the illuminated, but to those who 
hunger and thirst after righteousness. Yet there is a profound 
difference between, say, the spiritual life of St. Paul and that of 
the average well-meaning Christian soul. Wherein does that differ- 
ence consist, and can it be said that Paul was master of a special 
and more immediate "way" to God?
The two above illustrations are the answer to the above question 
and their purport is that "we have granted the esoteric principle" 
that the one has an "inborn divination, a genius for filial affection 
Now the consequences of this admission if allowed to pass unchalleng- 
ed as the final deliverance with regard to communion would be of in- 
calculable harm to the Christian life which depends on every believer 
being vitally unitea to Christ as the branches are united to the vine, 
The knowledge that we were obtuse brethren in Christ, a class to 
which most of us belong, and that real fellowship with Christ like 
that of the mystic was not possible for us, because of our want of 
inborn genius for communion would immediately inhibit all effort 
at communion and drive us sullenly to the attitude of "do your duty 
and take your chance" with envious eyes at those who "wear that in- 
definable hall-mark of spiritual aristocracy".
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It may seem that too much space is being here devoted to this 
question, "but the importance of this point cannot be over-estimated 
as it is the crux of the problem of ordinary communion, on the one 
hand, and of mysticism on the other hand, because the subject of 
communion is not nowadays in favour because of its affinity to mys- 
ticism, and mysticism is not in fa.vour because of its esotericism, 
and even careful writers like Mrs Herman make the mistake of making 
Christian mysticism more esoteric than it is, and of putting it out 
of reach of the ordinary believing Christian. Her position is also 
the position of Miss Evelyn Underhill, and of Dean Inge our greatest 
exponents of mysticism. It will therefore, be of service if we 
consider whether any other answer is possible to the above question 
of our writer which will explain more satisfactorily the nature of 
ordinary Christian communion on the one hand, and the nature of mys- 
tic" communion on the other, for, it is incredible that the highest 
gift of God, the gift of fellowship with Himself is dispensed to His 
creatures in this parsimonious and niggardly fashion, that puts a 
slur and a profound suspicion on His impartial love for all by de- 
barring the majority of them from His presence, because we shall try 
and prove there is only one way into His presence for mystics and 
"obtuse brethren" alike.
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What now requires to be done is to seek for some illustration 
or explanation that will explain the nature and conditions of Christ 
ian communion, and its connection with mystic communion. And the 
only explanation that can fit the problem is one which explains what 
happens when a natural man becomes a spiritual man. The natural ^an 
becomes a spiritual man, when he experiences the forgiveness of sins 
through the realisation of the love of God revealed through the Gross 
of Christ. Professor H. R. Mackintosh explains what happens in 
these circumstances, as follows: ("The Christian Experiences of For- 
giveness", London, Nisbet, 1927, p.257) "The effects of the Gospel 
are in tune with its meaning; and its meaning is that it brings men 
the knowledge of something that God has done, and bids them rejoice 
in a salvation that He has wrought. It thus sets man free from the 
chains of their past, transfers the centre of their expectations and 
opportunities from themselves to God, and calls them to a life of 
unrestricted fellowship with Him. It has frequently been argued 
that the Christian religion is self-centred, interested and pruden- 
tial; but the truth properly understood is simply that apart from 
such religion of the loftiest kind - in which the majesty of God's 
holy love overshadows all - morality cannot attach itself to what 
stands sublimely at once above the individual and above society, and 
wakes the reverent and self-abandoning homage of the soul. To owe 
everything to God as the pardoned do, is to have taken the first 
decisive step in escape from self-absorption, even though that may 
have been the not ignoble self-absorption of seeking*otit ways in 
which the inner Independence and harmony of the individual soul may 
be/
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be maintained. But when the focus of a man's interest has been 
definitely occupied by the great friendship and transcendent claims 
of God who has blotted out all his offences, a new principle of 
moral health has been implanted, and it is this emergence from ego- 
istic isolation, this opening gateway into the immeasurable world of 
Goodness, Truth and Beauty, all dependent on a Father who makes His 
children free of its wealth, which renders a marj for the first time 
capable of wholly unreserved fellowship with others".
Now we maintain that in this Christian experience of the for- 
giveness of sins is to be found the only esoteric principle there is 
in the Christian religion, and all who have this experience of for- 
giveness possess this esoteric gift. The exoteric people are those 
who have not this experience of forgiveness, but all those who have 
it are admitted into the innermost knowledge of God that there is, 
to "a life of unrestricted fellowship with Him", to "a new principle 
of moral health, to the immeasurable world of Goodness, Truth and 
Beauty", to the "wholly unreserved fellowship with others". This 
is the only esoteric principle there is in Christianity waich dis- 
tinguishes Christianity from other religions which cannot confer the 
same gift ontheir votaries, but it is a gift which is shared by 
every Christian believer, and it is impossible for anyone who.is ad- 
mitted into this knowledge and fellowship to take the Father's love 
for granted? The most practical, naturally unemotional and unimag- 
inative becomes stirred with a new emotion and illumination as soon 
as he experiences the love of God in Christ. As St. John says: "We 
know that the Son of God has come and that He has given us an unaer- 
standing/
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understanding", and all Christian believers ha've this "understanding" 
in their own degree; the most obtuse as well as the most psychic, 
the most matter of fact and practical as well as the moot affection-i 
ate and imaginative. Communion therefore, depends, not on the po- 
ssession of psychic gifts of divination or genius, but on the "Son 
of God" who has come and given us the "understanding". The degree 
of "understanding" will depend on the emotional, intellectual and 
practical gifts of respective persons, and some will attain to in- 
finitely higher knowledge than others, but the nature of the under- 
standing is the same in the case of all, and there are no two ways 
to God, the mystic and the ordinary. If the beginning of the 
Christian life is the entering on a life of unrestricted fellowship 
with a loving forgiving Father, then that communion is bound to be 
mystical communion, because there is no other way of describing 
communion with an unseen spiritual Personality such as God is. 
And this too is how communion with God and Christ is described by 
Jesus, by St. Paul and St. John.
Mysticism is only the attitude which the mind or soul adopts 
when it endeavours to hola converse with the unseen, and it is com- 
mon to every age and climate and race. Pure mysticism is pure 
pantheism, but Christian mysticism is only to be found in the 
Christian religion, and what determines and necessitates that mystic 
communion in the Christian religion is the fact of God's love in 
Christ. A religion which comes into existence out of such facts 
as the Cross of Christ, can only exist ondihs basis of communion and 
fellowship; fellowship is its foundation and in this connection we 
shall again quote Professor H. R. Mackintosh. He says; (op. cit., 
p.255) "The supreme secret of goodness which carries all else with- 
in/
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within itself, is, of-course the new fellowship with God on which 
the pardoned man has entered. This of itself makes him a new per- 
son, and turns the world he inhabits into a new and astonishing 
hopeful place. To be in filial contact with the Father has once 
and for all abolished the painful and disabling solitude of the 
moral conflict; it affords the certainty of an inwara presence by 
which moral weakness will be sustained, because the deepest springs 
of joy have been unsealed. I feel that at this point our thoughts 
about God cannot be too human. Every great friendship is felt by 
us as a fount of animating and uplifting power, and the first ques- 
tion we ask regarding a person of uncertain or immature character is 
whether he has good friends, whose stronger nature will fortify and 
inspirit his efforts to be brave and true, and the most important 
thing about the forgiven man, from the standpoint of ethics, is just 
that his eyes have been opened to the amazing truth that God is his 
friend, who can be trusteu never to let him down. Whatever his tem- 
ptations, whatever the weakness bequeathed by previous failure, Goa 
is still there, unchanging infaithful as well as in enacting string- 
ency of precept, so that never again need he face alone the onset of 
evil. That friendship, that communion, that overshadowing presence, 
whatever be the theological terms used for its designation - have 
changed his moral prospects utterly. For the first time he has 
learned from Jesus, most of all from His passion, what God is, and 
is for him; and the perception has recreated him in moral being".
The above quotation amply supports the view of religion set 
forth/
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forth in these pages as originating and developing out of communion 
or fellowship with God, for fellowship with Goa is "the secrst of 
goodness which carries all else before it". So vital is the import- 
ance of fellowship that "the first question we ask regarding a per- 
son of uncertain or premature character is whether he has good friena 
The truth of this remark is borne out by the evidence of experts in 
Criminology who say that if there is any hope of improvement for a 
discharged prisoner it is by some good person like the Court Sister 
becoming his friend. As long as he is so stationed that the friend- 
ship can continue the discharged prisoner resists temptation and 
makes progress, but as soon as circumstances compel him to lose 
touch with his friend, he falls back again. Moreover the friend- 
ship with God as described in the above quotation is of the most 
intimate and real kind. It is a fellowship with regard to which 
"our thoughts about God cannot be too human", a fellowship in which 
God is "an inward presence" as well as "an overshadowing presence". 
Now such a fellowship as this makes communion with God necessarily 
mystical if it is to have any depth or reality at all, for there is 
no other manner of communion possible with a spiritual personality 
except mystic communion, and it is essentially of the same nature 
whether it is found in the most ordinary believer or in Santa Teresa 
or in St. Paul. But they each have it in their own measure accord- 
ing to their capacity to receive and their diligence in keeping up 
the fellowship. Our conclusion then, is that ordinary Christian 
communion is not something outside and lower than mystic communion, 
but that all real communion with Goa is necessarily mystical, and 
the/
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the communion is first caused by the'love"of Gol revealeu. in the for- 
giveness of sins through Christ.
Before we pass on from this question we shall briefly apply to 
it the conception of love which we have been developing all along to 
see whether there are two ways to God through Christ or not, the 
mystical and the ordinary. We saw that the essence of the nature of 
God is love, and that the essence of human nature also is love, which 
is the core of personality. What personality, therefore, requires 
for its integration, development and perfection, is love. Person- 
ality is integrated, developed and perfected only as love finds sway 
in the life; it is disintegrated as love is contracted by finding 
unworthy objects, and what every personality needs is that that love 
be transferred to the supreme object of love, namely, the love of 
God, which finds supreme expression in the Cross of Christ. This is 
what wakens and generates love in the individual. "We love Him be- 
cause He first loved us". And this love has to be maintained alive 
and operative in each life by fellowship, otherwise it will languish, 
and die, and get transferred to worldly objects, in which case the 
early promises are not realised, the first love is lost, and dis- 
integrationof personality by degrees is the inevitable result. 
There are, therefore, no two ways to God through Christ, one for the 
unemotional, practical, unimaginative Christian, and another for the 
more emotional, more spiritual or psychical. Personality of what- 
ever "make-up" requires love for its Integration, development and 
perfection. Some, it is true, require more friendship than others, 
and make great demands on, and exhaust, their friends, just because 
they/
351.
they need it more, while others are more independent. But no hu- 
man being whose nature was meant to "be developed by love can do with- 
out the love of God in Christ, diligently sought and maintained by 
means of a life of communion with God, and, as was said already the 
communion, if it has any depth or reality at all, is mystical. And 
it has to have depth, if it is going to be effective at all. As 
Mrs. Herman says in another connection*, (op. cit., p. 66) "No genuine 
spiritual height can ever be attained along the path of the average. 
It is in our steady ana unremitting struggle with the average that 
our salvation lies - to conform to the average is to lose one's 
soul". The philosopher said: "Cogito ergo sum", but the Christian 
says: "diligo ergo sum". This is why Jesus said; "A new commandment 
I give unto you that ye love one another", and St. Paul said: "the 
greatest of these is love", because love is creative and there can 
be no growth or expansion or depth in personality without love. And 
St. John says: (l Jn. 4-7)"everyone that loveth is born of God, and 
knoweth God", love not simply to God and to friends, but love without 
limit and in all directions to all persons, is what makes the crea- 
ture come to full development and makes him like his Creator. And 
moreover it is love that brings the believer knowledge of God ac- 
cording to the above verse and not any psychic gift.
Having answered the question as to whether ordinary communion 
is the same as mystic communion we shall next enquire what relation 
ordinary mystic communion has with that stage of mysticism where 
visions and locutions are seen and heard, and to the further extreme 
stage where trance and eestasy are experienced. It is only possible 
here/
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here to refer to the problem in the briefest manner. It is the 
presence of these phenomena in Christian mysticism that has made it 
to be suspected and to be regarded by eminent scholars as alien to 
Christianity.
So far our argument has been that mysticism is a natural pheno- 
menon common to every age, race and country, to all humanity in fact, 
 whenever they attempt to have communion with God. All mysticism, 
except Christian mysticism, therefore, is of the same nature and its 
division into a milder and extreme type as proposed by Professor 
Pratt does not serve any useful purpose, and is quite arbitrary. 
We maintain, then, that the only real division of mysticism is into 
Christian and non-Christian. Some theologians recommend tfre divi- 
sion between mysticism of absorption and ordinary mysticism, but the 
division into Christian and non-Christian is more correct as it in- 
cludes the division between mysticism of absorption and ordinary 
mysticism, because Christianity with its emphasis on personality 
both human and divine as well as onthe transcendence and imminence 
of God which are the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and of the 
Holy Spirit respectively, "eo ipso" makes absorption illogical and 
impossible, True Christianity, therefore, informs, regulates and 
sets the limits to mysticism, which otherwise would be without any 
norm or guide in seeking communion with God, and, therefore liable 
to all kinds of dangerous extravagances, excesses and errors. 
"Pure mysticism", as Von Hugel says, "is pure pantheism". It is 
a voyage of adventure on an uncharted sea.
The division into Christian and non-Christian, therefore, ought 
to/
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to be the first starting-point on any treatment of mysticism, and. it 
is the failure to make this distinction onthe part of exponents of 
mysticism that is the cause of so much misunderstanding with regard 
to it, and consequently so much opposition to it, on the part of emi- 
nent theologians, because when this distinction is not clearly made 
Christian mysticism is confused with non-Christian mysticism which 
brings Christian mysticism into undeserved dispute. When this dis- 
tinction IB nc-t made Christian mysticism of the Dark Ages which was 
half Christian and half pagan, rivalling that of the Yogi and the 
Sufi was taken as the true type of Christian mysticism, whereas the
«
mysticism of the Middle Ages is in very important respects different 
from the highest form of Christianity of to-day, which is the very 
fact that would make the greatest difference between Christian and 
Non-Christian mysticism, for what makes the difference in mysticism 
is the objective reality with which it is concerned, the view of 
G-od, man and nature which is entertained. All forms of Christianity 
throughout history have not been equally Christian; the mysticism 
of the Roman Catholic Church was very different from that of the 
Protestant Church of the Reformation, and again from that of the 
Cambridge Platonists, and mysticism approximates normal spiritual 
experience according as it gets informed by the Spirit of Christ, 
who is the norm, "the way", to the Father. Mysticism alone does 
not conduct mankina to the Father but only to the Absolute, to Pan- 
theism, and absorption, and a depersonalised absolute has been 
proved by the religions that entertain it to have little saving 
effect upon personality. If mysticism alone could have shewn us 
the/
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the Father then the Incarnation would have been superfluous. But 
Christ assures us that He is the Way and the only Way to the Father, 
and He guides mankind to the Father simply by shewing Himself, as He
*
said: "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father", and, "I and the 
Father are one". Whenever Christ is fully presented, mankind finds 
in Him the Absolute as St. Peter did, and St. Paul, and St. John, and 
the early Church did, and the Reformed Church, and again the Church 
of the present day. But when Christ is obscured and He becomes an 
ecclesiastic or something else, the way to the Father is immediately 
obscured and all sorts of mystic vagaries begin, with which intel- 
ligent people will have nothing to do.
What is necessary, therefore, in order to commend communion 
with God in Christ to the present generation, and to the world, is 
to shew that the gift of communion with God in Christ through the 
Spirit is the very gift which Christianity has brought to all man- 
kind, whosoever cares to ask it, as Professor Mackintosh has shewn 
above, and it is this fellowship with God stripped of its archaic 
trappings, and pagan associations, and displayed in its simplicity 
and naturalness, as it was in the life of Christ that is the only 
power which is going in any age to revive and restore spiritual 
religion by giving to people first-hand personal experience of what 
the religion of Christ can be. That Christ conceived of communion 
with Himself as the "sine qua non" of the life which He came to give 
to the world, is shown by the fact of His institution of a rite which 
is intended to perpetuate that communion until He come, for the 
church can never by any higher wisdom outgrow the necessity of this 
communion, because it is the only way of enlightening the mind in the 
knowledge/
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knowledge of God, of energising the will, and expanding personality 
all which are only possible through, a fellowship of love such as we 
have in Christ.
It is, therefore, of incalculable harm if this communion which 
is only the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and of 
"Christ in us", and of "fellowship with the Father, and with His 
Son Jesus Christ", of the New Testament, is so confused with non- 
Christian mysticism or imperfect forms of Christian mysticism, that 
eminent theologians principally those of the Ritschlian School, con- 
demn mysticism as alien to Christianity. The reason of their con-o 
demnation is due to the fact that the experts fail to distinguish 
real Christian mysticism from non-Christian mysticism, and the fail- 
ure to make the distinction is fatal to their presentation of mysti- 
cism, because they fail to demonstrate the difference between the 
supposed indwelling of an imaginary conception like Brahma or Allah 
and the indwelling of Christ through the Spirit. This ought to have 
been the beginning, middle and ending of their exposition, but as we 
have seen, none of these experts, neither Baron Von Hugel, nor Dean 
Inge, nor Miss Underhill, nor any of the exponents of mysticism have 
m£de clear that Christianity has introduced a mysticism which is pos- 
sible for all, safe for all, and necessary for all believers. In- 
stead of this the way in which their presentation of mysticism is or- 
ientated has the unfortunate and baneful effect of making it like 
non-Christian mysticism dependent on a psychic gift, because it is 
only the psychic who attempt it,but what even the non-Christian psy- 
chic could not attain, every Christian believer/
believer can attain by the revelation of Christ, for no non-Christian 
mystic ever obtained a vision of God the Father, but only of an ima- 
ginary Absolute. The revelation of Christ immediately makes the be- 
liever into a mystic; "behold he prayeth" was the immediate effect 
of his conversion on St. Paul, as well as his retirement into Arabia 
and his lifelong effort to realise the presence of Christ through 
fellowship with His sufferings; and it would be inconceivable if the 
result of such facts as we have in the Incarnation, Cross, Resurrect- 
ion, and High Priestly Intercession of Christ, were to yield anything 
else but a religion whose essence was to be spiritual communion with 
God in Christ.
That we are falsely accusing the friends of mystic or spiritual 
religion of being its worst enemies may be understood from the fact 
that the best theologians do not yet believe that the experts have 
made out a clear case for mysticism, and their failure we have seen 
is due to two cardinal mistakes: the first is that they do not suf- 
ficiently differentiate Christian from non-Christian mysticism which 
has the effect of making them appear keener on their mysticism than 
on their Christianity; we "advisedly say "sufficiently" because 
there is a differentiation at points, but it is not sufficiently clear 
to make the ordinary reader see where the centre of gravity lies, or 
what the real truth about mysticism is: the second cardinal mistake 
is that of making communion with God depend on a psychic gift. 
These two great mistakes have defeated the objects of the exponents 
of mysticism in commending Christianity as essentially a religion of 
spiritual mystical communion, and this task still remains to be accom 
piished/
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accomplished and it constitutes the great need of the Church in 
every age, for no Church can be spiritually alive without spiritual 
experience which means spiritual enlightenment and spiritual or 
moral or religious power, and the very persons who could give us this 
exposition of Christianity are the above authorities on mysticism 
themselves and what they would require to do in order to give us a 
true picture of Christian communion would be to put the emphasis on 
the difference between Christian and non-Christian mysticism or com- 
munion, in which case the word mysticism as applied to Christian 
communion would tend to disappear as the meaning is sufficiently 
conveyed by the name, "Christian communion", and then communion 
would appear as the greatest gift of God to man, and tae natural goal 
of the human spirit, through which the highest gifts of G-od come to 
mankind.
In case we may appear to Judge the protagonists of mysticism on 
insufficient evidence, and, as it is a question of the utmost import- 
ance whether religion of spiritual communion is only for psychic 
people alone, as they^allege, it will clarify our position if we ex- 
amine the account of Christian mysticism given by one of them, namely
 
that given by Dean Inge in his "Christian Mysticism" (London, Methuen
6th Ed. 1925). To begin jvith, he gives a definition of mysticism
which appears to apply more to non-Christian mysticism than to
Christian mysticism, although the title of his book is "Christian
/ 
Mysticism", and, as there is no other definition of mysticism except
this/
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this one given by the author in his book, it is clear that this def- 
inition is intended to describe Christian mysticism also. The 
same definition is made to serve for Christian and non-Christian 
mysticism alike and nowhere in the book is it made clear what the 
essential difference is between Christian and non-Christian mysticism 
The definition is also exceedingly long which is another sign of ob- 
scurity of thought, but we reproduce it "in toto" as we wish to ex- 
amine it in detail. He says: (op. cit., pp.4-6) "The phase of 
thought or feeling which we call Mysticism has its origin in that 
which is the raw material of all religion, and perhaps of all philo- 
sophy and art as well, namely, that dim consciousness of the beyond, 
which is part of our nature as human beings. Men have given differ- 
ent names to these "obstinate questionings of sense and outward 
things". We may call them, if we will, a sort of higher instinct, 
perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary process; or an extension 
of the frontier of consciousness; or,in religious language, the voice 
of God speaking to us. Mysticism arises when we try to bring this 
higher consciousness into relation with the other contents of our 
minds. Religious Mysticism may be defined as the attempt to real- 
ise the presence of the living G-od in the soul, and in nature, or,
more generally, as the attempt to realise in thought and feeling, the
^_ 
imminence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in th£
temporal. Our consciousness of the beyond is, I say, the raw ma- 
terial of all religion, but being itself formless, it cannot be 
brought directly into relation with the forms of our thought. 
Accordingly, it has to express itself by symbols, which are as it 
were/
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were the flesh ana bones of ideas. It is the tendency of all sym- 
bols to petrify or evaporate, and either process is fatal to them. 
They soon repudiate their mystical origin, and forthwith lose their 
religious content. Then comes a return to the fresh springs of the 
inner life - a revival of spirituality in the midst of formalism or 
unbelief. This is the historical function of mysticism - it appears 
as an independent active principle, the spirit of reformations and 
revivals. But since every active principle must find for itself 
appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed a speculative and 
practical system of its own. As Goethe says, it is "the scholastic 
of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings". In this way, it be- 
comes possible to consider it as a type of religion, though it must 
always be remembered that in becoming such, it has incorporated ele- 
ments which do not belong to its inmost being".
Now in criticism of the above definition we remark that to say 
that mysticism is "that dim consciousness of the beyond, which is 
part of our nature as human beings" and "has its origin in the raw 
material of all religion, and perhaps of all philosophy and art as 
well", does not tell much that is definite about mysticism!; all that 
it iaplies is that it is a consciousness of there being a reality be- 
yond what we actually see which is characteristic of the thought of 
all people civilised and uncivilised alike, so that mysticism in 
this sense is only another synonym for consciousness. For the pur- 
pose of a definition the above sentence is useless, being exceedingly 
vague, and obscure, the reason being that in his treatment of mysti- 
cism the writer has no definite landmarks, so he makes mysticism be- 
gin/
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begin where everythings else begins, namely, "all religion, all phil- 
osophy and art". The truth of this cannot be denied,but it adds 
nothing to our information about mysticism.
Next, the definition tells us that mysticism is "a sort of 
higher instinct, perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary pro- 
cess; or an extension of the frontier of consciousness". Here we 
have the main fallacy of the champions of mysticism namely, that it 
is due to psychic endowment such as "a higher instinct", or "an 
extension of the frontier of consciousness" whatever that may mean 
psychologically. If this is mysticism, then it is not a thing for 
the normal person, but only for the person with a psychic gift, and, 
if that is so, then it is not Christian mysticism; the description 
may apply to non-Christian mysticism and to certain cases of Christ- 
ian mysticism,but not to Christian mysticism which is the theme of 
the writer. Christian mysticism as we saw above, is not limited to 
a few cases who possess a higher instinct, or an extension of the 
frontier of consciousness, but it is a possibility for all believers, 
and this all important fact ought to be acknowledged in the defini- 
tion of mysticism in a book which professes to deal with Christian 
mysticism. But the definition does not from start to finish mention 
the name of Christ or Christianity which conclusively shows that to 
the writer it is not the fact of Christ that is vital to Christian 
mysticism, but the above psychic endowments; that is to say,the
writer does not consider the objective factor or determinant in /nysti-
\ 
cisra, but only the subjective factor.
This neglect of the objective factor is still more obvious in 
his next sentence which says that "Mysticism arises when we try to 
bring this higher consciousness into relation with the other contents 
of/
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of our mind". What the mental process implied in this statement is, 
it is rather difficult to understand, and yet we are told it is the 
moment out of which mysticism arises. But though it does not seem 
to convey much meaning it is clear that it is a purely subjective
process, and shows that the writer so far has failed to realise that 
mysticism has to be defined with reference to the objective reality 
with which it is engaged, as well as by the subjective factor.
This subjectiveness would seem to be corrected in the sentence 
immediately following the above in which he says: "religious mysti- 
cism may be defined as the attempt to realise the presence of the 
living God in the soul and in nature, or, more generally as the 
attempt to realise, in thought and feeling, the imminence of the 
temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal". Now 
here the objective reality of God is for the first time referred to, 
whereas our idea of mysticism is that it arises whenever the attempt 
is made to have communion with God, which is the definition of non- 
Christian mysticism: and the definition of Christian mysticism 
would be the effort to have communion with Goo. in Christ, and, there- 
fore, the objective reality of God ought to come into the definition 
right at the beginning, but up till now the writer lias been occupied 
with subjective processes which are so obscure as to be well-nigh 
unintelligible, which gives the impression that mysticism is a kind 
of mental gymnastics produced inside the mind. And, when the writer 
does introduce the objective fact of God at this stage, it is in such 
a way as to convey the impression, not of communion with divine per- 
sonality which mysticism ought to be, but of a subjective process 
inside/
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inside the mind, for, "the attempt to realise the presence of the 
living God in the soul and in nature" is more suggestive of the doc- 
trine of deification in the one case, and of nature-worship in the 
other, than of communion with God. We do not attempt to realise 
the presence of God in nature which is Pantheism, but the contempla- 
tion of nature leads us to the thought of God; nor do we simply 
look into our souls to find God there, which would not be communion 
with God but a subjective mental process. Moreover "the attempt to 
realise inthought and feeling, the imminence of the temporal in the 
eternal, and of the eternal inthe temporal," might be a description 
of philosophy or metaphysics, but not of religion, much less of com- 
munion with God, and still less communion with God in Christ, so 
that this is neither a definition of Christian mysticism nor even of 
non-Christian mysticism.
The absence of the objective factor is still more glaringly evi- 
dent in his next sentence where he says: "our consciousness of the 
beyond is, I say, the raw material of all religion, but being itself 
formless, it cannot be brought directly into relation with the forms 
of our thought. Accordingly it has to express itself by symbols". 
Now formless consciousness seems to be nothing more than mental vac- 
uity which is the result, when there is no objective reality present 
to consciousness, and there are only subjective processes to be con- 
sidered. A formless consciousness is a consciousness without con- 
cepts, or thought of any kind. What he means is a consciousness of 
God which is not expressible in words, but only in symbols; but such 
a consciousness is not formless, because it has the definite idea 
that/
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that God is there. The writer has two concluding chapters on 
"Nature-mysticism and Symbolism" aa if we had mysticism wherever we 
had symbolism; but symbolism is not employed by mysticism alone, It 
is used in ordinary secular life as well, so that we are treated to 
all this vagueness,because the writer fails to realise that mysti- 
cism itself is subjectively nothing except the ordinary consciousness 
attuned to communion, and that what determines the nature of mysti- 
cism is the objective reality with which it is concerned whether the 
Absolute, or the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is on this 
basis alone that mysticism can be defined, as it varies indefinitely 
with its conception of God.
Finally, he says: ''But since every active principle must find 
for itself appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed a specu- 
lative and practical system of its own. As Goethe- says, it is 
"the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings". In 
this way it becomes possible to consider it as a type of religion". 
Now it is this anxiety on the i part of its protagonists to regard 
mysticism as a type of religion different from ordinary Christianity, 
a more or less esoteric type of Christianity that rouses so much well 
deserved suspicion and opposition to it on the part of other theolo- 
gians. This differentiation into a separate type is, however, abso- 
lutely unnecessary as mystical communion Is nothing different from 
ordinary Christianity. Mysticism of any kind is essentially com- 
munion with G-od: nature-mysticism is communion with God through 
nature, philosophic mysticism is communion with the Absolute through 
philosophy, non-Christian mysticism is communion with God through 
some form of higher power or some ?orm of Absolute, and Christian 
mysticism/
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mysticism is communion with God through Christ.
Christianity as communion with Go a. in Christ through the Spirit 
is not a type of Christianity, but is the only Christianity we know.- 
Christianity as defined by Christ, by St. Paul ana by ot. John. In 
these days also there is no real Christianity without fellowship with 
(rod in Christ through the Spirit. It is only through this communion 
and fellowship that the blessings of God are imparted to believers, 
and their redemption worked out. The fellowship may be broken ana 
intermittent, but every believer if he knowt] anything, knows this as 
the first and indispensaole article of his faith, that the sundering 
veil is rent in twain and that a way has been opened by Christ into 
the Holiest of all, into the very presence of the Father. It is 
this faith, in fact, that has made him a Christian, and, without this 
faith, he could not very well be called a Christian, for the facts 
of the Incarnation, Cross, Resurrection ana. Priesthood of Christ, as 
was said already, are such as to make a life of fellowship or com- 
munion a "sine qua non" for the believer; such facts not only make 
communion possible, but such is the gift of G-od in Christ, that for 
the true believer it compels communion, and he is not happy unless he 
is endeavouring to preserve by habits of prayer and worship, as un- 
broken fellowship as possible, because the love of God constrains 
him to do so. His public worship may be a distracted enough affair, 
but, at any rate he has endeavoured as far as human conditions allow, 
to hold communion with the Father, and publicly to show his faith and 
gratitude to God in return for His unspeakable gift. His family 
worship also may be formal enough, but at least it has brought him, 
with his family for a brief moment into the presence of Goo. who daily 
loadeth them with His benefits, and that brief act of worship, thunks 
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thanksgiving and prayer, keeps heart and mind in the knowledge and 
love of God and of His Son Jesus Christ. But when he closes the 
door behind him and engages in private prayer on his own behalf and 
onthe behalf of others he has as real communion with God as any of 
the mystics. It may not be as deep, or as long, but it is not any- 
thing different in type from what we know the communion of the mys- 
tics to have been. But we would not call such a man a mystic, but 
only an ordinary Christian, or his religion a special type of Christ- 
ianity .
What then is the difference between the Christian mystic and 
an ordinary Christian? The difference seems to be, if anything, only 
a difference in decree, and the name Christian mysticism seems hard- 
ly necessary, as Christian communion expresses all that is required, 
so that, if we wish to preach to the world the necessity of deeper 
and more real communion with God, and of a more spiritual life, it 
is not necessary to tell them that this can only be achieved, by a 
type of religion called Christian mysticism. But this is what Dean 
Inge implies, for he says that, "since every active principle must 
find for itself appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed, a 
speculative and practical system of its own......in this way it be-
«
comes possible to consider it as a type of religion". Now mysticism 
is not a religion, but only a t phase of every religion, namely, the 
communion phase, which is the vital moment of every religion that 
possesses any vitality. The writer does not specify which mysticism 
he is referring to, but, as his book is on Christian mysticism, pre- 
sumably he is talking about Christian mysticism, and in that case his 
meaning/
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meaning is that Christian mysticism is a type of religion different 
from ordinary Christianity or ordinary Christian communion, because 
he says that it has"developed a speculative ana practical system of 
its own". Now this claim can be substantiates only if the prota- 
gonists of mysticism can produce for examination and comparison a 
substantial body of speculative andppractical theology which differs 
from ordinary Christian theology to such an extent that it is enti- 
tled to be called a distinct type of Christianity. But when we read 
the works of the mystics and their exponents, we do not find any such 
speculative or practical systems, but only what one would call ordi- 
nary Christian theology and practice. The emphasis of the mystics 
and their exponents is no doubt on communion andllife in the Spirit, 
but that is where the emphasis of Christianity ought always to have 
been, and always is, wherever Christianity exists in its genuine form 
This claim to being a distinct type of religion with a speculative 
and practical system of its own on the part of the experts in mys- 
ticism cannot be substantiated, and it is this claim to esotericity, 
uniqueness and peculiarity, that brings mysticism into disrepute, 
and with it the whole subject of spiritual communion with God, be- 
cause anyone who nowadays writes on communion with God, or preaches 
it, is suspected of being an infatuated dabbler in mysticism, who is 
trying to revive the Christianity of the Middle Ages, with the re- 
sult that most sane people avoid the subject of communion, with in- 
calculable loss to the cause of true religion.
There is, therefore, urgent need of a "magnum opus" on the sub- 
ject of communion, which would at the same time clarify the meaning 
of mysticism, for evidently the vaguest ideas exist about it. Above 
Dean Inge agrees with Goethe in calling mysticism "the scholastic of 
the/
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the heart, the dialectic of the feeling" which implies that mysticism 
is entirely concerned with the heart or feelings, and yet he calls 
this at the same time a type of religion , in which case it would be 
a religion of the feelings only, but such a religion could, not very 
well develops speculative and practical system of theology, as feel- 
ings are inarticulate and all we would have would, be "formless" 
speculation as he suggested above, whatever that may be, or symbol- 
ism, another word dear to supporters of mysticism because they en- 
deavour to find in it the roots of mysticiam.
The need for this clarification of the meaning of mysticism 
would be still more apparent if we were to review the twenty-six 
definitions, by different philosophers and theologians, reproduced 
by Dean Inge in Appendix A of his book. The lengthy definition of 
Dean Inge reiterates the mistakes contained In most of them, namely, 
that mysticism is due to a psychic gift, or faculty the soul in 
which God works immediately, or that it is a subjective process, or 
that it is symbolism. A few particularly emphasise the fact which 
we have been emphasising here, that mysticism always has an objective 
reference and arises only when man endeavours to hold communion with 
God. One of these is Professor Seth, who says: (op. cit., p.339) 
"It (mysticism) appears in connection with the endeavour of the hu- 
man rnind to grasp the Divine essence or the ultimate reality of 
things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the 
highest". Another of the same view-point is Lasson; he says: (op. 
cit., p.34-3) "Religion is^a relation of person to person, a life, 
which in its form is an analogy to the earthly, while its content is 
pure relation to the eternal. Dogmatic is the skeleton, mysticism
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is the life-blood of the Christian body". With this agrees Baron 
Von Hiagel, who says: ("Essays and Addresses" London, Dent, 1924, p. 130 
"All mysticism is mysticism, in proportion as it thus apprehends and 
cultivates Presence as the centre of religion". Thus mysticism is 
not merely subjective, but is objective as w-jll, and it does not 
arise except through the interaction of the divine reality and mind.
The most interesting and vital criticism of mysticism is by var- 
ious members of the Ritschlian School; Harnack, Herrman, and Kaftan 
who accuse mysticism of dispensing with Christ and history, and of 
substituting subjective delusions in their place. Their contention 
is, that true Christianity is faith in the historic Christ, and that 
in the historic Christ we have "a fact the contents of which is in- 
comparably richer than that of any feelings which arise within our- 
selves". This is perfeatly true, but a historic fact is of no val- 
ue to the individual, unless it is value for him, and value as we 
have seen is experienced first in the feelings, so that the feeling 
factor as well as the objective historic factor is necessary. The 
charge of the Ritschlians would be justified only, if the mystic main- 
tained that they owed their experiences not to Christ, but to feel- 
ings derived from some other source, but no mystic ever maintained 
this, instead, they always averred, as strongly as possible, that 
from first to last Christ was the author of all their experiences.
But the mystics may be accused of a contempt of dogmatic theo- 
logy and of institutionalism, which, however, is to a certain extent 
excusable, because most of them did not profess to be either expert 
theologians or expert historians, but only seekers after God.
With regard to the Ritschlians; Dean Inge writes: (op. cit. p, 
346) "They are neo-Kantians whose religion is an austere moralism,
/
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and who seem to regard Christianity as a primitive Puritanism,
 
spoiled by the Greeks, who brought into it their intellectual!sm 
and their sacramental mystics..........It (the Ritschlian view; en- 
tirely ignores the Pauline and Johan n:.: doctrine of the mystical 
union, according to which Christ is not "external" to the redeemed 
soul, and most assuredly can never "vanish" from it. Instead of 
the "Lo I am with you always" of our blessed Lord, we are referred 
to "history" - that is, primarily, the four Gospels confirmed by 
"a fifth" the united testimony of the first Christian community".
 
The above criticism has force because, in the case of the Kitsch- 
lians the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme of putting all the 
emphasis on the objective factor till they neglected altogether the 
subjective, but, though they carried their emphasis to such an ex- 
treme that it became untruth, the real meaning of their contention 
was much required as a corrective to the excessive subjectivism of 
mysticism, and their emphasis on the objective fact of Christ is 
still very much required at the present day, because all our labour 
from the beginning of this chapter has been to ahow that it is the 
objective factor, which gives rise to, and determines the nature of, 
mysticism, and consequently it is the objective factor of Christ 
which gives rise to Christian mysticism, and not any subjective psy- 
chic gift, and our emphasis on the objective factor is Justified 
when, as we have seen Dean Inge can write a lengthy definition of 
mysticism without once mentioning the name of Christ, while almost 
the whole of his definition is occupied with descriptions of the 
subjective processes involved in mysticism.
Before we leave Dean Inge's definition of mysticism, as a result 
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of which he aeclares that mysticism is entitled, to be regarded as 
a special type of religion, with a speculative ana practical system 
of its own, we shall reproduce his reason for so regarding it. They 
are contained, in a passage which immediate] j.' follows his definition. 
He says: (op. cit., p.6;"As a type of religion, then, mysticism seems 
to rest on the following propositions or articles of faith: - first 
the soul (as well as the body) can see ana perceive...... .V/e have an
organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, wnich, in 
its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensa- 
tion in theirs. The second proposition is that, since we can only 
know what is akin to ourselves, man, in order to know God., must be a 
partaker of the divine nature.......This brings us to the third pro- 
position - "without holiness no man may see the Lord".......There is
one more fundamental doctrine Which we must not omit. Purification 
removes the obstacles to our union with God, but our guide to the up- 
ward path, the true hlerophant of the mysteries of God, is love.....
The mystic, as we have seen makes it his life's aim to be transformed 
into the likeness of Him in whose image he was created. He loves to 
figure his path as a laader reaching from earth to heaven, which 
must be climbed step by step. This "scala perfectlonis" is generally 
divided into three stages. The first is called the purgative life, 
the second the illuminative, while the third, which is really the 
goal rather than a part of the journey, is callea the unitive life or 
state of perfect contemplation.
Now with the second, th:rd and fourth propositions, tuere can 
be little disagreement, as they are admitted on all hands to be arti- 
cles of the Christian faith, nanely, the existence of a aivine image 
in man, ana the necessity of holiness ana of love, for coviaunion wit'-i 
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Goo.. These three articles, then, do not make mysticism into a 
"type of religion" different from ordinary Christianity; it is the 
first of the four articles, therefore, that makes mysticism into a 
separate type of religion, and this irticle maintains that "we have 
an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which, 
in its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sen- 
sation in theirs". Here it is plainly admitted that mysticism is 
dependant on a mystic organ, or faculty or psychic endowment for the 
discernment of spiritual truth, and it is spoken of as singular, so 
that it is one particular organ or faculty. But when we enquire as 
to its nature, and how it is related to the other elements in mind 
what we find a little further on is a complete denial of any such 
organ or faculty. He says: (op. cit., p.19; "The mystic then, is 
not, as such, a visionary; nor has he any interest in appealing to 
a faculty "above reason", if reason is usea in its proper sense, as 
a logic of the whole personality". In the sa;ie way Mrs Herman after 
supplying two illustrations to show that mysticism is dependant on 
a special psychic endowment, contradicts this a little later on when 
she says: "Few modern writers are bold enough to argue for the 
existence of a separate mystic sense, different in kind from those 
faculties of the soul which the mystic shows with the rest of human- 
ity". The fact seerns to be that the exponents of mysticism, when 
they attempt to show that Christian mysticism is a type of religion 
different from ordinary Christian communion, have nothing to aaauce 
in support of their contention except this .ythical .nystic sense or 
faculty, or organ wriich they bring forward at tue beginning of their 
theory of mysticism to prove the uniqueness of u^stic experience, and 
its aiffernce from ordinary communion, but when they lenve their
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theory of mysticism, and come down to facts of experience, the theory 
of the mystic organ or faculty has to be abjured.
We conclude then, that a case for mysticism has not been made 
out, and that, therefore, Christian mysticism is not a "type of re- 
ligion" different from ordinary Christian communion, because -nothing 
substantial can be produced by the supporters of mysticism to prove 
their contention that in Christian mysticism we have something more 
than Christian communion. It is time then that the myth of mysti- 
cism was abandoned by its votaries so that they may turn their at- 
tention to giving us an untrammelled exposition of communion with 
God, as it is found in the Old and New Testaments, in the Psalms, in 
the life of Christ, in St. Paul, in St. John, and in history. In 
such an exposition the results of the comparative study of religions, 
of psychology, ethics and metaphysics, would be put under contri- 
bution in order to show that communion with God through Christ in 
the Spirit, is the natural goal of the human spirit, the only means 
by which human personality can come to complete development and self- 
realisation.
Dean Inge has a smaller work on "The Platonic Tradition in Eng- 
lish Religious Thought", (The Hulsean Lectures 1925-26, London, 
Longmans) The lectures are really a plea for religion as spiritual 
communion with God according to Pauline and Johannine theology. 
The title of the book might give the Impression that Plato had more 
to do with spiritual communion than Christ, and if, instead of this 
apologetic title the author had called it "Christian Communion", and 
used Plato to supply parallels, he would be more convincing and true 
to facts, but there is this propensity on the part of such writers to 
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regard ordinary Christian communion as not being "in the same street" 
with what they call mysticism, and so the title has to be "The rla- 
tonic Tradition"ihstead of "Christian Communion" to supply the eso- 
teric flavour.
In spite of this defect the author has very weighty statements 
to make about the necessity of regarding Christianity as a religion 
the essence of which is communion. In his preface he says: "It 
is as the religion of the spirit that I plead the cause of what I 
have called the Platonic tradition . Professor W. P. Paterson, in 
his excellent Gifford lectures on "The Nature of Religion", recent- 
ly published, says that "popular Christianity has never apprehended 
the spirituality of the Christian revelation". Again he says: 
(op. cit., p.27; "My point is that the religion of the spirit, that 
autonomous faith which rests upon experience and individual inspir- 
ation, has seldom had much of a chance in the world since the Christ- 
ian revelation, in which it received its full and final credentials. 
We may call it the Platonic tradition since the school of Plato end- 
ed by being completely dominant in the last age of classical anti- 
quity. We may venture to call it the true heir of the original 
Gospel, while admitting that no direct Hellenic influence can be 
traced in our Lord's teaching. We may confidently call it Pauline 
and Johannine Chlrstianity".
Thus when the author leaves the theory of mysticism behind, and 
comes to close quarters with facts, he is perfectly sound, ana admits 
that the essence of Pauline and Johannine theology is communion with 
God in Christ. With regard to Paulinism he says: fop. cit., p.3o; 
"The Paulinism of the Reformation is not a true interpretation of 
St. Paul's religion. The Apostle of the Gentiles is far better 
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understood now than in the days when an elaborate theology of a for- 
ensic type was built upon the Epistle to the Romans. Tae Christ- 
mysticism which is the heart of his personal faith is seen to be far 
more important for an understanding of his Christianity than his 
arguments about justification by faith and vicarious atonement". 
While one does not agree with the opposition between Christian mys- 
ticism and theology expressed above, because theology as well as ex- 
perience is indispensable, yet one welcomes the admission here that 
Christian mysticism or communion is simply ordinary Christianity and 
is not the preserve of an esoteric coterie. He sums up by saying; 
(op. cit., p.33) "My contention is that besides the combative Catho- 
lic and Protestant elements in the churches, there has always been a 
third element, with very honourable traditions, which came to life 
at the Renaissance, but really reaches back to the Greek Fathers, to 
St. Paul and St. John, ana further back still. The characteristics 
of this type of Christianity are a spiritual religion, based on a 
firm belief in absolute and eternal values as the most real things in 
the universe - a confidence that these values are knowable by man - 
a belief that they can nevertheless be known only by whole-hearted 
consecration of the intellect, will, and affections to the great 
guest - an entirely open mind towards the discoveries of science - 
a reverent and receptive attitude to the beauty, sublimity and wis- 
dom of the creation,, as a revelation of the mind and character of
r
the Creator - a complete indifference to the valuation of the world- 
ling. The Christian element is supplied mainly by the identif icatici 
of the inner light with the spirit of the living, glorified and in- 
dwelling Christ. This was the heart of St. Paul's religion, and it 
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has been the life-blood of personal devotion in all branches of the 
Christian Church to this day. In such a presentation of Christian- 
ity lies, I believe, our hope for the future!1
In this presentation of mystical Christianity we have nothing 
more than ordinary spiritual Christianity and one could easily sub- 
scribe to most of what is here presented as being the essence of 
Christianity, all except the mistakes of making spiritual communion 
into a type of Christianity like the combative Catholic and combative 
Protestant, these being so far deviations f ronuthe true form; Christ- 
ian communion is not merely a type of Christianity, it is the root 
out of which grows Christian theology and Christian ethics, "the 
way" out of which develops "the truth and the life". The second 
point to which we could not subscribe in the above presentation of 
Christianity is that Christian communion goes further back still 
past St. Paul and St. John. What we have past St. Paul and St. John 
is a different phase of communion, communion with the Absolute, a 
phenomenon parallel to, but vastly different from, Christian commun- 
ion with the Father, because the Cross stands at the parting of the 
ways in the history of religion, making from that point "all things 
new", especially communion with God, and, the presentation of Christ- 
ian communion that is going to make the future new, will place the 
Cross in such a relief and perspective at the centre of history that 
it will enlighten the past as well as the future instead of appearing 
to be a stage on the way of a process which began with Plato.
What is required then, is a presentation of Christianity as a 
spiritual or mystical religion which would give to mysticism a thor- 
ough airing in the clear sunlight, and render the word "mysticism" 
innocuous/
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innocuous as a term, making it synonymous with spiritual communion, 
without any esoteric implications. This view of Christianity we 
have arrived at from our conception of love as the essence of both 
human and divine personality. Unless communion was the essence of 
Christianity this love could not find expression or means of develop- 
ment, but Christianity is the divine plan for creating and developing 
this love in human beings,and this is done by communion inspired by 
the continual vision of the love of God in Christ. Whatever the 
mistakes have been in the theory of the Christian mystics of the past 
as regards spiritual communion, they have made no mistake with regard 
to love being the essence of that communion, and it is here they 
score and become our teachers, and the love the best of them aimed 
at was a love which expressed itself in acts, and one of the ways in 
which the church of the future will be able to propagate this love, 
is by inculcating the pricelessness of acts of ordinary human kind- 
ness and sympathy in the ordinary affairs of life, by showing that 
such acts of ordinary human love and sympathy are, as Christ, St. Paul 
and St. John showed them to be, essentially the same as the love of 
God, and that "he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God". The 
parable of the Talents, of the Judgment and of the Good Samaritan 
shew that what is wanted is a big balance of good works in proportion 
to our gifts, that it is impossible to forgive those who have no good 
acts to their credit, and that even individual small isolated acts 
also are of eternal value. And there were none who were more insis- 
tent on the supremacy of love than the Old Testament prophets, but 
they used for it other terms, namely, "mercy", subjectively, and 
"righteousness" /
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righteousness", objectively. And the supreme truth that the Old 
and New Testament alike teach, is that it rests with tae will of man 
to realise or neglect this love.
The truth of this contention with regard to the supremacy of 
love may be further demonstrated from the physical effects of love. 
For instance, medical science tells us that the function of love is 
anabolic, and that of hate catabolic. That is to say, love is p.-;/ 
proved to build up the physical constitution as well as spiritual 
personality, whereas, for example, fits of blind anger, which are 
poles apart from the sacred tempered thing we call righteous indig- 
nation, are known to cause a discharge of adrenalin poison through 
the system which impairs physical as well as spiritual well-being, 
whilst, on the other hand, love controls the vital processes at 
the centre and fountain-head of being, and enables body and spirit 
to function naturally, and at their best.
Love, therefore is the original force that sustains in well- 
being, body as well as spirit, just as it is this force in the na- 
ture of the Godhead that has brought all things into being and sus- 
tains them in being. And, what love and hate respectively perform 
in the human body and life, they also perform on a proportionally 
larger scale in the body politic, in the life of society, and in the 
life of nations. This catabolic effect of hate is seen most clear- 
ly in the aftermath of a war like the last world war.
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Chapter X
A RECAPITULATION AND VINDICATION
In this concluding chapter an effort will be made to gather 
up the results of our investigation so as to coordinate its main 
ideas into one constructive argument, which will be used in the 
second part of the chapter for the purpose of a final vindication 
of our theory of the religious consciousness against what is its 
most formidable opponent, namely, the theory of the religious con- 
sciousness propounded by Kant and accepted uncritically by so many 
of his followers down to the present day.
All the results obtained so far have been preparing us for this 
final vindication of our thesis, the thesis that feeling is prim- 
ordial and regulative in consciousness, and, therefore, also in the 
religious consciousness which we maintain, is the most fundamental 
part of consciousness, and not the ethical part, as Kant and his 
followers maintain. If our theory proves effective in demonstrating 
the falsity of this Kantian position, we shall have supplied still 
further corroboration of the fundamental soundness of our theory.
Some writers regard Kant as the profoundest of all psychologists 
others regard him as no psychologist at all. But the fact is that 
Kant had very little need of psychology or investigation into the 
nature of mind, because he found all the psychology he wanted in the 
categorical/
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categorical imperative, the moral sense of duty. This was the 
foundation of all his philosophy and theology. The sense of duty 
was to him the foundation of the moral life, and the moral life 
again was the foundation of the religious life.
But, because we refuse to admit that religion is ancillary to 
morality, or an appendix to morality, we have been in the present 
thesis compelled to seek for the foundation of mind somewhere else 
than in the consciousness of right and wrong, namely, in the region 
of feeling where the religious feeling par excellence evinces it- 
self as a feeling of dissatisfaction with all created things includ- 
ing the categorical imperative,and a desire for communion with God.
This purpose led us, in the first place, to examine minutely 
the nature of consciousness, and the attempt was made to prove that 
feeling was primordial in mind. Some test examples were taken, and 
it was shown that theories like those of Ward, Hoffding, and Gallo- 
way, who put cognition or conation first, landed their theories in 
serious and palpable contradictions.
Then, having, as it were, isolated the element of feeling, and 
having indicated its nature and function, we submitted it to a more 
minute examination by taking two test examples, one at the beginning 
of modern psychology and one more recent, namely, Schleiermacher and 
Hocking. This examination disclosed the very elusive nature of 
feeling, and how difficult it is to explain even for a great psycho- 
logist like Schleiermacher, who albeit he is amply aware of its 
fundamental nature, yet fails to give any definite intelligible 
account/
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account of it, "because the net- result of his examination is to re- 
duce feeling to absolute indefinlteness or nothingness. Hocking on 
the other hand who is equally alive to the primary nature of feeling, 
the regulative role of which he dilates on in eloquent terms, failing 
to find an ultimate explanation thereof, turns an intellectual somer- 
sault, as it were, and finds that feeling which he had been pursuing 
all the time is, strange to tell, the same as "idea".
Having indicated, therefore, in contradiction to the above 
authorities, what we considered the real nature of feeling in relatio 1 
to the other states of consciousness we proceeded to seek for con- 
firmation of our theory by a consideration of the explanation of 
mind offered by the "instinct psychology" a region of study from 
which a great deal of most valuable information about mind has been 
gleaned, information regarding the origin and nature of mind, its 
structure and primitive workings. All this information the Kantian 
student regards as superfluous because he has found the ultimate 
truth about mind in the categorical imperative.
From this study, then, was elicited the fact which amply con- 
firmed our theory that instincts originate from a feeling of want or 
need on the part of the organism. This need compels it to emerge 
out of itself to find in the environment outside that which can satis 
fy its needs within. This feeling for something outside, results 
in awareness or cognition as a result of contact with external 
reality. This cognition or contact thereupon produces a reaction 
or conation appropriate to, or depending upon, the nature of that 
object, and so the experience continues and progresses Instincts, 
then/
then, are formed as a result of the reactions of the organism towards 
particular events, situations, or objects in the external environment 
the nature of the instincts thus formed depending upon the specific 
nature of the element in the environment which causes them. In- 
stincts, therefore, witness to the fact of, and nature of external 
reality as well as .to the nature and function of mind itself. If, 
then, it could be shown that there was a religious instinct, the 
conclusion would follow that there was an objective spiritual 
reality, in contact with which the religious instinct had emerged. 
It was found that no one particular instinct could be singled out 
as being the specifically religious one, and this result was hardly 
to be expected, but it was pointed out that just as there are sever- 
al senses required for the apprehension of physical reality, and 
there are again several instincts engaged in the apprehension of 
ethical truth, so there may be several instincts involved in the 
apprehension of religious reality, and it was pointed out that the 
instincts of love, fear, awe, self-effacement and sociableness 
might well be considered as most of those that combine to form the 
religious consciousness.
As a result of our study of the instincts, three facts emerged 
that were emphasised as being of special value to our main purposes, 
firstly, the primary part played by feeling in the formation of the 
Instincts, secondly, the fact that the nature of the Instincts wit- 
nessed to the nature of external reality, thirdly, the fact that the 
instincts were evolved during the process of evolution of the race, 
and/
and were thus inherited by each one and formed the basis of the 
sentiments of the individual. Thus instincts were founi to be 
feeling responses to specific aspects of reality which emerged 
during the process of evolution.
This result, again, led us to examine the nature of the senti- 
ments to see what evidence they supplied of the nature of conscious- 
ness, and it was discovered that sentiments were built on the found- 
ation of the instincts and were feeling complexes that formed round 
specific objects, situations, and events in the environment. The 
feeling complex or sentiment in each case was toned in a manner char- 
acteristic of that particular object round which it formed, so that 
the sentiment witnessed to the nature of the objective reality to 
which it referred. So, then, if it could be shown that there was 
a specifically religious sentiment or sentiments their presence would 
prove that there was some divine reality by which they were evoked. 
Here again we were encouraged by finding that leading psychologists 
admitted the existence of a self-sentiment and an altruistic senti- 
ment. Our theory however, led us to emend this classification of 
the psychologists by adding to the above two sentiments the religious 
sentiment which certainly does exist, and forms round the idea of 
God, as the history of religions amply proves. There is hardly a 
race anywhere which has not got a religious sentiment that is evolved 
by the idea of divinity.
The religious sentiment,, therefore, points to the existence of 
an objective reality which is the cause of it, and so the next part 
of/
of our task was to investigate the religious sentiment itself, in 
order to elicit therefrom information regarding the nature of the 
religious object. This was done by an examination of the religious 
consciousness offered by Professor Otto, and it was found that it was 
proved conclusively by Otto that a religious sentiment exists consis- 
ting of several allied sentiments. Otto's result however, was shown 
to be vitiated, and rendered almost nugatory by a wrong metaod of 
investigation whereby he failed to take account of the progressive 
development of the religious sentiment or religious knowledge, from 
the initial vague indefinite instinctive groping for the Divine, to 
more and more refined intimations thereof as experience developed. 
A clear description of these sentiments from their crude beginning 
through all their progressive stages to its most refined manifesta- 
tion would afford so far proof that a ctivine reality exists, be- 
cause sentiment is not "mere sentiment" but is an Implicit of feeling 
thought, and will, and thus the reality with which the sentiment is 
concerned in each case undergoes the threefold test of these three 
elements in mind, so that if a sentiment persists from the beginning 
of life to the end acquiring more and more strength, clarity, and 
power to influence the life, then, that persistence is so far proof 
of the reality of the object of that sentiment and its progressive 
self-revelation to the mind of man. Thus the work of Otto while it 
failed to present the phenomenon of the religious sentiment in its 
historical development - the task on which Ernst Troeltsch was en- 
gaged - still his investigation had one result of supreme importance 
for the argument of the present chapter, namely, his inexpugnable 
proof/
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proof of the existence of a religious sentiment as distinct from 
the ethical sentiments, a conclusion that Kant would, deny, ana Kant- 
ians spend much time and labour in refuting. This contention, how- 
ever, is the very core of the argument of this thesis, namely, that 
the Divine is apprehended in a different way from that in which our 
sense of duty, or the nature of physical reality is apprehended.
Further it was pointed out that Otto did the cause of religion 
a real disservice in endeavouring to prove that religion is independ- 
ent of morality. His unhistorical method helped him to do this with 
an appearance of success which at first sight seems splendid, but 
which on reflection produces profound disbelief in that part of his 
contention. Otto, then, fails to show how the relgious sentiment, 
in the course of its development, presses morality into its service 
for the realisation of its own ends. The result is* that he reauces 
the number of genuinely religious people in the world to a few seers 
and diviners with an inherited psychic gift. Otto failed to real- 
ise that the relation of morality to religion is not separation but 
subordination. Religion comes into play at all Just because the 
human consciousness cannot find permanent satisfaction in mere moral- 
ity. Then, when religion has found its goal in the vision of God, 
morality also is transformed and finds its goal in and through reli- 
gion, Morality by itself has no goal; it can only find its goal 
through religion, and its goal and function in the economy of things 
is to enable religion to attain its goal. Here, it is worth assert- 
ing as clearly as possible that there is only one goal to life, not 
two, and it is attained through religion by the help of morality. 
In attempting, therefore, to show that religion is independent of 
morality/
morality Otto did the cause of religion harm. He should have been 
content with showing that religion was different from morality 
though dependent on it for the realisation of its own end.
The positive evidence from Otto's work bearing on this argument 
with regard to feeling went to show that our intimations of divinity 
come to us mostly by means of feelings of various kinds, thus proving 
that feeling is a positive phase of mind in which reason and will are 
also latent and ready to serve if required, but the divine reality is 
of such a nature as to be felt easier than described. Here it is 
desirable to m,ake another strong assertion with regard to feeling, 
namely, that feeling is as positive and practical a phase of mind as 
reason or will, but it deals with a phase or moment of reality with
*
which these two cannot deal. We saw that there were five kinas of 
feelings enumerated by Ward, and we could name four more which he 
did not mention, namely, instinct, intuition, sentiment, ana inter- 
est or meaning or value. These latter four are halfway between 
feeling and cognition, so that feeling is not blind, but is also 
cognitive in its own way. Of the above four, sentiment and value 
are on the same intellectual level and practically connote the same 
thing. But though the three irreducible phases of mind intermingle 
to a certain degree yet each of them deals with a moment of reality 
with which the others cannot deal. Thus it is the function of 
feeling to bring cognition and will into operation. In the same 
way religion brings morality into operation and regulates it and 
supplies it with a goal.
After discussing the function of feeling, attention was then 
diverted to the role of reason in developing the religious conscious- 
ness. It was pointed out how reason is a want or urge of the human 
mind quite as much as feeling is. Man, by a necessity of his nature 
is under an urge or compulsion to give a reason for the faith that 
is in him, and thereby justify the reasonableness of his feelings, 
thoughts, and actions to himself and to others. Emphasis was also 
laid on the fact that reason never operates in isolation, but only 
in conjunction with the other two elements in mind. There is a 
conative element also in reason though it may not always be so ob- 
vious, but the feeling element is obvious because one of the favourite 
working conceptions of philosophic thinkers nowadays is that of 
"value" or more fully "feeling-value", a term which explicitly in- 
dicates the two elements in cognition, namely, the feeling or inter- 
est or meaning element alongside of the reason or .judgment element; 
and on our theory there is bound to be aconative element also, as is 
suggested by the ideo-motor theory of action of some philosophers. 
Thus feeling or interest is shown to be regulative of reason. It 
is also regulative of all processes of attention which are the raw 
material of reason. It is, moreover, the fundamental principle of 
all effective education which is largely a work of supplying reasons, 
and reasons cannot be supplied or retained without interest.
From this point our discussion took the form of a consideration 
of the traditional rational so-called proofs that have been put for- 
ward to prove the existence of God, the proofs known as the Theistic 
Proofs /
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Proofs or Arguments. It was shown that two fundamental mistakes 
were made with regard to these proofs. The first mistake was that 
these proofs were for so long taken as logical proofs ana great 
pains ?/ere taken to prove that no valid, conclusion coula be deduced 
from any of them because the conclusion was made to contain more 
than the premises. And so Kant taking them as a piece of logical 
reasoning refuted them by means of logic and so the proofs were dis- 
carded largely on his authority. But logic is not the only test 
that is applicable to this case, and it would be better to discard 
the word proof which suggests logic, and use the word argument which 
implies evidence, as these so-called proofs are of the nature of 
evidence each supplying its own contribution.
The second mistake was in dealing with these proofs in isolation 
as if each could yield independent proof. In spite, however, of 
Kant's isolation of the Moral Argument in order to find in it the 
absolute certainty of duty, we maintain that no one of the arguments 
can be taken by itself, and that no one af them can by itself yield 
ultimate certainty. Their significance lies in the fact that they 
fora one whole, and support and supplement one another, and the three 
together yield cumulative evidence that is still, in spite of Kant, 
of the greatest value possible, and of infinitely greater value than 
the Moral Argument taken alone. The three taken together are in 
fact the only evidence we have of the truth of religion apart from 
the revelation in Christ.
It is now necessary to prove this statement by referring to the 
Arguments themselves. The Arguments may be classified into three
groups, the first group comprising the Cosmological and Teleological 
Arguments, the second, the Moral and Historical Arguments, and the
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third, the Ontological Argument. These three groups deal with the 
whole of existent reality between them, as follows: the Cosmologica] 
and Teleological deal with physical reality, the Moral and Historical 
with ethical reality, and the Ontological with religious reality. 
The significance of these Arguments is simply this that they sum- 
marise man's thoughts about these three ultimate phases of reality, 
by the contemplation of which the human mind ever rises to the 
thought of God, whose existence is alone sufficient to explain the 
presence of these three phases of reality.
This movement of thought from the three phases of reality to 
God may be illustrated by a very brief consideration of the nature 
of the three Arguments. Firstly, with regard to the first group 
the Cosmological and the Teleological which as we saw imply one 
another, it is indisputable that the causation and purpose which 
they imply are our first tutors to take us the first stage forward 
towards morality, and hence towards religion. Without experience 
of cause and effect and of teleology or purpose we should have no 
appreciation of moral law, the essential conception of w&ich is pur- 
pose or end. Morality does not begin until teleology, purpose, end 
or good is conceived by mind in some shape or form.
It will toe objected that the sense of duty or the moral instinct 
is present in us innately. The reply, however, is that the phy- 
sical universe is prior to living beings who came into existence ., 
upon it, and the nature of the physical universe had a*great deal 
to do with the-^shaping of the instincts including the moral instinct, 
and this is believable because nature expresses the mind of God as 
far/
far as it is expressible through the medium of physical reality.
It is therefore, futile to dismiss the evidence from nature by 
mere logic, and regard it as of no value for proof, while all our 
certainty is supposed to come from the moral Sphere. The evidence 
from nature has its own importance, and the evidence is gaining in 
prestige day by day. Nowadays, for instance, scientists are speaking 
of living atoms and a living universe, and some do not even hesitate 
to use the terra spiritual of these same realities, so that the rap- 
prochement between science and religion is closer than ever before. 
The evidence, therefore, of a spiritual cause of the universe is 
increasing im strength, out there is no such thing as an absolute 
logical proof or certainty of the existence of God as first cause 
from this or from any of the arguments; nor need the absence of 
such an absolute proof be regretted, because the God, who could be 
proved by logical demonstration, would very likely not meet our 
religious needs.
Secondly, the itforal and Historical arguments in the same way 
yield their own contribution of evidence in their own characteristic 
way, but this argument also, in spite of Kant and Kantians, does not 
yield absolute certainty, as we shall see later. The evidence from 
this proof, however, is of the greatest importance and supplements 
that yielded by the first group. The Moral Argument points to the 
ultimate cause of the universe being a Good Will.
Then, thirdly, the Ontological Argument is a form of reasoning 
which originates in the human mind as a result of its dissatisfaction 
with the finiteness or imperfection of all things physical and moral 
which it experiences in the life process. The vastness, complexity 
mystery/
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mystery of the universe compels man to postulate God as first cause 
and sufficient explanation. In the same way the moral life with 
its mystery of good and evil, success and failure compels man to 
postulate a supreme Being, perfect in all moral attributes from 
whom moral nature emanates and in whom moral values are conserved. 
In this way physical reality and moral reality lead to the thought 
of religious reality or God. Thus the Ontologlcal Argument is the 
religious argument par excellence. It argues that if experience of 
physical nature and of moral nature compel man to postulate God, 
then, there is strong evidence that these phases of reality are ex- 
pressions of his mind in different forms and that, therefore, God 
exists and His essential nature may be known from physical ethical 
and religious nature as it exists in the world. The argument is 
the expression of a feeling of need - the need for God to explain 
existence.
We now come more particularly to Kant's preferential treatment 
of the Moral Argument. The sense of duty in man was an insuperable 
and self-evident argument to Kant that the Supreme Good must exist. 
This sense of duty formed the keystone of his philosophy, and he 
found in it the ultimate authority for the moral life, as well as 
for religion. The other proofs Kant refuted logically, and there- 
after he had no further use for them because he came to find in the 
Moral Argument all the certainty he wanted both for morality and 
for religion.
In criticism of this partiality of Kant towards one of the 
traditional proofs and his rejection of the others as valueless it 
may/
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may be remarked that it will seem strange in the light of what we 
have said above of the mutual relation between the three arguments 
that one of the arguments should be found so valid, ana that the 
others which formed one unity with it should have no validity what- 
soever. One of the reasons was that Kant's test of validity was 
a logical one, and the only one that passed muster was the Moral 
Argument, while the others fell out. And it passed muster because 
it fell readily into a succinct form like the Cartesian formula 
which owed not a little of its popularity to its succinctness and 
intelligibility. We maintain, however, that the Arguments are to 
be taken together because they refer to the three ultimate phases of 
reality. The arguments thus form a hierarchy culminating in the 
religious. The three are related to one another like three logical 
steps in one argument, and no one of these steps can be omitted 
without invalidating that argument. Moreover, these three Irredu- 
cible phases of reality are the means of developing the three 
Irreducible elements in man's spiritual nature, namely, feeling, 
knowing, and willing. The existence'of physical reality compels 
a man to know, the existence of a moral reality somewhere in the 
nature of the universe compels him to distinguish between good and 
evil, and the existence of a religious reality compels him to seek 
God. It is strange, therefore, if the nature of reality is such 
that absolute certainty was to be found in one of these spheres, 
and no certainty from either of the other two. We maintain however 
that the certainties that can be derived from these three spheres 
of/
of reality also form a hierarchy, each one making the next higher 
possible.
As was said above, causation ana teleology prepares the mina 
for the conception of purpose anJ. end which is the foundation of the 
conception of the moral consciousness. "Thou must" of the moral 
law would have no force for the individual, unless it was felt by 
the individual to serve an end or purpose for him. And, finally, 
without experience of the moral law man would never feel any need 
for religion. Thus it seems quite arbitrary to fix upon the moral 
law and affirm that it is the only source of certainty. The "ought" 
of the moral law, it is here maintained, is not more insistent than 
the "ought" of religion "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God". The 
proof of this, and that a very ample one, is the spectacle of reli-
a
gious devotion from the first dawning of human intelligence down to 
the religious condition of man at the present day. Had there been 
no religious imperative or compulsion there would be no spectacle of 
religious devotion. And further, we maintain that the religious 
sphere is higher than the moral sphere, and that it lends to morality 
all the sanction it possesses, and not vice versa as Kant maintained. 
Having arrived at this position we shall now proceed to prove it. 
?rom what we have said, it has been already made clear that 
there can be no attention except through interest. Therefore, there 
can be no "absolute" moral command. The individual would pay abso- 
lutely no attention to an absolute imperative, unless he saw that it 
was good for him. And the good for the individual is never absolute* 
it is determined partly by the moral ideas of the society around him, 
partly by his own individual idiosyncrasies, and partly even by his 
physical/
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physical nature. When it comes to be recognised that the moral 
imperative contains a personal equation depending on the degree of 
enlightenment of the conscience or moral ideal of the individual, 
then doubt creeps in as to its absoluteness.
There are, ofcourse, certain commands that are obvious like 
most of the Ten Commandments, but there are a great many cases in 
which the categorical imperative fails to inform us. Take the 
case of a preacher who has conducted Divine Service. After it is
*>
over he feels that he ought to have prepared his sermon better, 
been more earnest, been more simple, and ought to have presented the 
Gospel better. In such'cases the categorical imperative cannot 
inform us what to do; what degree of earnestness, for example, is 
right or what degree is wrong.
Then, again, and more serious still, when we question the moral 
imperative, it fails to tell us why we should perform it at all, or 
why we are here at all to perform it. There are these doubts re- 
garding the moral law all the time hanging about on the periphery of 
consciousness, and often invading its centre, and paralysing moral 
effort, producing the sense of doubt and uncertainty. Moreover 
there is the consciousness of failure, failure not only in the less 
clear cases, but also in the case of the clearest deliverances of 
consciousness. Ana the failure is felt to be aue to sheer lack of 
inspiration to perform the duty. So that as a result of the oper- 
tion of the moral law, man does not as Kant imagined, find himself 
on the only solid ground there is, but on the contrary he feels him- 
self/
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himself sinking deeper and deeper in debt to the moral law. He 
is tortured with his past failure ana future inability to fulfil all 
the commandments of the law perfectly, as he knows he ought to per- 
form them.
It is this dissatisfaction with the moral law that creates in 
man the need for religion or for some "way" in which this problem 
of fallure^of imperfect obedience to the moral law,can be solved. 
This, we saw, is the truth implied in the Ontological Argument, a 
dissatisfaction with the physical universe and the moral lav/, 
so that the human niina feeling the inability of the law to give 
satisfaction is compelled to postulate a higher phase of reality in 
which satisfaction for its moral nature may be found. This higher 
phase of reality man conceives of as a Spiritual Being who is Infi- 
nite in all the perfections - perfections in which man himself has 
failed. Friendship or fellowship with such a person it is felt, 
would provide an inspiration and guarantee that life was worth living 
and immortal life as well. The existence of such a Being is the 
only hope in sight of ever attaining to that perfection of the moral 
life for which man strives and longs. It is when faith in this 
possibiltiy comes that religious conversion takes place, ana the man 
who was formerly a legalist becomes a man of faith.
This is why Jesus offered Himself as the Way, the Truth, ana 
the Life. The Truth and the Life can never reach their goal except 
through the Way. Kant on the contrary maintains that the human mind 
comes to rest in the "ought" of morality as the anchor of the soul. 
That/
That the individual must obey the ought is the only thing in the 
universe he is sure of. But we are seeing that this theory is un- 
tenable. The ought of morality could give satisfaction only if we 
limit our duties to a defined number, as the Scribes and Pharisees 
did, but this is not morality, but mere legalism, so that legalism 
and self-righteousness is the only possible outcome of Kant's theory,
4
but despair of the moral law, the sense of the need of forgiveness, 
and the desire to have complete fellowship with the Forgiver, is the 
essence of religion. This forgiveness aims at purity of heart, a 
condition which involves the complete fulfilment of the moral law. 
Thus the moral law finds its inspiration as well as its goal in 
religion and not vice versa as Kant affirmed.
The point that has been reached, so far, is this, that there are 
three phases of reality, namely, physical reality, ethical reality, 
and religious reality. The Theistlc Proofs were the traditional 
froms in which thinkers endeavoured to make deductions from these 
three realities. The modern scientific methods ana the psycholo- 
gical historical methods being unknown logic was the only critical 
instrument and, being Inadequate to deal with all aspects of reality, 
it could not make any valid deductions about these realities much 
less make them into any proof of the divine re ility. According to 
our"theory, then, we dispute Kant's right to seek for all his cer- 
tainty in one sphere only, namely the moral , and derive therefrom 
his only certainty for religion also.
Human certainty, however, is not an absolute thing, cut progres- 
sive/
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progressive, and it begins in contact with physical reality. The 
certainty derived from nature is the foundation of ethical certain- 
ty, and their combination serves to form a higher certainty than 
either of them could be in isolation. The certainty derived from 
contact with nature and from the moral life, again, forms the con- 
dition of religious certainty. Each form of certainty in kind is 
different from the other, and they form a hierarchy, religious cer- 
tainty teing the highest because it deals with the highest and most 
inclusive reality of all. Whatever certainty we have,therefore, is 
derived from all three spheres, and not from one only as Kant main- 
tains, namely, the ethical., From this absolute ethical certainty he 
deduced our certainty in religion, but the certainty that we have is 
not an absolute one, for absolute certainty, as applied to morality 
and religion, no one can ever define. What we have is a degree of 
certainty adequate to our needs as human spiritual beings, namely 
the certainty of faith,which is advancing to more and more certainty
In accordance with our theory then, which posits three ultimate 
phases of reality corresponding to three ultimate phases of mind, we 
venture to emend what may be considered as Kant's confession of faith 
in his "Critique of the Practical Reason" where he says in accordance 
with his theory of a twofold reality: "Two things fill the mind with 
ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftsner and the more 
steadily we reflect on them; the starry heavens above and the moral 
law within". We would venture to emend it so as to make it say: 
"Three things fill the minu. with ever new and increasing admiration 
the/
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the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry 
heavens above, the moral law within, and man's quest for G-oa".
Lest it may seem sheer arrogance to question the position of 
such an intellectual stalwart as Kant, it is desirable to enlist on 
our side another great mind, namely, Ernst Troeltsch who "was cut
off from the land of the living" before he had finished his life's
* 
work.
Troeltsch followed Kant in making a twofold division of mind 
into the theoretic and the practical. The theoretic dealt with 
physical reality and the practical with ethical - religious- aes- 
thetic reality. This uncritical acceptance by Troeltsch of Kant's 
twofold division is only part of the spell which the great philoso- 
pher has cast over so many of his successors; even those who de- 
parted from him in important respects retained much of the framework 
of his philosophy. Troeltsch moved away from Kant towards a more 
psychological and historical method. In this connection it may be 
here pointed out that it has been particularly difficult for Kantian
 
students to move out of this El Dorado of the categorical imperative 
out of which is mined the precious ore of not only morality but also 
of religion; it is difficult for them to go afield and prospect for 
some other explanation than the categorical imperative. Consequent- 
ly we find that Ritschlians and Kantians have very scant use for 
psychology; there is in*fact to them no other psychology worth talk- 
ing about except this certainty of the "oughtness" of duty which 
sufficiently explains for them the origin of consciousness, morality, 
and religion.
Ritschlian/
Ritschlian and Kantian theologians, therefore, lose a great 
deal by not exploring other ways of explaining the nature of mind 
as, for example, the explanation of the origin and nature of mind 
offered by the instinct and sentiment psychology, tae possibilities 
of which are so clearly adumbrated by Otto's effort, although he 
came short of complete success on account of the inadequacy of his 
method which failed to demonstrate the mutual relations between the 
religious sentiment; and moral ideals in the historical process.
The Instinct ana sentiment psychology, however, seem to us to 
be worthy of study as being a hopeful line of investigation of the 
moral and the religious consciousness. In spite of his faulty un- 
historical method Otto has thrown much fresh light on the nature of 
the religious consciousness, but how much more important the result
*
would have been had his method been more adequate I It is not assert- 
ed that direct proof can be attained as Otto hoped for, but at least
important fresh sidelights may be obtained of the origin and nature 
of the early beginnings and development of man's apprehension of 
divine things. And one of the important facts that will be founa is 
what we have been endeavouring to demonstrate in the course of our 
argument, namely, the regulative part played by feeling, and this 
part it plays right up to the end of life. A second result would 
be the witness of the feelings to objective reality from which the 
religious idea of God springs and the mutual influence of feeling and 
idea in furthering one another's development could be demonstrated
by/
by a study of these in the historic process. It was bec-iuse of the 
prospect that it offered of some fresh insight into the nature of 
the religious consciousness that we ventured to follow this line of 
study in this thesis. Only the fringe, however, of the subject 
has been touched here, because the field of religious history and 
experience is so vast. What such a study would yield would be not 
proofs but a new view-point. But then a new view-point might mean 
ever so much to religion.
This was the work that Troeltsch hoped to perform and in col- 
lecting his data he proposed to follow the American school of reli- 
gious experience of Jaraes f Starbuck, Leuba, and Coe, and, having 
collated all possible facts regarding the religious consciousness 
he then proposed to rationalise them in order to come to definite 
conclusions regarding religious experience. Otto's method of in- 
vestigating the religious consciousness was also by way of the in- 
stincts and sentiments, but Troeltsch's method was more hopeful 
because more historical, and, therefore more scientific.
Though Troeltech followed Kant theoretically in the twofold 
division of reality, as we have seen, he departed from him practi- 
cally in making the sphere of religion a sphere entirely by itself 
independent of morality. To Troeltsch it was incomprehensible that 
the apprehension of the Divine by the soul should depend upon, or be 
developed from, a rationalisation like the categorical imperative. 
He refused to admit that this alone could ever constitute the organ 
of religious insight, and maintained, in spite of the fact of his 
binary division, that religion had an independent sphere of its own. 
We/
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We have, therefore, Troeltseh's support as against Kant that there 
are three avenues of knowledge, and not two, and they correspond to 
the three realities of physical nature, moral nature, and the Divine 
nature. The most fundamental classification of reality, therefore, 
is into physical, ethical, and religious, and not physical, ethical, 
aesthetic, because the aesthetic is not separate, but underlies all
three; nature, ethics, and religion: either that or it ought to be
t
subsumed under religion to which it is most related, as the aesthetic- 
element is of the nature of worship, worship of perfection or the 
ideal like religion.
Troeltsch called the religious consciousness the religious a 
priori. This name, however, is objectionable in that it suggests 
something like a religious sense or faculty. His method, however, 
showed that he really meant the religious sentiment which could be 
studied historically; an a priori is timeless and cannot be studied 
historically, which was the delusion in Otto's mind. The term a 
priori should, therefore, be discarded and the study of the religious 
consciousness should be conducted historically from the point of view 
first of all of the three Irreducible states of consciousness, in 
order to show their different functions and effect upon one another. 
Then after this should proceed the investigation of the Instincts, 
whi6h witness to reality more objectively than a so-called a priori, 
and thereafter the sentiments should be studied in their historical 
development.
A few observations will suggest how such a line of study worked 
up into a "magnum opus1* would alter appreciably the centre of gravity 
in/
in religious teaching and practice.
For example, too much inthe past,religion has been announced to 
people for acceptance like Kant's categorical imperative, whether 
they wish it or not, the effect often being the creation of a counter 
suggestion. But a due understanding of the nature of feeling, inter 
est, or meaning, and of the fact that there cannot be any attention 
without interest would foster the conviction that there Is no use 
preaching religion unless first of all people feel that it is going 
to mean something to them, and is going to meet some need of theirs. 
Why people neglect or oppose religion is Just because they are not 
interested; they do not feel that it contains anything that is going 
to meet their need. Secondly, the function of cognition would dis- 
close the fact that there is an urge in mina. to know the rationale of 
religion - how and why religion works. This would make preaching 
more religious instead of ethical or social or aesthetic or politic d 
And thirdly, a proper realisation of the function of the will would 
reveal the necessity of service. Moreover the existence of social 
instincts would reveal that man is meant to be social and can only 
achieve his salvation by fulfilling his part as a member of society; 
he cannot enter heaven alone. Then also it would be seen that the 
instinct which is the basis of the social or the gregarious instinct 
is the parental instinct or the instinct of altruistic love, and it 
is this instinct that leads man to seek in G-od wnat he fails to find 
in man, namely, perfect fellowship. This fellowship with God is the 
only thing that can make a better social being. Each instinct has 
its/
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its own lesson, but space does not permit to go into them in details.
The fact, however, that these instincts indicate what kind of 
life we were intended for would come home with far greater impressive 
ness than religious authority or the categorical imperative, especi- 
ally to educated and scientific people. And lastly the sentiment 
which is a feeling or complex of feelings that gather round an ob- 
ject, and religion being a sentiment that gathers round the idea of 
God, reminds us of the important fact that feelings grow cola unless 
kept warm by practices of devotion, worship, and service. When 
religion fails, for instance, it fails for lack of sentiment or dry- 
ness.
These are the lessons that are being emphasised to-day, ana they 
are the facts that appeal to present day people. They are being em- 
phasised at all because they have filtered down from the above 
studies. More intensive study, it can easily be believed, would 
yield more information still that would be of immense practical 
value to religion. It is not suggested that these are new truths 
that we have not got in revelation already; what is suggested is 
that these new facts corroborate revelation, and are invaluable 
because of the scientific and critical temper of the age which is 
disinclined to authority.
Troeltschj as we saw, based the religious consciousness on a 
religious a priori on the analogy of Kant's imperative, and thus 
failed to supply proof of a separate avenue of religious knowledge, 
but his method was on a broader basis than the idea of a priori 
would suggest, and sooner or later his method would have delivered 
him/
him from the Kantian tradition by causing him to discard the idea 
of a priori in favour of the instinct ana sentinent.
So far we have essayed to. vindicate our views of consciousness 
and its corresponding objective reality as divisible into three parts 
as against Kant's binary division. In concluding our criticism of 
this topic it may be pointed out that Kant himself variea as to his 
estimate of the imperative. His characteristic position is that 
the imperative is absolute and can, therefore, be made the premise 
of a logical proof for the absoluteness of duty, for the evidence of 
G-od, and for immortality.
At other times the imperative is almost the opposite of this,
4
and contains a personal coefficient, and although it serves the prac- 
tical ends of life, yet it cannot form the ground of a metaphysical 
theory of life. At such times he asserts that there is a need and 
a compulsion in duty, but that it is voluntarily accepted. Or he 
describes it as something approaching the will-to-believe of William 
James. And strangest of all he makes the ultimate springs of con- 
duct issue from love, for he says that in the end we must have some- 
thing to love. But "practical value", "voluntary acceptance", the 
"will-to-believe", and "love" are all forms of feeling, interest, 
or meaning, so that Kant, after having already described the ultimate 
organ of certainty as a combination of reason and will(practical 
reason), is now evidently forced to acknowledge that feeling or 
interest also enters into our volitions.
The above four supplementary descriptions of will prove that 
Kant unknown to himself is compelled to acknowledge that the three 
phases of consciousness are occupied in every conscious process, and 
in/
in every conscious process we saw that feeling or interest is regu- 
lative. Duty is, therefore, not an order addressed to reason from 
a transcendental sphere, but is the effort of tie individual to 
satisfy his instinctive one characteristic needs.
In the same way Kant having divorced feeling or interest from 
duty in this life has to supply the defect by a "deus ex-machina" 
who will in the next life dole out by instalments the happiness 
missed in this life. We close this criticism of Kant, then, by 
observing that any theory like Kant's that explains the metaphysics oj 
mind by ignoring the regulative function of feeling is bound to come 
to contradictions, as we have been seeing ill along.
In order to further vindicate our theme we shall now briefly 
consider two topics of the theology of Albert Ritschl which have a 
bearing on our present discussion: the first is his division of 
reality into two classes, and the second is his derivation of ultit 
mate religious certainty from morality. This was the Kantian 
schema but in Ritschl's case the provenance was different, and so Its 
consideration will further vindicate our theory.
The fundamental conception of Ritschl for explaining the nature 
of consciousness was lvalue", and value, we may observe here by the 
way, can be recognised as of the same category as feeling, interest, 
or meaning, so that his discovery was the discovery of the primary 
place of feeling in any ultimate metaphysical explanation of mind. 
The term value was prepared for Ritschl by Hermann Lotze who 
followed Kant in dividing all reality into two divisions of physical 
nature/
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nature and spiritual nature, but Lotze called, the two divisions 
"fact" and "value". Lotze also followed Kant in finaing in duty 
the ultimate source of certainty. But this certainty was not like 
Kant's an absolute one, but was decided by the feeling or interest 
or meaning which duty had for the personality. And this value 
yielded a certainty of its own kind which was as final and absolute 
for the total personality as logical truth was for the reason.
The discovery of feeling, interest, meaning, or value as an 
ultimate metaphysical explanation which is the theme of this essay, 
was a great advance in the history of thought. The doctrine was 
first given to the world by Pichte in the form of the doctrine of 
interest whereby he demonstrated that thinking must begin, not from 
external reality, but from the nature and constitution of conscious- 
ness and its interests.
Lotze took up the idea of the interests of the self as the 
starting point of philosophy, and pursued the subject under the form 
of the relation of value to reality. He essayed to pass over from 
value to reality, but found it difficult. Here Ritschl came in and 
solved the difficulty. Ritschl took up the idea of value and, while 
retaining Kant's division of reality into two departments, Ritschl 
endeavoured to reconcile these two.
To Kant, as we saw, reality was divisible into two parts, namely 
nature or facts or scientific knowledge on the one hand, and spirit- 
ual realities on the other. His"Critique of Pure Reason" dealt with 
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the first of these and his "Critique of the Practical Reason11 with 
the second. The object of his division was in order to distinguish 
as clearly as possible between these two domains in oraer to show the 
independence of morality and religion, of science. The stu-iy of the 
natural sciences led to materialism and scepticism, but Kant showed 
that investigation of the laws of nature can never affect the found- 
ations of faith* The sciences deal with fact, but philosophy with 
worth. Science cannot tell the worth of things. The thing of 
supreme worth is the good will. We can only know nature as pheno- 
mena, not the real essence, but in regard to duty we know it abso- 
lutely. It is the only thing we are certain of. Kant thus showed 
the independence of morality and religion of the claims of science 
which offered a Natural Theology based on science and independent 
of Revelation. Kant thus, in the Interests of morality ana. religion 
made a breach between these two phases of reality which he failed to 
reconcile. Lotze attempted to reconcile them under the form of fact 
and value, but failed to make any effective reconciliation.
Ritschl was successful in effecting a reconciliation between 
fact and value but failed on the other hand to accord to religion an 
autonomous sphere in his classification. Ritschl reconciled fact 
and value by recognising thnt nothing theoretic or practical can 
obtain the attention of consciousnesc unless it possesses value for 
the individual. Thus scientific facts have Interest or value for 
consciousness as well as moral and religious realities. Accordingly 
Ritschl divides all values into two classes: scientific facts he in- 
cluded/
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included under the rubric of concomitant values, ana spiritual facts 
under independent values.
The twofold division into concomitant and independent values, 
however, does not seem to us to be adequate to the problem in hand. 
We, therefore, venture to differ from Ritschl's classification. 
Our reason for doing so is this, that our theory requires a three- 
fold division of values into physical, ethical, and religious values. 
No two of these can be combined together without doing violence to 
either, because all three realities are essentially aifferent and 
irreducible to one another like the three irreducible states of con- 
sciousness. So that we have to recognise not two but three phases 
of reality.
Our second criticism of Ritschl bears on his affirmation follow- 
ing the Kantian tradition, that the ultimate certainty in religion is 
derived from the sphere of morality. This position is inconsistent 
with Ritschl's fundamental tenet which is that the starting point of 
religion is the consciousness of the need of the forgiveness of sins.
But this forgiveness surely, implies that the most certain fact 
for the forgiven person is not the categorical imperative but the 
existence of Jeity who forgives the sins, and having discovered this 
supreme fact, which he embraces by faith, the subject is now in 
possession of a new kind of certainty which infinitely transcends 
in quality and range any certainty that he may have had of the cate- 
gorical imperative. As a matter of fact, as we endeavoured to show 
already/
already, it was his dissatisfaction with the moral law that started 
the individual out on the quest for God. Right and wrong, we saw, 
might be perfectly clear in a great many cases, but in a great many 
cases also the decision was not so clear. Over and above that there 
was failure to follow the right even in the clear cases, and also 
there was the deep down questioning as to why right was right and 
wrong was wrong. But, once the individual acquires certainty of 
God and the forgiveness of sins, the moral law appears to him in a 
new light Invested with a new sanctity as the expression of the mind 
of God. This certainty the i laivldual now feels he must keep firm 
hold of by establishing a relationship or fellowship or communion 
with God, because his belief in forgiveness means that he has taken 
God for a real existent person.
This was our reason for inserting the last chapter on the nature 
of communion with God, because, as we set out to prove in the begin- 
ning of our thesis, religion is the quest for God, and communion or 
fellowship with God is the goal of religion. In that chapter object 
ion was made to exponents of mysticism who implied in their exposition 
that this communion was only possible for those who possessed a 
special psychic gift, thus divorcing the moral life from the insight 
obtained through religion. In spite, however, of this initial mis- 
take in the exposition of most writers on mysticism, they nevertheless 
take great pains to show that, after the initial illumination, progress 
in the divine life depends on the effort of the will to maintain a 
good life. But this effort of the will is rendered infinitely 
easier/
easier because it now has received the sanction and inspiration de- 
rived from the vision of God. Quietists, Antinomians f and Pantheists 
there are among them, "but the exception only proves the rule. Thus 
morality derives its sanction and inspiration from religion and finds 
its goal in religion and not vice versa as*Kantians maintain and 
Ritschlians in as far as they are under the dominance of the Kantian 
tradition.
In the hands of such Kantians, religion becomes a mere appendix 
to religion; all they need to know is what the duty is and straight 
way like the sons of Zebedee they are ready to say "We are able". 
To such Kantians the unfolding of the moral life itself reveals God; 
every moral life lived is a further revelation of God, and adds cer- 
tainty to the certainty alreaay obtained; and when they come to 
consider Christ they regard him according to Kant's doctrine, as only 
one more instance of what they have seen in themselves in the cate- 
gorical imperative, and in countless other human lives around them. 
Christ is admitted to be the supreme example of moral victory, and 
is so much the more inspiring and helpful, but there is nothing new 
in Christ but what was seen in many lives before. Every age possess- 
es a high-priest of this doctrine from the Stoics to Kant, from Kant 
to Emerson, and from Emerson to the present day.
On this theory one can hardly see what the necessity of the 
revelation of God in Christ can be; one canndt see why, instead of 
Christ, God did not arrange to send some great ethical teacher, a 
Socrates for each successive generation. This is the logical out- 
come of Kant's doctrine, and Kantians reduce it to a veritable 
"reductio/
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"reductio ad absurdum", and the more it is polished and elaborated 
the more crude the doctrine "becomes. The revelation in Christ is 
hardly required. Man sees God in his own will. "In the soul let 
redemption be sought", said Emerson. So the Kantian looks inside 
at his own will and fancies he sees God, but what he actually sees 
is only his own Kantian self. And so glued is the Kantian to his 
Idol of duty that he is prepared to sacrifice anything to it, even 
the divinity of Christ, and we would be inclined to leave him alone 
except for the incalculable harm that this doctrine can do and is 
doing in reducing religion to legalism. It is true that every hu- 
man life is a revelation of God in its own degree, but the degree of 
light contributed by one life or all combined is not sufficient for 
human needs. After man has seen all human example, it only makes 
him cry out in despair for God.
Kantians, however, have an objection, namely, that such knowledge 
of God as mystics and others profess to obtain is not demonstrable, 
and, therefore useless, because it cannot be made use of in any 
philosophical theory. We shall come to this point a little later. 
Meantime it is enough to say that this question depends on what kind 
of demonstration is expected, anj. finally it rnu.st be admitted, that no 
demonstration of any kind of the ultimate reality in religion could 
possibly convince a person without faith. Besides there is nothing 
worth while in the universe that can be proved. ' One, however, feels
»
that Kant and many of his followers had more religious faith than 
their doctrine permittee them to express, but the doctrine has to 
be/
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be condemned because of the prestige of its author, and the spell he 
has cast over his followers whose doctrines permeate down to the 
masses, and strike at the root of belief in supernatural revelation, 
or such facts as religious conversion and communion, both of which 
yield certainty far beyond that afforded by the moral conscience. 
These latter facts have a very slight hold nowadays on account of 
this Kantian philosophy of the subordination of religion to morality.
Though Ritschl followed Kant in thus deriving ultimate certainty 
from the moral consciousness, his fame rests on something else, name- 
ly on the emphasis he laid in contradiction to Kant and Kantians on 
the uniqueness of the revelation of God in Christ, and the way it 
meets the religious needs of man. Wilhelm Herrmann developed the 
teaching of Ritschl. Starting from the origin of religious need as 
originating not in the sense of duty, but in the sense of moral 
failure, he shows how the revelation of God in Christ meets that 
need. Herrmann opposes mysticism because Christ alone has the 
value of God for man, and we can find Gou. nowhere else except in 
Christ. Communion with God cannot, therefore, take place except 
through Christ, the "way". Mystics on the other hand leave Christ 
and run off to have fellowship with some other God or Absolute.
Thus Ritschl and Herrmann are poles apart from Kant in their 
estimate of Christ and Revelation, but the defect in their theology 
is their neglect of metaphysical explanation. This want of a meta- 
physical system leads them to affirm metaphysically one thing one 
time and its opposite the next. For example they assert the cate- 
gorical/
412.
categorical imperative at one time and Christ at another to be the 
ultimate authority in the Christian religion. They take refuge 
in positive authority which they "believe to be above logic and meta- 
physics. But Metaphysical explanation is an urge of the human mind, 
and its neglect cannot but result in confusion and obscurity. When 
the metaphysics is wrong the theory of religion foundea thereon is 
bound to be askew somewhere.
This derivation of certainty from the ethical sphere alone, is, 
therefore misleading, not so much in the hands of Ritschlian as in 
the hands of Kantian theologians. We have, therefore, to acknow- 
ledge what is the theme of this thesis that there are three avenues 
of knowledge, the physical, the ethical, and the religious, 
and not two only, and these three sources supplement one another, so 
that ultimate certainty can only be obtained when we have reached 
the highest of the three. Cointe divided reality into religion, 
metaphysics and science. Religion was myth and therefore lowest in 
the scale. Metaphysics was speculation, but science was the highest 
certainty of all and any real metaphysic of religion had to be de- 
rived from science. This however is a faulty classification invent- 
ed for a polemical purpose because the second order of reality is 
not metaphysics but ethics,and ethics is not speculation.
We shall proceed to draw this thesis to a close, then, by again 
asking the question: "Is there a religious sense or instinct or 
sentiment/
sentiment or awareness as distinct from the ethical variety of 
these? This is the question we have been answering all along, but we 
ask it again by way of summing uptjsar answer in more or less logical 
form as Kantians will demand a logical statement that can be used in 
a philosophical theory of religion.
All the steps of our reasoning from the beginning of this essay 
until now have been preparing us for the answer. Our argument may 
be put as follows: We have seen that there are three phases of 
reality:- the physical, the ethical, and the religious. Each of 
these is apprehended in its own peculiar, characteristic way. For 
example: reason is more occupied than the rest of mind in investi- 
gating the laws of nature, the will is more involved in the esti- 
mation of ethical matters, and feeling or interest, which witnesses 
to what we need, is the phase of mind that leads us on to religion. 
None of these mental phases exists in isolation, and all three phases 
enter into each mental process.
If, therefore, we can speak of a physical sense or sensation, 
a physical instinct, a physical sentiment or a physical awareness, 
and, if we can speak of an ethical sense, instinct, sentiment, or 
awareness,then, according to our line of reasoning, there is no 
reason why we should not speak of a religious sense, instinct, senti- 
ment or awareness, these terms indicating the form of knowledge in 
each case in its different stages from its most rudimentary stage to 
its complete form, the sense becoming an instinct, the instinct a 
sentiment/
sentiment, and the sentiment knowledge. If then, it is wrong to 
use these terms in the sphere of religion, we maintain that it is 
equally wrong to use them in the other two spheres. But what our 
investigation has taught us is this, that just as there are five 
senses with which we experience physical reality, so there are more 
than one instinct or one sentiment going to form our ethical appre- 
ciation, and likewise more than one instinct or one sentiment com- 
bining to give us religious knowledge, as we have seen already. So 
that our answer is that there is a separate avenue of knowledge for 
religion, religion being in its origin a felt need for fellowship 
with the Divine Being and in its development and goal a realisation 
of that fellowship. It is the same total personality and not "one 
compartment of it which is involved in religion as well as in phy- 
sical and ethical experience, but the sentiments or values vary in 
each case giving physical, ethical, and religious values respective^ 
Our second question is: "What is the nature of the knowledge of 
God which comes through this avenue"? The answer to this is admitted 
ly difficult. Kantians would say that no clear affirmation can be 
made of any demonstrable knowledge derived from this quarter, and, 
therefore, they say that the only definite knowledge we have is of 
the ethical, which knowledge is expressible in the word "duty". 
Mechanistic and Behavourist psychologists on the other hand, would 
say that the feelings of the mystics of ineffableness, unification of 
consciousness, nearness of the presence of God, power and expansive- 
ness, and ecstasy can all be produced by drugs. But the question 
depends/
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depends on what kind of proof or statement is possible or adequate 
to the case of religion. One suspects that what Kantians would 
like is a logical formula like "duty", and what the Behavourist would 
like is a photographic representation.
Religion as we saw in its origin ana essence, belongs more to 
the sphere of feeling like aesthetics, and the beautiful is very 
difficult to describe, as are all feelings. Yet religious feelings 
are as susceptible of description as -noral or aesthetic feelings, as 
Otto has conclusively proved.
But not even this way can we get a complete answer. A more 
satisfactory answer is to be got by observing what religion does. 
Drugs may in their effect simulate the experience of the mystics of 
G-od, but the effect of drugs is degeneration, while the effect of 
the vision of G-od is integration of personality and permanent, not 
temporary unification of character, leading to a higher potency of 
of spiritual life. And the element in the vision of God which 
achieves this result is the experience of God as Love.
The question, however, will be asked as to how we know that it 
is the love of God we are experiencing. The addict, Professor Leuba 
tells us, thinks that he feels the love of God around him while in 
his stupor. This is true; but his is a delusion whlfch he knows 
himself to be a delusion when he wakens. Not so, however, is the 
case with regard to communion with God. So that, when the Kantian 
challenges the mystic to produce as a result of his experience of 
communion with God a body of demonstrable verifiable information 
comparable to that derivable from the categorical imperative, the 
mystic/
mystic can reply that he has such a body of information, namely, 
that "God is love".
All prophets,saints, ana mystics witness to the fact that they 
have felt the presence of God as a Goo. of love, anj. the proof of 
their affirmation is that this self-revelation of God satisfied their 
need, and energised their lives, and raised them to an infinitely 
higher potency than before. Now the reason for this satisfaction is 
not mere delusion, as Professor LeuLa maintains, but the fact that 
love is the richest most comprehensive reality in the world, and, 
therefore, the most illuminating self-revelatory, and satisfying. 
It is the very essence of the divine nature as well as of human 
nature; and, when Goo. is experienced as Love, then as complete a 
knowledge of God is obtained as is possible for finite beings. So 
that, if we ask the mystic what information he can give about God 
from his mystic experience, what he can tell is that God is love; 
if we ask the moral philosopher, he will say that God is moral law; 
and if we ask the scientist he will say God is physical law. Thus 
each of these is a form of certainty peculiar to its own sphere and 
entitled to be recognised as such, and they supplement one another, 
for God is love because He is law, and law because He is love. 
Thus the mystic need not be afraid of the challenge of the Kantian - 
there is direct experience and knowledge of God and demonstrable 
information derivable from communion, as definite as that obtainable 
from nature or from the categorical imperative. We do not admit 
therefore that as the Kantian asserts,morality is everything and 
religion only a number of improvable assumptions addea to morality. 
As/
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As Cyril Hepher says: ("Fellowship of Silence", London, 1915) "v'~e 
knew God, and we knew that we knew Him. If this sound too bold a 
claim to make, my excuse must be that to say less would be to be- 
little the generosity of God".
* 
Now with regard to the question of certainty we observe that
from religion we derive a certainty of its own, but it is not ab- 
solute certainty , any more than the certainty we derive from ethics 
is an absolute certainty, or the certainty we derive from nature is 
an absolute certainty. This absolute certainty, which is so glibly 
talked about, nobody can define, much, less possess. The utmost 
that human finite beings can possess is a degree of certainty which 
is adequate to their needs. An infinite being might possess abso- 
lute certainty, but human finite beings can never transcend faith, 
which is a degree of certainty which is adequate to human needs. 
The mystic says that he knows God in communion, The Kantian says that 
he knows right and wrong by his conscience, and Samuel Johnson, in 
spite of Berkeley, said that he knew physical reality by kicking a 
stone. All three have certainty of a different kind ana in a differ 
ent way and sufficient for their needs, and the glory of human nature 
consists in the fact that as the needs and experience grow,the cer- 
tainty grows apace and our conception of certainty itself becomes 
more adequate with experience. And the certainty is a real one 
because it undergoes a threefold test of feeling, knowing and willing 
which are ail positive in character, and aiding and abetting one 
another in every process.
In the event, then, of our possessing not absolute certainty, 
but/
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but only the certainty of faith, which is a certainty which is 
adequate to our needs, we may point out in conclusion that the 
evidence of the combined religious history of the race or the 
Historical Argument cannot be dispensed with. Kantians have 
scant appreciation for this argument, because according to their 
logic by looking Inside your own mind at the categorical imperative 
you obtain your authentic religious data as reliably, and much more 
so, than if you had all religious history before you; history 
or the revelation in Christ may add confirmation to the certainty 
of the imperative, but its evidence is mere supererogation. This 
however, we saw is founded on the myth of an absolute ethical and 
religious certainty, but we have prove! that such certainty does 
not exist, the certainty we have being that of faith, and, therefore 
the "e consensu gentium 1 ' or Historical Argument is still indispen- 
sable. This is why we have a Bible, and why Christ became incarnate 
and this also is why Troeltsch intended to examine all possible re- 
ligious history before pronouncing upon the certainty of religious 
knowledge.
But the historic method is not as easy in its application as is 
often imagined. For instance, many writers think that it is suf- 
ficient to collate all the history of movements, biographies, ana 
religious psychologies of individuals and that these when brought 
side by side will, as it were, of themselves begin to speak and dis- 
close their own nature. An example of this method is Professor 
Leuba/
4*9.
Professor Leuba as we have seen in a former chapter. His array of 
religious facts in his "Psychology of Religious Mysticism" is most 
imposing, but his interpretation of these facts is nothing short of 
grotesque. Mere compilation of religious data is an easy work, 
but their interpretation is a most difficult task. A huge monu- 
ment of facts will not disclose its own meaning, or speak of itself 
any more than the Sphinx can. It requires an interpreting mind, 
and one whose only qualification is that of a psychologist is not 
qualified for the task of interpretation; it requires the minu of 
a Troeltsch, and granting such a mina there would be sidelights and 
intimations forthcoming from the study,;of history regarding religion 
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